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A B S T R A C T
This  thesis  interrogates  the  absence  of  questions  of  race,  colonialism,  and  their 
contemporary legacies in the philosophical literature on global justice and cosmopolitan 
ethics. What are the ethical, political, and material consequences of these “unspeakable 
things unspoken”, and what would it mean for cosmopolitanism to take seriously the 
problem of  the  global  colour  line?  The  thesis  provides  a  tentative  answer  to  these 
questions through a close engagement with contemporary debates about the meaning 
and  purpose  of  international  solidarity.  It  demonstrates  that  critical  and  liberal 
approaches often help reproduce and legitimise, rather than challenge and transcend, the 
current unjust and unequal racialized global order. Drawing on Cedric Robinson and the 
literature on racial capitalism, it interrogates how solidarity can be decolonised and re-
conceived so as to better attend to the materiality of the global colour line.  Through a 
close  reading  of  the  European  migrant  crisis,  recent  forms  of  Black-Palestinian 
solidarity, and the ongoing struggle for decolonisation in South Africa, it  identifies an 
alternative  internationalist  imaginary that  grows out  of the  solidarities  forged in  the 
struggle against imperialism, patriarchy, and racial capitalism. This is a radicalised and 
decolonised emancipatory project which retrieves the idea of universal history and total 
critique, but does so without invoking Eurocentric ideas of progress and teleology. In an 
era of Trump, Brexit, and global fascist resurgence—where the “white working class” 
frequently is juxtaposed with “immigrants”, and identity politics blamed for the demise 
of the organised Left—such an internationalist vision is urgently needed.
What can I do?
One must begin somewhere.
Begin what?
The only thing in the world worth beginning:
The End of the world of course.
– Aimé Césaire
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
In Search of Solidarity
“The radical nationalist movements of our time in Africa and the African 
diaspora have come at an historical moment when substantial numbers of 
the world's Black peoples are under the threat of physical annihilation or 
the promise of prolonged and frightening debilitation. The famines which 
have  always  accompanied  the  capitalist  world-system's  penetration  of 
societies have  increased in  intensity  and frequency.  The appearance  of 
literally  millions  of  Black  refugees,  drifting  helplessly  beyond  the 
threshold of  human sensibility,  their  emaciated bodies feeding on their 
own tissues, have become commonplace. The systematic attack on radical 
Black polities, and the manipulation of venal political puppets are now 
routine  occurrences.  Where  Blacks  were  once  assured of  some sort  of 
minimal existence as a source of cheap labor, mass unemployment and 
conditions of housing and health which are of near-genocidal proportions 
obtain. The charades of neo-colonialism and race relations have worn thin. 
In the metropoles,  imprisonment, the stupor of drugs,  the use of lethal 
force  by  public  authorities  and  private  citizens,  and  the  more  petty 
humiliations of racial discrimination have become epidemic. And over the 
heads of all,  but most particularly those of the Third World,  hangs the 
discipline  of  massive  nuclear  force.  Not  one  day  passes  without 
confirmation of the availability  and the willingness to use force in the 
Third World. It is not the province of one people to be the solution or the 
problem. But a civilization maddened by its own perverse assumptions 
and contradictions is loose in the world. A Black radical tradition formed 
in opposition to that civilization and conscious of itself is one of part of 
the solution. Whether the other oppositions generated from within Western 
society and without will mature remains problematical. But for now we 
must be as one.”1
International Political Theory and the Global Colour Line
There is something ghost-like about these words with which Cedric Robinson 
concludes Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition. Written almost 
40 years ago, they seem to speak directly to our contemporary era of Trumpism, Brexit, 
mass drownings in the Mediterranean, racialized police brutality,  the global “war on 
terror”, environmental degradation, ongoing settler colonialism, neoliberal restructuring, 
and widening global inequality. The global colour line, which W.E.B. Du Bois famously 
described as  the  problem of  the  20th century,  still  casts  its  shadow over  the  world. 
Indeed, while formal colonial rule ended almost fifty years ago, colonial relations of 
1 Cedric J. Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition, 2 edition (Chapel 
Hill, N.C: University North Carolina Pr, 2000), 317–8.
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power  remain significant  in  a  number of ways: the world's  eight  richest billionaires 
currently have the same wealth as the poorest half of the world2; 1 out of 10 people live 
in  extreme  poverty;3 815  million  of  the  world's  population  are  chronically 
undernourished;4 10%  of  the  world's  population do  not  have  access  to  safe  and 
uncontaminated water;5 and 21 children die every minute from preventable causes.6 That 
there is something terribly wrong with this world—and that it is structured along lines 
of race—seems obvious: as clear today as it was in 1983, when Robinson completed 
Black Marxism. And yet, to many it is not.7 
In this thesis I interrogate the absence of questions of race, colonialism, and their 
contemporary legacies in the philosophical literature on global justice and cosmopolitan 
ethics.8  While there in recent years has been a post-  and decolonial  drive for more 
global,  non-Eurocentric  scholarship,9 the  fields  of  ethical  and  moral  inquiry  have 
2 Deborah Hardoon, “An Economy for the 99%: It’s Time to Build a Human Economy That Benefits 
Everyone, Not Just the Privileged Few,” Briefing Paper (Oxfam, 2017), https://policy-
practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/an-economy-for-the-99-its-time-to-build-a-human-economy-that-
benefits-everyone-620170.
3 See the World Poverty Clock, https://worldpoverty.io 
4 Statistics available at https://www.worldhunger.org/world-hunger-and-poverty-facts-and-statistics/ 
5 “Progress on Drinking Water, Sanitation and Hygiene: 2017 Update and Sustainable Development 
Goal Baselines” (United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), 
2017), https://www.unicef.org/publications/index_96611.html.
6 See https://www.unicef.org/mdg/childmortality.html 
7 In this thesis I approach race, not as a pre-political, biological characteristic, but a social construct  
brought into being by social, economic, and political forces. In Nicholas De Genova's apt formulation, 
“race is not a fact of nature, but a socio-political fact of domination.” Importantly, race thus conceived 
is not reducible to skin-colour (which is a marker of racism), but instead describes a relation of 
subordination drawn along the line of the human. See Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial  
Formation in the United States (Routledge, 2014); Nicholas De Genova, “The ‘migrant Crisis’ as 
Racial Crisis: Do Black Lives Matter in Europe?,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 0, no. 0 (August 21, 
2017): 6, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1361543. See also Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden 
Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California (University of California 
Press, 2007), 28.
8 Following Thomas Pogge, I refer to cosmopolitanism as both a political project and normative 
perspective. Thomas W. Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” Ethics 103, no. 1 (1992): 48–75. 
As Patrick Hayden explains, according to cosmopolitanism “international politics should focus first on 
the interests, rights or welfare of persons, wherever they may reside rather than on the interests of  
states as such.” Cosmopolitanism is thus “the articulation of a set of moral principles as well as a 
commitment to the establishment of political institutions that support those principles.” Patrick 
Hayden, “Cosmopolitanism Past and Present,” in The Ashgate Research Companion to Ethics and  
International Relations, ed. Patrick Hayden (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2009), 43–4.
9 Indicatively, see Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam, Race and Racism in  
International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line (Routledge, 2014); Gurminder K. 
Bhambra, Connected Sociologies (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014); John M. Hobson, The Eurocentric  
Conception of World Politics : Western International Theory, 1760-2010 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012); Branwen Gruffydd Jones, Decolonizing International Relations (Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2006); Meera Sabaratnam, Decolonising Intervention: International Statebuilding in  
Mozambique (Rowman & Littlefield International, 2017); Sanjay Seth, Postcolonial Theory and 
International Relations: A Critical Introduction (Routledge, 2013); Robert Vitalis, White World Order,  
Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations, The United States in the World 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015). See also the special issue in Millennium: Journal of  
International Studies on “Racialized Realities in World Politics”, vol. 45, no. 3.
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remained largely insulated from this critique. Race continues to be seen as a domestic 
issue or historical phenomenon and, thus, as something that is of little or no relevance 
for addressing questions of justice in 21st century world politics. This is despite the fact 
that 85% of the world, until not so long ago, was under some form of colonial control;  
as  decolonial  theorist  Anibal  Quijano  explains,  “if  we  observe  the  main  lines  of 
exploitation and social domination on a global scale, the main lines of world power 
today, and the distribution of resources and work among the world population, it is very 
clear that the large majority of the exploited, the dominated, the discriminated against, 
are precisely the members of the 'races', 'ethnies', or 'nations' into which the colonized 
populations, were categorized in the formative process of that world power, from the 
conquest of America and onward.”10 
These blind spots are not unique to the literature on cosmopolitanism and global  
ethics.  As Sankaran Krishna has shown, “the discipline of International Relations was 
and is predicated on a systematic politics of forgetting, a wilful amnesia, on the question 
of race.”11 In recent years scholars such as John Hobson, Branwen Jones, and Robert 
Vitalis  have  traced  the  discipline's  imperial  and  racialized  origins.  In  White  World  
Order, Black Power Politics Vitalis  documents how, at  the moment of its inception, 
“international relations meant race relations.”12 The original purpose of IR, he argues, 
was to help maintain and expand white supremacy; race wars, not inter-state conflict, 
was  what  occupied  the  first  IR  theorists.  In  an  effort  to  “white-out”  these  racial  
underpinnings,  contemporary IR has turned questions of race and colonialism into a 
“taboo.”13 Recent scholarship has described this as an “epistemology of ignorance”14; as 
10 Aníbal Quijano, “Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality,” Cultural Studies 21, no. 2–3 (March 1, 
2007): 168–9, https://doi.org/10.1080/09502380601164353 As Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, 
and Robbie Shilliam make clear, world order is still “constitutively... structured, re-structured and 
contested along lines of race.” Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam, 
“Confronting the Global Colour Line: An Introduction,” in Race and Racism in International  
Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line, ed. Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie 
Shilliam (Routledge, 2014), 7.
11 Sankaran Krishna, “Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations,” Alternatives:  
Global, Local, Political 26, no. 4 (2001): 401, https://doi.org/10.2307/40645028.
12 Vitalis, White World Order, Black Power Politics, 1.
13 Srdjan Vucetic, “Against Race Taboos: The Global Colour Line in Philosophical Discourse,” in Race 
and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line, ed. Alexander Anievas, 
Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam (Routledge, 2014). See also Robert Vitalis, “The Graceful and 
Generous Liberal Gesture: Making Racism Invisible in American International Relations,” 
Millennium 29, no. 2 (June 1, 2000): 331–56, https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298000290020701.
14 See the collection of essays in Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana, Race and Epistemologies of  
Ignorance (SUNY Press, 2007). See also Charles W. Mills, “Global White Ignorance,” in Routledge 
International Handbook of Ignorance Studies, ed. Matthias Gross and Linsey McGoey, 2015.
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a “calculated forgetting”15 or “norm against noticing”16 through which those with power 
and privilege tell themselves and others, not only that the world is  postcolonial  and 
postracial, but also that the long history of colonialism, racialized indentured servitude, 
indigenous genocide, and transatlantic slavery have left no traces in culture, language, 
and knowledge production. This is not a passive act of forgetting; rather, and as Manu 
Vimalassery, Juliana Hu Pegeus, and Aloysha Goldstein remind us, it is “aggressively 
made  and  reproduced,  affectively  invested  and  effectively  distributed  in  ways  that 
conform the social relations and economies of the here and now.”17
In this thesis I argue that these “unspeakable things unspoken”18 are particularly 
problematic for cosmopolitan political theory. How can a field which defines itself as a 
humanistic discourse on global justice and the moral dimensions of world politics have 
had so little to say about the racial ordering of the international? What has the absence 
of questions of race and colonialism made possible? And, crucially, what would it mean 
for cosmopolitanism to take seriously the problem of the global colour line? These are 
the questions that motivate this study.
Within “Shouting Distance” of Marxism: Racial Capitalism and the Colonial Question
The few attempts that have been made within the cosmopolitan literature to 
address  questions of  race  and colonialism have predominantly focused on historical 
responsibility and reparative justice. Charles Mills,  for example,  has argued that the 
overall framing of global justice needs to be self-consciously rethought to account for 
the crimes committed through racial slavery and colonial conquest. Reparative justice—
rather than ideal theory and distributive models of justice—is needed to address “the 
legacy of the unfair global racial structure, established by colonialism and imperialism, 
white settlement and African slavery, that tendentially privileges whites globally.”19 A 
similar  argument  is  made by Daniel  Butt  in Rectifying  International  Injustice.  Butt 
suggests  that  the  descendants  of  the  victims  of  past  forms  of  injustice—such  as 
15 Debra Thompson, “Through, Against, and Beyond the Racial State: The Transnational Stratum of 
Race,” in Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line, ed. 
Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam (Routledge, 2014), 45.
16 Vitalis, “The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture,” 333.
17 Manu Vimalassery, Juliana Hu Pegues, and Aloysha Goldstein, “On Colonial Unknowing,” Theory & 
Event 19, no. 4 (2016).
18 Toni Morrison, Unspeakable Things Unspoken: The Afro-American Presence in American Literature 
(University of Michigan, 1989).
19 Charles W. Mills, “Race and Global Justice,” in Domination and Global Political Justice: Conceptual,  
Historical, and Institutional Perspectives, ed. Barbara Buckinx, Jonathan Trejo-Mathys, and Timothy 
Waligore (Routledge, 2015), 198.
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transatlantic  slavery  and  other  forms  of  colonial  domination—are  entitled  to 
compensation.20 These interventions are not without merit; however, they construct the 
time of the “now” as separate and distinct from the “past.” By focusing on past wrongs, 
they thus treat the problem of the global colour line as a historical issue only.
In contrast to this literature, in this thesis I approach race and colonialism, not 
as discrete events that belong to the past, but as enduring forms of structural injustice.21 
Drawing on Cedric Robinson—with whose haunting words I  opened this chapter—I 
develop a materialist  conception of the global colour line.  As Robinson reminds us, 
capitalism  has  always  been  racial  capitalism.22 The  accumulation  of  capital  has 
historically operated through racial projects that assign differential value to human life 
and labour, such as chattel slavery, settler colonial dispossession, racialized indentured 
servitude, and exploitation of immigrant labour.  The history of capitalism began with 
the slave trade and not with the factory system; in fact, there was never such a thing as 
capitalism without slavery, and “the history of Manchester never happened without the 
history of Mississippi.”23 As Lisa Lowe explains,  the concept of racial capitalism thus 
captures  “that  capitalism  expands  not  through  rendering  all  labor,  resources,  and 
markets across the world identical,  but by precisely seizing upon colonial  divisions, 
20 Daniel Butt, Rectifying International Injustice: Principles of Compensation and Restitution Between  
Nations (OUP Oxford, 2009). See also Catherine Lu, “Colonialism as Structural Injustice: Historical 
Responsibility and Contemporary Redress*,” Journal of Political Philosophy 19, no. 3 (September 1, 
2011): 261–81, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2011.00403.x.
21 Structural injustice, as theorised by Iris Marion Young, refers to social processes that “put large 
categories of persons under a systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop 
and exercise their capacities, at the same time as these processes enable others to dominate or have a  
wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising their capacities.” Iris Marion Young, 
“Responsibility and Global Justice:A Social Connection Model,” in Justice and Global Politics:  
Volume 23, ed. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller Jr, and Jeffrey Paul (Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 114. Young's concept of structural injustice is similar to Johan Galtung's theorisations of 
structural violence, which refers to a de-personalized form of violence that is built into social  
arrangements. See Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research 
6, no. 3 (September 1, 1969): 167–91, https://doi.org/10.1177/002234336900600301.
22 Robinson, Black Marxism. See also Gilmore, Golden Gulag; Gaye Theresa Johnson and Alex Lubin, 
Futures of Black Radicalism (Verso Books, 2017); Robin D. G. Kelley, “What Did Cedric Robinson 
Mean by Racial Capitalism?,” Text, Boston Review, January 12, 2017, 
http://bostonreview.net/race/robin-d-g-kelley-what-did-cedric-robinson-mean-racial-capitalism; Lisa 
Lowe, The Intimacies of Four Continents (Duke University Press, 2015); Jodi Melamed, “Racial 
Capitalism,” Critical Ethnic Studies 1, no. 1 (2015): 76–85, 
https://doi.org/10.5749/jcritethnstud.1.1.0076; David Roediger, Class, Race and Marxism (Verso 
Books, 2017).
23 Walter Johnson, “To Remake the World: Slavery, Racial Capitalism, and Justice,” Text, Boston 
Review, October 19, 2016, https://bostonreview.net/race/walter-johnson-slavery-human-rights-racial-
capitalism. See also  Gilmore, Golden Gulag; Johnson and Lubin, Futures of Black Radicalism; 
Kelley, “What Did Cedric Robinson Mean by Racial Capitalism?”; Lowe, The Intimacies of Four  
Continents; Melamed, “Racial Capitalism”; Roediger, Class, Race and Marxism; Robin D. G. Kelley, 
“Introduction,” in Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition, by Cedric J. Robinson, 
2000.
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identifying particular regions for production and others for neglect, certain populations 
for exploitation and still others for disposal.”24 Race, then, is neither reducible to class, 
nor is it a separate form of oppression. Instead, capitalism relies upon the elaboration, 
reproduction, and exploitation of racial difference: on the invention of what Robinson 
calls “the universal Negro.” Capitalism is ultimately racial, not merely because people 
racialized as non-white are disproportionately impacted and disadvantaged by the “free” 
market,  although  this  is  true  as  well.25 More  fundamentally,  racial  differences  are 
constitutive  of  capitalism because  processes  of  capital  accumulation  are  themselves 
predicated on the devaluation of Black and other non-white people.  Hence the term 
racial capitalism.
To  read  the  global  colour  line  in  this  way—through  the  lens  of  historical 
materialism and political economy—is at once a critique of liberal scholarship that tends 
to  confine colonialism to a distant time and era,  as well as of  postcolonial approaches 
that often privilege cultural and intertextual analysis over and above the structural and 
the  material.  Before  the  emergence  and  consolidation  of  postcolonial  studies  as  an 
academic  field  in  the  1970s  and  80s,  anti-colonial  thinkers  and  revolutionaries 
predominantly framed their  struggle  against  racial  violence and colonial  domination 
through a Marxist lens. This relationship was never easy, as George Ciccariello-Maher 
has  shown,  because  orthodox  Marxism's  Eurocentrism,  historical  determinism,  and 
singular emphasis on the (white) proletariat as the revolutionary class of history often 
seemed out of touch with the struggles against racism and colonialism.26 Nonetheless, in 
confronting these limitations and blind spots, thinkers such Cedric Robinson—alongside 
W.E.B. Du Bois,  Aimé Césaire, Oliver Cromwell Cox, Angela Davis, Frantz Fanon, 
C.L.R. James, Claudia Jones, Huey Newton, and many others—pushed Marxist thinking 
in new and innovative directions that linked the critique of economic exploitation to the 
critique of racial-colonial oppression, at home and abroad. In the aftermath of the events 
of 1989 when, in Eduardo Galeano's striking phrase, we were all “invited to the world 
burial of socialism”,27 this focus on racial capitalism faded into the background. Where 
Black radicals and anti-colonial thinkers had turned to Marx and historical materialism, 
today's  postcolonial  theory  has  predominantly  come  to  rely  on  the  linguistic  and 
24 Lowe, The Intimacies of Four Continents.
25 For example, see Akwugo Emejulu and Leah Bassel, “Minority Women, Austerity and Activism,” 
Race & Class, October 2, 2015, https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396815595913.
26 George Ciccariello-Maher, Decolonizing Dialectics (Duke University Press, 2017).
27 Galeano, quoted in Crystal Bartolovich and Neil Lazarus, Marxism, Modernity and Postcolonial  
Studies (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 2.
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culturally inflected analysis of poststructuralism.  The result  has been a jettisoning of 
political economy, a failure to interrogate the ways in which race and colonialism are 
part  of  the  historical  unfolding  of  capitalism,  and  a  relative  detachment  from 
emancipatory politics; feeding a growing consensus “on the political left as well as the 
right—that capitalism is an untranscendable horizon.”28 In this climate, Black and other 
minority  ethnic  struggles  against  racism have largely  been reconfigured as  identity-
based mobilisations for recognition, alongside feminist,  environmental, LGBTQ, and 
other social movements. As Satnam Virdee explains,
“Since the 1990s, research within the field of racism and ethnicity studies 
has tended to focus on the cultural at the expense of the economic; on the 
theory and politics of recognition and understanding difference rather than 
the theory and politics of inequality and redistribution. Sustained accounts 
of racism and its articulation with class development of capitalism in the 
age of globalism are rare... reflecting this altered state of affairs has been 
the almost wholesale abandonment of the workplace and its institutions as 
a legitimate site of study to explore how racism works. And with it of 
course have gone the workers—black, brown and white.”29
To counter this trend, in this thesis I develop a global political economic critique 
of race and racism. Remaining within “shouting distance” of Marxism, as David Scott 
so aptly has put it30,  I reconceptualise the global colour line as a racial ontology that 
enables the hyper-exploitation of non-white peoples and lands, while privileging others. 
As critical race theorist George Lipsitz explains, “the racisms that shape social relations 
around the globe are remnants of previous systems of servitude and segregation, to be 
sure, but they are also products of contemporary capitalism's ability to profit from new 
forms of differentiation that permit the exploitation of gendered and racialized labor 
within and across regional and national sites.”31 In this thesis I focus on two key aspects 
in which racial capitalism reproduces the global colour line: first, the violent surplussing 
of populations racialized as non-white; and second, the racialized violence of the penal 
28 For a materialist critique of postcolonial studies, see—indicatively—Bartolovich and Lazarus, 
Marxism, Modernity and Postcolonial Studies; Vivek Chibber, Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of  
Capital (Verso Books, 2013); Neil Lazarus, “What Postcolonial Theory Doesn’t Say,” Race & Class 
53, no. 1 (July 1, 2011): 3–27, https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396811406778; Sandro Mezzadra, “How 
Many Histories of Labour? Towards a Theory of Postcolonial Capitalism,” Postcolonial Studies 14, 
no. 2 (June 1, 2011): 151–70, https://doi.org/10.1080/13688790.2011.563458; Benita Parry, 
Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique (Routledge, 2004).
29 Satnam Virdee, “Challenging the Empire,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 37, no. 10 (August 24, 2014): 
1827, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2014.932408.
30 David Scott, “Stuart Hall’s Ethics,” Small Axe 9, no. 1 (2005): 4.
31 George Lipsitz, “Abolition Democracy and Global Justice,” Comparative American Studies An  
International Journal 2, no. 3 (August 1, 2004): 283, https://doi.org/10.1177/1477570004047906.
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and national security state. While the neoliberal  reordering of the world economy has 
led  to  a  reconfiguration  of  these  dynamics,  racialized  (and  gendered32)  forms  of 
domination  continue  to  pattern  global  politics—albeit  in  new  forms,  fit  for  the 
postcolonial and multicultural present. 
Race and the Politics of Solidarity
What  would  it  mean  for  the  philosophical  literature  on  global  justice and 
cosmopolitan ethics to take seriously the enduring logic of race and the many afterlives 
of historical and ongoing colonialism? In this thesis I provide a tentative answer to this 
question through a close engagement with contemporary cosmopolitan debates on the 
meaning and purpose of international solidarity. Solidarity provides a particularly useful 
lens  for  analysing  cosmopolitanism's  racial  caesuras.  This  is  not  only  because  all 
cosmopolitan approaches are underpinned by some form of solidaristic commitment, but 
also because the concept of solidarity has gained a sense of urgency over the last few 
years. In the wake of the global migrant crisis, the movement for Black lives in the 
United  States  and  beyond,  #StandWithStandingRock,  the  ongoing  occupation  of 
Palestine,  and the  rise  of  populist,  far  right,  anti-immigrant,  xenophobic,  and racist 
political parties throughout the global North, a growing number of academics, activists, 
and artists have called for solidarity with the plight of migrants, racialized minorities, 
and Indigenous peoples. In the field of IR, the cosmopolitan literature on solidarity has 
“ballooned” since the early 1990s, in part because of the public adoption of the term in 
global  activist  and  civil  society  campaigns,  but  also  because  of  the  renewed 
philosophical  interest  in  questions  of  global  ethics  and  responsibility.33 There  is  of 
course no such thing as a cosmopolitan conception of solidarity: definitions range from 
32 While in this thesis I predominantly focus on race and class, there is much to suggest that this analysis 
can be extended to gender. The regulation of intimacy, sexuality, desire, and female reproductive 
labour is not only central to the process of capital accumulation, but should also be seen as central to 
the (re)production of the global colour line. For a more detailed discussion, see the section on 
“Reproductive Racial Capitalism” in chapter 3. See also, indicatively, Antoinette Burton, Burdens of  
History: British Feminists, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865-1915 (Univ of North Carolina 
Press, 2000); Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James, The Power of Women and the Subversion of  
the Community (Falling Wall Press Ltd, 1975); Carole Boyce Davies, Left of Karl Marx: The Political  
Life of Black Communist Claudia Jones (Duke University Press, 2008); Maria Mies, Patriarchy and 
Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labour (Zed Books Ltd., 
2014); Angela Y. Davis, Women, Race, & Class (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2011); Nayan 
Shah, Stranger Intimacy: Contesting Race, Sexuality and the Law in the North American West 
(University of California Press, 2012); Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power:  
Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (University of California Press, 2002).
33 Sally J. Scholz, “Seeking Solidarity,” Philosophy Compass 10, no. 10 (2015): 725–35, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12255.
-9-
“the  disposition  to  act  towards  vulnerable  others  without  the  anticipation  of 
reciprocation”34 (Chouliaraki); the obligation “to help people who are beyond one’s own 
borders”35 (Coicaud and Wheeler); the preparedness of “taking responsibility” for one 
who “has formed his identity under completely different circumstances”36 (Habermas); a 
general feeling of sympathy or empathy for others37 (Rorty); a precondition for global 
democracy38 (Brunkhorst); “a struggle against powerful tendencies in the modern age to 
divide the world into camps and to idealise  one camp as much as we demonise the 
other”39 (Fine);  and  the  inclination  to  view  all  human  lives  as  equally  grievable40 
(Butler). In spite of these differences, these cosmopolitan approaches all put forward a 
vision of solidarity that transcends historical, cultural, and territorial borders, and that 
offers an alternative to communitarian and nationalist accounts that limit solidarity to 
those  bound  by  common  nationality,  ethnicity,  religion,  citizenship,  and  so  on.  As 
Vivienne  Jabri  explains,  cosmopolitan  theories  of  solidarity  are  based  on  “the 
assumption that the realm of the international, a location defined in terms of sovereign 
statehood, is somehow reined in, challenged, by another realm, that of the human.”41 
Ultimately, for these thinkers a global, cosmopolitan solidarity is necessary to confront 
the  large-scale  dilemmas  of  the  contemporary  world,  including  global  poverty, 
widespread  human  rights  abuse,  international  mass  migration,  environmental 
catastrophes, civil wars, and the ever-present growing disparity between the privileged 
and the poor. 
In this thesis I explore the limits and possibilities of such calls for solidarity 
beyond borders. In the first part I examine how, why, and with what effect questions of 
race  and  colonialism  continue  to  be  silenced  in  discussions  about  international  (or 
cosmopolitan)  solidarity.  I  argue that  liberal  as  well  as  critical  approaches  work  to 
reproduce and legitimise, rather than challenge and transcend, the current unjust and 
34 Lilie Chouliaraki, The Ironic Spectator: Solidarity in the Age of Post-Humanitarianism (John Wiley & 
Sons, 2013), 106.
35 Jean-Marc Coicaud and Nicholas J. Wheeler, National Interest and International Solidarity:  
Particular and Universal Ethics in International Life (New York: United Nations University Press, 
2008), 3.
36 Jürgen Habermas, Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory (John Wiley & Sons, 2015), 29.
37 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge University Press, 1989).
38 Hauke Brunkhorst, Solidarity: From Civic Friendship To A Global Legal Community (MIT Press, 
2005).
39 Robert Fine, “The Idea of Cosmopolitan Solidarity,” in Routledge Handbook of Cosmopolitanism 
Studies (Routledge, 2012), 384, 
https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203837139.ch31.
40 Judith Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? (London: Verso, 2010).
41 Vivienne Jabri, “Solidarity and Spheres of Culture: The Cosmopolitan and the Postcolonial,” Review 
of International Studies 33, no. 4 (2007): 714, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210507007747.
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unequal  racialized  global  order.  While  cosmopolitan  calls  for  solidarity  with  the 
vulnerable,  downtrodden,  and  marginalised  peoples  of  the  world  might  give  the 
appearance of contributing to an emancipatory political project, in reality they obfuscate 
how the modern world system was founded on, and continues as, a hierarchical racial  
order.  Like  the  civilising  missions  of  the  19th century,  these  discourses  are  heavily 
dependent  on  a  racialized  and  gendered  “imaginative  geography”42 that  divides  the 
world into  “the third world individual  living within a nation of danger and the first 
world rescuers residing in a space of safety and enlightened freedom.”43 By addressing 
the  first  world  as  a  bystander  to,  rather  than  beneficiary  of,  current  injustices, 
cosmopolitan calls for solidarity not only produce the first world as intrinsically “good”, 
“ethical”, and “humanitarian”, but they also render invisible the continuities between 
past  and  current  forms  of  violence  and  privilege.  The  result  is  a  grand  narrative 
structured  around  binaries  of  good/evil  and  saviours/victims  which,  as  Stephen 
Hopgood has argued, “gives an ideological alibi to a global system whose governance 
structures sustain persistent unfairness and blatant injustice.”44
In the second half of the thesis,  I demonstrate that a materialist reading of the 
global colour line opens up space for  new forms of solidarity and internationalism—
beyond the “master's tools”, in Audre Lorde's famous formulation. The concept of racial 
capitalism demonstrates how  different systems of oppression rely on one another in 
complex ways: racism, sexism, and classism are not separate forms of oppression that 
sometimes  intersect,  but  an  entangled  and  constitutive  part  of  the  capitalist  world 
system. This  does  not  deny the  uniqueness  and  specificity  of  local  struggles,  but 
highlights their transnational character. That is, while the struggles against empire, white 
supremacy, settler colonialism, gender subordination, and workers' exploitation are not 
the same, they are fundamentally  interlinked.  By reconnecting and aligning different 
struggles—struggles which might seem distinct and unrelated but which, when viewed 
through the lens of racial capitalism, turn out to be closely related—a materialist reading 
of the global colour line thus points to the importance of addressing racism, patriarchy, 
settler colonialism, imperialism, and other interlocking violences simultaneously. 45
42 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2014), 49.
43 Randall Williams, The Divided World: Human Rights and Its Violence (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2010), 28.
44 Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Cornell University Press, 2013), 2.
45 As I argue in chapter 4, this is not the same as intersectionality. Used to highlight the intersection of 
“multiple oppressions” as experienced by individuals, contemporary formulations of intersectionality 
are often delinked from the systemic critique of capitalism. Where the vocabulary of class figures, it 
is, as Delia Aguilar has argued, “merely designating income, occupation, or lifestyle”, and ultimately 
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The solidarity that emerges from this analysis  is fundamentally different from 
cosmopolitanism.  In cosmopolitan scholarship, the question of solidarity has typically 
been understood as a problem of how to overcome difference. While different thinkers 
disagree  on  the  exact  foundation  for  solidarity,  they  typically  understand  it  as  a 
universalising relation: as something that unfolds from the belief that all human beings 
have equal moral standing within and belong to a single world community. In contrast to 
these perspectives—which, as I argue in chapter 1, are haunted by a colonial logic—a 
materialist  reading of  the  global  colour  line opens  up space  for  a  different  kind  of 
solidarity, based not on sameness but the struggle against interlocking oppressions under 
racial capitalism.  This is a  revolutionary solidarity anchored in the intersectionality of 
freedom struggles, rather than on abstract notions of what it means to be human. The 
overall goal here not the creation of some form of a universal community based on law, 
rights, and citizenship, as it is for many cosmopolitan thinkers. Instead, and as Bradley 
Macdonald has  argued,  it  seeks  “to articulate  localized issues  and struggles into  an 
overall internationalism... It sees the necessity of understanding each particular struggle 
in the world as part of larger drama.”46 Consequently, where cosmopolitan perspectives 
often  depict  solidarity  as  a  one-way  street  whereby  powerful  and  privileged  actors 
extend  empathy  and  charity  to  silent  victims,  solidarity  thus  conceived  figures 
subalterns as agents in a collective struggle against interlocking systems of oppression 
under racial capitalism. While this is a project that is underwritten by universalism, it is 
not one that follows from any supposed unity of humankind. Instead, I suggest, it arises 
in  opposition to  the universalising  thrust  of  racial  capitalism—including  the  way in 
which it depends on gender subordination, border-making practices, ongoing primitive 
accumulation,  the  production  of  surplus  populations,  and  the  growth  of  a  global 
“security archipelago.”47
Radical Internationalism in Dark Times
The  revolutionary  solidarity  outlined  in  this  thesis  has  much to  offer  in  our 
“detached from mooring in the social relations of production.” This stands in sharp contrast to earlier 
formulations of intersectionality, such as that of the Combahee River Collective, Angela Davis, Selma 
James, and Maria Mies, which understood race and gender as constitutive elements of the inner logic 
of capital. See chapter 4 and Delia D. Aguilar et al., “Tracing the Roots of Intersectionality,” MR 
Online (blog), April 12, 2012, https://mronline.org/2012/04/12/aguilar120412-html/.
46 Bradley J. Macdonald, Performing Marx: Contemporary Negotiations of a Living Tradition (SUNY 
Press, 2012), 147.
47 Paul Amar, The Security Archipelago: Human-Security States, Sexuality Politics, and the End of  
Neoliberalism (Duke University Press, 2013).
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contemporary era of Trumpism, Brexit, and global fascist resurgence. As Kyriakides and 
Torres make clear, ours is an age where solidarity has come to seem difficult at best; 
where older visions of Third World, non-aligned, and coalitional politics have fractured 
into multiple “ethnically determined subjects of identity in competition not only for a 
shred of an ever-shrinking economic settlement but for recognition of their suffering 
conferred by a nation-state in which the Right won the political battle and the Left won 
the culture war.”48 The juxtaposition of the “white working class” with “immigrants” 
offers one of the starkest example of this fracturing of solidarity. Indeed, according to 
hegemonic narratives white workers were not only responsible for the Brexit vote and 
the election of Donald Trump, but are also the main engine behind the rise of populist, 
far-right, anti-immigrant, xenophobic, and racist political parties throughout the global 
North.  The rise of fascist  populism, it  is  often argued, has to be seen as a counter-
revolution to the post-WWII period, which has privileged identity politics at the expense 
of socio-economic inequality, and thus paid too much attention to questions of race, 
gender, and sexuality, and not enough to class. A New York Times column by Columbia 
professor Mark Lilla published shortly after the US presidential election  captures this 
sentiment:  a  focus  on  identity  politics,  Lilla  argued,  had cost  the  Democrats  the 
election.49 By emphasising difference at the expense of commonalities and fetishising 
the virtues of minorities, identity politics had alienated “the demos living between the 
coasts” and  undermined the possibility of creating a progressive coalition based on 
class. “Left behind” by deindustrialisation, globalisation, affirmative action, and identity 
politics,  white  workers  had  increasingly  begun  to  feel  like  “strangers  in  their  own 
land.”50 In 2016 they thus voted to take back control.
This narrative is problematic for a number of reasons, as several commentators 
48 Rodolfo Torres and Christopher Kyriakides, Race Defaced: Paradigms of Pessimism, Politics of  
Possibility (Stanford University Press, 2012), 119.
49 Mark Lilla, “Opinion | The End of Identity Liberalism,” accessed March 20, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-identity-liberalism.html. The 
argument is expanded in Mark Lilla, The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics 
(HarperCollins, 2017).
50 Arlie Russell Hochschild, Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right 
(New Press, The, 2016). See also, indicatively, Justin Gest, The New Minority: White Working Class  
Politics in an Age of Immigration and Inequality (Oxford University Press, 2016); David Goodhart, 
The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics (Oxford University Press, 
2017); Lisa Mckenzie, “‘It’s Not Ideal’: Reconsidering ‘anger’ and ‘apathy’ in the Brexit Vote among 
an Invisible Working Class:,” Competition & Change, April 13, 2017, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1024529417704134; Wolfgang Streeck, “Trump and the Trumpists,” Inference: 
International Review of Science, accessed March 21, 2018, http://inference-review.com/article/trump-
and-the-trumpists; Joan C. Williams, White Working Class: Overcoming Class Cluelessness in  
America (Harvard Business Press, 2017); Robert Wuthnow, The Left Behind: Decline and Rage in  
Rural America (Princeton University Press, 2018).
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have  shown:  indeed,  the  vote  to  leave  the  European  Union  was  delivered  by  the 
propertied, pensioned, well-off, white middle class based in southern England, and not 
the  working class  in  the  North51;  similarly,  the  swing to  Trump was predominantly 
carried by the white middle class, and not the white working class.52 In attributing Brexit 
and  the  Trump vote  to  the  white  working class,  this  widespread  narrative  not  only 
contradicts  the  available  empirical  evidence.  By  scapegoating  minorities—women, 
Blacks, immigrants, refugees, etc.—it also suggests that class and race (and gender and 
sexuality) are distinct and separate, and thus need to be ranked in order of importance. 
As Frederick Douglass once argued, to insist on such divisions is to overlook that it is in 
the interest of capital to pit white workers against black workers; “The slaveholders, by 
encouraging the enmity of the poor laboring white man against the blacks, succeeded in 
making the said white man almost as much of a slave as the black himself.” In fact, 
“both are plundered by the same plunderer.”53 
Taking issue with this narrative of the “left behind”, this thesis argues that it is a 
mistake to separate anti-capitalist politics from the struggle against white supremacy, 
51 “Brexit: The Decision of a Divided Country,” Danny Dorling - 丹尼·道灵 (blog), July 7, 2016, 
http://www.dannydorling.org/?page_id=5564.
52 Pew Research Center, “On Views of Race and Inequality, Blacks and Whites Are Worlds Apart,” Pew 
Research Center’s Social & Demographic Trends Project (blog), June 27, 2016, 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/06/27/on-views-of-race-and-inequality-blacks-and-whites-are-
worlds-apart/. Similarly, the idea that economic decline has uniquely affected whites is not born out by 
the data. In the United States, the unemployment rate of Blacks is nearly twice that of Hispanics and 
more than double that of whites. See David Roediger, “Who’s Afraid of the White Working Class?: On 
Joan C. Williams’s ‘White Working Class: Overcoming Class Cluelessness in America,’” Los Angeles 
Review of Books, accessed November 26, 2017, https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/whos-afraid-of-
the-white-working-class-on-joan-c-williamss-white-working-class-overcoming-class-cluelessness-in-
america/. See also Gurminder K. Bhambra, “Brexit, Trump, and ‘Methodological Whiteness’: On the 
Misrecognition of Race and Class,” The British Journal of Sociology 68 Suppl 1 (November 2017): 
S214–32, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12317; Robbie Shilliam, “Beware of Those Who Use ‘the 
People’ to Drive through Brexit,” The Policy Space (blog), April 11, 2017, 
http://www.thepolicyspace.com.au/2017/11/182-beware-of-those-who-use-the-people-to-drive-
through-brexit.
53 Quoted in Ahmed Shawki, Black Liberation and Socialism (Haymarket Books, 2005), 46. Writing in 
1870, Marx arrived at a similar conclusion: “Every industrial and commercial center in England 
possesses a working class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. 
The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. In 
relation to the Irish worker he feels himself a member of the ruling nation and so turns himself into a 
tool of the aristocrats and capitalists of his country against Ireland, thus strengthening their domination 
over himself. He cherishes religious, social and national prejudices against the Irish worker. His 
attitude is much the same as that of the 'poor whites' to the 'niggers' in the former slave states of the 
USA. The Irishman pays him back with interest in his own money. He sees in the English worker at 
once the accomplice and stupid tool of the English rule in Ireland. This antagonism is artificially kept 
alive and intensified by the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short by all the means at the disposal 
of the ruling classes. This antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English working class, 
despite its organization. It is the secret by which the capitalist maintains its power. And that class is 
fully aware of it.” See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto: A Road Map to  
History’s Most Important Political Document (Haymarket Books, 2005), 164.
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patriarchy, settler colonialism, and empire. A materialist reading of the global colour 
line uncovers the political possibilities that are inhibited by theoretical frameworks and 
political elites that insist on a neat separation between “race” and “class.” Race-making 
practices  are  fundamental  (not  epiphenomenal) to  the  operation  of  capital,  because 
racism supplies the precarious and exploitable lives capitalism needs to extract land and 
labour.  Consequently,  where  hegemonic  narratives  imply  that  countering  right-wing 
populism necessitates a privileging of the needs of the white working class, a focus on 
racial  capitalism  reveals  that  there  can  be  no  politics  of  class  that  is  not  already 
racialized. As Robbie Shilliam has recently argued, “this blunt demographic sensibility 
entirely obscures the operation of power, which is always to cut the social fabric at its 
weakest,  i.e.  through  the  bodies  of  those  racialized,  gendered  and  nationalized  as 
undeserving.”54 Rather  than  separating  race  and  class—which  post-Brexit  and  post-
Trump commentary insists that we should—a materialist reading of the global colour 
line thus points towards the necessity of weaving together anti-racist, anti-sexist, and 
anti-capitalist critique.  A focus on race (and gender)  need not detract  attention from 
questions of class: quite the opposite, a truly anti-capitalist politics has to be anti-racist, 
anti-sexist, and internationalist. 
These are not novel insights—forgotten, perhaps, but they are not new. Stuart 
Hall  and the  wider  collective  at  the  Birmingham Center  for  Contemporary  Cultural 
Studies had already in the late 1970s began to understand race as   “the modality in 
which  class  is  lived”  and “the  medium in  which  class  relations  are  experienced.”55 
Previous generations of radicals and revolutionaries—from the Black feminism of the 
Combahee River Collective to the Black Panther Party, the strikers at Grunwick, and 
Third World  anti-imperial  internationalism—similarly recognised  these linkages,  and 
thus imagined themselves as part of a larger community of resistance. As Malcolm X 
declared in a 1962 speech, “The same rebellion, the same impatience, the same anger 
that exists in the hearts of the dark people in Africa and Asia is existing in the hearts and 
minds of 20 million black people in this country who have been just  as thoroughly 
54 Robbie Shilliam, “Race and the Undeserving Poor,” The Disorder of Things (blog), 2018, 
https://thedisorderofthings.com/2018/06/27/race-and-the-undeserving-poor/. Reading historical class 
formation through the lens of empire, Shilliam argues that “The 'white working class' is not a natural 
or neutral category of political economy. As a constituency, the 'white working class' has rarely been 
self-authored, self-empowered or self-directed. This constituency must be apprehended principally as  
an elite artefact of political domination.” See also the excellent book Robbie Shilliam, Race and the 
Undeserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit (Agenda Publishing, 2018). 
55 Stuart Hall, “Race, Articulation, and Socities Structured in Dominance,” in Black British Cultural  
Studies: A Reader, ed. Houston A. Baker Jr, Manthia Diawara, and Ruth H. Lindeborg (University of 
Chicago Press, 1996), 55.
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colonized as the people in Africa and Asia.”56 For many of these radicals,  capitalism, 
racism, (settler) colonialism, and patriarchy had to be understood within a shared circuit 
and thus resisted simultaneously: as the women of Combahee explained, “the liberation 
of  all  peoples  necessitates  the  destruction  of  the  political-economic  systems  of 
capitalism and imperialism as well as patriarchy.”57
Such solidarities are not a thing of the past, but are indeed still in the making.  
From the streets of Ferguson and Baltimore to the dark waters of the Mediterranean, to 
the refugee camps of Gaza and the West Bank, and the townships of Cape Town, they 
are being re-enacted by a new generation of activists. By linking together seemingly 
disparate spaces and histories of revolutionary struggles, these groups and movement 
help us envision what emancipatory politics might look like in these dark times, when 
established  media  and  right-wing  demagogues  remain  committed  to  distinguishing 
between the interests of “material” class and “ideational” race. Marx understood the 
goal of critical theory as the “self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of the age.”58 
This thesis is written with that spirit in mind.
Chapter Outline
This thesis unfolds in three parts and eight chapters. The first part interrogates 
how, why, and with what effect questions of race and colonialism remain absent from 
cosmopolitan discussions of global justice and solidarity. The second part explores how 
it might be possible to stitch these “unspeakable things unspoken” back into the fabric 
of internationalism. Finally, the third and final section offers a detailed reading of a set 
of movements, groups, and activists that practice a different form of global solidarity: a 
revolutionary  political  solidarity  that  links  together seemingly  disparate  spaces  and 
histories of struggles—including the migrant crisis in Europe, the movement for Black 
lives in the United States, the Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, and 
the struggle for decolonisation in South Africa. Studying these movements opens up 
space for imagining what solidarity and emancipatory politics might look beyond the 
colour line.
56 Quoted on the cover of Sohail Daulatzai, Black Star, Crescent Moon: The Muslim International and  
Black Freedom Beyond America (U of Minnesota Press, 2012).
57 The Combahee River Collective, “The Combahee River Collective Statement,” 1977, 
https://americanstudies.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Keyword%20Coalition_Readings.pdf.
58 Cited in Nancy Fraser, “What’s Critical about Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender,”  
New German Critique, no. 35 (1985): 97, https://doi.org/10.2307/488202.
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Chapter 1, “Cosmopolitanism and the Colonial Life of Ethics”, offers a detailed 
analysis  and  critique  of  cosmopolitan  approaches  to  international  solidarity.  It 
demonstrates that liberal as well as critical conceptualisations reproduce and legitimise 
the racial structuring of world politics. Seeking to derive an apolitical understanding of 
solidarity, cosmopolitan thinkers often privilege ontological reflection above and before 
analysis  of  historical  relations.  This  substitutes  abstract  humanity  for  historical 
humanity,  and ultimately transforms the  responsible  colonial  agent  into  an innocent 
bystander.  The result  is a discourse of  hospitality,  generosity,  humanitarianism, and 
empathy rather than accountability, guilt, restitution, repentance, and structural reform.
Chapter 2, “From Revolution to Ethics: Historicizing the Cosmopolitan Turn”, 
interrogates the historical, political, and conceptual conditions of possibility of the turn 
to cosmopolitan political theory and ethics. The rise of cosmopolitan thinking in the 
1990s is  less a result  of a steady, gradual climb towards global justice,  and more a 
product of a set of historical and material conditions which in the late 20 th century made 
it highly desirable for policymakers, activists, and intellectuals to think of world politics 
as an  ethical space.  A historicization of the cosmopolitan project not only calls  into 
question  the  ethics/politics  distinction  on  which  it  is  based.  In  revealing 
cosmopolitanism as a historically produced discourse—anchored in particular material 
interests and relations of power—it also demonstrates that the cosmopolitan preference 
for abstraction, ahistoricism, and anti-politics is an eminently political strategy which 
helps  to  uphold,  legitimise,  and  entrench  the  current  unjust  and  unequal  racialized 
international order. 
Chapter  3,  “The  Political  Economy  of  Race:  Rethinking  the  Global  Colour 
Line”, takes up the task of radicalising and decolonising solidarity. Drawing on Cedric 
Robinson's  1983  magnum opus  Black  Marxism:  The  Making  of  the  Black  Radical  
Tradition, I argue that this necessitates that the global colour line be rethought through a 
materialist lens. In contrast to (postcolonial) scholarship that focuses on questions of 
Eurocentrism, representation, and cultural difference, such an approach centre-stages the 
global political economy of race and racism. Unwaged and less-than-free labour—such 
as chattel slavery, racialized indentured servitude, convict leasing, debt peonage, and 
gendered  forms  of  caring  work  and  reproductive  labour—are  not  just  incidental  to 
capital accumulation, but fundamental to its operations. 
Chapter  4,  “Identity  Politics  and  the  Class  Struggle:  Towards  a  New 
Internationalism”, builds on this to argue that a materialist reading of the global colour 
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line,  and  a  consequent  focus  on  interlocking  forms  of  oppressions  under  racial 
capitalism,  opens  up  space  for  a  different  kind  of  internationalism  and  politics  of 
solidarity: a revolutionary solidarity based on the intersectionality of freedom struggles, 
rather than on abstract notions of what it means to be human.
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 explore what such a solidarity looks like in practice. Chapter 
5, “The Drowned and the Saved: Circuits of Resistance in the Black Mediterranean”, 
explores the links between racial capitalism, imperialism, (neo)colonial dispossession, 
and  migration.  Focusing  on  Black  Lives  Matter  UK and  Parti  des  Indigènes  de  la 
République,  it  examines  how some activist  groups rupture  hegemonic  discourses  of 
Western  benevolence  towards  migrants  by connecting  the  mass  deaths  of  migrants 
during crossings of the Mediterranean to anti-racist struggles  within Europe. By place 
the  ongoing  migrant  crisis  within  a  broader analysis  of  empire,  capitalism,  labour 
exploitation,  and  neocolonialism,  these  groups  open  up  space  for  new  forms  of 
solidarity:  for  an  internationalism  that  subverts  the  national  “we”  and  that  brings 
together  migrants,  refugees,  workers,  and  European  minorities  (Blacks,  Muslims, 
women, Roma, Sami, and so on) in a shared struggle.
Chapter 6, “#Palestine2Ferguson: Empire and the Global Security Archipelago”, 
focuses on recent forms of Black-Palestinian solidarity. Where liberal commentators in 
recent  years  have  approached   Black  Lives  Matter  as  a  domestic  US  movement 
struggling for access and reform—and thus, for  a more inclusive American dream—I 
argue that the violence inflicted on Black people within the United States is intimately 
linked to the racial  terror imposed on Brown and Black people  globally. Focusing on 
campaigns such as “When I See Them I See Us” and #FreeAhed, I examine how Black-
Palestinian activists unravel these links by insisting that the militarisation and neoliberal 
governance  of  urban  Black  America  and  Palestinian  communities  must  be  viewed 
within a shared circuit.
Chapter 7, “Things Fall Apart: Contesting Settler Colonialism, in South Africa 
and Beyond”, deepens this analysis of entangled geographies of resistance by putting 
settler  colonial  studies  into  conversation  with  the  literature  on  racial  capitalism. 
Focusing on the Fallist and BDS movements, I argue that racialized dispossession is a 
constant feature of capital accumulation. While South Africa now is “free” in the legal 
sense of the term, the marginalisation and exploitation of the Black poor have in fact 
intensified since the transition to democracy. The South African experience thus heeds a 
warning  to  other  groups  and  movements  struggling  against  (settler)  colonialism, 
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including BDS.
Chapter  8,  “Universal  History  Without  Guarantees”, brings  these  arguments 
together by showing how the groups and movements discussed in previous chapters 
help us  disentangle emancipatory politics from its historical baggage of Eurocentrism, 
racism,  and empire.  If  the  global  struggle  against  racial  capitalism is  a  universalist 
project, then how can it avoid relying on the “master's tools” and repeating the moral-
political universalism it supposedly wants to challenge? To answer this question—and, 
thus, to show how it might be possible to retrieve the notion of universal history and 
total  critique,  without  invoking  Eurocentric  ideas  of  progress  and  teleology—this 
chapter draws on Susan Buck-Morss's re-reading of Hegelian dialectics and Stuart Hall's 
call for a Marxism “without guarantees.”
The conclusion, “Strikers in Saris: Poetry of the Future”, summarises the argument 
and contributions of the thesis through a discussion of the migrant women led strike at  
Grunwick in North London, 1976-8. In our contemporary era of Trump, Brexit, global 
sweatshops,  mass  migration,  environmental  catastrophes,  #metoo, racialized  police 
violence, and  global  fascist  resurgence—where  “white  workers”  frequently  are 
juxtaposed with “immigrants”,  and identity politics is  blamed for  the demise of the 
organised  Left—revisiting  these  “strikers  in  saris”  opens  up  space  for  imagining 
solidarity and emancipatory politics anew.
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C H A P T E R  1 
Cosmopolitanism and the Colonial Life of Ethics
“For those who rule, ethics needs to precede politics since they presuppose an 
already just and humane, although often hidden, environment as the de facto 
context of their inquiry into what ought to be. For those who are oppressed, they 
regard the appeal to ethics as begging the question of the relevance of good will 




“My Dear Sir,  I  have received your declaration of human rights and 
want to say frankly that I am greatly disappointed... Under paragraph 
five you appeal for sympathy for persons driven from the land of their 
birth; but how about American Negroes, Africans, and Indians who have 
not been driven from their land of birth but are nonetheless deprived of 
their  rights?  Under  paragraph  six  you  want  redress  for  those  who 
wander  the  earth  but  how  about  those  who  do  not  wander  and 
nevertheless are deprived of their fundamental human rights?... In other 
words, this declaration of rights has apparently no thought of the rights 
of  Negroes,  Indians,  and  South  Sea  Islanders.  Why  then  call  it  the 
Declaration of Human Rights?”2
These  words  were  written  by  W.E.B.  Du  Bois  in  his  1944  response  to  the 
American  Jewish  Committee's  proposal  for  a  “Declaration  of  Human  Rights.”  The 
Declaration,  he  argued,  was  framed  in  the  language  of  universal  humanity  but  in 
actuality reproduced the existing racial ordering of world politics. While Du Bois was a 
staunch critic of anti-Semitism, he worried that the effort to enshrine human rights in 
international law proceeded without confronting empire and the global colour line. A 
year  later  he  submitted  his  own proposal  to  the  founding conference  of  the  United 
Nations in San Francisco, stating that the “first statute of international law” should read: 
“The colonial system of government, however deeply rooted in history and custom, is 
today undemocratic, socially dangerous and a main cause of wars.”3 As it turned out, his 
proposal never made it to the UN floor.
1 Lewis R. Gordon, An Introduction to Africana Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 88.
2 W.E.B. Du Bois, The Correspondence of W. E. B. Du Bois (Univ of Massachusetts Press, 1997), 24.
3 Du Bois, 11.
-20-
This chapter offers a detailed analysis and critique of cosmopolitan approaches 
to  international  solidarity.  In  recent  decades  cosmopolitanism has  rapidly  become a 
topic of central concern within the scholarly community, in general, and the discipline 
of IR, in particular.4 In suggesting that we think of ourselves as global citizens—as a 
band  of  brothers  and  sisters  united  by  our  common humanity—cosmopolitanism is 
frequently presented as a cure for the worst forms of parochialism and nationalism. In 
Ulrich Beck's enthusiastic formulation, “citizens of the world, unite!”5 Through its focus 
on human rights, humanitarianism, and international law, cosmopolitanism brings the 
question of international solidarity into sharp focus. By calling for solidarity with those 
around  the  world  subjected  to  violence,  oppression,  and  human  rights  abuse, 
cosmopolitan approaches might give the appearance of constituting an emancipatory 
political project. Nonetheless, and as Du Bois made clear in his 1944 critique of human 
rights, appeals to common humanity frequently perform an ideological function. In this 
chapter I argue that cosmopolitan calls for international solidarity  obfuscate how the 
modern world system was founded on, and continues as, a hierarchical racial order. In 
framing the problem as one of how to shift from solidarity among “friends” to solidarity 
with  “strangers”,  these  approaches  not  only  rely  on  a  particular  reading  of  present 
relations that renders invisible the many afterlives of historical and ongoing colonialism; 
they also obscure how modern understandings of solidarity themselves evolved in the 
context  of  European  empire-building.  By  disconnecting  connected  histories,  these 
perspectives ultimately contribute to an ideological formation that removes from view 
the global history of empire,  colonialism, and transatlantic slavery. In that they  turn 
questions  of  accountability,  guilt,  restitution,  repentance,  and  structural  reform,  into 
matters of hospitality, generosity, humanitarianism, and empathy. 
The chapter develops this argument in four sections. The first section focuses on 
liberal cosmopolitanism: I argue that the liberal “practical project of an egalitarian and 
self-determined  solidarity  with  strangers”6 is  premised  on  a  wilful  amnesia  that 
4 See, indicatively, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, Reprint 
edition (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007); Daniele Archibugi, “The Global 
Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy,” Princeton University Press, 2008, 
http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8737.html; Seyla Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism (Oxford 
University Press, 2008); Richard Beardsworth, Cosmopolitanism and International Relations Theory 
(John Wiley & Sons, 2013); Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (Routledge, 
2003); Toni Erskine, Embedded Cosmopolitanism: Duties to Strangers and Enemies in a World of  
“Dislocated Communities” (Published for The British Academy by Oxford University Press, 2008); 
David Held, Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities (Polity, 2010).
5 Quoted in Archibugi, “The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy,” 
134.
6 Hauke Brunkhorst, Solidarity: From Civic Friendship To A Global Legal Community (MIT Press, 
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disavows  the  long  history  of  empire  and through  that  assists  in  the  ongoing 
consolidation of Western hegemony. More controversially, I suggest that this also holds 
true  for  those  cosmopolitans,  such  as  Thomas  Pogge,  who  arguably do take  these 
aspects very seriously. The second section turns to critical and poststructuralist attempts 
to rethink solidarity through notions of bodily vulnerability, grief, suffering, pain, loss, 
and trauma. While these approaches aim to take seriously the silences and exclusions of 
liberal cosmopolitanism, my analysis shows that they take up the struggle against pain, 
suffering,  and  vulnerability without  engaging  the structures  and  histories  of  racial 
violence that produce these conditions.  In the third section I turn to recent attempts 
within  postcolonial  theory  to  derive  a  rooted,  vernacular,  and  subaltern 
cosmopolitanism.  While  these  perspectives  are  highly  critical  of  liberal  top-down 
approaches, I show that they do not so much challenge as supplement them by providing 
a description of how cosmopolitan sentiments might come into being from below. More 
problematically,  by  focusing  on  questions  of  cultural  identity,  Eurocentrism,  and 
representation,  these  approaches  often  sideline  global  structural  inequalities  and  the 
critique  of  political  economy.  By  conceiving  of  colonialism in  purely  civilisational 
terms,  and  Eurocentrism  as  a  mainly  cultural  force,  postcolonial  formulations  of 
cosmopolitanism actually help mystify the materiality  of the global colour  line.  The 
final  section  ties  these  argument  together  by  arguing  that  cosmopolitan  solidarity 
constitutes a “swindle.” The problem with cosmopolitan approaches is not only that they 
fail to take seriously the racial ordering of world politics: more problematically, they are 
themselves underpinned by a particular racial logic—based on the desire to protect and 
offer political resistance for endangered others—which makes it possible for the white 
Western subject to re-constitute itself as “ethical” and “good”, innocent of its imperialist 
histories and present complicities.
Can Solidarity Save Strangers? Liberalism and Empire
Liberal  cosmopolitan  understandings  of  solidarity  revolve  around  notions  of 
human rights, international law, universal citizenship, and democracy. Grounded in an 
ontology  centred  on  the  universal,  rational,  and  sovereign  subject,  liberal 
cosmopolitanism understands  the  individual  human  being  as  the  ultimate  object  of 
moral concern in world politics.  As Vivienne Jabri explains, for liberal cosmopolitans 
2005), 76.
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“the realm of the international, a location defined in terms of sovereign statehood, is 
somehow reined  in,  challenged,  by  another  realm,  that  of  the  human.”7 Tracing  its 
lineage to the Cynics and the Stoics and, in particular, to Kant's project of perpetual 
peace, liberal cosmopolitan approaches typically regard solidarity as an expression of an 
underlying human essence. Applied to the international, this is taken to imply that it is 
morally arbitrary to accord “citizens” a higher priority than “strangers.” Variations of 
this theme can be found in the deontological, utilitarian as well as contractarian models 
of cosmopolitanism developed by  Charles Beitz, Brian Barry, Thomas Pogge, Martha 
Nussbaum, Peter Singer,  and Simon Caney, amongst others.8 It  also informs  English 
School  solidarists  such  as  Nicholas  Wheeler  and  Jean-Marc  Coicaud,  for  whom 
international solidarity is based on the idea that
“whilst human beings live in a plurality of cultures, which exhibit a range 
of particular moral practices, all have basic needs and rights that have to 
be  respected.  These  basic  needs  and  rights,  constituting  the  core 
commonality of individuals across the world, are also what bring them 
together and impel them to identify with, and care about, each other’s 
suffering.  Violation  of  these  needs  and  rights  calls  for  a  sense  of 
international  solidarity.  Failing  to  respond  to  the  plight  of  the  other, 
failing  to  show  solidarity,  diminishes  the  humanity  of  all.  As  such, 
international  solidarity  points  to  the  international  community’s 
responsibility and obligation toward victims of conflict regardless of their  
personal circumstances and geographical location. This is how the idea 
and practice of international humanitarian intervention can be viewed as 
one expressing an ethics of international solidarity.”9
For Wheeler and Coicaud, international solidarity is intrinsically linked to the spread of 
the  “culture  of  human  rights”  which,  they  argue,  makes  it  possible  for  citizens  to 
imagine themselves in other people's situation; indeed, “the universalization of human 
rights  is  a  real  articulation  of  international  solidarity  as  exercised  in  favor  of 
7 Vivienne Jabri, “Solidarity and Spheres of Culture: The Cosmopolitan and the Postcolonial,” Review 
of International Studies 33, no. 4 (2007): 715, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210507007747.
8 See Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, Revised edition (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1999); Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford England: Clarendon 
Press ; New York, 1996); Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006); Thomas W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan  
Responsibilities and Reforms, First Edition edition (Cambridge ; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2002); 
Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1, no. 3 (April 1, 1972): 
229–43.
9 Jean-Marc Coicaud and Nicholas J. Wheeler, National Interest and International Solidarity:  




Another set of liberal  cosmopolitans conceive of international solidarity, not as 
an expression of an underlying human essence, but an offshoot of new forms of global 
governance.  Pointing  to  the  process  of  globalisation,  the  growth  of  transnational 
linkages and international communications,  and the global nature of climate change, 
thinkers  such  as  Danielle  Archibugi,  Ulrich  Beck,  Hauke  Brunkhorst,  David  Held, 
Jürgen Habermas,  and Andrew Linklater  advocate  for  the creation  of  new forms of 
cosmopolitan  democracy.  For  thinkers  such  as  Held  and  Archibugi,  this  entails  the 
creation of an international order based on the principles of liberal democracy and law.11 
Others, such as Habermas, adopt a thinner conception of cosmopolitanism premised on 
the  democratic  process  of  establishing  law.  While  some  of  these  thinkers  distance 
themselves from classic appeals to human essence and common humanity, they agree 
that  the ideal of cosmopolitan solidarity is intrinsically linked to the spread of human 
rights. As Brunkhorst explains, since the French revolution the “normative horizon of 
the citizen is that of the global citizen” and therefore everyone as a global citizen has the  
moral  duty  to  realise  “[t]he  practical  project  of  an  egalitarian  and  self-determined 
solidarity with strangers.”12 Cosmopolitan solidarity, he maintains, will unfold as part of 
the Enlightenment project of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Until such institutions are 
in place, cosmopolitan solidarity will have “to support itself on the moral universalism 
of human rights alone.”13
For  all  these  liberal  cosmopolitans,  the  problem  at  hand  is  that  solidarity 
traditionally  has  been  confined  to  the  territorial  nation-state.  Viewed  from  this 
perspective, the challenge is precisely one of how to extend solidarity beyond the citizen 
rights of particular nation-states to include a “human-rights patriotism.”14 As Fukuyi 
Kurasawa  explains,  this  is  why  liberal  cosmopolitans  promote  an  understanding  of 
solidarity according to which the latter consists of “a process of trickle-down integration 
of the world's citizens through their adherence to a common political culture composed 
of  universal  principles  (participatory  democracy,  human  rights,  etc.)  entrenched  in 
international  law and  global  institutions.”15 Nonetheless, in  framing the  problem in 
10 Coicaud and Wheeler, 4.
11 Archibugi, “The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy”; Held, 
Cosmopolitanism.
12 Brunkhorst, Solidarity, 76.
13 Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays (John Wiley & Sons, 2015), 108.
14 Brunkhorst, Solidarity, 8.
15 Fuyuki Kurasawa, “A Cosmopolitanism from Below: Alternative Globalization and the Creation of a 
Solidarity without Bounds,” European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie 45, 
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terms of how to shift  from solidarity among “friends” to solidarity with “strangers”, 
these thinkers both rely on and reproduce a particular (Eurocentric, colonial) reading of 
history. As scholars working within the post- and decolonial tradition have shown, the 
world has long been a space of “imperial globality” in which historical trajectories have 
been intertwined through power relations.16 In Frantz Fanon's famous formulation, 
“In a very concrete way Europe has stuffed itself inordinately with the 
gold and raw materials of the colonial countries: Latin America, China 
and Africa. From all these continents, under whose eyes Europe today 
raises  up  her  tower  of  opulence,  there  has  flowed  out  for  centuries 
diamonds and oil, silk and cotton, wood and exotic products. Europe is  
literally the creation of the Third World. The wealth which smothers her 
is that  which was stolen from under-developed peoples. The ports of 
Holland, the docks of Bordeaux and Liverpool were specialised in the 
Negro  slave-trade,  and  owe  their  renown  to  millions  of  deported 
slaves.”17
In  a  recent  book  Lisa  Lowe follows  Fanon in  documenting  how the  coeval  global 
processes of settler colonialism, transatlantic slave trade, and indentured labour were the 
very conditions of possibility “for British and American national formations for liberty, 
liberal  personhood,  society,  and  government  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  and  the 
beginning of the nineteenth centuries.”18 While modernity typically is understood as a 
mainly  European  phenomenon—as  a  product  of  the  European  Renaissance  and 
Enlightenment—in reality Europe's economic and political ascendancy would not have 
been possible without the establishment of interrelated systems of domination over the 
peoples of the Americas, Africa, and Asia.19 As Lowe makes clear, European modernity 
cannot  be  disentangled  from  the  histories  of  dispossession,  colonialism,  and 
enslavement:  in  Aimé  Césaire's  famous  formulation,  there  is  no  “civilization and 
colonization”, but they are rather one and the same.20
no. 2 (August 2004): 234, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975604001444.
16 Julian Go and George Lawson, Global Historical Sociology (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 3. 
See also Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism (NYU Press, 2000); Dipesh Chakrabarty, 
Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton University Press, 
2000); W. E. B. Du Bois, Darkwater: Voices from Within the Veil (Cosimo, Inc., 2007); Enrique D. 
Dussel, The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of “The Other” and the Myth of Modernity 
(Continuum International Publishing Group, Limited, 1995); Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth 
(Grove/Atlantic, Inc., 2007); Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-
Century British Liberal Thought (University of Chicago Press, 1999).
17 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 2007, 59.
18 Lisa Lowe, The Intimacies of Four Continents (Duke University Press, 2015), 21.
19 See Enrique Dussel, “Eurocentrism and Modernity (Introduction to the Frankfurt Lectures),” 
Boundary 2 20, no. 3 (1993): 65–76, https://doi.org/10.2307/303341.
20 Aimé Césaire, “Discourse on Colonialism,” in Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A 
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By  relying  on  methodological  nationalist  accounts  that  bracket  the 
“international” and the “external”, liberal cosmopolitans thus obfuscate that the modern 
concept  of  solidarity  evolved  in  a  context  characterised,  not  only  by  urbanisation, 
secularisation,  and  the  development  of  the  modern  state,  but  also  and  crucially  by 
European  empire-building.21 Indeed,  while modern  understandings  of  solidarity  “are 
associated with coming to be on the side of angels”,22 as David Roediger has argued, the 
origins of the term “are surprisingly entwined with impulses that, if not conservative, 
are seemingly at odds with the left uses of the word so common today.”23 As it evolved 
in the 18th and 19th century, the concept of solidarity is closely linked to the Christian 
concept of caritas with its emphasis on compassion for the poor, the dispossessed, and 
the wounded.24 This is an abstract, universal, and apolitical understanding of solidarity, a 
solidarity  that  embraces  all  Christians  and,  in  its  aspirations,  all  of  humankind. As 
Ruben Gaztambide-Fernandez explains, this “implicates notions of solidarity as part of 
the justification for religious conversion as a central strategy for colonisation.”25 Authors 
such  as Michael  Barnett  and  David  Rieff  have  charted  the  relationship  between 
colonialism  and  international  solidarity  (in  its  Christian  as  well  as 
secularised/humanitarian  version). From  la  mission  civilisatrice  to  the  white  man's 
burden and manifest destiny, colonialism was frequently construed as a charitable and 
solidaristic  mission  aiming  to  rescue  backward  races  from disease,  destitution,  and 
depravity.26 As Barnett makes clear, the “commitment to helping distant strangers and 
deepening new forms of transnational solidarity”27 was an integral aspect of the colonial 
Reader, ed. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (Routledge, 2015), 172.
21 There are some notable exceptions to this trend; Thomas Pogge, perhaps most famously, includes the 
history of empire and colonialism as part of his argument for global economic redistribution and 
institutional reform. Yet as I discuss in more detail in the following pages, Pogge treats this history as 
a deviation from the key premises of liberalism, and not as something that is constitutive of liberal 
assumptions about rationality and history.
22 David Roediger, “Making Solidarity Uneasy: Cautions on a Keyword from Black Lives Matter to the 
Past,” American Quarterly 68, no. 2 (June 28, 2016): 225, https://doi.org/10.1353/aq.2016.0033.
23 Roediger, 229.
24 See Brunkhorst, Solidarity; Michael Hoelzl, “Recognizing the Sacrificial Victim: The Problem of 
Solidarity for Critical Social Theory,” Journal for Cultural and Religious Studies 6 (2004); Steinar. 
Stjernø, Solidarity in Europe: The History of an Idea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511490378.
25 Rubén A. Gaztambide-Fernández, “Decolonization and the Pedagogy of Solidarity,” Decolonization:  
Indigeneity, Education & Society 1, no. 1 (September 8, 2012): 47, 
http://decolonization.org/index.php/des/article/download/18633.
26 See Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Cornell University Press, 
2011); David Rieff, A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis (Random House, 2002).
27 Barnett, Empire of Humanity, 55. Anthony Pagden and Craig Calhoun have similarly pointed to the 
difficulty of disentangling cosmopolitanism from the history of European universalism and its 
civilizing mission, see Craig Calhoun, “The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travellers: Towards a 
Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism,” in Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context  
and Practice, ed. Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen (Oxford University Press, 2002); Anthony 
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enterprise. Walter Crane's monumental “Imperial Federation Map Showing the Extent of 
the British Empire”, produced in 1886, captures this link between empire and solidarity. 
Filled  with  orientalist  imagery,  exotic  animals,  and  racial  stereotypes,  the  map  is 
crowned by three banners proclaiming the promise of empire: “Freedom”, “Federation”, 
and—indeed—“Fraternity”, the older word for solidarity.28 Historically the concept of 
solidarity might thus have done “more for the enforcement of colonial orders than for 
decolonisation.”29
Fig. 1: Walter Crane—Imperial Federation Map Showing the Extent of the British Empire in 1886
The historical imbrication of solidarity with colonialism should make us cautious 
about the ways in which cosmopolitan theorists use and understand the concept today. 
Indeed, as Pierluigi Musarò has argued, contemporary liberal articulations of solidarity 
continue to be premised on a “religious-salvational narrative of rescue”, based on “the 
Pagden, The Burdens of Empire: 1539 to the Present (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2015).
28 David Roediger discusses Crane's map in detail in Roediger, “Making Solidarity Uneasy,” 234.
29 Gaztambide-Fernández, “Decolonization and the Pedagogy of Solidarity.” See also David Roediger's 
presidential address from ASA 2015, published as Roediger, “Making Solidarity Uneasy.”
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noblesse oblige of the powerful (rights holders) toward the powerless (those who cannot 
enact their human rights on their own).”30 Such understandings are ultimately premised 
on a certain dislocation from history: it is only by removing from view the long history 
of empire, transatlantic slavery, and colonial conquest that thinkers such as Brunkhorst, 
Habermas, and Wheeler are able to formulate the problem of cosmopolitan solidarity as 
one of how to shift from solidarity among “friends” to solidarity with “strangers.” 
The  effects  of  this  erasure  is  clearly  visible  in  contemporary  debates  about 
humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect (R2P). At a base level, these 
discussions  revolve  around  the  question  if,  and  at  what  point,  the  international 
community should intervene to stop human rights violation perpetrated by states against 
their populations. What, in other words, are our responsibilities towards those who are 
not our fellow citizens? As Anne Orford has argued, these debates take for granted that 
the people we are concerned to help are “strangers” and, hence, that the choice facing 
the international community is one between (military) action and inaction, presence and 
absence. As Orford makes clear, these debates are underpinned by a deeply racialized 
and gendered “imaginative geography... according to which the international community 
is  absent  from  the  scene  of  violence  and  suffering  until  it  intervenes  as  a  heroic 
saviour.”31 Such imaginative geographies sanction the idea that humanitarian crises are 
inherently “local”, and the exclusive result of homegrown ethnic hatreds and age-old 
animosities. This obscures the systemic and structural violence that often is complicit in 
creating the conditions that lead to humanitarian crises. As Robert Meister has argued, 
this  means that  the R2P and human rights can oppose genocide,  but  not  the global 
structures that make such violence possible; indeed, “[a] perverse effect of a globalized 
'ethic' of protecting local human rights is to take the global causes of human suffering 
off the political agenda.”32 For some, including French philosopher Alain Badiou, this is 
why  the  liberal  paradigm  of  human  rights  and  humanitarian  intervention must  be 
considered the very foundations of imperialism: indeed, 
30 Pierluigi Musarò, “The Banality of Goodness: Humanitarianism between the Ethics of Showing and 
the Ethics of Seeing,” Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and  
Development 6, no. 2 (July 23, 2015): 318, https://doi.org/10.1353/hum.2015.0018.
31 Anne Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
85.
32 Robert Meister, After Evil : A Politics of Human Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 
47. For an account of how human rights focus on  preventing cruelty and violence in their specific and 
physical form foremost, rather than the structural violence and social deprivation that make it possible, 
see also David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1998); Jenny Edkins, Whose Hunger? (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000); Randall Williams, The Divided World: Human Rights and Its  
Violence (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010).
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“Who can fail to see that un our humanitarian expeditions, interventions, 
embarkations  of  charitable  légionnaires,  the  Subject  presumed  to  be 
universal is split? On the side of the victims, the haggard animal exposed 
on television screens. On the side of the benefactors, conscience and the 
imperative to intervene. Any why  does this  splitting always assign the 
same roles to the same sides? Who cannot see that this ethics which rests 
on the misery of the world hides, behind its victim-Man, the good-Man, 
the white-Man?”33 
The  liberal  self-congratulatory  discourse  on  moral  responsibility,  Badiou  argues, 
ultimately amounts to little more than a “sordid self-satisfaction in the 'West', with the 
insistent argument according to which the misery of the Third World is the result of its 
own incompetence, its own inanity—in short, its own subhumanity.”34
There  now  exists  a  well-established  feminist,  poststructuralist,  and 
post/decolonial  literature  that  critically  interrogates  the  ways  in  which  liberal 
cosmopolitanism assists  in  the  consolidation  of  Western  hegemony.  By  calling  into 
question the assumptions about humanity that underlie liberal cosmopolitanism, these 
critics have demonstrated that the rational sovereign subject must be understood as a 
reflection of parochial, historically specific values and experiences—typically those of 
the well-off citizen; a heterosexual, white, urban male. As Enrique Dussel has shown, 
René Descartes' dictum “I think, therefore I am”—the epitome of the liberal ontology of 
the sovereign subject—is in fact preceded by 150 years of “I conquer, therefore I am.”35 
Descartes formulated his philosophy in Amsterdam at the very moment in the mid-17th 
century  when  Holland  occupied  the  core  of  the  world-system.  The  idolatrous 
universalism of Cartesian philosophy—which claims to be able to speak from a zero-
point,  possessing a  perspective  equivalent  to  God's  Eye—thus arises from a subject 
whose geopolitical location is determined by its existence as a colonizer/conqueror. The 
Cartesian subject, Dussel argues, is in fact the Imperial Being: in actual history, the ego 
cogito is not simply the homo sapiens but the conqueror. In other words, while liberal 
cosmopolitanism claims to speak from a neutral and universal perspective, in actuality it 
reflects  parochial  interests  cloaked  in  the  moral  imperative  to  save  other,  distant 
populations.  Although  liberal  cosmopolitanism  might  give  the  appearance  of 
contributing to an emancipatory political project that extends solidarity to the poor, the 
33 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil (Verso, 2002), 12–13.
34 Badiou, 13.
35 Dussel, The Invention of the Americas.
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vulnerable,  and  the  downtrodden,  as  Jabri  makes  clear,  in  reality  it  is  “a  project 
complicit  in  the  perpetuation  of  structures  of  domination  generative  of  the  very 
conditions which are then framed in a discursive politics of human solidarity.”36
The are, of course, notable exceptions to this  way of framing the problem of 
solidarity: indeed, it would be misleading to characterise  all liberal cosmopolitans as 
apologists of empire. Thinkers such as Thomas Pogge have arguably been amongst the 
fiercest critics of Western (neo)colonialism. Pointing to the colonial origins of Third 
World  poverty,  Pogge  argues  that  existing  inequality  is  “deeply  tainted  by  how  it 
accumulated over the course of  one  historical process... that was deeply pervaded by 
enslavement,  colonialism,  even genocide.”37 Members  of  affluent  countries  not  only 
continue  to  benefit  from  these  past  injustices,  but  are  also  actively  involved  in 
sustaining Third World poverty by virtue of upholding a harmful global economic order 
that directly violate the rights of the poor. Because of this they have a moral duty to 
eliminate poverty—something that, Pogge argues, could be achieved by reforming the 
international institutions that continue to reproduce poverty.
Despite his critique of colonialism and the role that international institutions play 
in  reproducing  global  inequalities,  there  are  however  a  number  of  problems  with 
Pogge's  argument.  Throughout  his  work  Pogge  has  continued  to  regard  the  “basic 
structure” as distinct from white supremacy (and patriarchy).38 As Charles Mills points 
out,  white  supremacy is  for  Pogge a  deviation  “from a  flawed  but  basically  sound 
institutional architecture” rather than “constitutive of that architecture itself.”39 That is, 
while Pogge does refer to colonialism as an unjust planetary institution “based upon 
racial  superiority”,  he ultimately does not think meaningful  global justice requires a 
more fundamental modification of the world order: indeed, poverty can be eradicated 
through “minor modifications of the global economic and political order.” Rather than 
unraveling the complicity of liberalism with empire and colonialism, Pogge ultimately 
treats  them  as  exceptions  to  an  otherwise  peaceful  norm:  while  the  history  of 
36 Jabri, “Solidarity and Spheres of Culture,” 724.
37 Thomas Pogge, “Severe Poverty As A Human Rights Violation,” in Freedom from Poverty as a  
Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor?, ed. Thomas Pogge (United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 2007), 31. See also Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 
2002; Thomas W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Polity, 2008).
38 Following Rawls, Pogge understands the “basic structure” as the “primary subject of justice”: it 
“'comprises the main social institutions—the constitution, the economic regime, the legal order and its 
specification of property,' the family in some form, and how these institutions cohere into one unified 
system of social cooperation.” Thomas W. Pogge, John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice (Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 29.
39 Charles W. Mills, “Realizing (Through Radicalizing) Pogge,” in Thomas Pogge and His Critics, ed. 
Alison Jaggar (Polity, 2010), 153.
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colonialism, transatlantic slavery, and Indigenous genocide are appalling and should be 
condemned, for Pogge this does not necessitate a rethinking of liberalism.  This is in 
contrast to a growing literature on liberal visions of empire, spearheaded by scholars 
such as Duncan Bell, Uday Singh Mehta, and Jennifer Pitts.  As these thinkers make 
clear,  far  from  contradicting  the  key  tenets  of  liberalism,  empire  and  colonialism 
actually stem from deeply liberal assumptions about rationality and historical progress.40
Responding to this critique in recent years a variety of critical,  feminist,  and 
poststructuralist  thinkers  have  sought  to  derive  an  alternative  conceptualisation  of 
solidarity that goes beyond the pitfalls of liberalism. These thinkers argue for a new 
humanism based,  not  on  the  rationalist  sovereign  subject  central  to  liberal  political 
theory, but on notions of loss, grief, relationality, and bodily vulnerability. Nonetheless, 
and  as  we  shall  see  in  the  next  section,  they  frequently  end  up  reproducing  the 
underlying assumptions of the liberal cosmopolitan solidarity they seek to critique and 
transcend.
Solidarity of the Shaken: Poststructuralism and Colonial Unknowing
“The scream that goes through the house is the heartbeat that makes audible, at last, who 
we are, how resonant we are, how connected we are.”
—Arnold Weinstein41
Questions  of  ethics,  solidarity,  and  humanism  have  come  to  occupy  an 
increasingly  central  position  in  contemporary  poststructuralist  and  feminist  theory. 
Where  there  was  once  a  relative  consensus  that  the  philosophical  tenets  of 
poststructuralism—anti-foundationalism,  the emphasis on the multiplicity  of possible 
readings or interpretations,  and the critique  of subjectivity—rule out  an engagement 
with concrete ethical issues and the articulation of substantive responses to them, recent 
years  have  witnessed  a  poststructuralist  “turn  to  ethics.”  Building  on  the  works  of 
Jacques  Derrida  and  Emmanuel  Levinas,  thinkers  such  as  Judith  Butler,  Simon 
Critchley,  David  Campbell,  Francois  Raffoul,  Stephen White,  and Ewa Ziarek  have 
40 See, indicatively, Duncan Bell, Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire (Princeton 
University Press, 2016); Mehta, Liberalism and Empire; Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of  
Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton University Press, 2009).
41 Arnold Weinstein, A Scream Goes Through the House: What Literature Teaches Us about Life 
(Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2004), xii.
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argued for  an ethics  characterised by infinite  responsibility to  the Other.42 This is  a 
cosmopolitan genre that seeks to forge bonds of solidarity on the level of affect, and 
which is grounded in shared experiences of mourning, pain, suffering, and loss. Bonnie 
Honig describes this as a “turn to Antigone”, highlighting how these thinkers seek to 
counter  sovereign  violence  and  rationality  (identified  with  Oedipus)  with  a  new 
humanism grounded in exposure, ek-stasis, mortality, and vulnerability (identified with 
Antigone).  Humanism,  Honig  argues,  has  thus  made  a  comeback:  this  is  “not  the 
rationalist universalist variety discredited  by post-structuralism and the horrific events 
of the twentieth century, but a newer variant that asserts that what is common to humans 
is not rationality but the ontological fact of mortality, not the capacity to reason but 
vulnerability to suffering.”43
Judith Butler has been at the forefront in theorising such a cosmopolitan ethics 
centred around notions of vulnerability to suffering.  In  Giving An Account of Oneself, 
Precarious Life, and  Frames of War she  calls for a “reconceptualization of the Left” 
based on precariousness as “a shared condition of human life.”44 As she explains,  “we 
are, as it were, social beings from the start, dependent on what is outside ourselves, on 
others, on institutions, and on sustained and sustainable environments, and so are, in this 
sense,  precarious.”  She argues  that  mindfulness of this  ontological  vulnerability  can 
serve as  a  new basis  of  political  community,  enabling  a  “we” to  be  formed across 
cultures of difference.  The experience of loss and mourning is central to this project 
because, as Butler explains, it unravels the precariousness of life and our vulnerability to 
the Other, showing that we are never completely autonomous “bounded beings”45 but 
always already linked to others, to strangers. Indeed, “many people think that grief is 
privatizing, that it returns us to a solitary situation and is, in that sense, depoliticizing. 
But I think it furnishes a sense of political community of a complex order, and it does 
this  first  of all  by bringing to the fore the relational  ties  that have implications for 
theorizing fundamental dependency and ethical responsibility.”46 
42 See Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2004); 
Simon Critchley, Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance (Verso Books, 
2013); Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia; David Campbell 
and Michael Shapiro, Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota, 1999); FranÃ§ois Raffoul, The Origins of Responsibility (Indiana University Press, 2010); 
Stephen K. White, The Ethos of a Late-Modern Citizen (Harvard University Press, 2009); Ewa 
Płonowska Ziarek, An Ethics of Dissensus: Postmodernity, Feminism, and the Politics of Radical  
Democracy (Stanford University Press, 2001).
43 Bonnie Honig, Antigone, Interrupted (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 17.
44 Judith Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? (London: Verso, 2010), 13–14.
45 Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 24.
46 Butler's argument thus stands in contrast to the psychoanalytic tradition of Freud which understands 
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The immediate problem for such an ethics is that “certain human lives are more 
grievable  than  others.”47 While  precariousness  for  Butler  is  an  ontological,  shared 
condition of humanity, her work is alert to the various ways in which this vulnerability 
is differently distributed, rendering some lives more vulnerable than others. In Frames 
of War she explains how the possibility of acknowledging another person's vulnerability 
and suffering depends on certain “epistemological frames.”48 That is, while some lives 
are  constructed  as  grievable  and  in  need  of  protection,  others  are  cast  as  bogus, 
“collateral damage”, and destructible. As she explains, “[t]hose we kill are not quite 
human, and not quite alive.”49 A simple acceptance of grief is therefore not sufficient to 
establish  bonds  of  solidarity  beyond  borders.  Rather, the  political  task  consists  in 
organising  precariousness  in  a  more  egalitarian  way,  most  crucially  by  devising 
alternative epistemological frames that enable those that are currently excluded to be 
recognised as fully human and as lives that matter. When the recognition of corporeal 
vulnerability is universally extended, or so the  argument goes, there is potential for a 
different kind of global politics.
Butler  has  not  been  alone  in  exploring  how the  experience  of  vulnerability, 
mourning,  and  suffering  can  inspire  new forms  of  solidarity.  This  approach gained 
particular traction after 9/11, when a diverse array of theorists began to reflect on how 
universal  vulnerability  can  provide  the  ground  for  a  renewed  cosmopolitanism.50 
Already in 1989 Richard Rorty argued for a solidarity based on the common human 
susceptibility  to  pain  and  humiliation.  In  Contingency,  Irony,  and  Solidarity  he 
suggested  that  progress  in  the  direction  of  greater  human  solidarity  is  achieved  by 
widening the scope of those who are considered “one of us”, which depends on the 
“imaginative ability to see strange people as fellow sufferers.”51 More recently, Stephen 
White  has  affirmed  an  ethics  based  on  the  “existential  realities”  of  finitude  and 
mortality.52 Trauma theorists such as Cathy  Caruth have similarly argued that trauma 
can  serve  as  a  new humanist  universal;  witnessing  trauma,  and  acknowledging  the 
capacity for pain that all people share, “may provide the very link between cultures.”53 
mourning as a private project. See Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, 22.
47 Butler, 30.
48 Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?, 9.
49 Butler, 42.
50 See James Brassett, “Cosmopolitan Sentiments after 9-11? Trauma and the Politics of Vulnerability,” 
Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies 2 (2010).
51 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge University Press, 1989), xvi.
52 White, The Ethos of a Late-Modern Citizen; Stephen K. White, Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths 
of Weak Ontology in Political Theory (Princeton University Press, 2000).
53 Cathy Caruth, Trauma: Explorations in Memory (JHU Press, 1995), 11.
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Trauma makes us realise  the shared humanity that links us to others who suffer;  as 
Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman explain, “the human being suffering from trauma” 
is  “the  very  embodiment  of  our  common  humanity.”54 Media  and  communication 
scholars Lili Chouliaraki and Susie Linfield have similarly explored how imaginative 
identification  with  those  who  suffer  can  function  as  a  catalyst for  the 
“cosmopolitanization” of solidarity.55 For  Chouliaraki and Linfield, stories and images 
of suffering are the primers for the exercise of our “citizenship of the world”, for the 
sentimental education of “our moral community”, and for the training of our empathetic,  
moral imagination. 
While  this  critical  turn  to  suffering  and  vulnerability  has  had  a  pronounced 
influence on international political theory,56 a number of critics have denounced it for 
reanimating an extra- or pre-political ground for politics; that is, for substituting politics 
for ethics or ontology.57 Honig, perhaps most forcefully, has argued that Butler's ethics 
of mourning succumbs to a “Hamletization” of politics which transforms “'the figure of 
the avenger into a reflective, self-conscious melancholic', mournful, and incapable of 
action.”58 A “politics of lamentation”, she suggests, easily slides into a “lamentation of 
politics”  which  merely  mourns,  rather  than  challenges,  sovereign  violence.59 Whilst 
some of  this  critique  is  overstated,  it  nonetheless  points  to  a  crucial  issue:  namely, 
whether an ethics grounded in the generalized suffering of a generic humanity is the best 
way  for  counteracting  contemporary  forms  of  violence  and  injustice.  Butler,  for 
example, takes it for granted that the contemporary unequal distribution of mourning—
whereby some forms of suffering and violence manage to generate mass outpourings of 
54 Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman, The Empire of Trauma: An Inquiry Into the Condition of  
Victimhood (Princeton University Press, 2009), 33.
55 Lilie Chouliaraki, The Ironic Spectator: Solidarity in the Age of Post-Humanitarianism (John Wiley & 
Sons, 2013); Lilie Chouliaraki, The Spectatorship of Suffering (Pine Forge Press, 2006); Susie 
Linfield, The Cruel Radiance: Photography and Political Violence (University of Chicago Press, 
2012).
56 For a selection, see Thomas Gregory, “Potential Lives, Impossible Deaths,” International Feminist  
Journal of Politics 14, no. 3 (September 1, 2012): 327–47, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2012.659851; Christina Masters and Elizabeth Dauphinee, eds., The 
Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Lauren B. 
Wilcox, Bodies of Violence: Theorizing Embodied Subjects in International Relations (Oxford 
University Press, 2014); Maja Zehfuss, “Hierarchies of Grief and the Possibility of War: 
Remembering UK Fatalities in Iraq,” Millennium 38 (2009).
57 For example, see Ella Myers, Wordly Ethics: Democratic Politcis and the Care for the World 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2013); Julian Reid, “The Vulnerable Subject of Liberal War,” South 
Atlantic Quarterly 110, no. 3 (June 20, 2011): 770–79, https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-1275788; 
Antonio Y. Vázquez-Arroyo, “Responsibility, Violence, and Catastrophe,” Constellations 15, no. 1 
(2008), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8675.2008.00476.x; Janell Watson, “Butler’s Biopolitics: 
Precarious Community,” Theory & Event 15, no. 2 (2012).
58 Honig, Antigone, Interrupted, 41.
59 Honig, 14.
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outrage, sorrow, or anguish, while others are barely noticed at all—is best countered by 
a pronounced emphasis on recognition, cultural difference, and affective identification 
with the wounds of others: in essence, by compassion, care, and empathy. Her call for 
an international politics of mourning in this way assumes that “proper” recognition will 
make the world less violent, and that resistance to normative “frames” will honour and 
protect the precarious, disposable bodies shattered throughout the world. As Burkhard 
Liebsch's explains, this is a “grief for strangers”, a mode of mourning that  refuses to 
“abandon the child who dies between boundary stones, the tortured person, the victim of 
racist  violence,  or  the  starving  person to  a  history  that  heedlessly  walks  over  dead 
bodies.”60 In that, the problem with an ethics of loss, vulnerability, and mourning might 
not  be its lack of political  engagement  (as suggested by critics such as Honig) but, 
rather, the particular kind of politics it serves to legitimise and make possible.
In her trilogy on national sentimentality, Lauren Berlant problematises one of the 
assumptions that underpin the critical turn to ethics; namely, the idea that changes in 
feeling and identification with pain lead to structural social change.61 The focus on pain 
and suffering, Berlant argues, all to frequently works to turn political problems into an 
affective  matter  to  be  solved  through  proper  feeling,  which  obscures  the  structural 
nature of oppression and inequality. In equating structural change with feeling good, the 
ethics  of compassion and sentimental  sympathy for  the  suffering  of  others  come to 
function as “propleptic shields” and as “ethically incontestable legitimating devices for 
sustaining the hegemonic field.”62 What, Berlant asks, “if it turns out that compassion 
and coldness are not opposite at all but are two sides of a bargain that the subject of 
modernity has struck with structural inequity?”63 For Berlant, sentimental politics is an 
eminently political project, launched on behalf of the beneficiaries of social injustice: it 
is a “defensive response by people who identify with privilege yet fear they will be 
exposed  as  immoral  by  their  tacit  sanction  of  a  particular  structural  violence  that 
benefits them.”64 Berlant's critique highlights the trajectory on which ethical conceptions  
such as those of Butler and Rorty are based: from pain to recognition to solidarity; or, 
from apathy to empathy to moral action. Such a perspective not only takes for granted 
60 Burkhard Liebsch and Donald Goodwin, “Grief as a Source, Expression, and Register of Political 
Sensitivity,” Social Research: An International Quarterly 83, no. 2 (October 4, 2016): 242.
61 Lauren Berlant, “The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy, and Politics,” in Cultural Pluralism, 
Identity Politics, and the Law, ed. Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns (University of Michigan Press, 
2001).
62 Berlant, 109.
63 Lauren Berlant, Compassion: The Culture and Politics of an Emotion (Routledge, 2014), 10.
64 Berlant, “The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy, and Politics,” 83–4.
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that a life that matters is a life that is recognised by “us”—in other words, by those with 
power and privilege located in the global North. It also fails to move beyond the frame 
of recognition to interrogate the material  structures of oppression that produce pain, 
suffering, and vulnerability as global and racialized conditions. As Neil  Lazarus and 
Rashmi  Varma  have  argued,  these  ethical  perspectives  ultimately  call  for  “minor 
adaptions”  and  a  passive  reconfiguration  of  the  hegemonic  order,  rather  than  a 
revolutionary displacement of the system.65 In a series of controversial tweets published 
in  2012,  novelist  Teju  Cole  describes  this  as  a  “white-saviour  industrial  complex”, 
which  allows  people  with  power  and  privilege  to  feel  outrage  at  isolated  disasters 
without taking note of the larger disasters behind them. As Cole explains, this is a form 
of solidarity in which “we can participate in the economic destruction of Haiti over long 
years,  but  when the earthquake strikes it  feels  good to send $10 each to  the rescue 
fund.”66 This form of solidarity produces no action towards justice; instead it is a “non-
confrontational politics” which, as James Petras has argued, takes up struggles against 
injustice without engaging “the social system that produces these conditions.”67 
In the end, the poststructuralist call for a new form of solidarity turns out to be 
not all that different from the liberal version it sets out to critique.68 While thinkers such 
as Butler are deeply critical of the abstract subject that anchors liberal ethics, their own 
ethical  formulations  operate  behind a  similar  veil  of  ignorance:  namely,  behind the 
generalized and anonymised suffering of a generic humanity.  The result  is  a similar 
erasure  of  history,  and  a  transformation  of  the  relation  between  the  oppressor  and 
oppressed into one of the lucky and the unlucky. By substituting abstract humanity for 
historical  humanity,  these  perspectives  ultimately  elide  the  historically  instantiated 
difference between what Sunera Thobani describes as “those doing the occupying and 
65 Neill Lazarus and Rashmi Varma, “Marxism and Postcolonial Studies,” in Critical Companion to 
Contemporary Marxism, ed. Jacques Bidet (BRILL, 2008).
66 Teju Cole, “The White-Savior Industrial Complex,” The Atlantic, March 21, 2012, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/03/the-white-savior-industrial-
complex/254843/
67 James Petras, “NGOs: In the Service of Imperialism,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 29, no. 4 
(January 1, 1999): 435, https://doi.org/10.1080/00472339980000221.
68 In a recent article, Ansems de Vries et al similarly argue that poststructuralist thought, “despite its 
commitment to critiquing modern, liberal ontologies” often tacitly reproduce “these same ontologies... 
resulting in a failure to grasp contemporary structures and histories of violence and domination.” See 
Leonie Ansems de Vries et al., “Collective Discussion: Fracturing Politics (Or, How to Avoid the Tacit 
Reproduction of Modern/Colonial Ontologies in Critical Thought),” International Political Sociology 
11, no. 1 (March 1, 2017): 90, https://doi.org/10.1093/ips/olw028. Robert Meister makes a similar 
point in After Evil when he notes that “like today’s humanitarian politics, the first imperative of 
Levinasian ethics like humanitarian is to avoid historical contextualization.” Meister, After Evil, 
2011, 43.
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those being occupied.”69 
So far I have argued that cosmopolitan articulations of solidarity—in its liberal 
as well as critical-poststructuralist form—often fail to take seriously questions of race, 
colonialism, and their contemporary legacies. Because of this they frequently fall into 
the trap of reproducing and legitimising the current unjust, racialized global order. But 
what  about  the  growing  body  of  literature  on  postcolonial  cosmopolitanism—
scholarship that does centre-stage the colonial question? In the next section I turn to the 
work of Kwame Anthony Appiah and Homi Bhabha to show that a postcolonial  re-
reading of cosmopolitanism “from below” in fact is insufficient to properly address the 
racial structuring of the international. Postcolonial approaches do not so much challenge 
as  supplement  hegemonic  forms  of  cosmopolitanism,  offering  a  description  of  how 
cosmopolitan  sentiments  might  come  into  being  from  below.  As  we  shall  see,  in 
conceiving of colonialism in purely civilisational terms, and Eurocentrism as a mainly 
cultural force, these approaches ultimately elide the political economy of race and the 
materiality of the global colour line.
Solidarity From Below: Postcolonialism and the Elision of Political Economy 
In recent years postcolonial thinkers such as Kwame Anthony Appiah and Homi 
Bhabha  have  sought  to  derive  a  rooted,  vernacular,  and  subaltern  form  of 
cosmopolitanism. These attempts to rethink cosmopolitanism from the margins emerged 
as  a  response  to  critiques  that  cosmopolitanism  is  an  elitist  project  born  out  of 
economic, political, and cultural privilege. As Craig Calhoun has famously argued, the 
culture of cosmopolitanism has historically flourished in locations created by empire 
and capitalism; today it finds its strongest expression among “the top management of 
multinational corporations and even more in the consulting firms that serve them.”70 
Cosmopolitanism,  Calhoun  concludes,  is  ultimately  no  more  than  a  “good  ethical 
orientation for those privileged to inhabit the frequent traveler lounges.”71 
69 Sunera Thobani, “White Wars: Western Feminisms and the `War on Terror’,” Feminist Theory 8, no. 2 
(August 1, 2007): 176, https://doi.org/10.1177/1464700107078140.
70 Calhoun, “The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travellers: Towards a Critique of Actually Existing 
Cosmopolitanism,” 106.
71 Calhoun, 8. Jeremy Waldron similarly defines the cosmopolite as someone who “refuses to think of 
himself as defined by his location or his ancestry or his citizenship or his language. Through he may 
live in San Francisco and be of Irish ancestry, he does not take his identity to be compromised when 
he learns Spanish, eats Chinese, wears clothing made in Korea, listens to arias by Verdi sung by a 
Maori princess on Japanese equipment, follows Ukrainian politics, and practices Buddhist meditation 
techniques. He is a creature of modernity, conscious of living in a mixed up world and having a mixed 
up self.” Jeremy Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative,” University of  
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Responding to this critique,  scholars such as Kwame Anthony Appiah,  Homi 
Bhabha, Kobena Mercer, Partha Mitter, Fukuyi Kurasawa, and  Srinivas Aravamudan 
have argued that it in fact is possible to re-conceive cosmopolitanism from the margins. 
As Robert  Holton  explains, there  exists  a  “plurality  of  forms of  cosmopolitanisms” 
which  expose  “the  Eurocentricity  of  the  older  unitary  Western  cosmopolitanisms.”72 
James Clifford was the first to theorise such a cosmopolitanism from below. In his 1992 
article  “Traveling  Cultures”  he  contests  the  idea  that  cosmopolitans  necessarily  are 
members of a global elite. As he explains, 
“people have, for many centuries, constructed their sense of belonging, 
their notions of home, of spiritual and bodily power and freedom, along a 
continuum of socio-spatial attachments. These extend from local valleys 
and  neighbourhoods  to  denser  urban  sites  of  encounter  and  relative 
anonymity, from national communities tied to a territory to affiliations 
across borders and oceans. In these diverse contact zones, people sustain 
critical, non-absolutist strategies for survival and action in a world where 
space is always already invaded. These competencies can be redeemed 
under a sign of hope as 'discrepant cosmopolitanism.'”73 
For  Clifford,  there  are  many  different  cosmopolitan  practices,  each  with  their  own 
historicity and distinctive world-view. The project of cosmopolitanism, he argues, need 
thus not be “class-or ethno-centric.”74 
Clifford's ideas have been picked up by a range of authors who have put forward 
their  own version  of “postcolonial”,  “rooted”,  “subaltern”,  “marginal”,  “vernacular”, 
and  “actually  existing”  cosmopolitanisms.75 As  Paul  Rabinow  explains,  these 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform 25 (1992 1991): 95. Similarly, and as Gurminder Bhambra explains, 
“'being cosmopolitan' (as a practice) is seen as being in the West and cosmopolitanism (as an idea) is  
seen as being of the West.” Gurminder Bhambra, “Cosmopolitanism and the Postcolonial Critique,” in 
The Ashgate Research Companion to Cosmopolitanism, ed. Maria Rovisco and Magdalena Nowicka 
(Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2011), 314.
72 Robert John Holton, “Cosmopolitanism or Cosmopolitanisms? The Universal Races Congress of 
1911,” Global Networks 2, no. 2 (April 1, 2002): 153, https://doi.org/10.1111/1471-0374.00033.
73 James Clifford, “Mixed Feelings,” in Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation, ed. 
Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (U of Minnesota Press, 1998), 367.
74 James Clifford, “Travelling Cultures,” in Cultural Studies, ed. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and 
Paula A. Treichler (Psychology Press, 1992), 107.
75 Amongst others, Kobena Mercer has argued for “what could be called a 'cosmopolitanism-from-
below', in which perspectives on mass migration, exile, asylum, and border-crossings feature 
prominently”; Partha Mitter has written about the “virtual” cosmopolitan “who was a native of the 
peripheries, but who intellectually engaged with the knowledge system of the metropolis”; Uma 
Kothari has argued that migrants' “lived realities disrupt the predominantly elitist and Eurocentric 
characterizations of cosmopolitanism”; and Srinivas Aravamudan, in a similar vein, has put forward 
the idea of the “tropicopolitan” to describe figures such as Olaudah Equiano and Toussaint Louverture 
who “challenge the developing privilege of Enlightenment cosmopolitans”. See Kobena Mercer, ed., 
Cosmopolitan Modernisms (London, England : Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2005); Partha 
Mitter, “Reflections on Modern Art and National Identity in Colonial India,” in Cosmopolitan 
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perspectives are  committed to an  understanding of cosmopolitanism as “an ethos of 
macro-interdependencies, with an acute consciousness (often forced upon people) of the 
incapabilities and particularities of place, characters, historical trajectories, and fates.”76 
The result has been a rapid proliferation of cosmopolitan figures: no longer confined to 
the elite traveler, the category of the cosmopolitan is now also used to describe refugees, 
migrants, and the diaspora, as well as “North Atlantic merchant sailors, Caribbean au 
pairs in the United States, Egyptian guest workers in Iraq, [and] Japanese women who 
take gaijin lovers.”77
The idea of a cosmopolitanism from below is perhaps most closely associated 
with the work of Hombi Bhabha and Kwame Anthony Appiah. Bhabha, whose approach 
is based on the multi-ethnic ethics of British migrants and minorities, has theorised the 
existence of a “cosmopolitan community envisaged in marginality.”78 This is a border 
zone “between the patriotic and the cosmopolitan, the home and the world”79 which he 
labels vernacular cosmopolitanism. British minorities, he argues, lead a “double life... 
translating between cultures,  renegotiating traditions from a position where 'locality' 
insists  on  its  own  terms,  while  entering  into  larger  national  and  societal 
conversations.”80 Vernacular cosmopolitanism is thus to be “on the border,  in between, 
introducing the global-cosmopolitan 'action at a distance' into the very grounds—now 
displaced—of the domestic.”81
Modernisms, ed. Kobena Mercer (Institute of International Visual Arts, 2005); Srinivas Aravamudan, 
Tropicopolitans: Colonialism and Agency, 1688-1804 (Duke University Press, 1999). See also Kwame 
Anthony Appiah, The Ethics of Identity (Princeton University Press, 2010); Dipesh Chakrabarty et al., 
Cosmopolitanism (Duke University Press, 2002); Pheng Cheah, Bruce Robbins, and Social Text 
Collective, Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation (U of Minnesota Press, 1998); 
Uma Kothari, “Global Peddlers and Local Networks: Migrant Cosmopolitanisms,” Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 26, no. 3 (June 1, 2008): 500–516, https://doi.org/10.1068/dcos2; 
FUYUKI KURASAWA, “A Cosmopolitanism from Below: Alternative Globalization and the Creation 
of a Solidarity without Bounds,” European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de  
Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv Für Soziologie 45, no. 2 (2004): 233–55, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/23999133; Marianna Papastephanou, Thinking Differently About  
Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Eccentricity, and the Globalized World (Routledge, 2015); Stephanos 
Stephanides and Stavros Karayanni, Vernacular Worlds, Cosmopolitan Imagination (BRILL, 2015); 
Pnina Werbner, Anthropology and the New Cosmopolitanism: Rooted, Feminist and Vernacular  
Perspectives (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015).
76 Paul Rabinow, “Representations Are Social Facts,” in Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of  
Ethnography, ed. James Clifford and George E. Marcus (University of California Press, 1986), 258.
77 Bruce Robbins, “Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism,” in Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling 
Beyond the Nation, ed. Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (U of Minnesota Press, 1998), 1.
78 Homi K. Bhabha, “Unsatisfied: Notes on Vernacular Cosmopolitanism,” in Text and Nation: Cross-
Disciplinary Essays on Cultural and National Identities, ed. Laura García-Moreno and Peter C. 
Pfeiffer (Camden House, 1996), 195–6.




Appiah,  meanwhile,  has  called  for  a  “rooted”  cosmopolitanism  which  puts 
Western and non-Western (in particular, African) values, traditions, and debates about 
human  rights,  citizenship,  and  cultural  identity  into  dialogue.82 Reading  Western 
Enlightenment liberal  thinkers such as John Stuart  Mill alongside Asante philosophy 
and the political experience of his Ghanian father, who lived through colonialism and 
the anti-colonial struggle for liberation and independence, Appiah outlines a new and 
dialogic  cosmopolitanism committed  to  acknowledging  and  pursuing  difference  and 
cultural hybridisation. In contrast to those who see cosmopolitanism as the antidote to 
nationalism,  he  maintains  that  cosmopolitanism in  fact  begins  from membership  in 
communities that value notions such as toleration and openness to the world and others.  
He is careful to point out that this is different from communitarianism, because rooted 
cosmopolitanism “is not the name for a dialogue among static closed cultures, each of 
which is internally homogenous and different from the others: not a celebration of the 
beauty of a collection of closed boxes.”83 Rather, it is based on the idea that “localism is 
an instrument to achieve universal ideals, universal goals.”84 On this basis, he goes on to 
argue, it is possible to construct “a form of universalism that is sensitive to the ways in 
which historical context may shape the significance of a practice.”85
What unites theorists such as Clifford, Bhabha, and Appiah is an emphasis on the 
non-elite  as  well  as  a  refusal  to  choose  between  postcolonial  nationalism  and 
cosmopolitanism.  Offering  a  via  media  between  liberal  cosmopolitanism  and 
communitarianism, they seek to combine respect for local differences with universal 
principles.  As  Angela  Taraborelli  explains,  “for  cosmopolitanism  from  below, 
cosmopolitanism  and  national  (or  national  conscience),  global  and  local  are  not 
necessarily  mutually  antithetical.”86 Where  liberal  versions  of  cosmopolitanism 
emphasise the formation of a global culture based on international law and institutions, 
postcolonial forms of cosmopolitanism thus rely on global pluralism and difference. In 
82 Appiah, The Ethics of Identity. See also Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World 
of Strangers, Reprint edition (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007) and Kwame Anthony 
Appiah, “Cosmopolitan Patriots,” Critical Inquiry 23, no. 3 (1997): 617–39, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1344038.
83 Appiah, The Ethics of Identity, 256.
84 Appiah, 241.
85 Appiah, 256.
86 Angela Taraborrelli, Contemporary Cosmopolitanism (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015), 92. Meyda 
Yegenoglu similarly argues that cosmopolitanism from below is “less dismissive of the need for 
nationalism in the Third World, a nationalism that is capable of articulating the will of the excluded 
subaltern populations”. See Meyda Yeĝenoĝlu, “Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism in a Globalized 
World,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 28, no. 1 (January 1, 2005): 103, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0141987042000280030.
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the words of Kurasawa, “transnational social integration along cosmopolitan lines does 
not require cultural assimilation but, on the contrary, the acknowledgement of global 
diversity.”87
While  these  approaches  have  been  successful  in  demonstrating  that 
cosmopolitanism need not  be elitist,  they are not  without  their  problems.  As David 
Harvey points out, vernacular cosmopolitanisms are more concerned with articulating 
“locally meaningful, relational futures than with transformation at a systemic level.”88 
While  thinkers  such  as  Bhabha  and  Appiah  are  critical  of  traditional  top-down 
approaches,  their  rooted  and  vernacular  alternatives  do  not  so  much  challenge  as 
supplement them, providing a description of how cosmopolitan sentiments might come 
into being from below. For Harvey,  Appiah's call for a rooted cosmopolitanism even 
“ends up supporting the liberal and neoliberal imperialist practices that reproduce class 
inequalities,  while  soothing  our  nerves  with  respect  to  multicultural  differences.”89 
Alfredo Gonzales-Ruibal has similarly argued that postcolonial cosmopolitanisms elide 
“global  structural  inequalities,  long-term  processes  of  oppression,  and  the  real  and 
traumatic  impact  that  Western  culture  and  politics  exercise  over  the  third  world.”90 
Postcolonial  versions  of  cosmopolitanism  do  not disturb  or  quarrel  with  colonial 
relations of  power and the global  colour  line;  quite  the  opposite,  these “liberals  on 
safari”91 actually sanction the status quo, because they allow Western elites “to keep 
their lifestyles and worldviews, while at the same time appeasing their consciences.”92 
The underlying problem, as materialist thinkers such as Benita Parry and Neil Lazarus 
remind us, is that the field of postcolonial studies historically has overlooked the link 
between colonialism and the wider history of capitalist development. By conceiving of 
colonialism in purely civilisational terms, and Eurocentrism as a mainly cultural force, 
postcolonialism  has  often  helped  mystify  the  larger  historical  dynamic  of  global 
capitalism and its role in reproducing racial differences.93 That is, in approaching race 
87 KURASAWA, “A Cosmopolitanism from Below,” 239.
88 David Harvey, Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom (Columbia University Press, 2009), 
113.
89 Harvey, 115.
90 Alfredo González-Ruibal, “Vernacular Cosmopolitanism: An Archeological Critique of Universalistic  
Reason,” in Cosmopolitan Archaeologies, ed. Lynn Meskell (Duke University Press, 2009), 118.
91 González-Ruibal, 118.
92 González-Ruibal, 118.
93 For a historical materialist critique of postcolonialism, see Crystal Bartolovich and Neil Lazarus, 
Marxism, Modernity and Postcolonial Studies (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Benita Parry, 
Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique (Routledge, 2004); Lazarus and Varma, “Marxism and 
Postcolonial Studies”; Neil Lazarus, “What Postcolonial Theory Doesn’t Say,” Race & Class 53, no. 1 
(July 1, 2011): 3–27, https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396811406778; Vivek Chibber, Postcolonial Theory  
and the Specter of Capital (Verso Books, 2013).
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through the lens of difference rather than domination, these perspective ultimately evade 
the materiality of racial hierarchies, including the entanglements of the racialized social 
order, the spread of empire, and capitalist accumulation.  This is in contrast to earlier 
anti-colonial  thinkers  such  as  Frantz  Fanon,  C.L.R.  James,  Claudia  Jones, Amílcar 
Cabral, Cedric Robinson, and Angela Davis, who situated their critiques of colonialism 
and racial oppression within a historical materialist framework. In chapter 3 I argue that 
addressing  the  coloniality  of  mainstream  perspectives  requires  more  than  “plural”, 
“hybrid”, and “diverse” re-readings of cosmopolitanism. As we shall see, it necessitates 
that  the  very  nature  and  problem of  the  global  colour  line  be  rethought  through  a 
materialist lens, so as to uncover the link between the logic of capital and the production 
of racial difference. Before moving on to this, we must first consider the ideological 
work done by cosmopolitan formulations of solidarity, in its liberal, poststructuralist, 
and postcolonial forms.
The Swindle
In The Meursault Investigation, Kamel Daoud offers a postcolonial rejoinder to 
Albert Camus' absurdist classic The Stranger. Told in the words of Harun—the brother 
of the nameless Arab murdered by Camus' protagonist in the blazing sun on an Algerian 
beach—Daoud makes us remember what Camus erased: Africa. The Stranger, he wants 
us to understand, is ultimately a “swindle.” It presents itself as an existential reflection 
on man's absurd condition but is, in actuality, structured by French colonialism and an 
imperial sensibility that renders native Algerians as faceless puppets and mannequins: as 
the background against which the adventure of the central, European character unfolds. 
As Harun tells us:
“The books success is still undiminished, but I repeat, I think it's an awful 
swindle.  After Independence,  the more I  read of your hero's work,  the 
more I had the feeling I was pressing my face against the window of a big 
room where a party was going on that neither my mother nor I had been 
invited to. Everything happened without us. There's not a trace of our loss 
or of what became of us afterward.  No a single trace,  my friend! The 
whole world eternally witnesses the same murder in the blazing sun, but 
no one saw anything, and no one watched us recede into the distance. No 
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one! There's good reason to get a little angry, don't you think?”94
Like The Stranger, cosmopolitan formulations of solidarity can be thought of as 
a swindle: as  structured by a colonial condition they legitimate as they obfuscate. As 
Sankaran Krishna reminds us in an article from 2001, the whole of IR is “predicated on 
a systematic  politics of forgetting,  a wilful  amnesia,  on the question of race.”95 IR's 
founding narrative of the territorially sovereign state system is kept in place and made 
possible by the “valorization, indeed fetishization, of abstraction” which removes from 
view the “violence, genocide, and theft that marked the encounter between the rest and 
the West in the post-Columbian era.”96 In cosmopolitan theorising, this valorisation of 
abstraction shows up as a preference for what Raymond Geuss has called “ethics-first”: 
the idea that  “there is, or could be, such a thing as a separate discipline called Ethics 
which... can  be studied without locating it in the rest of life, and in relation to claims of 
history, sociology and economics.”97 From this flows the belief that ethical inquiry is 
separate from moral practice and, thus,  that ethics can be abstracted from particular 
histories and geographical circumstances. As we have seen, liberal, poststructural and, 
to some extent, postcolonial cosmopolitans all strive for an apolitical understanding of 
solidarity, one that is grounded in ontology and arise from  a pre-existing moral relation
—be it  rationality,  sovereignty,  vulnerability,  or suffering.  This  focus on abstraction, 
ahistoricism, and anti-politics is not innocent: indeed, it  contributes to a wilful amnesia 
on  the  question  of  race  in  world  politics.  As  Krishna  makes  clear,  the  “fetish  for 
abstraction  [is] deeply political and depoliticizing”98 because it brackets questions of 
history,  “of  theft  of  land,  violence,  and  slavery—the  three  processes  that  have 
historically underlain the unequal global order we now find ourselves in.”99 As anti-
colonial scholars and practitioners such as Césaire, Cabral, and Fanon remind us, wilful 
amnesia sits at the heart of the colonial project—because it sanctions the idea, not only 
that  the  world  is  postcolonial  and  postracial,  but  also  that  the  long  history  of 
colonialism,  racialized  indentured  servitude,  Indigenous  genocide,  and  transatlantic 
94 Kamel Daoud, The Meursault Investigation (Oneworld Publications, 2015), 64.
95 Sankaran Krishna, “Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations,” Alternatives:  
Global, Local, Political 26, no. 4 (2001): 401, https://doi.org/10.2307/40645028.
96 Krishna, 401.
97 Raymond Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). See 
also Bernard Williams, In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument 
(Princeton University Press, 2009).
98 Krishna, “Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations,” 402.
99 Krishna, 401–2.
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slavery have left no traces in culture, language, and knowledge production.100 
Viewed from this perspective, the cosmopolitan disavowal of the global colour 
line is,  as Charls Mills has argued, less the result  of a “mysterious omission than a 
straightforward  implication  of  a  framework  built  on  mystifying  the  past  and  the 
present.”101 After all,  the act  of forgetting is never benign: rather, and as Ann Laura 
Stoler points out, it is a political condition and a form of “remembering otherwise.”102 In 
telling  the  story  of  Meursault,  Camus  forgot  nothing;  as  a  settler  and  pied-noir  in 
Algeria, his life was shaped by French colonialism. Colonialism is at once everywhere 
and nowhere in The Stranger. In cosmopolitan formulations of solidarity, it is similarly 
hidden  in  plain  sight.  Indeed,  in  their  desire  to  carve  out  a  moral,  impartial,  and 
ahistorical  space  beyond  ideology  and  political  differences,  cosmopolitan  thinkers 
frequently repress the global histories of empire and colonial capitalism. The result is an 
inherently hierarchical and ahistorical understanding of solidarity, one that is based on 
the  authority  of  the  international  and  its  (supposedly)  clean  hands.  Ultimately,  by 
addressing the “international community” as bystanders rather than beneficiaries (who 
are not to blame for the excesses and violence of the current order), these perspectives 
invite  the  white  subject  to  understand  itself  as  if  outside  of  history,  and  thus  as 
inherently  “ethical”  and  “good.”  The  result  is  a  shift  in  focus,  from  questions  of 
accountability, guilt, restitution, repentance, and structural reform to matters of empathy,  
generosity, and hospitality: a politics of pity rather than justice, in the words of Hannah 
Arendt, and a consequent recasting of the responsible colonial agent into an innocent 
bystander.103 
A swindle, in other words.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that cosmopolitan theories of solidarity contribute 
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David Theo Goldberg and Ato Quayson (Wiley-Blackwell, 2002); Paul Gilroy, Postcolonial  
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to  an ideological  formation that  rationalises and legitimises  the racial  structuring of 
world  politics.  In  seeking  to  derive  an  apolitical  understanding  of  solidarity,  these 
approaches privilege ontological reflection above and before analysis of historical and 
material  relations of power.  The cosmopolitan  valorisation of ontological thinking—
which sees solidarity  as arising from a pre-  or extra-political  moral relation—is not 
innocent, because it reduces political conflicts “to an ethical narrative structured around 
binaries  of  good/evil  and  saviours/victims. As  Meister  demonstrates  in  After  Evil, 
cosmopolitan political theory presents itself as having transcended the old politics of 
revolution and counterrevolution. This is in contrast to revolutionary ideologies which, 
as Meister argues, typically conceived of “justice-as-struggle.”104 The goal was not only 
to overthrow the evil regime but also to force beneficiaries of past injustice to relinquish 
their  illegitimate  gains.  In  contrast,  cosmopolitanism  rests  on  a  sympathetic 
identification with innocent victims on all sides. At the heart of this is a more narrow 
understanding of the concept of “evil.” Instead of “a system of social injustice that can 
have ongoing structural effects,  even after the structure is dismantled”,105 the utmost 
form of evil is here seen as physical violence against the human body. As we shall see in 
the next chapter, for cosmopolitans stopping evil thus “consists of rescuing those who 
suffer, even if that suffering is inflicted in the name of revolution.”106 This shift—from 
revolutionary justice to an ethics based on putting an end to physical violence—would 
have been inconceivable without the demise of the global struggles against colonialism 
and capitalism. In fact, and as Randall Williams has argued, today's cosmopolitanism 
has not just replaced the Third World decolonising struggles of the 1950-70s, but has 
“come to oppose other progressive forms.”107 
In the end, the problem with cosmopolitan approaches to international solidarity 
is not only that they substitute ethical truths for political struggle. They also contribute 
to a wilful amnesia on the question of race in world politics—a point that was made by 
Du  Bois  already  in  1944.  By  transforming the  responsible  colonial  agent  into  an 
innocent bystander, these perspectives turn questions of accountability, guilt, restitution, 
repentance,  and  structural  reform,  into  matters  of  hospitality,  generosity, 
humanitarianism, and empathy—a self-congratulatory defense of the racialized unequal 
and unjust status quo.  Framed  as a one-way street whereby powerful and privileged 
104 Meister, After Evil, 2011, 22.
105 Meister, 25.
106 Meister, 20.
107 Williams, The Divided World: Human Rights and Its Violence, 16.
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actors extend solidarity, compassion, and empathy to those who suffer, the praxis of 
international solidarity here becomes “a matter of self-empowerment through which the 
idealized Western  subject  improves  his  humanity  at  the  expense of  the  suffering of 
others through the practice of deferred complicity.”108 Cosmopolitan approaches thus 
turn out to themselves be underpinned by a particular racial logic—based on the desire 
to protect and offer political resistance for endangered others—which enables the white 
Western subject to re-constitute itself as “ethical” and “good”, innocent of its imperialist 
histories and present complicities.  As we shall see, the cosmopolitan projection of the 
world as  an  ethical space  is  ultimately  a  historically  produced discourse, intimately 
linked to the defeat of the global counterrevolutions to colonialism and capitalism.
108 Gaztambide-Fernández, “Decolonization and the Pedagogy of Solidarity,” 55.
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C H A P T E R  2
From Revolution to Ethics: Historicizing the Cosmopolitan Turn
“In 1968 that word—revolution—was on everyone's lips. By the early 1980s and 
especially by the 1990s, everywhere one turned, there was talk of ethics. What 
had been revolutionized was the very notion of revolution itself.”
—Julian Bourg1
Introduction
In an article reflecting on the politics of humanitarianism, Didier Fassin argues 
that the past fifty years have undergone a radical shift in moral outlook; “Whereas, not 
so long ago, that is until the 1960s, volunteers went off to fight alongside peoples in 
their liberation struggles, it is now humanitarian workers who go to take care of victims 
of conflict.”2 Indeed, where  the language evoked to defend oppressed peoples used to 
focus  on  revolution  and  anti-imperialism,  today  we  favour  “the  vocabulary  of 
psychology to sensitize the world to  their  misfortune.”3 In  our  era,  Fassin seems to 
suggest, it is the “the Holocaust” and not “the Revolution” that has come to define the 
relation between ethics and politics.
In this chapter I take Fassin's observation as the starting point for deepening my 
analysis of cosmopolitanism, ethics, and the global colour line. In the previous chapter I 
argued  that  cosmopolitan  theories of  solidarity  are  premised  on  the  idea  that  it  is 
possible, and indeed desirable, to separate ethics and politics (or ontology and history). 
In  this  chapter  I  subject  this  assumption  to theoretical  and  empirical  inquiry  and 
challenge. Interrogating the historical, political, and conceptual conditions of possibility 
of the turn to cosmopolitan political theory, I argue that the meaning of solidarity has 
undergone a radical transformation since the 1970s, as discourses of ethics, empathy, 
and  suffering  have  come  to  displace  the  language  of revolution,  liberation,  and 
decolonisation. My analysis reveals that this discursive shift reflects particular historical 
and material conditions, which include the global defeat of  the counterrevolutions to 
colonialism and capitalism,  the  transformation of  the  old (Euro-American)  Left,  the 
American search for a new moral vocabulary after Vietnam, and the globalisation of 
1 Julian Bourg, From Revolution to Ethics: May 1968 and Contemporary French Thought (McGill-
Queen’s Press - MQUP, 2007), 4.
2 Didier Fassin, “The Humanitarian Politics of Testimony: Subjectification through Trauma in the 
Israeli–Palestinian Conflict,” Cultural Anthropology 23, no. 3 (November 4, 2012): 532.
3 Fassin, 532.
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neoliberal capitalism.  A critical analysis of these structuring forces not only calls  into 
question the ethics/politics distinction on which the cosmopolitan project is based. As 
we shall  see,  it also demonstrates that  cosmopolitanism's  preference  for  abstraction, 
ahistoricism, and anti-politics is an eminently political strategy; a strategy that helps to 
uphold, legitimise, and entrench the current unjust and unequal racialized international 
order. 
I develop this  argument in four sections. I begin with a short introduction to 
Marxist approaches to political theory in order to answer the question: Why historicize? 
That is, why subject theoretical texts to historical analysis? Drawing on scholars such as 
Ellen Meiksins Woods, C.B. Macpherson, and Richard Ashcraft, I argue that  political 
theory  needs  to  be  understood  as  historical  product,  and  as  anchored  in  particular 
material  conditions  and relations  of  power.  Building  on this,  the  following sections 
interrogate the conditions of possibility of the rise of cosmopolitan ethics. My analysis 
centre-stages the two world revolutions of 1848 and 1968, and shows how these gave 
rise to moral discourses seeking to legitimise, perpetuate, and entrench the current world  
order.  I  begin by detailing the birth and evolution of Victorian humanism, from the 
foundation  of  the  International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross  (ICRC) in  1853 to  its 
apogee  with  the  creation  of  the  League  of  Nations  in  1919.  As  the  global  contest 
between the superpowers built up and Europe lost its empire after the Second World 
War, these ethical discourses temporarily receded into the background. Sections three 
and four analyse the structuring forces that returned humanism in the 1970s. I argue that 
the resurgence of cosmopolitan thinking is intimately linked to the defeat of the global 
counterrevolutions  to  colonialism  and  capitalism,  as  well  as  the  globalisation  of 
neoliberal  capitalism.  This  propelled  a  return to  Victorian  humanist  ideas  about  the 
white man's burden, and a consequent transformation of the meaning of solidarity. As 
Kant displaced Marx, and discourses of empathy and suffering superseded the language 
of  struggle  and liberation,  solidarity  would increasingly  come to be associated with 
ethics—and not the revolution. 
Why Historize? A Marxist Approach to Political Theory
The idea that political theory must be historicized is most commonly associated 
with  Marxist  methods  of  interpretation.  In  contrast  to  the  cosmopolitan  thinkers 
discussed in the previous chapter, Marxist interpretation approaches political theory as 
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historical  product.4 Marx  developed  this  idea  in  The  German  Ideology,  where  he 
criticised the Young or Left Hegelians for wrongfully considering thoughts and ideas as 
freestanding  from  material  surroundings;  “It  has  not  occurred  to  any  one  of  these 
philosophers”, he argued, “to inquire into the connection of German philosophy  with 
German reality, the connection of their criticism with their own material surroundings.”5 
For  Marx,  this  was  problematic  because  “[t]he  mode of  production  of  material  life 
conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general.”6 Indeed, “[i]t is 
not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary,  their 
social  being  that  determines  their  consciousness.”7 Political  theorists  such  as  Ellen 
Meiksins Wood, C.B. Macpherson, and Richard Ashcraft  have extended this idea by 
highlighting the political and ideological—as opposed to philosophical or idealistic—
nature  of  political  theory.  Academic  theory,  they  argue,  does  not  exist  in  a  sphere 
independent  of  economic,  political,  and  ideological  conflicts,  but  is  a  reflection  of 
particular historical and material conditions. This means that the goal of the Marxist 
critic is to expose “the illusion of the epoch” by showing how political theory texts work 
to universalise particular (class) interests. 
In her “social history of Western political theory”,8 Ellen Meiksins Wood details 
the requirements and political stakes of Marxist interpretation. Examining the specific 
historical contexts in which thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine, and 
Thomas  Aquinas  developed  their  canonical  works,  she  argues  that  “the  political 
questions addressed by political theorists are thrown up by real political life and are 
shaped by the historical conditions in which they arise.”9 This might sound similar to the 
historical approach associated with the Cambridge School. However, unlike Cambridge 
School scholars such as Skinner and Pocock—for whom political theory needs to be 
situated in relation to specific texts and intellectual debates of the time—Wood also 
seeks  to  unravel  the  link  between  material  conditions  and  political  ideas.  Political 
theory, she argues, must be analysed in relation to the material and class interests it 
4 For a good introduction to Marxian interpretation, see Richard Ashcraft, “Political Theory and the 
Problem of Ideology,” The Journal of Politics 42, no. 3 (August 1, 1980): 687–705, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2130546; Katherine A. Gordy, “Marxian Interpretations of Political Theory,” 
in Interpretation in Political Theory, ed. Clement Fatovic and Sean Noah Walsh (Taylor & Francis, 
2016); Ellen Meiksins Wood, Citizens to Lords: A Social History of Western Political Thought from 
Antiquity to the Late Middle Ages (Verso Books, 2011).
5 Quoted in Allen Oakley, Marx’s Critique of Political Economy Volume One: Intellectual Sources and  
Evolution (Routledge, 2013), 90.
6 Oakley, 103.
7 Oaklet, 103.
8 Wood, Citizens to Lords.
9 Wood, 8.
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serves  and from which  it  emerges.  This  means  interrogating the  “relations  between 
people who produce and those who appropriate what others produce”; “the forms of 
property  that  emerge  from  these  social  relations”;  and  “how  these  relations  are 
expressed in political domination, as well as resistance and struggle.”10
One of the best-known examples of Marxist  interpretation in practice is C.B. 
Macpherson's  The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, published in 1962. In 
this work Macpherson interrogates how and why contractarian thinkers such as Hobbes 
and Locke embraced an understanding of the individual as “essentially the proprietor of 
his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them.”11 His analysis details 
how Hobbes and Locke took this idea from their surrounding capitalist relations, at the 
same time that they helped justify them. As Macpherson points out,  capitalism only 
makes sense as long as humans are understood as possessive individuals. Through their 
market  assumptions  about  human nature,  Hobbes  and  Locke  thus  helped legitimise 
particular inequalities endemic to market relations because
“the maintenance [of any particular system of property] requires at least 
the acquiescence of the bulk of the people, and the positive support of 
any leading classes.  Such support requires a belief  that the institution 
serves some purpose or fills some need. That belief requires, in turn, that 
there be a theory which both explains and justifies the institution in terms  
of the purpose served or the need filled.”12
For Macpherson, this is precisely what possessive individualist theories do—and as such 
political theory is neither neutral nor autonomous.
In the discipline of IR, the best example of Marxist interpretation is perhaps E.H. 
Carr's  classic  The Twenty  Years'  Crisis.  While  Carr  often is  categorised  as  a  realist 
thinker—belonging  to  the  same  camp  as  Morgenthau  and  Niebuhr—his  critique  of 
interwar  liberal  internationalism is  in  fact  an  exercise  in  Marxist  interpretation  and 
ideology  critique.13 Thinkers  such  as  Norman  Angell  and  Leonard  Woolf  were, 
according to Carr, exponents of the ideology of the rich and powerful states. Liberal 
assumptions about the hidden hand—which postulates that the market is what provides 
10 Wood, 12.
11 Crawford Brough Macpherson and Frank Cunningham, The Political Theory of Possessive  
Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford University Press, 2011), 3.
12 Quoted in Peter Lindsay, Creative Individualism: The Democratic Vision of C. B. Macpherson (SUNY 
Press, 1996), 71.
13 For a good overview of Carr's Marxist commitments, see Peter Wilson, “Radicalism for a 
Conservative Purpose: The Peculiar Realism of E. H. Carr,” Millennium 30, no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 
123–36, https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298010300010901.
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the greatest possible freedom, welfare, and peace for all  humanity as a whole—were, 
for  Carr,  the ideological  move par  excellence.  That  is,  by elevating law,  order,  and 
laissez faire capitalism to the status of universal principles, interwar liberals failed to see  
the self-interested character of their own thought.
To summarise, Marxist interpretation points to the necessity of giving political 
theory a foundation in history and revealing its ideological function. As Karl Mannheim 
explained, “there are modes of thought which cannot be adequately understood as long 
as  their  social  origins  are  obscured.”14 Political  theory  does  not  take  place  in  an 
autonomous realm, but is a deeply and inherently political exercise.15 The task, thus, is 
to  situate  arguments  that  present  themselves  as  expressing  timeless  and  universal 
interests and to expose the particular interests that they serve. The majority of Marxist 
works of interpretation have so far focused on canonical texts in political theory, with 
little or no work being done on contemporary political theorising. While scholars such 
as  Anthony  Pagden  have  shown  that  cosmopolitan  discourses  historically  have 
flourished in locales of empire, there have been relatively few attempts to historicize the 
post-1989 revival of cosmopolitan political theory.16 Seeking to address this lacunae, in 
what  follows  I  interrogate  the  historical,  conceptual,  and  political  conditions  of 
possibility of the recent turn to cosmopolitanism. What, I ask, would it mean to think of 
contemporary cosmopolitanism as a historically produced discourse and—crucially—as 
an ideological reflection of particular material conditions?
Victorian Beginnings: 1848 and the White Man's Burden
The historical roots of cosmopolitanism are often said to reside in Cynic and 
Stoic philosophy, in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, the French and American 
Revolutions, in Tom Paine's The Rights of Man and Immanuel Kant's Perpetual Peace. 
According  to  standard  Whig  historiography,  these  unfolding  ideas  about  justice, 
freedom, and human dignity came into their own in the post-Cold War era, where they 
14 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (Routledge, 2013), 2.
15 This critique is no longer unique to Marxism. More recently postcolonial, decolonial, and feminist 
scholars have also challenged the idea that knowledge production can take place outside of history and 
social relations. Indicatively, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought  
and Historical Difference (Princeton University Press, 2000); Edward W. Said, Orientalism, 25th 
Anniversary Ed with 1995 Afterword Ed edition (London: Penguin Books, 2003); Gayatri Spivak, 
“Can the Subaltern Speak?,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and 
Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988).
16 Exceptions include Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Cornell University Press, 
2013); Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia (Harvard University Press, 2012). See also Anthony Pagden, 
The Burdens of Empire: 1539 to the Present (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 7.
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paved the  way for  cosmopolitan institutions  and doctrines  such as  the  International 
Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002 and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005. In what 
follows I challenge this interpretation by demonstrating that the rise of cosmopolitanism 
in the 1990s is less the result of a steady, gradual climb towards global justice, and more 
the product of a set of historical and material conditions which in the late 20 th century 
made it highly desirable for policymakers, activists, and intellectuals to think of world 
politics as an  ethical space. To understand what these conditions were we must begin 
much earlier—in fact, with the revolutions of 1848 and the “enlightened conservatism” 
to which they gave rise.
In  The  Endtimes  of  Human  Rights Stephen  Hopgood  details  the  Victorian 
origins of contemporary discourses of human rights, humanitarianism, and international 
law.  Victorian  humanism,  he  argues,  emerged  as  a  response  to  the  rapid  social 
transformations  of  the  19th century,  including  the  industrial  revolution, the  rapid 
integration  of  the  world  markets,  the  expansion  of  the  European  bourgeoisie,  and 
urbanisation on an unparalleled scale.17 These historical transformations gave rise to a 
wide array of new social problems which threatened to erupt the fabric of European 
society. In 1848 revolutions swept across Europe, with over fifty countries affected. The 
same year Marx and Engels wrote The Communist Manifesto, declaring that “a spectre 
is  haunting  Europe,  the  spectre  of  Communism.”18 A few years  later,  in  1864,  the 
International Workingmen's Association (better known as the First International) was 
formed in London; and then, in 1871, the Paris Commune demonstrated that the rapidly 
expanding working class  had  the  capacity  to  take  power  in  a  major  European city. 
Importantly, and as Robin D.G. Kelley observes,
“We tend to picture the 1848 revolutions... as the story of white men in 
the trenches, red flag unfurled in the name of bearded and proud skilled 
workers. But the 'colored' world remained a haunting specter in 1848. 
The  Revolution  in  France  resulted  in  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  its 
colonies, forty-four years after African descendants threw them out of 
Haiti and ended French slavery and colonialism there by combat. The 
British  had  abolished  slavery  fourteen  years  earlier  and  were  still 
wrestling their  Negro  Question:  how to turn  all  this  ex-property into 
willing and docile workers for Britannia.”19
17 In 1800 only 12% of Europe's population lived in sizeable cities; by 1900 this figure had risen to 30%. 
See Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights, 8; 32.
18 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (The Floating Press, 2009), 4.
19 Robin D. G. Kelley, Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination (Beacon Press, 2003), 40.
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For the ascendant bourgeoisie these developments posed an immanent threat and danger. 
The question, as Hopgood explains, was how “the contradictions within scientific and 
industrial  progress  [could] be reconciled while  sustaining public order  and avoiding 
social revolution.”20 The answer came in the form of Victorian moralism, charity, and 
universal  humanist  norms.  A  key  figure  in  this  development  was  the  Genevan 
businessman Henri Dunant.
In 1859 Dunant had traveled to Solferino to negotiate his imperial interests in 
Algeria  with  Napoleon III,  who at  the  time  was  commanding  the  Franco-Sardinian 
troops in northern Italy. Dunant arrived in Solferino to find thousands of soldiers lying 
dead and dying on the battlefield. Appalled by the misery and suffering he witnessed, 
Dunant  joined  the  local  townspeople  to  provide  whatever  help  he  could.  He  later 
described his experience in  A Memory of Solferino, a book which became a European 
bestseller and spearheaded the birth of humanitarianism. In 1863 Dunant founded the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the world's first official international 
humanitarian  organisation,  together  with  Gustave  Moynier,  Louis  Appia,  Theodore 
Maunoir, and Henri Dufour. A year later he persuaded the Swiss government to host a 
diplomatic conference, which resulted in the adoption of the first Geneva convention. 
Gustave Moynier subsequently co-founded the Institut de Droit International (IDI), a 
standing council of public international lawyers who would act as the guardians of the 
Geneva Convention.  As one of its members explained, the IDI was based on the idea 
that  “protection  of  the  individual  is  the  ultimate  purpose  of  the  State  and  goal  of 
international  relations.”21 Combining  an  interest  in  individual  rights  with 
humanitarianism and humanitarian law, these early institutions laid the foundations for 
20th century cosmopolitanism.
What  united  these  early  pioneers  of  Victorian  humanism—beyond  their 
immediate  compassion  for  the  suffering,  wounded,  and innocent—was  that  they  all 
came from  a narrow and exclusive Geneva-based elite.  As Caroline Moorehead has 
shown, the founders of ICRC all
“belonged  to  Geneva's  oldest,  most  prosperous  families,  active  over 
many generations in the law, medicine, the army, and politics, and three 
of them—Dufour, Moynier, and Appia—were rich enough to not have to 
work. All were Protestant and practising Christians and shared Dunant's 
feelings about the ethics of war, 'the moral sense of the importance of 
20 Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights, 9.
21 Hopgood, 41.
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human life,  the  humane  desire  to  lighten  a  little  the  torments'  of  the 
wounded.”22
Hopgood also emphasises the social  order on which Victorian humanism was 
based: it was middle-class, status quo, and socially reformist. Many of its spokespersons 
were  already  involved  in  domestic  charity  work—Florence  Nightingale  is  the  most 
famous example—and actively campaigned for the importance of education, adequate 
housing, health care, orphanages, and so on. These campaigns may have given an aura 
of progressiveness yet were,  as Hopgood shows, deeply rooted in class interests, “a 
product of the 'bourgeois public sphere' and its sense of itself as a distinct class with a 
distinct sensibility.”23 The members of ICRC were “cultural Christians, overwhelmingly 
Protestant and pious, their social lives organized around conventional patriarchal family 
relations.”24 That they were of Protestant background is not irrelevant, nor that the ICRC 
chose a Protestant icon—the cross—as its symbol: indeed, Victorian humanism from the 
very beginning performed the same function that the Christian god had done in the past. 
The humanitarian hero was, in effect, a secular version of the Good Samaritan, and the 
suffering,  innocent victim a modern take on the crucified Christ.25 That  there was a 
glaring paradox between being a member of the Genevan elite, on the one hand, and 
affirming the universal bonds of suffering that united humankind, on the other, seems 
not to have bothered these early humanists. Redistribution of power and resources was 
after all  not part  of their agenda,  and as such they often found enthusiastic  support 
amongst the European aristocracy; Queen Augusta of Prussia, for example, often wore 
her Red Cross armband in public and openly spoke of Dunant as a messenger from 
God.26 As Hopgood rightly notes, Victorian humanism must for this reason be seen as a 
deeply  conservative project that strove “to hang on to transcendent authority in the face 
of revolutionary social change with a sense of individuals  as individuals.”27 This took 
the form of a moral duty—a burden through which the Victorians acquired “a sense of 
confidence,  piety,  responsibility,  and  purpose  among  themselves”28—to  provide 
civilization and humanitarian assistance to socially backward classes, races, religions, 
and cultures. It was, of course, an inherently imperial project, based on the bourgeoisie's 
22 Caroline Moorehead, Dunant’s Dream: War, Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross, 1st Carroll 
& Graf ed edition (New York: Carroll & Graf Pub, 1999), 17.
23 Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights, 25.
24 Hopgood, 10.
25 Hopgood, 11.
26 John Hutchinson, Champions Of Charity: War And The Rise Of The Red Cross (Hachette UK, 1997).
27 Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights, 11.
28 Hopgood, 9.
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perceived historical  destiny to  enlighten others.  In  his  monthly periodical  L’Afrique 
Explorée et Civilisée, Gustave Moynier, one of the founding fathers of the ICRC and its 
subsequent first president, declared his support for the civilising mission;  “The white 
race  should  help  the  black  race...  and  provide  it  with  the  tools  held  by  modern 
civilization so that it can improve its fate in such a way that coheres with the wishes of 
providence.”29 As David Theo Goldberg has shown, humanist campaigns such as the 
abolition of slavery were premised on ideas of racial historicism, on “the set of claims 
that those not European or descended from  Europeans are not inherently inferior but 
historically immature or less developed.”30 While racial historicist ideas can be found 
already in the writings of John Locke, they rose to prominence in the mid-19th century 
as “the violence of an imposed physical repression yield[ed] to the infuriating subtleties 
of a legally fashioned racial order.”31 Popularised by thinkers such as John Stuart Mill 
and Auguste Comte, racial historicism may have been less overtly violent than the ideas 
associated with natural or biological racism; in reality they nonetheless functioned as a 
legitimation of the continued expropriation of colonised lands. As Mill made clear in his 
Writings on India, it was through the tutelage of the the white man and the introduction 
of what the English missionary-explorer David Livingston summed up as the three C's 
(commerce,  Christianity,  and  civilization) that  natives  could  achieve  progress  and 
inclusion in history—an idea that resonated with the socially progressive and reformist 
Victorians.
Victorian humanism reached the height of its glory after the First  World War 
with the creation of the League of Nations. The League was a de facto culmination of 
the global governance structures that Dunant and his fellow humanists had pioneered: it 
offered  collective  security  and  efforts  to  disarm;  pioneered  the  WHO,  ILO,  and 
UNESCO;  introduced  committees  on  opium  eradication,  and  women  and  child 
trafficking;  established a  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice;  and,  through the 
Mandate System, an institutional form for civilizing colonial peoples.32 Statesmen of the 
time variously described the League as an “effective guardian of international right and 
international  liberty  throughout  the  world”33 (Lloyd  George),  a  “great  caravan  of 
29 Quoted in The Colonial Legacy in France: Fracture, Rupture, and Apartheid (Indiana University 
Press, 2017), 138.
30 David Theo Goldberg, “Neoliberalizing Race,” Macalester Civic Forum 1, no. 1 (2009): 78.
31 Goldberg, 79.
32 Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights, 42.
33 Quoted in The League of Nations in Retrospect / La Société Des Nations: Rétrospective: Proceedings  
of the Symposium Organized by The United Nations Library and The Graduate Institute of  
International Studies, Genève, 6-9 November 1980 / Actes Du Colloque Organisé Par La Bibliothèque  
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humanity”34 (Jan  Smuts),  and  an  “attempt  to  begin  building  a  world  society.”35 
Nonetheless,  and  as  Hopgood  righty  notes,  underlying  this  enthusiasm  was  “a 
determination to maintain the structures of power that were integral to the European 
imperial  project.”36 In  the  words  of  Mark Mazower,  the  League  was an “eminently 
Victorian institution” designed to carry out a “global civilizing mission through the use 
of international law.”37
The outbreak of the Second World War temporarily hampered this project. The 
ICRC, which controversially had refrained from denouncing the Holocaust (a result of 
its principle of impartiality), was said to have lost its moral compass. Others, such as 
E.H. Carr, went further by arguing that utopian humanist thinking had been complicit in 
creating the conditions that led to the outbreak of war. While the years following the end 
of the war saw the creation of an impressive array of new institutions and conventions—
including the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, and the idea of crimes 
against  humanity  (genocide)  as  justiciable  international  law—humanism  and  ethics 
receded into the background.38 As the global contest between the superpowers built up 
and Europe lost its empire, other internationalist visions flourished, calling, amongst 
other things, for decolonisation and the creation of emancipated nations in the Third 
World;  for  “socialism  with  a  more  human  face”  in  the  Soviet  Union;  for  world 
revolution and the spread of Soviet-style communism; and for social democracy and an 
end to hollow consumerism and middle class conformity in the West.39 As Immanuel 
Wallerstein has argued, the years 1945-68 was a period of remarkable success for these 
movements: 
“Third International parties came to power, by one means or another, in 
a series of countries more or less contiguous to the U.S.S.R. (eastern 
Europe, China, North Korea). Second International parties (I use the 
term loosely,  including in this category the Democratic  Party in  the 
United  States  as  Roosevelt  reshaped  it)  came to  power  (or  at  least 
Des Nations Unies et l’Institut Universitaire de Hautes... (Walter de Gruyter, 1983), 146.
34 Quoted in Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights, 43.
35 Charles Howard Ellis, The Origin, Structure & Working of the League of Nations (The Lawbook 
Exchange, Ltd., 1929), 19.
36 Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights, 43.
37 Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United  
Nations (Princeton University Press, 2009), 21.
38 Samuel Moyn even suggests that when human rights were popularised in the 1970s, they “emerged... 
seemingly from nowhere”. Moyn, The Last Utopia, 3.
39 Moyn, 3.
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achieved droit de cité, that is, the right of alternance) in the western 
world  (western  Europe,  North  America,  Australasia).  Nationalist  or 
national  liberation  movements  came  to  power  in  most  formerly 
colonized areas in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, the Caribbean, and in 
somewhat different forms in long-independent Latin America.”40
Yet  these  internationalisms would  not  last  long.  Already by the  mid-1970s political 
moralism had begun to resurface, first as a critique of (Soviet) totalitarianism, and later, 
as a new imperative to bring democracy, development, and human rights to the Third 
World. To understand how and what made this possible, we need to consider a series of 
moments, contexts, and events that crystallise around the global revolts of 1968 and 
their  aftermaths—including  the  transformation  of  the  old  Left  and  the  retreat  from 
organised politics; the global defeat of anti-imperialism; the American search for a new 
moral  vocabulary  after  the  Vietnam  failure;  and  the  globalisation  of  neoliberal 
capitalism. As we shall see, just like Victorian moralism had been a response to the 
historical transformations that led to the 1848 revolutions, so the turn to cosmopolitan 
ethics  in  the  latter  half  of  the  20th century  was  a  latent—and indeed—conservative 
response to the revolts that shook the world in 1968.
The Turn to Ethics: 1968 and the Transformation of the Left
From Paris to Prague, Berlin to Berkeley, Madrid to Mexico City, in 1968 mass 
protests  swept  the  world:  in  the  United  States,  protests  focused  on  imperialism, 
militarism, and racism, against the background of the Vietnam War and the continued 
denial  of  civil  liberties  to  African-Americans41;  in  Spain  and  Brazil,  students  and 
workers protested against military dictatorship; in Czechoslovakia, protestors took to the 
streets as more than 200,000 troops of the Warsaw Pact entered the country to put an 
end  to  the  Prague Spring  reforms and “socialism with  a  human face”;  in  Calcutta, 
students protested against inequality, overcrowding, and poverty, as well as the legacies 
of  British  colonialism;  in  Dakar,  students,  labour  union  members,  and  unemployed 
citizens  protested  against  the  betrayals  of  the  postcolonial  state;  in  Mexico City  an 
estimated 300 to 400 protestors were killed by military and police. The ongoing national 
40 Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System 
(Cambridge University Press, 1991), 69.
41 As Max Elbaum documents, in 1968 more American college students (20%) identified with Che 
Guevara than with any of the candidates for the US presidency. A New York Times survey from 1971 
indicated that 40% of all students thought that a revolution was needed in the US. See Max Elbaum, 
“What Legacy from the Radical Internationalism of 1968?,” Radical History Review 82, no. 51 
(2002): 37.
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liberation struggles in the global South were, by many, seen as the cutting edge of what 
was a worldwide revolutionary movement. As Max Elbaum documents, “it was a time 
when the Vietnamese and Cuban Revolutions, People's China, and Marxist-led armed 
movements in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East appeared to mesh into 
one unstoppable torrent.”42 In the global North, the most spectacular of these revolts was 
the  May  1968  protest  in  France.  What  began  as  a  spontaneous  and  sometimes 
carnivalesque student  revolt  again  against  capitalism,  consumerism, and imperialism 
soon spread to a massive general strike. At the height of its fervour, 11 million workers
—corresponding to  roughly  22% of  the  French population—went  on strike  for  two 
weeks, bringing the economy to a virtual standstill and giving political leaders reason to 
fear civil  war and revolution.43 Importantly,  and as Wallerstein has argued, the 1968 
protests were “simultaneously a cri de coeur against the evils of the world-system and a 
fundamental  questioning  of  the  strategy  of  the  old  left  opposition  to  the  world-
system.”44 That is, the revolts were targeting both the capitalist world system as well as 
the old Lefts throughout the world. These had not only failed to challenge the capitalist 
system but had also created alternative state structures with devastating consequences. 
As Wallerstein explains, by 1968 the old Lefts “were no longer to be considered 'part of 
the solution.' Rather, they had become 'part of the problem.'”45
Scholars  such  as  Julian  Bourg,  Michael  Scott  Christofferson,  and  Antonio 
Vázquez-Arroyo  have  analysed  how the  protests  of  1968  radically  transformed  the 
European intellectual Left. While the protests in the short term revived the politics of 
class struggle and equality,  in  the long term they fuelled a  shift  from revolutionary 
fidelity to ethical orientations.  As Vázquez-Arroyo explains, “[f]rom 1968 on, in both 
Germany and France the language of ethics became the favored nomenclature to frame 
and deal with political questions.”46 Ethics, of course, had not been wholly absent before 
1968—thinkers such as Albert Camus had long argued for a humanist ethics of non-
violence. Nonetheless, after 1968 ethics would increasingly come to replace the concept 
of revolution in French and German thought. Widespread disappointment and frustration 
42 Elbaum, 38.
43 For a good overview of the 1968 protests, see Elaine Carey and Alfred J. Andrea, Protests in the 
Streets: 1968 Across the Globe (Hackett Publishing, 2016).
44 Giovanni Arrighi, Terence K. Hopkins, and Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, Antisystemic Movements 
(Verso, 1989), 101.
45 Immanuel Wallerstein, “1968, Revolution in the World-System,” Theory and Society 18, no. 4 (July 1, 
1989): 435, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00136434.
46 Antonio Y. Vázquez-Arroyo, Political Responsibility: Responding to Predicaments of Power 
(Columbia University Press, 2016).
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with the failure of 1968 to effect immediate social change led many French intellectuals 
to doubt the tenets of historical materialism. As Bourg has shown, the ethos of May 
1968 entailed a rejection of all law except the Marxist “revolutionary laws of history 
(class  struggle,  the  proletariat  as  historical  agent,  violence  as  the  handmaiden  to 
revolution  and so  forth).”47 When  the  revolution  faded,  doubts  about  these  laws  of 
history began to set in.  In 1973 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's  The Gulag Archipelago was 
published, detailing the horrors of the Soviet labour camps. While the book revealed 
nothing  new—the  Gulag  camps  were  not  unknown,  and  testimonies  from  Trotsky, 
Victor Serge,  and others were both available and read in France—it  was to play an 
important role in discrediting Marxist thought and organized radical politics. Under the 
banner  of  “New  Philosophy”,  thinkers  such  as  Bernard-Henri  Lévy  and  André 
Glucksmann began to equate Marxism with the Soviet Gulag, and revolutionary politics 
with  totalitarianism.48 Lévy  explained  that  Solzhenitsyn  had  awoken  them  “from  a 
dogmatic sleep” by tracing the crimes of Stalinism to “the one he dares to denounce for 
the first time—the founding father in person, Karl Kapital and his holy scriptures.”49 In 
place of the Marxist dream of historical transformation, New Philosophy emphasised 
the  importance  of  ethical  thought  and action;  not  the  political  ethics  of  Sartre  and 
Beauvoir, but Kant's ethics of individual responsibility and Lévinas's ethics of alterity. 
In Barbarism With a Human Face, Lévy outlined an ethical project based on the defense 
of human rights, the primacy of the individual, and the critique of the political;  “the only 
successful revolutions have been totalitarian”, he argued, and as such “we no longer 
have politics, a language, or a recourse. There remain only ethics and moral duty.”50 
Glucksmann  similarly  argued  for  the  need  to  break  with  politics  and  revolutionary 
visions. In  The Master Thinkers he asserted that the writings of Fichte, Hegel, Marx, 
and Nietzsche had been a pre-condition for the Holocaust, the Gulag, and the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution; “the sixty million deaths of the gulag are the logical application of 
47 Bourg, From Revolution to Ethics.
48 Kristin Ross summarises the prevailing sentiment as “revolution = communism = totalitarianism.” 
Kristin Ross, May ’68 and Its Afterlives (University of Chicago Press, 2008), 152. Nonetheless, 
and as Christofferson explains, “in ideological debates of the late 1970s, the gulag was less a 
revelation than a metaphor, the one word that could represent and legitimize the emerging radical 
repudiation of communism and revolutionary politics.” Michael Scott Christofferson, French 
Intellectuals Against the Left: The Antitotalitarian Moment of the 1970’s (Berghahn Books, 
2004), 90.
49 Bernard Henri Lévy, Barbarism with a Human Face (Harper & Row, 1980), 154.
50 Quoted in Tamara Chaplin, Turning On the Mind: French Philosophers on Television (University of 
Chicago Press, 2007), 152.
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Marxism.”51 By  connecting  the  critique  of  revolutionary  politics  with  the  ethics  of 
human rights, New Philosophy was thus able to give old anti-communist themes a new, 
libertarian  cloak.  In  the  autumn of  1977,  they  were  introduced to  the  wider  public 
through a  Time Magazine cover-story declaring that “Marx is  dead!” As a group of 
young,  handsome,  and  anti-Marxist  French  intellectuals,  their  arguments  “chimed 
perfectly with the American ideals of free enterprise and individualism.”52
While the turn to ethics was spearheaded by thinkers such as Glucksmann and 
Lévy, it was not unique to New Philosophy. As Richard Wolin has shown, thinkers such 
as Sartre also concluded that “fraternity could no longer be produced by 'politic.' From 
Robespierre to Lenin to Mao, the political dreams of the Left had all been stillborn. Its 
new guarantor was ethics.”53 A variety of thinkers—ranging from Derrida to Deleuze to 
Foucault—soon came to embrace ethics. Derrida would draw on Lévinas to demonstrate 
that deconstruction could be understood as an ethical practice; Foucault turned to Greek 
philosophy to derive an ethics based on “care of the self”; and Deleuze argued for an 
immanent ethics.  By the early 1980s, the idea that was once so central to the French 
Left—namely,  that  history  unfolds  according  to  the  dialectic  of  revolution  and 
counterrevolution—had been largely abandoned, with nearly everyone championing the 
priority of ethics over politics. Anti-Marxism was prominent, leading Perry Anderson to 
declare  Paris—which  had  been  the  capital  of  the  European  Left  after  WWII—the 
“capital  of  European  reaction.”54 Bourg  summarises  this  remarkable  transformation 
when he notes that
“the Cold War ended in Paris before the Berlin Wall fell. Remarkably, 
radical politics had provided some of the most important resources for 
overcoming radical politics: Marxism was present at its own funeral.”55
The German experience of 1968 was markedly different from the French one; 
yet here, too, ethical theorising emerged victorious. While students and workers in Paris 
had rebelled against the autocratic style of de Gaulle, the young Germans who came to 
be known as the “1968 generation” or the Achtundsechziger saw themselves as rebelling 
51 Quoted in Michael Scott Christofferson, “Foucault and New Philosophy: Why Foucault Endorsed 
André Gluckmann’s The Master Thinkers,” in Foucault and Neoliberalism, ed. Daniel Zamora and 
Michael C. Behrent (John Wiley & Sons, 2016), 186.
52 Dominique Lecourt, The Mediocracy: French Philosophy Since the Mid-1970s (Verso, 2002), 61.
53 Richard Wolin, The Wind from the East: French Intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution, and the Legacy  
of the 1960s (Princeton University Press, 2012), 226.
54 Quoted in Christofferson, French Intellectuals Against the Left, 1.
55 Bourg, From Revolution to Ethics.
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against  Nazism  and  the  complicity  of  their  parents  in  the  Nazi  crimes.  As  Hans 
Kundnani explains, “[w]hereas young people in some other countries were driven by a 
dream of creating a better society, in West Germany they were driven by a nightmare.”56 
The German 1968, he argues, was first and foremost a reckoning with “the Auschwitz 
generation.” Unlike France,  1968 was therefore “a moral movement before it  was a 
political one.”57 Yet like France, the following decade would see an intellectual retreat 
from the historical materialism of Marx and Marxism, and a philosophical turn towards 
abstraction  and  intrasubjectivity.58 As  Lecourt  concluded,  “[t]he  return  to  morality 
unquestionably correspond[ed] to the retreat of the political vision of the world that had 
crystallized around the idea of revolution.”59 
At  the  same time that  French and German intellectuals  were retreating  from 
revolutionary  critique  into ethical  theorising,  dissidents  in  the  Soviet  Union enacted 
their  own  ethical  turn.  The  Warsaw  Pact  invasion  of  Czechoslovakia  in  1968 
demonstrated that “socialism with a human face” would not be tolerated by Moscow. In 
its wake many dissidents began to argue  for a shift from politics to ethics. As Andrei 
Sakharov, the influential Soviet dissent and co-founder of the Committee on Human 
Rights in the Soviet Union, explained:
“I  am convinced  that  under  the  conditions  obtaining  in  our  country  a 
position  based  on  morality  and  law  is  the  most  correct  one,  as 
corresponding to the requirements and possibilities of society. What we 
need  is  the  systematic  defense  of  human  rights  and  ideals  and  not  a 
political  struggle,  which  would  inevitability  incite  people  to  violence, 
sectarianism, and frenzy. I am convinced that only in this way, provided 
there is the broadest possible public disclosure, will the East be able to 
recognize the nature of our society; and that then this struggle will become 
part  of  a  word-wide  movement  for  the  salvation  of  all  mankind.  This 
constitutes  a  partial  answer  to  the  question  of  why  I  have  (naturally) 
turned from world-wide problems to the defense of individual people.”60
56 Hans Kundnani, Utopia Or Auschwitz?: Germany’s 1968 Generation and the Holocaust (Columbia 
University Press, 2009).
57 Kundnani, 11.
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Sarkhov's belief in the primacy of ethics was echoed by other Soviet dissidents. Key 
figures such Anatoly Yakobson, Pavel Litvinov, and Yuri Orlov similarly argued that 
politics had failed and that dissidence from now on had to take the form of “a moral 
struggle” based on an “ethics common to all humanity.”61 As Vaclav Havel argued, there 
was  a  danger  in  “overestimat[ing] the  importance  of  direct  political  work  in  the 
traditional sense”62; what was needed, rather, was an internationally defined morality 
capable of transcending politics.
On the other side of the Atlantic, human rights was quickly becoming a publicly 
acknowledged buzzword.  The publication of John Rawls's  Theory of Justice in 1971 
sparked a renewed interest in individual rights in the Anglophone world. While Rawls 
himself restricted his analysis to the nation-state, others liberal thinkers such as Ronald 
Dworkin, Thomas Scanlon, and Charles Beitz soon began to theorise the meaning and 
nature  of  international  human  rights.  In  1977  Jimmy  Carter  was  inaugurated  as 
President of the United States, promising a new, moralised foreign policy with human 
rights as its leitmotif:  “Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of 
freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference for those societies 
which share with  us an abiding respect  for individual  human rights.”63 Increasingly, 
human rights were seen as part of the political ideology of modern liberalism, together 
with  democracy,  rule  of  law,  and  free  markets.  As  Hopgood  has  shown,  this 
development was a result of elite mobilisation rather than domestic social movement: 
human rights were rarely invoked by American citizens, but was “foreign policy for 
non-Americans.”64 Most  importantly,  and  as  congressman  Donald  Fraser  explained, 
human rights provided a way for “the United States  [to] feel better about itself” after 
“the  trauma  of  the  Vietnam  War.”65 Following  Carter's  inauguration,  the Ford 
Foundation and other philanthropies began to pour money into human rights initiatives, 
funding amongst other things the creation of the Helsinki Watch (later Human Rights 
Watch) and the pioneering Columbia University Centre for the Study of Human Rights. 
At  the  same time social  movements also began to embrace  the  language of  human 
rights. In 1977 Amnesty International was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its work to 
“contribute to the implementation, in every country, of the principles of the Declaration 
61 Quoted in Moyn, 136.
62 Quoted in Moyn, 162.
63 Quoted in Peter Van Ness, Debating Human Rights: Critical Essays from the United States and Asia 
(Routledge, 2003), 263.
64 Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights, 97.
65 Barbara J. Keys Keys, Reclaiming American Virtue (Harvard University Press, 2014), 5.
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of Human Rights.”66 As Jan Eckel has argued, this represented a clear break with the 
essential  elements  of  earlier  forms  of  activism;  rather  than  “changing  'the  system'” 
Amnesty limited itself to making “the world a slightly less wicked place.”67 Like the 
New Philosophy sweeping across the European continent, the human rights activism of 
the 1970s must thus be seen as “the product of a post-revolutionary idealism, growing 
out of a certain disillusionment about the preceding decade's attempts to bring about 
political change and jettisoning some of the highest hopes and most optimistic tones 
which had underlain them.”68 However, although human rights were said to offer a “new 
morality”  beyond  the  logics  of  Cold  War  power  politics,  in  reality  they  frequently 
functioned  as  a  weapon  in  the  ideological  war  against  communism. As  the  global 
struggle  against  colonialism  came  to  an  end  in  the  1970s,  human  rights  would 
increasingly  begin  to  travel  South,  joining  hands  with  discourses  of  development, 
democracy-promotion, and humanitarianism. What had begun as a turn to ethics and 
critique of totalitarianism would soon take the shape of a new white man's burden.
The Humanitarian Melodrama: 1989 and the Rediscovery of the Third World 
At the twentieth anniversary of May 1968, Bernard Kouchner,  co-founder of 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), appeared in a French television program entitled “Le 
Procès de Mai” (The Trial of May). The event is recounted by Kristin Ross in May '68 
and Its Afterlives. Ross explains how Kouchner, who in 1968 had been a militant in the 
Union des Etudiants Communistes, begins the program by praising the '68 generations' 
“daring to dream.” His tone of self-satisfaction quickly switches to a posture of self-
criticism as he goes on to describe how
“'we [the '68 generation] were navel-gazing, we forgot the outside world, 
we didn’t  see what  was happening in  the  rest  of  the  world,  we were 
folded  in  on  ourselves.'  He  continues,  much  more  triumphantly:  'We 
didn’t  know what we would discover only in the following years:  the 
third world, misery.'”69
As Ross explains, Kouchner goes on to
66 See https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1977/press.html
67 Quoted in Moyn, The Last Utopia, 147.
68 Moyn, 147.
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“[i]n  one  fell  swoop...  assume  the  power  to  clear  away  an  entire 
dimension  of  the  movement:  its  relation  to  anticolonial  and  anti-
imperialist struggles in places like Vietnam, Algeria, Palestine, and Cuba. 
A whole world disappears—the war in Vietnam, the iconography of Che, 
Mao, and Ho Chi Minh... which is to say a militant or combative third 
world, so that another can be heroically 'discovered' years later: the third 
world as figured in the Human Rights discourse, of which Kouchner has 
by that time emerged as one of the principal spokesmen.”70
Ross's analysis reveals how, by the early 1980s, the ethical turn had begun to go global. 
To understand how and why intellectuals, activists, and policymakers “rediscovered” the 
Third World as an (un)ethical space, we need to consider two events: first, the defeat of 
the  global  struggle  against  colonialism  and,  second,  the  globalisation  of  neoliberal 
capitalism.
The Third World was not a place but a project, so Vijay Prashad reminds us. 
Pursued by a group of recently decolonised states between the mid-1950s and the early 
1980s, the Third World project was an attempt to disrupt the global hegemonic order 
and its continued organisation around relations of race and colour.  In Hedley Bull's 
classical formulation, it was a “revolt against the West”71 that championed new norms of 
racial equality, economic justice, and cultural liberation. The term the “Third World” 
was coined by the French economic historian Alfred Sauvy in 1952, invoking not only 
an alternative to the First and Second Worlds but also the Third Estate of the French 
Revolution.  As  Rahul  Rao  has  explained,  the  implication  seems to  have  been that, 
similar to workers and the bourgeoisie in the French Revolution, the newly decolonised 
states would play a crucial role in transforming the prevailing global order.72 While the 
roots of this project precede the era of decolonisation,73 it was given concrete form at the 
1955 Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia. Attended by 29 Asian and 
African countries—which, as Rajagopal notes, was of “the then total world number of 
fifty-nine”—Bandung symbolised a “new spirit of solidarity of the Third World”74 and a 
collective  challenge  to  the  racial  structuring  of  world  politics.  In  Robbie  Shilliam's 
70 Ross, 156.
71 Hedley Bull, “The Revolt Against the West,” in Great Power Relations, World Order, and the Third  
World, ed. SisirGupta et al. (Vikas, 1981).
72 Rahul Rao, Third World Protest: Between Home and the World (OUP Oxford, 2010), 25.
73 Early manifestations of what later would become known as the Third World project can arguably be 
found in the 1920 Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East and the 1927 conference of the League 
Against Imperialism at Brussels, the Communist Internationals, and the numerous Pan-African 
Congresses held in the first half of the twentieth century. See Rao, 25.
74 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third  
World Resistance (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 74.
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formulation,  Bandung  was  ultimately  an  attempt  by  which  “the  hinterlands  of  the 
(post)colonized  proposed  to  break  free  from  the  global  architecture  laid  by  the 
colonizer.”75 The agenda centred on a loose set of goals summarised by Prashad as a call 
for “peace, bread, and justice”; peace, understood as cooperation against the arms race 
between the superpowers; bread, meaning a renegotiation of the economic relationship 
between  the  Third  and  First  Worlds;  and  justice,  entailing  a  more  democratic 
international  order and better  representation of Third World interests  at  the decision 
making table at the IMF, World Bank, GATT, and the UN Security Council. The Third 
World project reached its peak with the oil crisis of 1972, when OPEC member states 
proclaimed an oil embargo in protest of states supporting Israel in the Yom Kippur War. 
The  embargo  momentarily  demonstrated  the  power  of  Third  World  solidarity  in 
upending the terms of global trade. Spurred by this confidence, in 1974 the Declaration 
of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) was put forward to the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The proposal entailed a series of 
global  reforms  that  codified  many  of  the  Third  World's  long-standing  demands, 
including sovereign debt relief, increased foreign aid, and preferential trade agreements. 
In hindsight, this was the high point of the Third World project; a decade later it 
was dead. While it was hampered by a range of factors—including lack of democracy in 
some  of  the  new  nations,  mismanagement  of  economic  resources,  and  a  set  of 
problematic assumptions that sometimes reproduced rather than challenged the logic of 
the coloniser76—it was not these limitations that caused its demise. As Prashad details in 
The Poorer Nations, “[w]hat did it in was the Atlantic project.”77 The Atlantic project, 
he argues, was a co-ordinated effort by the G7 powers to advance a project of neoliberal 
restructuring launched by “the propertied classes to maintain or restore their position of 
dominance.”78 The  project  was  multi-pronged  and  involved  a  variety  of  strategies, 
including a new intellectual agenda based on the revival of laissez-faire economics and 
75 Robbie Shilliam, “Colonial Architecture or Relatable Hinterlands? Locke, Nandy, Fanon, and the 
Bandung Spirit,” Constellations 23, no. 3 (September 1, 2016): 426, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
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the Hayek school of liberalism; a revamping of international institutions such as the 
IMF  and  the  World  Bank,  as  well  as  key  United  Nations  organisations,  and  a 
replacement  of  old  Keynesians  and  developmentalists  with  monetarists;  and—most 
crucially—a manipulation of the international debt crisis of the 1980s to “open up the 
countries of the South to the factories of the North.”79 At the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT, a new intellectual property and trade regime was introduced, making reverse 
engineering or transfer of technology illegal: “The North and its business would be able 
to outsource the production of commodities to the South, but the bulk of the profits for 
their  sale would be preserved as rent for intellectual property.”80 Deregulation,  good 
governance, structural adjustments, balanced budgets, and fiscal responsibility were the 
pillars of the new era, “a North-led International Property Order” rather than “a South-
led New International Economic Order.” “Trade, not aid” became the mantra of the new 
order, as Reagan chided those who “mistake compassion for development and claim 
massive transfers of wealth somehow will produce new well-being.”81 Development, he 
argued, would be achieved not through regulation or redistribution but by “free people” 
building “free trade.” 
Discourses of human rights, humanitarianism, and democracy were not external 
to this development. Quite the opposite: the language of moralism emerged as a solution 
to the postwar era's racial contradictions laid bare by the Third World project. As Jodi 
Melamed has shown,  anticolonial and antiracist movements politicized “the depth and 
injustices of Western and white supremacy”, demonstrating the hypocrisy of European 
powers and the United States which
“claimed to be fighting an antiracist and antifascist war  [WW2], while 
practicing  racism  and  fascism against  people  of  color  in  the  United 
States,  Europe,  and  the  colonies...  These  movements  condemned 
Western imperialisms and recognized white supremacy as an illegitimate 
and artificial ideology of white and European domination. As the terms 
of the ideological Cold War between the United States and the Soviet 
Union jelled,  racism in the United States and other Western capitalist 
societies became one of  the  chief  propaganda weapons in  the  Soviet 
79 As Prashad makes clear, the problem was not the debt itself but the power asymmetries built into 
international financial institutions: “These are not 'poor' countries. Over the course of (the past) three 
decades, the sixty states (have) paid USD550 billion in principle and interest on loans worth USD540 
billion. Yet the still owe USD523. The alchemy of international usury binds the darker nations.” 
Prashad, 276.
80 Vijay Prashad, “Dream History of the Global South,” Interface: A Journal for and about Social  
Movements 4, no. 1 (2012): 48–9.
81 Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New  
Imperialism (Henry Holt and Company, 2006), 186.
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Union’s  arsenal.  In  order  to  define  successfully  the  terms  of  global 
governance after World War II, U.S. bourgeoisie classes had to manage 
the  racial  contradictions  that  antiracist  and  anticolonial  movements 
exposed.”82
The language of ethics, human rights, and development emerged as solutions to these 
contradictions, as they provided a way to safeguard the moral legitimacy of US global 
leadership  in  a  postcolonial  world.  As  moralism  replaced  the  critique  of  political 
economy, not only did race disappear as “a referent for the inequality of the historical 
development  of  modern  capitalism.”  The  struggle  against  inequality,  poverty,  and 
racism “now explicitly required the victory and extension of US empire.”83 Political 
moralism thus rose to power in the very moment that hopes of a new economic world 
order were abandoned: the humanitarian utopia was effectively one that took both US 
ascendancy and global capitalism for granted. 
This link between ethics, empire, and global capitalism was clearly recognised 
by the Mont Pelerin Society, whose founding members include Friedrich Hayek, Milton 
Friedman, Ludwig von Mises, and Karl Popper. In its founding statement, the group 
sought to counter what they perceived as “an ideological movement” threatening “the 
central values of civilization” with “intellectual argument” centred on “absolute moral 
standards” such as human dignity, the rule of law, and private property.84 That these 
views were embraced by neoliberal economists might not be surprising, yet by the early 
1980s they had become commonplace on the Euro-American Left. As Neil Lazarus has 
shown, after 1975 the prevailing political sentiment in the West “turned sharply against 
anticolonial  nationalist  insurgency  and  revolutionary  anti-imperialism.”85 New 
Philosophers such as Glucksmann and Lévy increasingly began to extend their critiques 
of totalitarianism to the “tyrannical” and “bloodthirsty” Third World state. The former 
colonies, they argued, had in the wake of decolonisation reverted back to their former, 
precolonial state of savagery and barbarism. As Jacques Julliard explained, “[i]t is true 
that there are two opposing sides in the third world. But they aren't the American and 
the Soviet sides. They are those of the torturing State and the martyred people.”86 The 
82 Jodi Melamed, “The Spirit of Neoliberalism: From Racial Liberalism to Neoliberal Multiculturalism,” 
Social Text 24, no. 4 89 (December 21, 2006): 4, https://doi.org/10.1215/01642472-2006-009.
83 Melamed, 6.
84 “Statement of Aims | MPS,” accessed October 14, 2017, https://www.montpelerin.org/statement-of-
aims/.
85 Neil Lazarus, “What Postcolonial Theory Doesn’t Say,” Race & Class 53, no. 1 (July 1, 2011): 3–27, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396811406778. See also Neil Lazarus, The Postcolonial Unconscious 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011).
86 Quoted in Ross, May ’68 and Its Afterlives, 160. See also Julian Bourg, “From the Left Bank to Libya: 
-67-
European Left, he went on to argue, must denounce “power” in the Third World, and aid 
the victims of famine, flood, and authoritarian state apparatuses. Julliard's remarks are 
indicative of a discursive shift that had begun to take hold of intellectual life in the late 
1970s. In the previous two decades many on the Left had looked to the Third World's 
struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism, as well as to the writing of Frantz 
Fanon, Che Guevara, and Mao Tse Tung, as a model for Western emancipatory thinking; 
Sartre's preface to  The Wretched of the Earth is a typical example of the spirit of this 
time. With the global defeat of anti-imperialism, and a harshening critique of the Third 
World  state,  a  new  regime  of  representation  began  to  take  hold:  no  longer  a 
revolutionary  leading  the  way  towards  worldwide  emancipation,  the  Third  World 
subject  was reconstituted as  a  victim—of overpopulation,  famine,  flooding,  poverty, 
illiteracy, and so on—urgently in need of Western help.87 As Ross explains, the colonial 
or  Third  World  other  of  the  1960s  was  ultimately  “transformed  from  militant  and 
articulate fighter and thinker to 'victim' by a defense of human rights strictly identified 
as the rights of the victim, the rights of those who do not have the means to argue their 
rights  or  to  create  a  political  solution  to  their  own  problems.”88 The  result  was  a 
humanitarian sensibility and modern-day version of Victorian humanism, emblematised 
by Kouchner's MSF, which reanimated the moral discourse of the civilising mission and 
the rhetoric of European civilization versus non European barbarism.89 After the Biafra 
War, Kouchner had left the ICRC which, he argued, took the principle of neutrality to 
the  point  of  complicity;  “By  keeping  silent  we  doctors  [are] accomplices  in  the 
systematic  massacre  of  a  population.”90 With  the  foundation  of  MSF  in  1971  he 
inaugurated a new era of humanitarianism, grounded in the principle of témoignage—
the French term for testimony, witnessing, and bearing witness. New humanitarianism 
The New Philosophy and Humanitarianism,” in Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention:  
Legitimizing the Use of Force since the 1970s, ed. Annette Weinke, Norbert Frei, and Daniel Stahl 
(Wallstein Verlag, 2017), 95.
87 As Michael Barnett explains, “Against the backdrop of a newly decolonizing world, many 
nongovernmental organizations that once had concentrated on Europe now discovered a whole world 
waiting to be helped.” Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Cornell 
University Press, 2011), 2. See also Eleanor Davey, Idealism beyond Borders: The French  
Revolutionary Left and the Rise of Humanitarianism, 1954–1988 (Cambridge University Press, 2015).
88 Ross, May ’68 and Its Afterlives, 167. As Arif Dirlik explains, “Within a decade, the 'South' had turned 
from a possible savior of the world to an object of compassion that must be saved in order for the 
world to save itself.” Arif Dirlik, Global Modernity: Modernity in the Age of Global Capitalism 
(Routledge, 2015), 14.
89 See Paige Arthur, Unfinished Projects: Decolonization and the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre (Verso, 
2010), xxiv.
90 Quoted in Daniel Robert DeChaine, Global Humanitarianism: NGOs and the Crafting of Community 
(Lexington Books, 2005), 70.
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successfully drew together intellectuals from all sides of the political spectrum and was, 
as Glucksmann explained, “the end of the cold war in our heads.”91 A heterogeneous 
configuration of intellectuals—including Foucault, Barthes, Sartre, and Aron—in 1979 
came together to endorse MSF's campaign for a “Boat for Vietnam.”92 The campaign 
was a striking symbol of the new intellectual consensus. Sartre and Aron, who had taken 
opposing  positions  on  almost  every  issue  since  their  break  in  1947,  now  found 
themselves  brought  together  over  the  issue  of  Vietnamese  refugees.  The  famous 
photograph from the press conference captures this new, post-ideological consensus; as 
described by Paul Berman, the picture shows “Sartre side by side with the conservative 
Aron and a Beatle-haired Glucksmann—three men, representing the old-fashioned left, 
the old-fashioned conservatives, and the new-fashioned younger generation, all of them 
united in solidarity with the victims of Vietnamese Communism.”93
Importantly,  new  humanitarianism  was  in  many  ways  a  media  affair. 
Glucksmann, Lévy, and Kouchner rode the wave of the rapid shift from a literary to 
media culture, and made extensive use of print, radio, and television media to spread 
their  message.94 As  Ilan  Kapoor  rightly  notes,  the  new  humanitarian  principle  of 
witnessing was, after all, “about witnessing not just on behalf of disaster victims, but 
also  for the media/public.”95 Through the mediasphere,  a new—and highly racialized 
and gendered—aesthetic of suffering was popularised, bringing Western audiences into 
contact with faraway conflicts, suffering Brown bodies, and innocent starving children.96 
These  representations  were  crucial  in  creating  what  Meister  calls  “the  humanitarian 
melodrama,”97 a  morality  play  between  victims,  savages,  and  heroic  rescuers.  Such 
91 Quoted in James Traub, “A Statesman without Borders,” The New York Times, February 3, 2008, sec. 
World, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/03/news/03iht-03kouchnert.9691898.html.
92 See D. Drake, Intellectuals and Politics in Post-War France (Springer, 2001), 153–4 and 
Christofferson, “Foucault and New Philosophy: Why Foucault Endorsed André Gluckmann’s The 
Master Thinkers.”
93 Paul Berman, Power and the Idealists: Or, the Passion of Joschka Fischer and Its Aftermath (W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2007).
94 Lévy, perhaps better than anyone else, recognised the power of this new media culture. As the 
journalist Gaby Wood observes, Lévy often presented himself as a rockstar: “his clothes (open-necked 
white shirts and designer suits), his friends (Yves Saint Laurent, Alain Delon, Salman Rushdie), his 
homes (the flat in Saint Germain, a hideaway in the South of France, an eighteenth-century palace in 
Marrakesh that used to belong to Jean Paul Getty) are endlessly commented on.” Gaby Wood, “Je Suis 
Un Superstar,” The Observer, June 15, 2003, sec. Books, 
http://www.theguardian.com/books/2003/jun/15/society.
95 Ilan Kapoor, Celebrity Humanitarianism: The Ideology of Global Charity (Routledge, 2012), 92.
96 One of the earliest examples of the link between the television and humanitarianism is the Nigerian 
Civil War, which drew considerable attention among Western audiences. See Lasse Heerten, The 
Biafran War and Postcolonial Humanitarianism: Spectacles of Suffering (Cambridge University Press, 
2017), 6; Jan Eckel and Samuel Moyn, The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 130. 
97 Robert Meister, After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights (Columbia University Press, 2012), 66.
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narratives  both  drew inspiration  from and  helped  reinforce  what  in  the  1970s  was 
becoming a metanarrative about  the Holocaust.  While modern-day human rights are 
often  considered  as  the  logical  culmination  of  forces  that  where  unleashed  in  the 
aftermath of the Second World War, throughout the 1950s and 60s there was a lack of 
widespread consciousness about the Holocaust. As Peter Novick has argued, it was only 
with the trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961 that the Holocaust was introduced to the public 
lexicon, giving it “the transcendent status as the bearer of eternal truths or lessons that 
could be derived from contemplating it.”98 The killing of six million Jews (alongside 
Roma, ethnic Poles, gay men, political dissidents, and so on) became the holocaust and 
then The Holocaust; a narrative that no longer focused on Jewish suffering per se, but on 
the  suffering  endemic  to  humanity.  As  the  Cold  War  ended  and  the  Soviet  Union 
collapsed, the old discourse of revolution and counterrevolution,  which had been so 
central to the Left since 1789, had largely been superseded by a humanitarian sentiment 
focusing on suffering. In many ways this was the logical conclusion of the processes 
that  had  been  set  in  motion  in  1968,  culminating  in  a  humanist  ideology not  very 
different  from  that  of  the  Victorians  in  the  long  19th century.  For  some,  such  as 
American political scientist Francis Fukuyama, the crumbling of the Berlin Wall thus 
constituted much more than the end of the bifurcation of the international sphere: it also 
signalled “the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of 
Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”99 As a new (but in 
some respects, old) era dawned on the post-1989 world, the discourse of human rights, 
humanitarianism,  and  international  law would  soon rise  to  hegemony in  the  global 
North. In Alain Badiou's formulation, this is why “the reign of 'ethics' coincides, after 
decades  of courageous critiques of colonialism and imperialism,  with today's  sordid 
self-satisfaction in the 'West,' with the insistent argument according to which the misery 
of the Third World is the result of its own incompetence, its own inanity—in short, of its 
subhumanity.”100
Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that cosmopolitan political theory is a historically 
produced discourse,  anchored in  particular material  interests  and relations of  power. 
98 Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2000), 110. See also S. 
Slabodsky, Decolonial Judaism: Triumphal Failures of Barbaric Thinking (Springer, 2014).
99 Francis Fukuyama, End of History and the Last Man (Simon and Schuster, 2006), xi.
100 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil (Verso, 2002), 13.
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Where  cosmopolitan  theorists  typically  insist  on  a  distinction  between  ethics  and 
politics,  ontology  and  history,  I  have  argued  that  cosmopolitanism  is  a  politically 
produced discourse that, similar to Victorian humanism in the 19th century, contributes 
to an ideological formation that gives legitimacy to the unjust, racialized global order. 
The rise of cosmopolitan thinking in the 1990s is less a result of a steady, gradual climb 
towards global justice, and more a product of a set of historical and material conditions 
that in the late 20th century made it  highly desirable for policymakers,  activists,  and 
intellectuals  to  think of  world politics as  an  ethical space.  The global defeat  of  the 
counterrevolutions to colonialism and capitalism, the transformation of the old Left, the 
American  search  for  a  new  moral  vocabulary  after  Vietnam,  the  globalisation  of 
neoliberal  capitalism,  and the invention of a  mediatised aesthetic of suffering:  these 
were the social forces that propelled the rise of cosmopolitan thinking in the late 20th 
century. 
Samuel  Moyn  has  argued  that  the  rise  of  human  rights  and  cosmopolitan 
political theory in the latter part of the 20th century depended on the collapse of other, 
prior  internationalism such as  Marxism and anti-colonial  nationalism.  Against  those 
who depict history as a “dramatic struggle for human rights across the ages, from the 
Mesopotamian Codes of Hammurabi to today’s globalization era”,101 Moyn argues that 
history in fact “left open diverse paths into the future, rather than paving a single road 
toward  current  ways  of  thinking  and  acting.”102 While  Moyn  is  right  to  place  the 
resurgence of cosmopolitanism in the context of the demise of other internationalisms, 
the story he tells is ultimately one that preserves the innocence of cosmopolitanism: as 
other internationalisms “imploded” and “collapsed”, Moyrn suggests, a vacuum was left 
behind  that  cosmopolitanism  hesitantly  and  involuntarily  came  to  fill.  In  depicting 
cosmopolitanism as the reluctant heir to past and prior utopias, Moyn therefore cannot 
explain why it was cosmopolitanism—and not any other internationalism—that rose to 
hegemony  in  the  late  1980s.  In  contrast,  in  this  chapter  I  have  argued  that 
cosmopolitanism  contributes  to  an  ideological  formation  that  helps  to legitimise, 
perpetuate, and entrench the current world order. The end of the Cold War marked not 
so much the beginning of a new global era as a return to the North-dominated global 
order  of  1492-1945.  As the  global  counterrevolutions  to  colonialism and capitalism 
came to an end and other internationalisms were brutally blocked, the ethical discourses 
101 Micheline R. Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era 
(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2008), book cover.
102 Moyn, The Last Utopia, 5.
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that  in  the  long  19th century  had legitimised  the  colonial  enterprise  returned  but  in 
updated form. The result was a turn to Victorian humanist ideas about the white man's 
burden, and a consequent transformation of the meaning of solidarity. As Kant displaced 
Marx, and discourses of empathy and suffering superseded the language of struggle and 
liberation, solidarity would increasingly come to be associated with ethics—and not the 
revolution. 
This shift  from political  economy to the language of moralism has also had 
pronounced effects  on  postcolonial  theory.  As we shall  see  in  the  next  chapter,  the 
erasure  of  political  economy as  a  means of  understanding and critiquing the  global 
colour  line  has  led  to  an  overwhelmingly  focus  on  questions  of  cultural  identity, 
Eurocentrism, and representations of Self/Other—ultimately framing race as a question 
of “difference” rather than “domination.” The project of radicalising and decolonising 
solidarity thus requires—as a first step—that the problem of the global colour line be 
rethought through a materialist lens. It is to this that we now turn.
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C H A P T E R  3
The Political Economy of Race: Rethinking the Global Colour Line
“If their blood has not mingled extensively with yours, their labour power has long since 
entered your economic blood stream. It is the sugar you stir, it is in the sinews of the 
infamous British sweet tooth, it is the tea leaves at the bottom of the British cuppa.”
—Stuart Hall1
Introduction
In her classic essay from 1979, self-described “Black, lesbian, mother, warrior, 
poet”  Audre Lorde argued that  “the master's  tools will  never dismantle  the master's 
house.”2 Calling on white feminists to confront their racism and homophobia, she asked:
“What  does  it  mean when the  tools  of  a  racist  patriarchy are  used  to 
examine the fruits of that same patriarchy? It means that only the most 
narrow parameters of change are possible and allowable.”3
While the master's tools “may allow us to temporarily beat him at his own game”, Lorde 
concluded, “they will never enable us to bring about genuine change.”4
In this chapter I build on Lorde's provocation to examine what a radicalised and 
decolonised solidarity might look like and mean—beyond the “master's tools.” How can 
the  theory  and  practice  of  internationalist  solidarity  be  reimagined anew,  and  what 
would it mean for international political theory to take seriously the racial ordering of 
world politics? In what follows I argue that answering these questions requires, as a first 
step, that the nature and problem of the global colour line be rethought. In postcolonial 
1 Quoted in Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: Race and Racism In  
70’s Britain (Routledge, 2004), 283.




theory,  within  as  well  as  outside  of  IR,  the  racial  ordering of  the  international  has 
predominantly  been  framed  as  a  problem of  cultural  difference,  Eurocentrism,  and 
representations of the imperial Self and the colonial Other.5 While this focus has been 
successful in bringing certain features of the global colour line into view, it has also left 
other aspects to the side—in particular, the material and socioeconomic dimensions of 
race and racism. As Andrew Sartori has argued, postcolonial scholarship has often let 
“the representational order” take “precedence in the analytical sequence”, thus eliding 
the question of the materiality of colonial relations.6 By conceiving of colonialism in 
purely  civilisational  terms,  and  Eurocentrism  as  a  mainly  cultural  force,  the 
entanglements  between  the  racialized  social  order,  global  empire,  and  capital 
accumulation have often tended to fade from view. The result, as Arif Dirlik has argued, 
has  been  “a  disassociation  of  questions  of  culture  and  cultural  identity  from  the 
structures of capitalism, shifting the grounds for discourse to the encounter between the 
colonizer and the colonized, unmediated by the structures of political economy within 
which questions of culture had been subsumed earlier.”7 Consequently, while many IR 
5 Indicatively, see John M. Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics : Western  
International Theory, 1760-2010 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Uday Singh Mehta, 
Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought (University of 
Chicago Press, 1999); Duncan Bell, Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire 
(Princeton University Press, 2016); Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism  
in Britain and France (Princeton University Press, 2009); Walter Mignolo, The Darker Side of  
Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options (Duke University Press, 2011). To be clear, 
many postcolonial scholars do emphasise that colonialism often involved different forms of coerced 
labour and resource extraction; what is missing from this literature, rather, is any kind of deeper 
analysis of how capital accumulation, race, and physical violence are intwined. As Ince points out,  
“this ignominious record congeals into an undifferentiated mass of 'imperial' violence that liberal 
thinkers then rationalize or criticize.” See Onur Ulas Ince, Colonial Capitalism and the Dilemmas of  
Liberalism (Oxford University Press, 2018), 16.
6 Andrew Sartori, “The British Empire and Its Liberal Mission,” The Journal of Modern History 78, no. 
3 (2006): 632, https://doi.org/10.1086/509149. This critique is of course not true for all postcolonial 
scholars. See, for example, Lisa Tilley and Robbie Shilliam, eds., “Special Issue: Raced Markets,” 
New Political Economy 0, no. 0 (December 21, 2017): 1–10, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2017.1417366; John Narayan, “The Wages of Whiteness in the 
Absence of Wages: Racial Capitalism, Reactionary Intercommunalism and the Rise of Trumpism,” 
Third World Quarterly 38, no. 11 (November 2, 2017): 2482–2500, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1368012; Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe:  
Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton University Press, 2000).
7 Arif Dirlik, “Rethinking Colonialism: Globalization, Postcolonialism, And The Nation,” Interventions 
4, no. 3 (January 1, 2002): 432, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801022000013833. See also Neil 
Lazarus, “What Postcolonial Theory Doesn’t Say,” Race & Class 53, no. 1 (July 1, 2011): 3–27, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396811406778; Benita Parry, Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique 
(Routledge, 2004); Sandro Mezzadra, “How Many Histories of Labour? Towards a Theory of  
Postcolonial Capitalism,” Postcolonial Studies 14, no. 2 (June 1, 2011): 151–70, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13688790.2011.563458; Vivek Chibber, Postcolonial Theory and the Specter  
of Capital (Verso Books, 2013); Ince, Colonial Capitalism and the Dilemmas of Liberalism; Satnam 
Virdee, “Challenging the Empire,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 37, no. 10 (August 24, 2014): 1823–29, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2014.932408; Crystal Bartolovich and Neil Lazarus, Marxism,  
Modernity and Postcolonial Studies (Cambridge University Press, 2002). For an account of empire as 
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theorists recall W.E.B. Du Bois's famous statement, that “[t]he problem of the Twentieth 
Century is the problem of the color line”, few have realised that Du Bois, in the later  
stages of his  life,  became convinced that the problem of the global colour line  is a 
question of political economy: 
“Here then is the fundamental question of our day: How far can nations 
who are at  present most advanced in intelligence...  and technique keep 
their wealth without using the land and labor of the majority of mankind 
mainly for the benefit of the European world and not for the benefit of 
most men, who happen to be colored?”8
For Du Bois, who sought to reveal the “continuities between prewar colonial capitalism 
and postwar U.S. global ascendancy and expanding transnational capitalism”,9 it was 
clear that anti-racist politics had to be anti-capitalist. 
In this chapter I take up Du Bois's call for a global political economic critique of 
race and racism. The project of radicalising and decolonising solidarity, I argue, must 
begin with  rethinking  the global colour through a materialist lens. Drawing on Cedric 
Robinson's  1983  magnum opus  Black  Marxism:  The  Making  of  the  Black  Radical  
Tradition, this chapter reconceptualises the global colour line as a racial ontology that 
enables the hyper-exploitation of non-white peoples and lands, while privileging others. 
Building on Robinson's concept of racial  capitalism, I demonstrate  how race-making 
practices are constitutive of the logic of capital. The history of capitalism began with the 
slave trade and not with the factory system; in fact, and as Black Marxism demonstrated, 
there  was  never  such  a  thing  as  capitalism  without  slavery,  and  “the  history  of 
Manchester  never  happened  without  the  history  of  Mississippi.”10 In  contrast  to 
an explicitly capitalist endeavour, see Steven Press, Rogue Empires: Contracts and Conmen in  
Europe’s Scramble for Africa (Harvard University Press, 2017); Ince, Colonial Capitalism and the 
Dilemmas of Liberalism.
8 Quoted in Jodi Melamed, “The Spirit of Neoliberalism: From Racial Liberalism to Neoliberal 
Multiculturalism,” Social Text 24, no. 4 89 (December 21, 2006): 11, 
https://doi.org/10.1215/01642472-2006-009.
9 Melamed, 13.
10 Walter Johnson, “To Remake the World: Slavery, Racial Capitalism, and Justice,” Text, Boston 
Review, October 19, 2016, https://bostonreview.net/race/walter-johnson-slavery-human-rights-racial-
capitalism. See also  Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in 
Globalizing California (University of California Press, 2007); Gaye Theresa Johnson and Alex Lubin, 
Futures of Black Radicalism (Verso Books, 2017); Robin D. G. Kelley, “What Did Cedric Robinson 
Mean by Racial Capitalism?,” Text, Boston Review, January 12, 2017, 
http://bostonreview.net/race/robin-d-g-kelley-what-did-cedric-robinson-mean-racial-capitalism; Lisa 
Lowe, The Intimacies of Four Continents (Duke University Press, 2015); Jodi Melamed, “Racial 
Capitalism,” Critical Ethnic Studies 1, no. 1 (2015): 76–85, 
https://doi.org/10.5749/jcritethnstud.1.1.0076; David Roediger, Class, Race and Marxism (Verso 
Books, 2017); Robin D. G. Kelley, “Introduction,” in Black Marxism: The Making of the Black  
Radical Tradition, by Cedric J. Robinson, 2000.
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conventional  Marxist  thinking,  Robinson's  work  thus  points  to  the  necessity  of 
understanding race and class as co-constitutive. As Lisa Lowe explains, the concept of 
racial  capitalism  captures  “that  capitalism  expands  not  through  rendering  all  labor, 
resources, and markets across the world identical, but by precisely seizing upon colonial 
divisions, identifying particular regions for production and others for neglect, certain 
populations  for  exploitation  and  still  others  for  disposal.”11 Race,  then, is  neither 
reducible to class, nor is it a separate form of oppression. Instead, capitalism relies upon 
the elaboration, reproduction, and exploitation of racial difference: on the invention of 
what Robinson called “the universal Negro.” Capitalism is ultimately racial, not merely 
because  people  racialized  as  non-white  are  disproportionately  impacted  and 
disadvantaged by the “free” market, although this is true as well12; more fundamentally, 
racial  differences  are  constitutive  of  capitalism  because  processes  of  capital 
accumulation are themselves predicated on the devaluation of  Black and other  non-
white people. Hence the term racial capitalism.
By centre-staging the political economy of race and racism, this chapter lays the 
foundations for my larger project of radicalising and decolonising solidarity. In chapter 
4, I show that a materialist reading of the global colour line, and a consequent focus on 
interlocking oppressions under  racial capitalism, open up space for a different kind of 
internationalism and politics of solidarity, beyond the “master's tools.” The immediate 
aim of the the present chapter, then, is to interrogate what a rematerialised conception of 
the global colour looks like and means.
The chapter unfolds in three sections. In the first section I undertake a close 
reading of  Black Marxism to  put forward a global political economic critique of race 
and racism. Contra Marxist orthodoxy, Robinson helps us understand that racism is a 
constitutive  feature  of  capital  accumulation,  as  opposed  to  a  mere residue  of  pre-
capitalist social relations. In the second section I extend this discussion by putting Black  
Marxism in  dialogue with feminist  theory and activism. Unraveling the centrality  of 
sexuality  and  gender  differences  to  racial  capitalism,  I  argue  that  the  regulation  of 
intimacy  and  female  reproductive  labour  is  central  to  the  process  of  capital 
accumulation. In the third and final section I examine how the rise of neoliberalism has 
led to a reconfiguration of the global colour line. Racialized and gendered forms of 
domination continue to pattern global politics but have, as we shall see, evolved to take 
11 Lowe, The Intimacies of Four Continents.
12 For example, see Akwugo Emejulu and Leah Bassel, “Minority Women, Austerity and Activism,” 
Race & Class, October 2, 2015, https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396815595913.
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on new forms, fit for the postcolonial and multicultural present.
Racial Capitalism and the Global Colour Line
When Black Marxism first appeared in 1983 it drew little attention. “It was badly 
received”, remembers Elizabeth Robinson, the wife of Cedric Robinson, and sometimes 
“not received at all.”13 With its focus on capital and the production of racial difference, it  
started from coordinates that increasingly were seen as marginal and suspicious. With 
the  global  defeat  of  the  counterrevolutions  to  colonialism  and  capitalism,  the 
transformation  of  the  old  (Euro-American)  Left,  and  the  rising  hegemony  of 
postmodernism and “Theory”, research on race and racism was  undergoing a distinct 
shift, from critiques of political economy towards questions of cultural identity; from 
“the  theory  and  politics  of  inequality  and  redistribution”  towards  “the  theory  and 
politics of recognition and understanding difference.”14 Political economy was no longer 
the focus of research on race, as it once had been for Black radicals such as Du Bois, 
C.L.R. James, Oliver Cromwell Cox, Eric Williams, Stuart Hall,  Robert Miles,  and A. 
Sivanandan.  As  Kunkel  recalls,  in  this  period,  and  especially  after  1989,  “it  often 
seemed  easier  to  spot  the  contradictions  of  Marxism  than  the  more  famous 
contradictions  of  capitalism.”15 Black  Marxism was  thus,  at  least  to  some  extent, 
impossibly  out  of  tune  with  its  times.  And still,  the  text  survived:  it  traveled with 
Robinson's students, colleagues, and friends, found a home in activist circles, and was 
finally republished in 2000.  Fred Moten, who came into contact with the text during 
graduate school, remembers how 
“for a long time... it circulated underground, as a recurrent seismic event 
on the edge of or over the edge of the university, for those of us who 
valorized being on or over the edge even if we had been relegated to it. 
There, at least, we could get together and talk about the bomb that had 
gone off in our heads. Otherwise we carried around its  out, dispersive 
potenza as contraband, buried under the goods that legitimate parties to 
exchange can value, until we could get it to the black market, where (the) 
license has no weight, and  hand it  around out of a suitcase or over a 
kitchen table or from behind a makeshift counter.”16
13 Johnson and Lubin, Futures of Black Radicalism, 103.
14 Virdee, “Challenging the Empire,” 1827. As Dirlik explains, postcolonial scholarship has been 
“overtaken by cultural nationalisms of one kind or another that take for granted the existing system of 
political economy and fight out their battles on the grounds of culture.” Dirlik, “Rethinking 
Colonialism,” 442.
15 Benjamin Kunkel, “Into the Big Tent,” London Review of Books, April 22, 2010.
16 Fred Moten, “The Subprime and the Beautiful,” African Identities 11, no. 2 (May 1, 2013): 239, 
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35 years after its publication,  Black Marxism remains  one of the most incisive 
commentaries on the relationship between racism and capitalism. With its focus on the 
global political economy of race, it steps into  what Walter Mignolo has described as 
Marxism's “colonial fracture.”17 Where Marx had missed “the colonial mechanism of 
power underlying the system he critiques”18, Black Marxism challenges “the hegemonic 
imperial  macro-narratives”  that  privileged  the  Euro-American  proletariat  as  the 
revolutionary class of history. In its place it  centres the Black radical  tradition, “the 
colonial territories, marginalized colored people of the metropolitan centres of capital, 
and  those  Frantz  Fanon  identified  as  the  'wretched  of  the  earth.'”19 Echoing  Audre 
Lorde, Robinson revealed why the master's tools would never dismantled the master's 
house; and in its place, he examined what would.
Robinson,  of  course,  was not  the  first  thinker  to  put  a  spotlight  on the  link 
between  race  and  class.  Black  Marxism  drew  inspiration  from  a  long  tradition  of 
scholarship—including the work of W.E.B. Du Bois,  Oliver Cromwell Cox, Claudia 
Jones, Angela Davis, Eric Williams, Walter Rodney, and Stuart  Hall—who had held 
Black  radicalism  and  organised  Marxism in  uneasy  yet  productive  tension.20 Hall's 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14725843.2013.797289.
17 Walter D. Mignolo, “Delinking,” Cultural Studies 21, no. 2 (2007), 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09502380601162647. Anthony Bogues describes this as a Black radical 
heretical practice, through which Black radicals sought to expose Marxism's incompleteness when it 
came to the non-white and colonial world. As Bogues explains, black heretics entailed “a double 
operation—an engagement with Western radical theory and then a critique of this theory.” Anthony 
Bogues, Black Heretics, Black Prophets: Radical Political Intellectuals (Routledge, 2015), 13.
18 Mignolo, “Delinking,” 483.
19 Kelley, “Black Marxism,” xii.
20 In recent years a growing body of scholarship have examined how Black radicalism developed as a  
conversation with, and critique of, Marxist theory and practice. See, indicatively, Hakim Adi, Pan-
Africanism and Communism: The Communist International, Africa and the Diaspora, 1919-1939 
(Africa World Press, 2013); Carole Boyce Davies, Left of Karl Marx: The Political Life of Black 
Communist Claudia Jones (Duke University Press, 2008); Dayo F. Gore, Radicalism at the  
Crossroads: African American Women Activists in the Cold War (NYU Press, 2012); Cheryl 
Higashida, Black Internationalist Feminism: Women Writers of the Black Left, 1945-1995 (University 
of Illinois Press, 2011); Robin D. G. Kelley, Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists during the  
Great Depression (UNC Press Books, 2015); Minkah Makalani, In the Cause of Freedom: Radical  
Black Internationalism from Harlem to London, 1917-1939 (Univ of North Carolina Press, 2011); Erik 
S. McDuffie, Sojourning for Freedom: Black Women, American Communism, and the Making of  
Black Left Feminism (Duke University Press, 2011). Sylvia Wynter's apt description of C.L.R. James 
captures the uneasy yet productive relationship between Black radicalism and Marxims. James, she 
argues, was “a Negro yet British, a colonial native yet culturally a part of the public school code, 
attached to the cause of the proletariat yet a member of the middle class, a Marxian yet a Puritan, an  
intellectual who plays cricket, of African descent yet Western, a Trotskyist and Pan-Africanist, a  
Marxist yet a supporter of black studies, a West Indian majority black yet an American minority 
black.” For Wynter, these sides of James should not be seen as contradictions or antagonisms, but 
rather as parts of a unified whole. James refused to choose between “either race of class, proletariat or  
bondsman labor, or damnes de la terre, Pan-African nationalism or labor internationalism.” Instead, 
“[t]he quest for a frame to contain them all came” to constitute the essence of James's scholarship.  
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theory  of  articulation,  in  particular,  opened  up  space  for  a  non-reductionist 
understanding of race; race, Hall argued, is not epiphenomenal to capitalist development 
but a structuring relation. Yet  where Hall and others sometimes had fallen back on an 
easy separation between the materiality of class and the ideology of race,  Robinson 
refused the distinction altogether: race, he argued, is neither reducible to class, nor is it a 
separate  form  of  oppression.  Instead,  capitalism  relies  upon  the  elaboration, 
reproduction, and exploitation of racial difference: on the invention of what he called 
“the universal Negro.” Capitalism has historically operated through racial projects that 
assign differential value to human life and labour. Marxism, with its valorisation of the 
proletariat as the universal subject of history, thus failed to grasp that wage labour is not 
the only form of exploitation on which capitalism depends and thrives. Unwaged and 
less-than-free labour—such as chattel slavery, racialized indentured servitude, convict 
leasing, debt peonage, and gendered forms of caring work and reproductive labour—are 
not just incidental to capital accumulation, but fundamental to its operations.  Colonial 
land grabs, the transatlantic slave trade, native dispossession,  and armed trading had 
historically tied Europe, the Americas, Asia, and Africa into a differentiated but unified 
whole; indeed, “from its very foundations capitalism had never been—any more than 
Europe—a 'closed system.'”21 
Black  Marxism arrives  at  this  conclusion  through  a  close  study  of  one  of 
Marxism's key premises: namely, that capitalism emerged as a revolutionary negation of 
feudalism. Rejecting this idea, Robinson instead charts how capitalism evolved from a 
European feudal order that was already infused with racialism:
“The  bourgeoisie  that  led  the  development  of  capitalism  were  drawn 
from particular ethnic and cultural groups; the European proletariats and 
the mercenaries of the leading states from others; its peasants from still 
other cultures; and its slaves from entirely different worlds. The tendency 
of European civilization through capitalism was thus not to homogenize 
but to differentiate—to exaggerate regional, subcultural, and dialectical 
differences into 'racial' ones. As the Slavs became the natural slaves, the 
racially inferior stock for domination and exploitation during the early 
Middle  Ages,  as  the  Tartars came to  occupy a similar  position  in  the 
Italian cities of the late Middle Ages, so at the systemic interlocking of 
Quoted in Cyril Lionel Robert James, Mariners, Renegades, and Castaways: The Story of Herman  
Melville and the World We Live in (UPNE, 1953), x.
21 Cedric J. Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition, 2 edition (Chapel 
Hill, N.C: University North Carolina Pr, 2000), 4. See also Lowe, The Intimacies of Four Continents; 
Anibal Quijano and Michael Ennis, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,” 
Nepantla: Views from South 1, no. 3 (November 1, 2000): 533–80.
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capitalism in the sixteenth century, the peoples of the Third World began 
to  fill  this  expanding  category  of  a  civilization  reproduced  by 
capitalism.”22
While European colonialists would come to associate non-waged labour with  Indians, 
Blacks, and mestizos,23 Robinson shows how the racialization of the labouring classes in 
fact  begun  within  Europe,  long  before  Europe's  colonial  encounter  with  the  global 
South. The first  European proletarians were racial subjects—including the Irish, Slavs 
(the slaves), Roma, and Gypsies—and they were subject to dispossession, enclosure, 
and slavery within Europe.24 Alongside “indentured peasants, political outcasts produced 
at  varying times  by  national  and civil  wars,  and poor  or  orphaned females”25,  Irish 
immigrant  workers formed  a  particularly  important  element  in  the  English  working 
class; in 1841, there were 400.000 Irish immigrants livings in Great Britain, constituting 
“the cheapest labour in Western Europe.”26 Consequently, and as Robinson makes clear,
“The English working class was never the singular social and historical 
entity suggested by the phrase... The negations resultant from capitalist 
modes  of  production,  relations  of  production,  and  ideology  did  not 
manifest themselves as an eradication of oppositions among the working 
classes. Instead, the dialectic of proletarianization disciplined the working 
classes  to  the  importance  of  distinctions:  between  ethnics  and 
nationalities; between skilled and unskilled workers; and... in even more 
dramatic  terms,  between  races.  The  persistence  and  creation  of  such 
oppositions  within  the  working  classes  were  a  critical  aspect  of  the 
triumph of capitalism.”27
While racial ideologies justified low wages and mistreatment, they were—importantly
—not   invented  by  the  emergent  bourgeoisie;  rather,  racialism  already  saturated 
European civilisation, and thus came to shape “the process of proletarianization and the 
formation  of  working-class  consciousness.”28 In  other  words,  capitalism  was  less  a 
22 Robinson, Black Marxism, 26.
23 As Quijano points out, from the very beginning of the colonisation of America, Europeans associated 
non-paid or unwaged labor with Indigenous peoples because they were “inferior” races. Quijano and 
Ennis, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,” 538.
24 Robinson, Black Marxism, 3. As Robinson explains, racism “was not simple a convention for ordering 
the relations of Europeans to non-European peoples but has its genesis in the 'internal' relations of 
European peoples.” Kelley, “Black Marxism,” 2.. See also Geraldine Heng, The Invention of Race in  
the European Middle Ages (Cambridge University Press, 2018).
25 Robinson, Black Marxism, 116.
26 E.P. Thompson, quoted in Robinson, 39.
27 Kelley, “Black Marxism,” 42.
28 Kelley, xiii. As Kelley explains: “Capitalism was 'racial' not because of some conspiracy to divide 
workers or justify slavery and dispossession, but because racialism had already permeated Western  
feudal society.”
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negation of the feudalist social order, than the global extension of it; in essence, and as 
Robin D.G. Kelley explains, capitalism and racism “did not break from the old order but 
rather evolved from it to produce a modern world system of 'racial capitalism' dependent  
on slavery, violence, imperialism, and genocide.”29 The creation of raced—and, as we 
shall see in the next section, gendered—subjects organised the capitalist social order by 
splitting humanity into those associated with property, citizenship, and wages, and those 
subjected to superexploitation and dispossession. 
Marx, of course, was not unaware of the problems posed by this racial world 
order. He condemned both colonialism and slavery, and  called on workers to oppose 
racism. Nonetheless,  by bracketing  racial  violence as a  form of “so-called primitive 
accumulation”—and, thus, as something that belongs to a separate historical era—he 
neglected  to  interrogate  the  link  between  racial  difference  and  the  logic  of  capital. 
Rather than a process that is integral to capital accumulation, racism, for Marx, was an 
embarrassment residue of pre-capitalist social relations.30 In his famous formulation,
“The  discovery  of  gold  and  silver  in  America,  the  extirpation, 
enslavement, and entombment in mines of the indigenous population of 
that continent, the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and 
the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of 
blackskins, are all things that characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist 
production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive 
accumulation.”31
Consequently, while Marx condemned colonialism, he ultimately thought that capitalism 
bore little responsibility for the trade in human bodies, the theft of Indigenous lands and 
resources, and the colonial genocides committed in the name of Western civilisation. 
Capital may come into the world “dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with 
blood and dirt”32 but, he argued, it manages to clean up its act.  In contrast, in  Black  
Marxism Robinson  theorised  racial  violence  as  a  permanent,  rather  than  anterior, 
condition of capital accumulation.33 To consign slavery to a pre-capitalist era, Robinson 
29 Kelley, xiii.
30 Marx's notion of primitive accumulation describes the foundational process through which non-
capitalist forms of land and labour are incorporated into capitalist social relations. In recent years  
David Harvey has tried to update this concept; nonetheless, while this work is driven by an interest in 
questions relating to what Harvey terms the “new imperialism”, race and gender both remain curiously 
absent from the analysis. See David Harvey, The New Imperialism (OUP Oxford, 2003).
31 Quoted in Nikhil Pal Singh, Race and America’s Long War (Univ of California Press, 2017), 82.
32 Quoted in David Harvey, A Companion to Marx’s Capital (Verso Books, 2010), 300.
33 In recent years a number of theorists have argued that Marx in fact took a great interest in questions of  
colonialism, imperialism, and slavery, as well as the revolutionary efforts to abolish and overthrow 
them. See Kevin B. Anderson, Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western  
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argued, is to overlook that “the Atlantic slave trade and the slavery of the New World 
were integral to the modern world economy.”34 Indeed, “[f]or more than 300 years slave 
labor persisted beyond the beginnings of modern capitalism, complementing wage labor,  
peonage, serfdom, and other method of labor coercion.”35 Plantation slavery,  territorial 
expropriation,  social  displacement, militarised  trading,  indentured  servitude,  and 
resource extraction were all established and organised as building blocks of the global 
capitalist market. As Robinson concludes, “[f]rom whatever vantage point one chooses, 
the  relationship  between  slave  labor,  the  slave  trade,  and  the  weaving  of  the  early 
capitalist  economies  is  apparent.  Whatever  were  the  alternatives,  the  point  remains: 
historically, slavery was a critical foundation for capitalism.”36
Crucially,  then,  and  in  contrast  to  Marx's  expectation  that  bourgeois  society 
would  eradicate  racism  from  social  relations,  “the  development,  organization,  and 
expansion of capitalist society pursued essentially racial directions.”37 Violent forms of 
labour  exploitation such as  slavery,  sharecropping,  and indentured  servitude are not 
incidental  to capitalism. Rather,  capital  differentiates between free and less-than-free 
labour,  according  to  racial,  national,  ethnic,  and—as  we  shall  see,  gendered—
hierarchies.  As  Chris  Chen  elaborates,  “[t]he  history  of  capitalism  isn't  simply  the 
history of the proletarianisation of an independent peasantry but of the violent racial 
domination of populations whose valorisation as wage labour,  to  reverse a common 
formulation, has been merely historically contingent: 'socially dead' African slaves, the 
revocable  sovereignty  and  terra  nullius  of  indigenous  peoples,  and  the  nerveless, 
Societies (University of Chicago Press, 2016); Robin Blackburn, ed., An Unfinished Revolution: Karl  
Marx and Abraham Lincoln (London ; New York: Verso, 2011). And indeed, at moments Marx did 
recognise the centrality of slavery to capitalism; he argued that “the veiled slavery of the wageworkers  
in Europe needed, for its pedestal, slavery pure and simple in the new world”; that “the business of 
slavery is conducted by capitalists”; and that “direct slavery is just as much the pivot of the bourgeois 
industry as machinery, credits, etc. Without slavery you have no cotton; without cotton you have no 
modern industry. It is slavery that has given the colonies their value; it is the colonies that have created 
world trade, and it is world trade that is the precondition of large-scale industry. Thus slavery is an 
economic category of the greatest importance.” And yet, in spite of this, Marx consistently failed to 
develop a theory of the relation between slavery and capitalism. For a thorough critique of Marx's  
treatment of race, slavery, and colonialism, see Singh, Race and America’s Long War, 87.
34 Robinson, Black Marxism, 4. See also Edward E. Baptist, The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and  
the Making of American Capitalism (Hachette UK, 2016); Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global  
History (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2014); Stephanie E. Smallwood, Saltwater Slavery: A  
Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora (Harvard University Press, 2009); Eric Williams, 
Capitalism and Slavery (Lulu Press, Inc, 2015).
35 Robinson, Black Marxism, 4.
36 Robinson, 116 . For a similar argument on the colonial appropriation of Indigenous lands see Glen 
Sean Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2014); Brenna Bhandar, Colonial Lives of Property: Law, Land, and 
Racial Regimes of Ownership (Duke University Press, 2018).
37 Kelley, “Black Marxism,” 2.
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supernumerary body of the coolie labourer.”38 Contra Marxist orthodoxy, capitalism did 
not create the European proletariat as a universal subject. Rather, capitalism emerged—
and continues to operate—through racial projects that assign differential value to human 
life and labour.  Race-making practices are intrinsic to capital  accumulation, because 
racism supplies the precarious and exploitable lives capitalism needs to extract land and 
labour. In Jodi Melamed's formulation,
“Capital  can only be capital  when it  is accumulating, and it  can only 
accumulate  by  producing  and  moving  through  relations  of  severe 
inequality  among  human  groups—capitalists  with  the  means  of 
production/workers without the means of subsistence, creditors/debtors, 
conquerors of land made property/the dispossessed and removed. These 
antinomies of accumulation require loss, disposability, and the unequal 
differentiation of human value, and racism enshrines the inequalities that 
capitalism requires.”39
In  other  words,  there  can  be  no  capitalism  without  racializations:  hence  racial  
capitalism. 
The concept of racial capitalism helpfully highlights the underlying materiality 
of  the global colour line. In contrast to postcolonial scholars that predominantly have 
focused  their  analysis  on  questions  of  Eurocentrism,  representation,  and  cultural 
difference,  Robinson's  analysis  encourages  us  to  take  seriously  the  historical  and 
ongoing global political  economy of race and racism. The production of racial  (and 
gendered) differences is ultimately how capital manages the contradiction “between the 
promise of political  emancipation and the conditions of economic exploitation.”40 As 
Silvia Federici explains, 
“capitalism,  as  a  social-economic  system,  is  necessarily  committed  to 
racism  and  sexism.  For  capitalism  must  justify  and  mystify  the 
contradictions built into its social relations—the promise of freedom vs. 
the reality of widespread coercion, and the promise of prosperity vs. the 
reality  of  widespread  penury—by  denigrating  the  'nature'  of  those  it 
exploits: women, colonial subjects the descendants of American slaves, 
the immigrants displaced by globalization.”41
38 Chris Chen, “The Limit Point of Capitalist Equality,” Endnotes 3, accessed May 13, 2018, 
https://endnotes.org.uk/issues/3/en/chris-chen-the-limit-point-of-capitalist-equality.
39 Melamed, “Racial Capitalism,” 77.
40 Lisa Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics (Duke University Press, 1996), 23.
41 Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation (Autonomedia, 
2004), 17.
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Before exploring how these structures continue to pattern global politics, we must first 
account for the role of gender and sexuality in racial capitalism.
Reproductive Racial Capitalism
Black Marxism has rightly been praised for bringing anti-racist, anti-imperialist, 
and anti-capitalist  critiques into productive conversation.  It  has,  however,  also faced 
criticism for being an overtly masculine text.42 Critics have called out  Robinson for 
centre-staging the work of three male thinkers—Du Bois, C.L.R. James, and Richard 
Wright, as opposed to, say, Ella Baker, Sojourner Truth, or Ida B. Wells—and for eliding 
the question of gender and sexual differences.43 In what follows I argue that Robinson's 
work, in spite of these blindspots, can be put into fruitful dialogue with feminist theory 
and  activism.  As  we  shall  see,  doing  so  not  only  unravels  the  ways  in  which  the 
regulation of intimacy and female reproductive labour is central to the process of capital 
accumulation; it also pushes us to take seriously the role of gender in producing and 
reproducing the global colour line.
Women  of  colour  feminists  such  as  Mariarosa  Dalla  Costa,  Selma  James, 
Claudia Jones,  Maria Mies,  Angela Davis,  and the Combahee River Collective have 
highlighted the various ways in which the home and housework function as foundations 
of  the  capitalist  social  order.44 In  their  influential  The  Power  of  Women  and  the  
Subversion of the Community  from 1972, Dalla Costa and James challenged the idea 
that sexism (like racism) is a residue of pre-capitalist social relations. The exploitation 
of women, they argued, is central to the process of capital accumulation. Through their 
household  work  and  other  forms  of  unwaged  work,  women  are  the  producers  and 
reproducers of capitalism's most crucial commodity: namely, labour-power. Anticipating 
Robinson's insight that capital depends on the existence of a large pool of workers who 
42 For example, see H. L. T. Quan, “Geniuses of Resistance: Feminist Consciousness and the Black 
Radical Tradition:,” Race & Class, June 30, 2016, https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396805058081.
43 In an interview with Christina Heatherton and Jordan T. Camp, Robinson admits to having left out the 
question of gender from the analysis in Black Marxism. It should be noted that Robinson's other 
books, most crucially, An Anthropology of Marxism, do offer an extensive discussion of women's 
activism, including that of Fanny Lou Hamer and Ella Baker. See Christina Heatherton and Jordan T. 
Camp, “The World We Want: An Interview with Cedric and Elizabeth Robinson,” in Futures of Black 
Radicalism, ed. Gaye Theresa Johnson and Alex Lubin (Verso, 2017).
44 See, indicatively, Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James, The Power of Women and the Subversion  
of the Community (Falling Wall Press Ltd, 1975); Davies, Left of Karl Marx; Maria Mies, Patriarchy 
and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labour (Zed Books Ltd., 
2014); Angela Y. Davis, Women, Race, & Class (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2011); 
Combahee River Collective, The Combahee River Collective Statement: Black Feminist Organizing in  
the Seventies and Eighties (Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press, 1986).
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stand outside of the formal wage relation, Dalla Costa and James demonstrated how the 
home is  one of the pillars  of capitalist  social  relations.45 Next to the slave,  colonial 
subject,  coolie,  and  wageless  worker,  they  thus  added  another  unwaged  figure:  the 
proletarian housewife, who reproduces the workforce. The division between “gender” 
and “class”, they concluded, is ultimately a false dichotomy: “women's history” is a 
form of “class history”, because gender names a specific form of class relation, rather 
than a cultural norm or biological reality.
In  Caliban and the Witch, the Italian feminist  Marxist  thinker Silvia Federici 
builds on these insights to rethink the concept of primitive accumulation from a feminist 
perspective.  Examining  “the  execution  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  'witches'  at  the 
beginning of the modern era”, she interrogates why “the rise of capitalism demanded a 
genocidal attack on women.”46 The construction of a new sexual  division of labour, 
confining women to reproductive work,  required that the “world female subject”  be 
destroyed: “the heretic, the healer, the disobedient wife, the woman who dared to live 
alone,  the obeha woman who poisoned the master's food and inspired the slaves to 
revolt.”47 By destroying the control that women had exercised over their reproductive 
function, the persecution of witches paved the way for a more oppressive patriarchal 
regime.  The  witch-hunt,  Federici  concludes,  was  ultimately  “as  important  as 
colonization and the expropriation of the European peasantry from its land were for the 
development of capitalism.”48 
In recent years a growing body of scholarship has highlighted the ways in which 
the  intimate  sphere  of  sexuality,  desire,  and  reproductive  labour  were  central  to 
colonialism and New World slavery. In her influential Carnal Knowledge and Imperial  
Power,  Ann  Laura  Stoler  demonstrates  how  “gender-specific  sexual  sanctions  and 
prohibitions” were crucial for establishing and securing the categories of coloniser and 
colonised. Focusing on parents and parenting, nursing mothers, servants, orphanages, 
and abandoned children, she shows how the “troubled intimacies of domestic space” 
were essential to imperial governance; “[r]ace was a primary and protean category for 
colonial capitalism and... managing the domestic was crucial to it.”49 Similarly, and as 
45 Costa and James, The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community. See also Mies, 
Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale.
46 Federici, Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation, 14.
47 Federici, 11.
48 Federici, 12.
49 Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule 
(University of California Press, 2002), 13. See also Antoinette Burton, Burdens of History: British  
Feminists, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865-1915 (Univ of North Carolina Press, 2000); 
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thinkers such  as Angela  Davis,  Jennifer Morgan, and Saidiya Hartman have  shown, 
gendered  racial  violence  was one  of  the  pillars  of  the  system of  New World  racial 
slavery: slaveowners relied on African captive women, not only for unpaid productive 
labour, but also for their reproductive capacities. The appropriation of Black women's 
reproductive  labour,  Christina  Sharpe  writes,  “turns  the  womb  into  a  factory 
reproducing blackness as abjection and turning the birth canal into another domestic 
middle  passage.”50 Slaveowners  effectively  conscripted  the  womb for  their  own 
financial  gain; they “'coupled'  men and women, named them husband and wife, and 
foresaw their own future in the bellies of enslaved workers.”51 
By reading  gender  and  sexuality  into  racial  capitalism,  this  diverse  array  of 
thinkers unravel the ways in which the regulation of intimacy and women's reproductive 
labour is crucial to the functioning of the “free” market. Neither race nor gender are 
accidental features of the global capitalist order, but are constitutive and central to its 
survival and reproduction. In the next section I consider how the rise of neoliberalism 
has reconfigured the global colour line. As we shall see, racialized and gendered forms 
of  domination  have  evolved  to  taken  on  new  forms,  fit  for  the  postcolonial  and 
multicultural present.
Ghettos, Slums, Favelas: Neoliberalism and the Global Production of Surplus 
Humanity
Over the last two decades,  and especially after the election of America's first 
Black President, the idea of the postracial has risen to prominence. Race, it is frequently 
claimed, either is or is quickly becoming a thing of the past.52 As David Theo Goldberg 
Nayan Shah, Stranger Intimacy: Contesting Race, Sexuality and the Law in the North American West 
(University of California Press, 2012); Philippa Levine, Gender and Empire (OUP Oxford, 2007); 
Laura Wexler, Tender Violence: Domestic Visions in an Age of U.S. Imperialism (UNC Press Books, 
2000).
50 Quoted in Saidiya Hartman, “The Belly of the World: A Note on Black Women’s Labors,” Souls 18, 
no. 1 (March 14, 2016): 169, https://doi.org/10.1080/10999949.2016.1162596.
51 Jennifer Morgan, Laboring Women: Reproduction and Gender in New World Slavery (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 105. Hartman similarly concludes: “black women’s domestic labors and 
reproductive capacities... labor was critical to the creation of value, the realization of profit and the 
accumulation of capital.” Hartman, “The Belly of the World,” 167. See also Angela Davis, 
“Reflections on the Black Woman’s Role in the Community of Slaves,” The Massachusetts Review 13, 
no. 1/2 (1972): 81–100; Darlene Clark Hine, “Rape and the Inner Lives of Black Women in the 
Middle West,” Signs 14, no. 4 (1989): 912–20; Darlene C. Hine, “Female Slave Resistance: The 
Economics of Sex,” Western Journal of Black Studies, January 1, 1979.
52 Mark Ledwidge, Kevern Verney, and Inderjeet Parmar, Barack Obama and the Myth of a Post-Racial  
America (Routledge, 2013); N. B. C. News, “Obama: Police Need to Work on Building Trust,” NBC 
News, April 29, 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/baltimore-unrest/obama-police-need-work-
building-trust-n350501; Tim Wise, Colorblind: The Rise of Post-Racial Politics and the Retreat from 
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explains,  the  “key  conditions  of  social  life”,  including  education  possibility, 
employment opportunities, and residential location, are increasingly thought to be “less 
and  less...  predicated  on  racial  preference,  choices,  and resources.”53 In  parallel,  an 
unprecedented  number  of  women  have  come  to  occupy  positions  of  power  in  the 
professional-managerial class. As an increasing number of women “lean in” and climb 
the corporate ladder, they will achieve the liberation that generations of feminists have 
struggled for—at least if one is to believe Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg.54 What, if 
anything, do these shifting racial-sexual grammars tell us about the current articulation 
of the global colour line? Has capital stopped operating through racial and gendered 
logics? If not, what has changed and why?
To  answer  these  questions,  it  is  helpful  to  consider  the  genealogy  of 
postracialism. In the previous chapter I traced how the postwar period's anticolonial and 
civil rights movements produced a crisis in white supremacy. By exposing the racial 
contradictions of European powers and the United States—which had claimed to fight 
an  antiracist  and  antifascist  war  against  Germany,  while  simultaneously  practising 
racism and fascism against people of colour in Europe, the US, and in the colonies—
these movements successfully discredited white supremacy as official state policy on 
both  a  national  and  international  level.  The  result  was  a  shift,  from  overt  white 
supremacy to what Jodi Melamed calls “racial liberalism.”55 Racial liberalism differs 
from white supremacy in so far as it “recognizes racial inequality as a problem” and 
“secures a liberal  symbolic framework for race reform centered in  abstract  equality, 
market individualism, and inclusive civic nationalism.”56 The shift to racial liberalism 
discredited scientific racism with its belief in the inherent biological inferiority of non-
white peoples. In its place, it centre-staged a cultural paradigm which traced the roots of 
poverty  and  inequality  to  cultural  values.  The  rise  of  neoliberalism  has  further 
reconfigured  this  framework:  under  neoliberalism,  the  determining  factor  in  an 
individual’s life chances is said to be individual choice—as opposed to skin colour, the 
relative wealth of the families individuals are born into, and so on. As Ashwin Desai and 
Richard  Pithouse  note,  this  has  led to  a  delinking of  “the classic  racial  stereotypes 
(laziness,  dirtiness, dangerous men and willing women etc)  that legitimated colonial 
Racial Equity (City Lights Books, 2010).
53 David Theo Goldberg, Are We All Postracial Yet? (John Wiley & Sons, 2015), 2.
54 Sheryl Sandberg, Lean In: Women, Work, and the Will to Lead (Random House, 2013).
55 Howard Winant, “The Modern World Racial System,” in Transnational Blackness: Navigating the  
Global Color Line, ed. M. Marable and Vanessa Agard-Jones (Springer, 2008).
56 Melamed, “The Spirit of Neoliberalism: From Racial Liberalism to Neoliberal Multiculturalism,” 2.
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domination from race”, and a subsequent projection of “them onto the global poor of all 
races in order to legitimate contemporary forms of domination that entrench inequalities 
that were previously created in explicitly racist terms.”57 New categories of privilege 
and subordination have thus come to blend with older racial categories.
One of the key mechanisms through which this has happened is  gender.  The 
post-war entrance of women into the labour market coincided with the globalisation of 
neoliberal capitalism and the international deregulation of markets.  As Nancy Fraser 
notes,  the conscription of women into the paid work force has been essential  to the 
expansion of low-wage work, with women providing the majority of workers in the 
fastest-growing areas of poorly paid employment.58 The new ideal of the modern two-
earner family, she argues, has had the effect of squeezing out time for unpaid carework. 
Women who “lean in” are thus forced to lean on other women “by offloading their own 
care  work  and  housework  onto  low-waged,  precarious  workers,  typically  racialized 
and/or immigrant women.”59
In the neoliberal present neither race nor gender have thus withered away, but 
very much continue to  structure the social and economic processes of capitalism. As 
Melamed explains, “race remains a procedure that justifies the nongeneralizability of 
capitalist  wealth...  organizing  the  hyperextraction  of  surplus  value  from  racialized 
bodies and naturalizing a system of capital accumulation that grossly favors the global 
North  over  the  global  South.”60 Under  neoliberalism,  capitalism's  initial  division 
between free  and less-than-free labour—in the form of  slavery,  serfdom, indentured 
servitude,  unpaid  reproductive  labour,  and  so  on—has  been  systematised  and 
reconfigured as a racialized division of labour. While the freedoms and rights won by 
anticolonial  and  civil  rights  movements  must  not  be  underestimated,  racialized 
domination has simultaneously evolved to take on new forms, fit for the postcolonial 
and postracial  present.  In the face of austerity measures and neoliberal restructuring, 
capitalism's  production  of  surplus  populations  has  both  intensified  and reconfigured 
57 Ashwin Desai and Richard Pithouse, “‘What Stank in the Past Is the Present’s Perfume’: 
Dispossession, Resistance, and Repression in Mandela Park,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 103, no. 4 
(September 16, 2004): 848–9.
58 See Nancy Fraser, Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis 
(Verso Books, 2013).
59 Nancy Fraser and Gary Gutting, “A Feminism Where ‘Lean In’ Means Leaning On Others,” The New 
York Times, 1444893675, //opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/a-feminism-where-leaning-in-
means-leaning-on-others/.
60 Melamed, “The Spirit of Neoliberalism: From Racial Liberalism to Neoliberal Multiculturalism,” 10; 
1.
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itself. Today's surplus populations are not “a reserve army of labour” in Marx's sense—
namely, workers who are hired and fired in times of economic expansion and decline61
—but a growing mass of humanity that are disposable and yet trapped within the capital 
relation.  Reduced to waste,  bare  life,  and excess,  these  are  the  “lumpenproletariat”: 
those who exist at the margins of the capitalist economy and “whose plight cannot... be 
meaningfully addressed or meaningfully improved within the neoliberal institutions of 
global capitalism.”62 According to urban geographer Mike Davis, this outcast proletariat 
today amounts to a staggering 1.4 billion people, making it “the fastest growing... social 
class on earth.”63 From the ghettos of Los Angeles to the slums in Cairo, the banlieues of 
Paris, and the favelas of Rio, the global colour line is quickly being reconfigured and 
hardened  along  lines  of  free  and  less-than-free  (including  unwaged,  coerced,  and 
dependent forms of) labour. As Chris Chen explains, 
“At the periphery of the global capitalist system, capital now renews 'race' 
by  creating  vast  superfluous  urban  populations  from  the  close  to  one 
billion  slum-dwelling  and  desperately  impoverished  descendants  of  the 
enslaved  and  colonised...  As  capital  sloughs  off  these  relative  surplus 
populations in the core, the surplus capital produced by fewer and more 
intensively exploited workers  in  the  Global  North scours  the  globe  for 
lower wages, and reappears as the racial threat of cheap labour from the 
Global South.”64
Neoliberalism, thus, reproduces the global colour line in at least two ways: through the 
hyperextraction of surplus value from racialized bodies, as well as—and in conjunction 
with—the  racialized violence of the penal and national security state. That is, race both 
manifests itself as “a probabilistic assignment of relative economic value” and “an index  
of differential vulnerability to state violence.”65 This stands in contrast to conventional 
interpretations of neoliberalism, which often conceptualise it in terms of a withdrawal of 
61 In Capital, Marx described surplus populations as a structural necessity of the capitalist system; the 
accumulation of capital, he argued, depends on “a relatively redundant working population, i.e. a 
population which is superfluous to capital’s average requirements for its own valorization, and is 
therefore a surplus population.” Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Penguin Books 
Limited, 1976), 782.
62 Michael Cloete, “Neville Alexander: Towards Overcoming the Legacy of Racial Capitalism in Post-
Apartheid South Africa,” Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 86, no. 1 (March 
10, 2015): 43, https://doi.org/10.1353/trn.2014.0032. See also McIntyre Michael and Nast Heidi J., 
“Bio(necro)polis: Marx, Surplus Populations, and the Spatial Dialectics of Reproduction and 
‘Race’1,” Antipode 43, no. 5 (June 1, 2011): 1465–88, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8330.2011.00906.x.
63 Mike Davis, Planet of Slums (Verso, 2007), 178.
64 Chen, “The Limit Point of Capitalist Equality.”
65 Chen.
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the  (welfare)  state  through  privatisation  and  deregulation.  While  this  is  true, 
neoliberalism also entails a simultaneous roll-out of new forms of state interventionism 
and social control. As Stuart Hall and his co-authors demonstrated in their 1978 classic 
Policing the Crisis, neoliberalism justifies new ways of regulating class, race, and space 
through the construction of “moral panics” and an ideology of crisis, in which tough-on-
crime policies are seen as the only bulwark against the breakdown of social order.66 
Policing the Crisis offers a critique of the idea that policing and other forms of state 
violence are inevitable reactions to “threats” to public safety. As Hall et al explain, the 
penal and national security state emerged as a strategy for “managing” the populations 
rendered redundant in relation to capital. The slide to authoritarianism in Britain in the 
1970s was less the result of an increase in racialized street crime—“mugging”—than of 
an  underlying  crisis  in  hegemony,  which  saw  the  state  struggle  to  reproduce  itself 
without “an escalation in the use and forms of repressive state power.”67 Consent to 
these repressive measures were won “through race”:
“A crisis  of  hegemony  marks  a  moment  of  profound  rupture  in  the 
political  and  economic  life  of  a  society,  an  accumulation  of 
contradictions...  Such  moments  signal,  not  necessarily  a  revolutionary 
conjuncture nor the collapse of the state, but rather the coming of “iron 
times”... Class domination will be exercised, in such moments, through a 
modification in the modes of hegemony... and the powerful orchestration... 
of  an  authoritarian consensus...  The  forms  of  state  intervention  thus 
become more overt and more direct.”68
In today's neoliberal present, moral panics around race, crime, security, (dis)order, and 
law  frequently  function  as  legitimating  discourses  for  the  state's  expanded  use  of 
policing, prisons, and bordering practices. As Loïc Wacquant explains, in neoliberalism 
“the 'invisible hand' of the casualized labor market finds its institutional complement 
and counterpart in the 'iron fist' of the state which is being redeployed so as to check the 
disorders generated by the diffusion of social insecurity.”69 This “iron first” manifests 
itself in a variety of contexts and geographies, some which I discuss in my three case 
studies: including the mass incarceration and policing of Black and Brown populations 
66 Stuart Hall et al., Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order (Macmillan International 
Higher Education, 2013). See also Nisha Kapoor, “The Advancement of Racial Neoliberalism in 
Britain,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, no. 6 (June 1, 2013): 1028–46, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2011.629002.
67 Hall et al., Policing the Crisis, 298.
68 Hall et al., 214.
69 Loïc Wacquant, “The Penalisation of Poverty and the Rise of Neo-Liberalism,” European Journal on  
Criminal Policy and Research 9, no. 4 (December 1, 2001): 401–2, 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013147404519.
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in  the  United  States,  Brazil,  and  South  Africa,  counterinsurgency  operations  in  the 
Middle East, mass surveillance, and the proliferation of militarised borders alongside 
the world's North-South equator. IR theory, with its language of borders, frontiers, and 
territorial sovereignty, is ill-equipped to capture this dynamic—characterised, as it is, by 
the gradual unravelling of the Westphalian order and the  simultaneous proliferation of 
hard,  militarised  borders.  The  proliferation  of penal  and  national  security  measures 
ultimately constitute a growing “security archipelago”70, designed to protect the wealthy 
and powerful from those rendered surplus by the social and economic dislocations of 
racial capitalism. For Mike Davis, this is why surplus populations must be considered 
“the ghosts at the table of world politics. Every debate about the war on 
terrorism, the future of the Middle East, the AIDS crisis in Africa, and 
the international narcotics trade is haunted by their presence and growing 
desperation. The helicopter gunships that hover over the megaslums of 
Gaza and Sadr City, the nightly gun battles in the shantytowns of Bogota 
and Karachi, the bulldozers in Nairobi, Delhi, and Manila—is this not 
already an incipient world war between rich and poor?”71
In linking the growth of surplus humanity to  the neoliberal  reordering of the world 
economy, Davis gets the broad strokes of the story right. Nonetheless, by centre-staging 
the political economy of the global colour line, we can be more precise: in fact, is this 
not an incipient world war between the rich and  the racialized populations rendered  
superfluous by global capital?
Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that the global colour line is best understood as a 
racial  ontology  that  enables  the  hyper-exploitation  of  non-white  peoples  and  lands, 
while  privileging  others.  In  contrast  to  (postcolonial)  scholarship  that  focuses  on 
questions of Eurocentrism, representation, and cultural difference, a materialist reading 
of the global colour line centre-stages the political economic critique of race and racism. 
Unwaged  and  less-than-free  labour—such  as  chattel  slavery,  racialized  indentured 
servitude,  convict  leasing,  debt  peonage,  and  gendered  forms  of  caring  work  and 
reproductive labour—are not just incidental to capital accumulation, but fundamental to 
70 Paul Amar, The Security Archipelago: Human-Security States, Sexuality Politics, and the End of  
Neoliberalism (Duke University Press, 2013).
71 Mike Davis, “Planet of Slums,” Harper’s Magazine, June 2004, 
https://harpers.org/archive/2004/06/planet-of-slums/.
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its operations. As Aloysha Goldstein summarises, 
“Race and gender are not incidental or accidental features of the global 
capitalist order, they are constitutive. Capitalism emerged as a racial and 
gendered regime... The secret to capitalism's survival is racism, and the 
racial and patriarchal state.”72
The neoliberal reordering of the world economy has led to a reconfiguration of these 
dynamics: while racialized and gendered forms of domination continue to pattern global 
politics,  they  have  evolved  to  take  on  new  forms,  fit  for  the  postcolonial  and 
multicultural  present. How can these processes be challenged? In the next  chapter I 
show that a materialist  reading of the global colour line, and a consequent focus on 
interlocking oppressions under  racial capitalism, open up space for a different kind of 
internationalism and politics of solidarity. In the contemporary era of Trump, Brexit, and 
global fascist  resurgence—where the “white working class” frequently is  juxtaposed 
with “immigrants”, and identity politics blamed for the demise of the organised Left—
such an internationalist vision is urgently needed.
72 Aloysha Goldstein, “On the Reproduction of Race, Capitalism, and Settler Colonialism” (Race and 




C H A P T E R  4
Identity Politics and the Class Struggle: Towards a New Internationalism
“For the vast majority of the planet's peoples, the global economy publicizes itself in 
human misery. Thus, the simple fact is that liberationist movements abound in the real 
world—a reason for attention far more weighty than the self-serving conceits of 
capitalist triumphalism and incessant chants of globalism followed upon the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union.”
—Cedric Robinson1
“I think that we have to have a global perspective. We need—we used to call it 
internationalism... I think we need to create a 21st century internationalism. None 
of the past struggles in this country, progressive struggles, took place in isolation 
from what was happening in the rest of this world... I think we need to begin to 
think in those terms.”
—Angela Y. Davis2
Introduction
In  The Many-Headed Hydra, Peter Linebaugh and Markus Rediker reconstruct 
the history of the rise of Atlantic capitalism and the revolutionary movements to which 
it gave rise. As the expansion of trade and colonisation launched the world's first global 
economy, a vast,  landless, and ethnically and racially diverse workforce was born; a 
motley  crew  of  African  slaves,  English  convicts,  conquered  Irishmen,  indentured 
servants,  conscripted  sailors,  dispossessed  commoners,  religious  radicals,  pirates, 
witches,  and  prostitutes.  These  “planetary  wanderers”  not  only  built  their  own 
autonomous,  multi-ethnic,  and cross-gendered  communities  on the  factory-like  ships 
that  roamed  the  Atlantic.  They  also  resisted  the  brutal  conditions  of  the  British 
transatlantic empire and successfully instigated rebellions ocean-wide. As this “many-
headed  hydra”  disintegrated,  “[w]hat  was  left  behind  was  national  and  partial:  the 
English working class, the black Haitian, the Irish diaspora.”3
What might it mean to reimagine such a motley crew of “planetary wanderers” 
in 21st century world politics? In this chapter I argue that a materialist reading of the  
1 Cedric J. Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition, 2 edition (Chapel 
Hill, N.C: University North Carolina Pr, 2000), xxviii.
2 “Freedom Is a Constant Struggle: Angela Davis on Ferguson, Palestine & the Foundations of a 
Movement,” Democracy Now!, accessed May 29, 2017, 
http://www.democracynow.org/2016/3/28/freedom_is_a_constant_struggle_angela.
3 Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the  
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global colour line provides  answers to this question. An analysis of racial capitalism 
demonstrates that different systems of oppression—based on race, class, gender, and so 
on—are inherently international and rely on one another in complex ways. While the 
struggles against empire,  white  supremacy, settler  colonialism, gender  subordination, 
and  workers'  exploitation  are  not  always  and  everywhere  the  same,  they  are 
fundamentally  interlinked:  different  fronts  of  the  same  war.  Where  cosmopolitan 
scholarship typically understands solidarity as a product of commonality—in short, as 
something  that  arises  amongst  people  and  groups  that  are  alike—a focus  on  racial 
capitalism thus opens up space for a different kind of solidaristic politics, centred on an 
analysis of how different forms of oppression depend on one another. Racism, sexism, 
and  classism are  not  separate  forms  of  oppression  that  sometimes  intersect,  but  an 
entangled and constitutive part  of the capitalist global order. This does not deny the 
uniqueness and specificity of local struggles; instead, in emphasising their international 
character,  it  points  to  the  importance  of  connecting—but  not unifying—different 
struggles,  projects,  and  trajectories  into  a  “many-headed  hydra”:  a  radical 
internationalism for the 21st century.
I  develop these arguments in  three sections.  In the first  section I  provide an 
overview  of  (white)  Marxist  critiques  of  identity  politics.  Scholars  such  as  David 
Harvey, Nancy Fraser, and Wendy Brown have insisted on a firm distinction between 
identity politics and class struggle, whereby they  separate anti-capitalist politics from 
the  struggle  against  white  supremacy,  patriarchy,  settler  colonialism,  and empire.  A 
materialist  reading  of  the  global  colour  line  demonstrates  why  this  separation  is 
problematic: race-making practices are intrinsic to capital accumulation, because racism 
supplies the precarious and exploitable lives capitalism needs to extract land and labour. 
In eliding this dynamic, critics of identity politics ultimately take it for granted that there 
exists a variety of different oppressions that are separate from (and less important than) 
the  workers'  struggle.  The second section challenges  this  claim by returning  to  the 
original  formulation  of  identity  politics  as  theorised  by  the  Black  lesbian  feminist 
organisation  the  Combahee River  Collective  (CRC).  Anticipating  Cedric  Robinson's 
analysis in Black Marxism, the CRC showed that a focus on race and gender need not 
detract attention from class: quite the opposite, a truly anti-capitalist politics has to be 
anti-racist, anti-sexist, and, indeed, internationalist. In the final section I argue that such 
an analysis opens up space for a different kind of internationalism. Where cosmopolitan 
perspectives often depict solidarity as a one-way street whereby powerful and privileged 
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actors extend empathy and charity to silent  victims,  internationalism thus conceived 
figures  subalterns  as  agents  in  a collective  struggle  against  interlocking  systems  of 
oppression under racial capitalism.
The Colour Line and the Assembly Line
In the  late  1960s,  a  group of  working-class  white  activists  called  the  Young 
Patriots  formed a class-based,  multi-racial  coalition with the Black Panther Party in 
Chicago. The Patriots consisted of poor white migrants from the Appalachian region in 
West Virginia,  Tennessee, and Kentucky that had come to Chicago with the hope of 
finding work and a brighter future. The actual Chicago was very different from what 
they had dreamed of: a city characterised by slums, poverty, racism, unemployment, 
police violence,  housing discrimination,  and lack of social  services.  Confined to  the 
economically deprived Uptown neighbourhood, the  Appalachian community struggled 
to find jobs and often found itself stuck in day labour, hustling, domestic work, and 
social welfare. In this environment, the Patriots organised against the capitalist system 
and claimed the white southern's right to self-determination, describing themselves as 
“hillbilly  nationalists.”  They chose  the  Confederate  flag as  their  symbol  and had it 
sewed onto their denim jackets and berets—less an endorsement of white supremacy, 
which they opposed, and more “a blatant middle finger to the student left”,4 which they 
argued was dominated by middle-class students and their contempt for the white poor. 
In  the 1960s they successfully set  up the Rainbow Coalition—the “vanguard of the 
dispossessed”—together with the Black Panther Party. In addition to the Panthers and 
the Patriots, the Coalition also included the Puerto Rican street-gang-turned-political-
organisation the Young Lords as well as other groups organising poor whites, including 
Rising Up Angry and Jobs or Income Now (JOIN). Despite “the seeming contradiction 
of confederate flag waving revolutionaries in deep dialogue about  Black Power and 
Third World Liberation”,5 the Coalition successfully established a string of community 
service  programs  addressing  poor  people's  immediate  concerns,  including  health, 
welfare, housing, jobs, drug addiction, and police violence.6 As Amy Sonnie and James 
4 Amy Sonnie and James Tracy, Hillbilly Nationalists, Urban Race Rebels, and Black Power:  
Community Organizing in Radical Times (Melville House, 2011), 75.
5 Sonnie and Tracy, 4.
6 For a more detailed account of the Rainbow Coalition, see Sonnie and Tracy, Hillbilly Nationalists,  
Urban Race Rebels, and Black Power. See also the webpage: “The Young Patriots and the Original 
Rainbow Coalition,” accessed November 26, 2017, http://www.youngpatriots-rainbowcoalition.org/.
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Tracy  recount  in  Hillbilly  Nationalists,  Urban  Race  Rebels,  and  Black  Power,  the 
Coalition “opened direct links to struggles in communities of color, allowing poor and 
working-class whites to participate as actors, not just allies, in the struggle for racial and 
economic justice.”7 Kathleen Cleaver, who at the time was one of the leading Panther 
figures, remembers how
“In a world of racist polarization, we sought solidarity... We organized the 
Rainbow  Coalition,  pulled  together  our  allies,  including  not  only  the 
Puerto Rican Young Lords, the youth gang called Black P. Stone Rangers, 
the Chicano Brown Berets, and the Asian I Wor Kuen (Red Guards), but 
also  the  predominantly  white  Peace  and  Freedom  Party  and  the 
Appalachian Young Patriot Party. We posed not only a theoretical but a 
practical challenge to the way our world was organized. And we were 
men and women working together.”8
Five  decades  later,  the  Rainbow  Coalition—grounded,  as  it  was,  in  a 
understanding of the revolutionary struggle as a specifically cross-racial one—seems 
unlikely if not utopian. As Sonnie and Tracy point out, “[t]here's a reason West Side 
Story tells a tale of true love tragically divided. Would anyone believe the plot if the 
Sharks and the Jets had joined forces to fight the police and open a community health 
clinic? Popular history gives us so many of these stories that tales of racial unity seem 
romantic at best, propaganda at worst.”9 
Why have multi-racial  alliances like the Rainbow Coalition come to seem so 
impossible? The standard answer typically centres on the rise of identity politics and the 
fracturing of old, working class solidarity. As we saw in chapter 2, since 1968 the Euro-
American Left has witnessed an intellectual retreat from the historical materialism of 
Marx and Marxism, and a philosophical turn towards questions of human rights, the 
primacy of the individual, and the critique of the political. This transformation also gave 
rise to new social movements, focused on race, gender, nationality, sexuality, ecology, 
and other issues not explicitly expressed in the language of class. As Wendy Brown 
explains,
“Where there was once the Movement, there are now multiple sites and 
modalities  of  emancipatory  struggle  and  egalitarian  protest.  Similarly, 
7 Sonnie and Tracy, 4.
8 Quoted in Kathleen Cleaver and George Katsiaficas, Liberation, Imagination and the Black Panther  
Party: A New Look at the Black Panthers and Their Legacy (Routledge, 2014), 125.
9 Sonnie and Tracy, Hillbilly Nationalists, Urban Race Rebels, and Black Power, 7.
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where there was once a millenarian, redemptive, or utopian project around 
which  to  organize  the  various  strategies  of  the  political  present,  such 
projects have splintered politically at the same time that they have been 
quite thoroughly discredited by cultural and philosophical critique.”10
Calls for revolutionary social change have, according to Brown, today been “diffused 
into  local,  issue-oriented,  or  identity-based  struggles  that  generally  lack  a  strong 
alternative  vision.”11 In  short,  identity  politics  has  displaced  class  struggle,  and  the 
colour line has supplanted the assembly line as the central category of political analysis. 
Brown's argument is echoed by a number of contemporary thinkers, including Nancy 
Fraser,  Todd  Gitlin,  Adolph  Reed,  Ellen  Meiksins  Wood,  and  Slavoj  Zizek.  Fraser 
describes the rise of identity politics as a product of the “renaturalization of capitalism” 
which, in her view, has come to characterise Leftist discourse since the 1970s. In this 
climate, where “the Right won the political battle and the Left won the cultural war”,12 
“cultural  domination”  has  increasingly supplanted  “exploitation”  as  the  fundamental 
injustice. The result  has been a political  imaginary centred on notions of “identity”, 
“difference”, and “recognition”, and a displacement of the socialist imaginary with its 
framing of “redistribution” as the central goal of political struggle. As the “politics of 
difference”  overtook  the  “politics  of  class”,  solidarity  across  divides—such  as  that 
enacted by the Rainbow Coalition—has been rendered increasingly suspicious.
To what extent is this a correct description? Critiques of identity politics are of 
course not without their merit. In some versions, identity politics has indeed functioned 
as  the  handmaiden  of  neoliberalism—exemplified,  perhaps  most  starkly,  by  Hillary 
Clinton's  presidential  campaign,  which  adopted  the  language  of  “privilege”  and 
“intersectionality”  to  combat  the  left-wing challenge from Bernie Sanders.  And yet, 
critiques of  identity  politics all  to  frequently function to  police  and gate-keep what 
counts as class struggle “proper.” As Stuart Hall and his co-authors argued in Policing  
the  Crisis,  what  defines  an  anti-capitalist  movement  is  not necessarily  the  issue  it 
mobilises around.13 In Hall's famous formulation, “[r]ace is the modality in which class 
is lived, the medium through which class relations are experienced, the form in which it 
is  appropriated  and  fought  through.”14 Where  Marxist  orthodoxy  often  framed  the 
10 Wendy Brown, Politics Out of History (Princeton University Press, 2001), 20.
11 Brown, 20.
12 Rodolfo Torres and Christopher Kyriakides, Race Defaced: Paradigms of Pessimism, Politics of  
Possibility (Stanford University Press, 2012), xi.
13 Asad Haider, Mistaken Identity: Race and Class in the Age of Trump (Verso Books, 2018), 16.
14 Stuart Hall, “Race, Articulation, and Socities Structured in Dominance,” in Black British Cultural  
Studies: A Reader, ed. Houston A. Baker Jr, Manthia Diawara, and Ruth H. Lindeborg (University of 
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struggle against racism as a mere precursor to the real, unified working-class struggle, 
Hall argued that it in fact is through the experience of race and racialization that some 
groups come to “comprehend, handle and then begin to resist the exploitation which is 
an objective feature of their class situation.”15 As we saw in chapter 3, race-making 
practices are central—not epiphenomenal—to the accumulation of capital: capitalism in 
fact relies upon the elaboration, reproduction, and exploitation of racial difference. As 
Harsha Walia summarises, “[r]ace, class, gender, sexuality, and ability are not derivative 
of capitalism and colonialism; oppression is foundational to the structuring of capitalism 
and  colonialism.”16 In  reducing  struggles  around  race  (and  gender)  to  questions  of 
recognition,  critics of identity politics thus conceal  what arguably is  a  much deeper 
elision  within  the  Marxist  “politics  of  class”:  namely,  the  white  masculine  identity 
politics on which it  de facto depends.  In conceiving of the  spread of working-class 
consciousness as the basis for revolutionary struggle, Marxist orthodoxy actually frames 
solidarity as  a problem of identity—and, specifically, of masculine class identity.17 In 
other words, it is  only by separating  race, sex, and gender domination from capitalist 
domination that Marxism can privilege the (white male) proletariat as the (universal, 
neutral, and general) revolutionary class of history. As Robinson explains, this means 
that 
“Marxism's internationalism was not global; its materialism was exposed 
as  an  insufficient  explanator  or  cultural  and  social  forces;  and  its 
economic  determinism  too  often  politically  compromised  freedom 
struggles  beyond  or  outside  of  the  metropole.  For  Black  radicals, 
historically and immediately linked to social bases predominantly made 
of peasants and farmers in the West Indies, or sharecroppers and peons in 
North  America,  or  forced  laborers  on  colonial  plantations  in  Africa, 
Marxism appeared distracted from the cruelest and most characteristic 
manifestations of the world economy. This exposed the inadequacies of 
Marxism as an apprehension of the world economy, but equally troubling 
was Marxism's neglect and miscomprehension of the nature and genesis 
of liberation struggles which already had occurred and surely had yet to 
appear among these people.”18
Chicago Press, 1996), 55.
15 Quoted in Helen Davis, Understanding Stuart Hall (SAGE, 2004), 117.
16 Harsha Walia, Undoing Border Imperialism (AK Press, 2014), 191.
17 For a more detailed account of this argument, see Chris Chen, “The Limit Point of Capitalist 
Equality,” Endnotes 3, accessed May 13, 2018, https://endnotes.org.uk/issues/3/en/chris-chen-the-
limit-point-of-capitalist-equality.
18 Robinson, Black Marxism, xxx. For a contemporary formulation, see David Harvey, Seventeen  
Contradictions and the End of Capitalism (Oxford University Press, 2014). Harvey suggests that race 
(as well as gender) is an external rather than constitutive part of the logic of capital. In contrast,  
scholars such as Lisa Lowe and David Roediger have argued that Marxism fails to account “for race in  
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As Robinson makes clear, Marxism has ultimately been mistaken “for something it is 
not: a total theory of liberation.”19 
In the end, what critics of identity politics overlook is that the 1980s, and the rise 
of a neoliberal consensus under Reagan and Thatcher, “was a defeat for the new social 
movements, just as much as it was for organized labour.”20 Indeed, as Salar Mohandesi 
explains “[w]hat began as a promise to push beyond some of socialism's limitations to 
build a richer, more diverse and inclusive socialist politics”21 were soon appropriated 
and watered down by political and economic elites, and subsequently used as a strategy 
to  neutralise  radical  movements.  Forgotten  in  this  process  is  that  the  original 
formulation of identity politics emerged from an analysis of interlocking oppressions 
under racial  capitalism.  In  the  next  section  I  turn  to  the  Black  lesbian  feminist 
organisation the Combahee River Collective—who coined the term identity politics—to 
demonstrate  how  a  materialist  reading  of  the  global  colour  line  unravels  the 
interconnected,  global  dimensions  of  freedom struggles.  In  contesting  the  idea  that 
labour and identity-based struggles are qualitatively different, this opens up space for a 
different  kind  of  revolutionary  solidarity.  As  we  shall  see,  it  was  precisely  such  a 
solidarity that brought the Rainbow Coalition into being.
The Common Cause Is Freedom
The concept  of  identity  politics  was first  introduced by the  Combahee River 
Collective in their now classic “A Black Feminist Statement” from 1978. Formed in 
Boston in  1974 as a radical  alternative to the National  Black Feminist  Organisation 
(NBFO), the CRC operated on the premise that the inclusion of race into the feminist 
the making of capitalism”, partly because it of its refusal to recognise that “capital has maximised its 
profits not through rendering labour abstract but precisely through the social production of difference 
marked by race, nation, geographical origins and gender.” Lisa Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian  
American Cultural Politics (Duke University Press, 1996), 28. See also David R. Roediger, The 
Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class (Verso, 1999) and David 
Roediger, Class, Race and Marxism (Verso Books, 2017).
19 Robin D. G. Kelley, “Introduction,” in Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition, by 
Cedric J. Robinson, 2000, 451.
20 Haider, Mistaken Identity, 99.
21 Salar Mohandesi, “Identity Crisis,” Viewpoint Magazine, March 16, 2017, 
https://www.viewpointmag.com/2017/03/16/identity-crisis/.As Asad Haider explains, “While the 
demands of these movements lived on, they grew increasingly detached from the grassroot mass 
mobilization that could advance the demands as a challenge to the whole system. Enormous progress 
was made at a cultural level, fundamentally changing our language. But the underlying material 
structures were spared.” Haider, Mistaken Identity, 99.
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movement was insufficient to account for the experience of Black women's oppression. 
In contrast to the NBFO and the white feminist movement, founding members Barbara 
Smith,  Beverly Smith,  and Demita  Frazer  openly described themselves  as  socialists 
committed  to  struggling  against  capitalism.  However,  “although  we are  in  essential 
agreement with Marx’s theory as it applied to the very specific economic relationships 
he analyzed, we know that this analysis must be extended further in order for us to 
understand our specific economic situation as black women.”22 In particular,  Marxist 
theory was inadequate to explain “our specific economic situation as black women.”23 
Anticipating  Robinson's  analysis  of  racial  capitalism,  the  CRC  instead  sought  to 
formulate a socialist politics which recognised “the real class situation of persons who 
are not merely raceless, sexless workers.”24 As the 1978 Statement made clear:
“The most general statement of our politics at the present time would be 
that  we  are  actively  committed  to  struggling  against  racial,  sexual, 
heterosexual,  and class  oppression,  and see  as  our  particular  task  the 
development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that 
the major systems of oppression are interlocking.”25
Marxism had to be revised in order to account for the simultaneity of racism, class 
exploitation, imperialist aggression, and gender subordination, because  “the liberation 
of  all  peoples”  necessitates  “the  destruction  of  the  political-economic  systems  of 
capitalism and imperialism as well  as patriarchy.”26 Identity  politics,  in this  context, 
referred not to recognition-seeking struggles or a project of cultural diversity—which is 
how it is currently understood by critics such as Brown, Fraser, and Harvey. Instead, for 
the women of the CRC identity politics named the particular politics that emerged from 
placing their own experience—as Black lesbian women—at the centre of analysis. In 
Barbara Smith's formulation, 
“What we were saying is that we have a right as people who are not just 
female, who are not solely Black, who are not just lesbians, who are not 
22 The Combahee River Collective. As Barbara Smith explains, “the reason Combahee's Black feminism 
is so powerful is because it's anticapitalist. One would expect Black feminism to be antiracist and 
opposed to sexism. Anticapitalism is what gives it the sharpness, the edge, the thoroughness, the 
revolutionary potential.” Quoted in Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, How We Get Free: Black Feminism  
and the Combahee River Collective (Haymarket Books, 2017).
23 The Combahee River Collective, “The Combahee River Collective Statement,” 1977, 
https://americanstudies.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Keyword%20Coalition_Readings.pdf.
24 The Combahee River Collective.
25 The Combahee River Collective.
26 The Combahee River Collective.
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just working class, or workers—that we are people who embody all of 
these identities, and we have a right to build and define political theory 
and practice based upon that reality... That's what we meant by identity 
politics. We didn't mean that if you're not the same as us, you're nothing. 
We  were  not  saying  that  we  didn't  care  about  anybody  who  wasn't 
exactly like us.”27
While  contemporary  critics  often  dismiss  identity  politics  as  divisive  and 
“balkanizing”—in short, as a Tower of Babel—for the members of Combahee it was 
never  exclusionary.  Identity  politics  did  not  mean  that  only  those  who  experience 
oppression can work to overthrow it. The CRC rejected  the idea that women should 
separate  from  men  (as  advocated  by  lesbian  separatists  at  the  time)  and  instead 
emphasised the importance of building coalitions to expand the fight for equality on 
multiple fronts. As the Statement made clear: “We feel solidarity with progressive black 
men and do not advocate the fractionalization that white women who are separatists 
demand.’’28 Rather  than a  demand for separatism,  the CRC thus envisioned identity 
politics as a way of validating Black women's experience of oppression under racial 
capitalism, while simultaneously opening up possibilities for connecting their struggle
—to  the  struggles  of  Black  men  in  the  United  States,  as  well  as  to  anti-colonial 
movements and workers' struggles worldwide. As Keeyanga-Yamahtta Taylor explains, 
for  the  Combahee  solidarity  thus  “did  not  mean  subsuming  your  struggles  to  help 
someone  else;  it  was  intended  to  strengthen  the  political  commitments  from  other 
groups by getting them to recognize how the different struggles were related to each 
other and connected under capitalism.”29 Far from a Tower of Babel, identity politics 
was in fact the very foundation from which solidarity and coalitional politics could be 
built.
27 As the 1978 statement read, “This focusing on our own oppression is embodied in the concept of 
identity politics. We believe that the most profound and potentially most radical politics come directly 
out of our own identity, as opposed to working to end somebody else's oppression.” The Combahee 
River Collective.
28 The Combahee River Collective.
29 Taylor, How We Get Free, 11. Founding member Demita Frazier elaborates on the importance of 
coalitions to the work of the CRC: “I never believed that Combahee, or other Black feminist groups I 
have participated in, should focus only on issues of concern for us as Black women, or that, as 
lesbian/bisexual women, we should only focus on lesbian issues. It's really important to note that 
Combahee was instrumental in founding a local battered women's shelter. We worked in coalition with 
community activists, women and men, lesbians and straight folks. We were very active in the 
reproductive rights movement, even though, at the time, most of us were lesbians. We found ourselves 
involved in coalition with the labor movement because we believed in the importance of supporting 
other groups even if the individuals in that group weren't all feminist. We understood that coalition 
building was crucial to our own survival.” Quoted in Winifred Breines, The Trouble Between Us: An  
Uneasy History of White and Black Women in the Feminist Movement (Oxford University Press, 
2007), 122.
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The women of the CRC are often credited with having laid the foundations for 
what Kimberlé Crenshaw later would call  intersectionality.  While there are affinities 
between these approaches, it is crucial to note that they also differ in important ways. In 
mainstream discourse, intersectionality is today typically understood as an adding up of 
independent oppressions; as accounting for race and class and gender. As Marsha Henry 
explains, intersectionality is “a way of capturing multiple differences and their effects 
on  individuals.”30 Used  to  highlight  the  intersection  of  “multiple  oppressions”  as 
experienced  by  individuals,  the  analysis  of  intersectionality  has  thus  become 
increasingly delinked from the systemic critique of capitalism. Where the vocabulary of 
class figures, it is, as Delia Aguilar has argued, “merely designating income, occupation, 
or  lifestyle”,  and  ultimately  “detached  from  mooring  in  the  social  relations  of 
production.”31 The  concept  of  intersectionality  has  thus  undergone a  transformation: 
from the CRC's explicitly materialist and systemic critique, in which race and gender 
were understood as constitutive elements of the inner logic of capital, to the level of 
discourse and identity—where it is vulnerable to precisely the critique put forward by 
thinkers  such  as  Brown,  Fraser,  and  Harvey.  The  contemporary  usage  of 
intersectionality thus stands in stark contrast to what the CRC originally had in mind: 
“We are  socialists,”  they proclaimed,  but  “[w]e  are  not  convinced...  that  a  socialist 
revolution  that  is  not  also  a  feminist  and  anti-racist  revolution  will  guarantee  our 
liberation.”32 Hence the original meaning of identity politics: namely, that race, gender, 
and class oppression  are different  facets  of  the  same system,  not  separate  forms of 
oppression that sometimes intersect. As Taylor explains, “the CRC statement identified 
'class oppression' as central to the experience of Black women... in doing so they helped 
to distinguish radical Black feminist politics from a developing middle-class orientation 
in Black politics that was in the ascent in the 1970s.”33 While later (liberal) theorists of 
intersectionality  have  followed the  CRC in centre-staging the  interlocking nature of 
multiple forms of oppression, they have often been less interested in how and why these 
systems of oppression historically came to be articulated together, as well as why they 
continue  to  be  reproduced  together.  In  contrast,  for  the  women  of  Combahee  the 
30 Marsha Henry, “Problematizing Military Masculinity, Intersectionality and Male Vulnerability in 
Feminist Critical Military Studies,” Critical Military Studies 3, no. 2 (May 4, 2017): 186, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/23337486.2017.1325140.
31 Delia D. Aguilar et al., “Tracing the Roots of Intersectionality,” MR Online (blog), April 12, 2012, 
https://mronline.org/2012/04/12/aguilar120412-html/.
32 The Combahee River Collective, “The Combahee River Collective Statement.”
33 Taylor, How We Get Free, 9.
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simultaneity of oppressions meant that socialism had to be much richer than previously 
imagined: since capitalism operated through racial and gendered forms of oppression, a 
socialism which did not centre-stage the struggle against both racism and sexism was 
impoverished. Accordingly, to focus on Black women was not paramount to a rejection 
of  others  who  also  endured  economic  inequality,  as  is  sometimes  suggested  by 
contemporary critics: rather it meant that the struggle for Black women's liberation, by 
necessity,  would  destabilise  inequality  writ  large  and  through  that  create  new 
possibilities for everyone. 
In what ways does the Combahee's notion of identity politics help us rethink the 
problem of solidarity? In highlighting how racial, sexual, and classed oppressions rely 
on one another in complex ways, the CRC helpfully demonstrates why a focus on race 
and  gender  need  not  detract  attention  from  class:  quite  the  opposite,  a truly  anti-
capitalist  politics  has to  be  anti-racist,  anti-sexist,  and internationalist.  Such  a 
framework—which recognises the global, interconnected character of various freedom 
struggles—offers a useful corrective to what has come to be known as the “Oppression 
Olympics”,  according to  which marginalised groups compete against  one another  to 
establish who is most oppressed.34 As Taylor rightly notes, such a perspective “miss how 
we are  connected  through oppression—and  how those  connections  should  form the 
basis of solidarity, not a celebration of our lives on the margins.”35 Indeed, a materialist 
reading of the global colour line—grounded in a global political economic critique of 
race and gender—points to the importance of addressing anti-Black racism, patriarchy, 
settler  colonialism,  imperialism  and  other  interlocking  violences  simultaneously.  As 
Paul Gilroy has argued, the value of such an approach is precisely that it renders “the 
connection between history and concrete struggles,  structure and process,  intelligible 
even in  situations  where collective  actors  define themselves and organize as  'races', 
people, maroons, ghost-dancers or slaves rather than as a class.”36 This should not be 
mistaken for a call to homogenise different forms of oppression; rather it highlights the 
importance of examining how white supremacy, patriarchy, anti-immigrant xenophobia, 
and  settler  colonialism  interlock  and  mutually  reinforce  one  another  under  racial 
capitalism. The struggles against empire, white supremacy, settler colonialism, gender 
subordination, and workers' exploitation are not the same—but they are interconnected. 
34 The original formulation of Oppression Olympics can be found in Elizabeth Martínez, “Beyond 
Black/White: The Racisms of Our Time,” Social Justice 20, no. 1/2 (51–52) (1993): 22–34.
35 Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation (Haymarket Books, 2016), 
187.
36 Paul Gilroy, There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack (Routledge, 2013), 24.
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It  was  precisely  this  insight  that  guided  the  Panthers  and  the  Patriots  when  they 
established the Rainbow Coalition. In a speech given at the Poor People's Convention in 
1968,  Peggy Terry of JOIN summarised the political commitment that had driven her 
organisation to join the Coalition:
“Poor whites are here today... to make ourselves visible to a society 
whose continued existence depend on the denial of our existence. We 
are here today united with other races of poor people, Puerto Ricans, 
Mexican-Americans, Indians, and Black people in a common cause. 
That common cause is freedom!”37
Consequently,  while  the  Rainbow  Coalition  today  might  “seem  romantic  at  best, 
propaganda at worst”, it  was rooted in a sophisticated analysis of the racial logic of 
capitalism. As Asad Haider has shown, the Black Panther Party recognised that “if you 
talked about racism without talking about capitalism, you weren't talking about getting 
power in the hands of the people. You were setting up a situation in which the white cop 
would be replaced by a black cop”—and this, in the end, “was  not liberation.”38 The 
Rainbow Coalition thus emerged as a solution to the problem of how to challenge the 
international, interlocking oppressions of race, class, empire, and gender. In the next 
section I explore what this means for the theory and practice of internationalism.
Revolutionary Solidarity and the Politics of Internationalism
In  chapter  1  I  argued  that  cosmopolitan  theories  are  rooted  in  particular 
conceptions of solidarity: indeed, the problem for cosmopolitan thinkers is precisely one 
of how to shift from solidarity among “friends” to solidarity with “strangers.” Solidarity 
thus  understood  is  a  question  of  how  to  overcome  difference.  While  different 
cosmopolitans disagree on whether solidarity stems from a common human essence or 
shared set of experiences, they typically conceive of solidarity as something that arises 
(or that should arise) amongst people and groups that are  alike. As Michael Principe 
explains, most theorisations of solidarity implicitly agree that “one will be responsible 
for those with which one has something in common.”39 In short, we stand in solidarity 
37 Quoted in Richard Moser, “Radical White Workers During the Last Revolution,” Counterpunch, 
September 12, 2017, https://www.counterpunch.org/2017/09/12/radical-white-workers-during-the-
last-revolution/.
38 Haider, Mistaken Identity, 18–19.
39 Michael A. Principe, “Solidarity and Responsibility: Conceptual Connections,” Journal of Social  
Philosophy 31, no. 2 (2000): 139–45, https://doi.org/10.1111/0047-2786.00035.
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with those that are “like us.”
In contrast to these perspectives, a materialist reading of the global colour line 
opens up space for a different kind of solidarity: a revolutionary solidarity based on the 
global, interconnected character of geographically dispersed freedom struggles, rather 
than on abstract notions of what it means to be human. This is a solidarity which is 
inherently internationalist in orientation: a solidarity which is  made rather than found; 
historically  generated  rather  than ethically  universal;  and a  doing rather  than being. 
Solidarity  thus conceived  offers a  radical  alternative  to the (cosmopolitan)  idea that 
solidarity must be anchored in preexisting commonalities, and instead redefines it as a 
relation  forged  in  political  struggle.  Where  cosmopolitan  approaches  often  depict 
solidarity as a one-way street whereby powerful and privileged actors extend solidarity 
to those who suffer, this is a solidarity which is formed from the “ground” up and which 
ultimately  frames subalterns as agents rather than victims.  Chandra Mohanty captures 
the  essence  of  what  such  a  revolutionary  solidarity  might  entail  in  her  Feminism 
Without Borders, where she argues for a coalitional politics grounded in “communities 
of people who have chosen to work and fight together.”40 In contrast to cosmopolitan 
approaches—which typically  conceive of solidarity as something that arises from pre-
political, ontological, and ahistorical universalism—this is a solidarity which is “forged 
on the basis of memories and counter narratives, not on an ahistorical universalism.”41 
This is  not a  simplistic  call  for  recognising common experiences of  oppression and 
marginalisation,  but  “an  argument  for  recognizing  (concrete,  not  abstract)  'common 
interests'  and  the  potential  bases  of  cross-national  solidarity—a common context  of 
struggle.”42 That is, in place of a solidarity that grows out of ethical universals and pre-
political  identification,  such  a  solidarity  is  politically  and  historically  generated:  a 
coalitional  politics  “that  has  to  be  worked  for,  struggled  toward—in  history.”43 As 
Sriram Ananth  summarises,  this  means  that  “the  realization  of  solidarity  has  to  be 
grounded in, emerge from, and evolve within real-life struggles. It must acknowledge 
flesh-and-blood people who, despite all their differences, are finding common ground to 
wage a liberatory struggle.”44
40 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Feminism without Borders : Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity 
(Durham ; London: Duke University Press, 2003), 7.
41 Mohanty, 117. See also David Featherstone, Solidarity: Hidden Histories and Geographies of  
Internationalism (Zed Books Ltd., 2012).
42 Mohanty, 143.
43 Mohanty, 116.
44 Sriram Ananth, “Conceptualizing Solidarity and Realizing Struggle: Testing against the Palestinian 
Call for the Boycott of Israel,” Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements 6, no. 2 (2014): 
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In recent years a number of scholars have sought  to recover a variety of such 
revolutionary  or  “subaltern  solidarities”45,  ranging  from  the  Bandung  spirit  and 
tricontinentalism,  to  the  interactions  between the  Black radical  imagination  and the 
Muslim  Third  World,  to  feminist  Black  internationalism,  and  the  “deep  relations” 
between  African  and  Maori  anti-colonial  struggles.46 Capturing  the  political  and 
historical character of these solidarities, Vijay Prashad notes how,  in the era of anti-
colonial and Third World national liberation struggles, 
“[u]nity  of  the  people  of  the  Third  World  came  from a  political 
position against colonialism and imperialism, not from any intrinsic 
cultural or racial commonalities. If you thought against colonialism 
and  stood  against  imperialism,  then  you  were  part  of  the  Third 
World.”47 
Solidarity, in these contexts, was organised around the idea of a shared global struggle, 
and entailed a weaving together of revolutionary world-views and radical traditions. In 
the  words  of  Linda  Tabar,  “'international'  was  not  a  pre-determined  group”  but 
“something that you became,  in  the  praxis  of  struggle  for  a  different  world  and an 
alternative global order.”48
Crucially, the concept of revolutionary solidarity opens up space for a different 
kind  of  cosmopolitan  theory  and  practice:  namely,  for  an  oppositional  or  insurgent 
158.
45 Mustapha Kamal Pasha, “The ‘Bandung Impulse’ and International Relations,” in Postcolonial Theory 
and International Relations: A Critical Introduction, ed. Sanjay Seth (Routledge, 2013), 154. See also 
Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History (University of Pittsburgh Pre, 2009), 133 for 
a formulation of “subterranean solidarity.”
46 Indicatively, see Sohail Daulatzai, Black Star, Crescent Moon: The Muslim International and Black  
Freedom Beyond America (U of Minnesota Press, 2012); Cheryl Higashida, Black Internationalist  
Feminism: Women Writers of the Black Left, 1945-1995 (University of Illinois Press, 2011); Alex 
Lubin, Geographies of Liberation: The Making of an Afro-Arab Political Imaginary (UNC Press 
Books, 2014); Vijay Prashad, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South (Verso 
Books, 2013); Vijay Prashad, Everybody Was Kung Fu Fighting: Afro-Asian Connections and the  
Myth of Cultural Purity (Beacon Press, 2002); Robbie Shilliam, The Black Pacific: Anti-Colonial  
Struggles and Oceanic Connections (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015); Nico Slate, Colored 
Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India (Harvard 
University Press, 2012); Darryl C. Thomas, The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity 
(Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001).
47 Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World (ReadHowYouWant.com, 
2010), 34.As Arif Dirlik explains, “the idea of the Third World pointed to the necessity of a common 
politics that derived from a common positioning in the system (rather than some homogeneous 
essentialized common quality, as is erroneously assumed these days in much postcolonial criticism).” 
Arif Dirlik, “Rethinking Colonialism: Globalization, Postcolonialism, And The Nation,” Interventions 
4, no. 3 (January 1, 2002): 433, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801022000013833.
48 Linda Tabar, “From Third World Internationalism to ‘the Internationals’: The Transformation of 
Solidarity with Palestine,” Third World Quarterly 38, no. 2 (February 1, 2017): 418, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1142369.
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internationalism. If different forms of oppression interlock under racial capitalism, then 
a revolutionary solidarity must necessarily be internationalist in its orientation.  Steven 
Salaita gestures towards precisely such an internationalism in his comparative work on 
the  national  liberation  movements  of  Palestinians  and  Indigenous  peoples  in  North 
America.  He  posits  “inter/nationalism”  as  a  certain  kind  of  decolonial  thought  and 
practice which “at its most basic... demands commitment to mutual liberation based on 
the  proposition  that  colonial  power  must  be  rendered  diffuse  across  multiple 
hemispheres  through  reciprocal  struggle.”49 This  is  an  internationalist  theory  and 
practice which aspires to connect—rather than unify—different projects and trajectories 
in a global process of decolonisation.  Boaventura de Sosa Santos  work on the anti-
globalisation movement and the World Social  Forum develops a similar  conception. 
Calling  for  “a  new kind  of  situated,  insurgent,  decolonial,  intercultural,  bottom-up, 
cosmopolitan culture and politics”50,  Santos argues that  there is an ongoing counter-
hegemonic  globalisation  from  below  that  links  together  “social  groups,  networks, 
initiatives, organisations and movements” struggling against neoliberal globalisation.51 
This,  he  maintains,  represents  an  internationalism from the  South,  where  the  South 
expresses  “not  a  geographical  location  but  all  forms  of  subordination  (economic 
exploitation; gender, racial and ethic oppression and so on) associated with neoliberal 
globalization.”52 Such an insurgent or oppositional internationalism must ultimately be 
understood  as  an  emancipatory  project  in  which  oppressed  groups  “organize  their 
resistance and consolidate political coalitions on the same scale as the one used by the 
oppressors to victimize them, that is, the global scale.”53 The overall goal here is not the 
creation of some form of a universal community based on law, rights, and citizenship, as 
it  is  for  the  cosmopolitan  thinkers  discussed  in  chapter  1.  Instead,  and  as  Bradley 
49 Steven Salaita, Inter/Nationalism: Decolonizing Native America and Palestine, 1 edition 
(Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2016), ix.
50 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide (Routledge, 
2015), 68.
51 Santos insurgent cosmopolitanism seeks to address the needs of those “groups whose aspirations are 
denied or made invisible by the hegemonic use of the concept but who may be sereved by an 
alternative use of it”. “Who needs cosmopolitanism?” he asks. “The answer is simple: whoever is a  
victim of intolernace and discrimination needs tolernace; whoever is denied basic human dignity 
needs a community of human beings; whoever is a noncitizen needs world citizenship in any given 
community or nation. In sum, those socially excluded victims of the hegemonic conceptions of 
cosmopolitanism need a different type of cosmopolitanism. Subaltern cosmopolitanism is therefore an 
oppositional variety.” Santos, 135.
52 Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A. Rodríguez-Garavito, “Law, Politics, and the Subaltern in 
Counter-Hegemonic Globalization,” in Law and Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan 
Legality, ed. Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A. Rodríguez-Garavito (Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 14.
53 Santos, Epistemologies of the South, 135.
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Macdonald has  argued,  it  seeks  “to articulate  localized  issues  and struggles into  an 
overall internationalism... It sees the necessity of understanding each particular struggle 
in  the  world  as  part  of  larger  drama.”54 This  does  not  deny  the  uniqueness  and 
specificity of local struggles; instead it emphasises their international character and thus 
points to the importance of connecting—but not unifying—different struggles, projects, 
and trajectories under racial capitalism. 
David Theo Goldberg's concept of relational racisms helpfully demonstrates the 
methodological and political stakes of such an analysis. As Goldberg makes clear,  the 
prevailing paradigm for studying race and racism has historically been comparative. 
Whether focused on Britain, the US, Canada, Australia, or South Africa, such analyses 
have typically been framed by methodological nationalism, seeking to reveal similarities 
and differences between different national expressions of racism. While comparative 
approaches are not without merit, as Goldberg makes clear, they “actually seem to miss 
a crucial dimension for comprehending racial significance and racist conditioning in all 
their complexity”:55 namely, the global colour line. Taking Gaza and the Warsaw ghetto 
as an example, he argues that local racisms “are almost always tied to extra- and trans-
territorial  conceptions  and  expressions,  those  that  revolve  in  the  wider  circles  of 
meaning and practice.”56 From a relational perspective, the point is not just that Gaza is 
like (or  as  some  would  argue,  unlike)  the  Warsaw  ghetto  but  also,  and  more 
fundamentally, “that Israeli military officers are on record for explicitly invoking the 
Warsaw ghetto as a model for thinking about how to regulate the Palestinian refugee 
camps.”57 That is, just as the early 20th century British and German concentration camps 
in Africa served as models for the Nazi Holocaust, so the Warsaw ghetto provides a 
model  for  the  occupation  of  Gaza.  Recognising  these  linkages  and  interconnected 
histories and logics, Goldberg argues, can help us understand that “racist arrangements 
anywhere—in  any  place—depend,  to  a  smaller  or  larger  degree,  on  racist  practice 
almost everywhere else.”58 The internationalism that grows out of this recognition is 
thus anchored in an analysis of relational logics—not comparative similarities.
54 Bradley J. Macdonald, Performing Marx: Contemporary Negotiations of a Living Tradition (SUNY 
Press, 2012), 147.
55 David Theo Goldberg, “Racial Comparisons, Relational Racisms: Some Thoughts on Method,” Ethnic 
and Racial Studies 32, no. 7 (September 1, 2009): 253, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870902999233.
56 Goldberg, “Racial Comparisons, Relational Racisms.”  As Goldberg explains, “local practices that 





To  conceive  of  internationalism  in  this  way—as  a  shared  struggle against 
interlocking oppressions under racial capitalism—is ultimately to enact a shift in focus, 
from the spectacle of the dying bodies of subaltern others to the structural violence that 
produces subalternity. As Lawrence Blum reminds us, “there is a difference between 
solidarity  with  people  suffering  from oppression,  and  solidarity  with  those  actively 
resisting it.”59 From a radical internationalist perspective, the overall goal is not empathy 
and affective identification with suffering (as it is for many cosmopolitan thinkers) but, 
rather, collective struggles against systems of oppression. Nikita Dhawan describes this 
as “a move away from a politics of help that reinforces asymmetrical relations between 
givers and receivers of solidarity to a subversive listening, wherein global agents are 
hospitable  to  the  idea  of  learning  from  those  whose  epistemic  agency  has  been 
historically  disregarded.”60 In  contrast  to  cosmopolitan  approaches  that  typically 
foreground  the  spectacle  of  the  suffering,  the  poor,  and  the  oppressed,  radical 
internationalism thus shifts the focus to the global material structures that produce “slow 
death”61 and suffering. This is not a  practice based on “saving” suffering others “out 
there”, but a relation that grows out of concrete struggles for liberation. 
Ken Gonzales-Day's “Erased Lynching” series from 2006 powerfully illustrates 
what such a shift in focus might look like and mean.62 A collection of old postcards and 
photographs,  Gonzales-Day's  series  explores  the  history  of  lynchings  in  the  United 
States. The pictures depict scenes of mob violence, but without the brutalised bodies in 
the  original  images,  which  have  been  digitally  removed.  Left  are  the  crowds  of 
onlookers, laughing and jeering. As Gonzales-Day explains, the purpose of the pictures 
is to “direct the viewers attention, not upon the lifeless body of lynch victim, but upon 
the mechanisms of lynching themselves: the crowd, the spectacle, the photographer.”63 
By removing the lynched bodies,  the pictures refuse to allow violence to define the 
Black  body.  Focusing  on  the  perpetrators,  they  instead  raise  questions  about  “the 
conditions that made these events possible in the first place.”64
59 Quoted in Gideon Calder, Magali Bessone, and Federico Zuolo, How Groups Matter: Challenges of  
Toleration in Pluralistic Societies (Routledge, 2014), 176.
60 Dhawan Nikita, “Can Non‐Europeans Philosophize? Transnational Literacy and Planetary Ethics in 
a Global Age,” Hypatia 32, no. 3 (May 24, 2017): 502, https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12333.
61 Lauren Berlant, “Slow Death (Sovereignty, Obesity, Lateral Agency),” Critical Inquiry 33, no. 4 
(2007): 754, https://doi.org/10.1086/521568.
62 The erased lynching series can be viewed on https://kengonzalesday.com/projects/erased-lynchings/ 
63 Quoted in Django Paris, Humanizing Research: Decolonizing Qualitative Inquiry With Youth and  
Communities (SAGE, 2013), 241.




In this chapter I have argued that a materialist analysis of the global colour line 
opens up new possibilities  for  solidarity  and emancipatory  politics.  Groups like the 
CRC, the Black Panthers, and the Patriots defy any easy distinction between identity 
politics  and  class  struggle.  In  linking  up  the  struggles  against  racism,  capitalism, 
patriarchy, and imperialism, the CRC and the Rainbow Coalition enacted a different 
kind  of  solidarity—a “many-headed hydra”—which was  based,  not  on  sameness  or 
shared  experiences,  but  on  an  analysis  of  interlocking  oppressions  under  racial 
capitalism. In the same way that Cedric Robinson's Black Marxism insisted on reading 
the plantations of Mississippi and the factories of Manchester not as separate systems 
but as differentiated and complementary parts of the same global economy, these groups 
understood  their  struggles  as  mutually  constitutive  and  dialectically  entwined.65 By 
reconnecting and aligning different struggles—struggles which might seem distinct and 
unrelated but which, when viewed through the lens of racial capitalism, turn out to be 
closely  related—they  help  us  re-imagine  solidarity  and  internationalism beyond  the 
“master's tools.”
What, then, does this “many-headed hydra” look like today? In the next three 
chapters I turn to the violent surplussing and policing of racialized life in a range of 
contexts—including the migrant crisis in Europe, the movement for Black lives in the 
United States, the Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, and the struggle 
for decolonisation in South Africa—to explore how today's  motley crew of “planetary 
wanderers”  are  enacting  a  hydra-like  internationalism  from  below.  My  analysis 
specifically  highlights  four  themes:  first,  the  violent  surplussing  of  racialized 
populations  under  racial  capitalism;  second,  the  growth  of  the  penal  and  nationals 
security state, and how it is designed to police and pacify those rendered surplus by 
racial capitalism; third, the inherently global dimensions of these violent dynamics; and 
fourth, how they are being resisted and challenged. As we shall see, in the process of 
linking together seemingly disparate spaces and histories of revolutionary struggles, the 
planetary wanderers of today are building a counter-archive of internationalist theory 
65 In the words of Huey Newton, “The Black Panther Party is a revolutionary nationalist group and we 
see a major contradiction between capitalism in this country and out interests. We realize that this 
country became very rich upon slavery and that slavery is capitalism in the extreme. We have to evils  
to fight, capitalism and racism. We must destroy both racism and capitalism.” Quoted in Ahmed 
Shawki, Black Liberation and Socialism (Haymarket Books, 2005), 211.
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and practice. It is to this archive that we now turn.
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C H A P T E R  5
The Drowned and the Saved: Circuits of Resistance in the Black 
Mediterranean
“Political struggles are not fought on the surface of geography but through its 
very fabrication.”
—Steve Pile1
“We didn't cross the border, the border crossed us.”
—Popular activist chant
Introduction
On the evening of the 3rd of October 2013, an overcrowded fishing boat carrying 
more than 500 migrants sank off the coast of the Italian island Lampedusa.2 Amongst 
the 368 found dead was an Eritrean woman who had given birth as she drowned. The 
divers found her a hundred and fifty feet down in the ocean together with her newborn 
baby, still attached by the umbilical cord. Her name was Yohanna, the Eritrean word for 
“congratulations.”3
Over the last 25 years, the turquoise-blue waters of the Mediterranean have been 
turned  into  a  space  of  death  and  suffering,  what  some  describe  as  “a  nautical 
graveyard”4 and  a  new  “frontier  of  poverty.”5 What  is  typically  referred  to  as  the 
European migrant or refugee “crisis” has provoked numerous responses and activism; 
1 Steve Pile, “The Troubled Spaces of Frantz Fanon,” in Thinking Space, ed. Mike Crang and N. J. 
Thrift (Psychology Press, 2000), 273.
2 Sections of this chapter have been published as part of Ida Danewid, “White Innocence in the Black 
Mediterranean: Hospitality and the Erasure of History,” Third World Quarterly 38, no. 7 (July 3, 
2017): 1674–89, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1331123.
3 Yohanna's story is recounted in Frances Stonor Saunders, “Where on Earth Are You?,” London Review 
of Books, March 3, 2016 and Mattathias Schwartz, “Letter from Lampedusa: The Anchor,” The New 
Yorker, April 21, 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/04/21/the-anchor.
4 Liz Fekete, “Death at the Border – Who Is to Blame? | Institute of Race Relations,” accessed August  
31, 2016, http://www.irr.org.uk/news/death-at-the-border-who-is-to-blame/.
5 Anna Triandafyllidou and Ruby Gropas, What Is Europe? (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 170. The 
International Organization of Migration (IOM) estimates that between 2000 and 2014, 22,400 
migrants died while trying to cross the Mediterranean;  in 2015 and the first half of 2015, another 
6,600 migrant deaths have so far been reported. See Tara Brian and Frank Laczko, “Fatal Journeys: 
Tracking Lives Lost during Migration” (International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2014) and 
“Missing Migrants and Managing Dead Bodies in the Mediterranean: A Briefing Note” (International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), 2016), http://iomgmdac.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Mediterranean-Missing-Briefing-Note-June2016.pdf. IOM's latest figures are 
available at http://missingmigrants.iom.int/ 
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ranging from Ai Wei Wei's life vest installation6 to Pope Francis's “day of tears”,7 from 
Angela Merkel's “open door” refugee policy8 to radical activist campaigns such as “The 
Dead  Are  Coming”,9 from  the  silent  minute  in  the  European  parliament10 to 
#AlanKurdi.11 Responding to an era shaped by the global war on terror and securitizing 
discourses  that  figure  the nation-state  as  a  body under  threat,  a  variety of  scholars, 
activists, artists, and politicians have called for empathy and solidarity with the fate of 
shipwrecked migrants. By recognising and publicly mourning the lives that have been 
lost,  many  have  sought  to  “humanise”  those  who,  like  Yohanna  and  her  baby,  are 
swallowed by the turquoise-blue waters of “Our Sea.”
These expressions of solidarity stand in sharp contrast to populist, far right, anti-
immigrant, and xenophobic discourses that portray  migrants as a form of danger—to 
Europe's  security,  welfare state,  women, and so on. And yet,  and as I  argue in this 
chapter,  these  discourses  actually  share  an  underlying  assumption  of  migrants  as 
“strangers,”  “uninvited  guests”,  and  “charitable  subjects:  that  is,  as  people  fleeing 
conditions and conflicts that supposedly originate “elsewhere”, outside of Europe. As 
Ethemcan Turhan and Marco Armiero explain, this framing of Europe as an innocent 
bystander overlooks that 
“migration is often an externality of military interventions, proxy wars, 
imposition of structural  economic reforms, multi-causal  destruction of 
livelihoods  both  by  rapid  and  slow  violence  through  environmental 
change, establishment of enclosures, and corporate imperialism that have 
dispossessed and continues to dispossess people in different corners of 
the world.”12
By evading Europe's long, constitutive history of empire,  colonial conquest, and racial 
capitalism, as well as the ways in which (neoliberal) capital continues to depend on the 
6 Lauren Said-Moorhouse CNN, “Ai Weiwei Covers Berlin Venue with Refugee Life Vests,” CNN, 
accessed May 3, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/14/arts/ai-weiwei-berlin-life-jackets/index.html.
7 “Pope Francis: Migrants’ Deaths Are Shameful,” accessed May 3, 2017, 
http://www.news.va/en/news/pope-francis-migrants-deaths-are-shameful.
8 “Angela Merkel Defends Germany’s Open-Door Refugee Policy,” Financial Times, accessed May 3,  
2017, https://www.ft.com/content/a60f289a-9362-11e5-bd82-c1fb87bef7af.
9 raisa2, “‘The dead are coming’: Germans dig mock graves for migrants who died at sea,” Text, The 
Stream - Al Jazeera English, June 22, 2015, http://ajmn.tv/7sn5.
10 “Opening: Minute’s Silence for Migrants Drowned off Lampedusa,” European Parliament News, 
October 7, 2013, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20131004IPR21512/opening-
minute’s-silence-for-migrants-drowned-off-lampedusa.
11 The twitter feed can be found at: https://twitter.com/hashtag/Alankurdi
12 See Ethemcan Turhan and Marco Armiero, “Cutting the Fence, Sabotaging the Border: Migration as a 
Revolutionary Practice,” Capitalism Nature Socialism 28, no. 2 (April 3, 2017): 2, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2017.1315245.
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production  of  vulnerable,  deportable,  and  therefore  super-exploitable  (non-white) 
workers, these discourses ultimately  contribute to an ideological discourse that  turns 
questions  of  responsibility,  guilt,  restitution,  repentance,  and  structural  reform  into 
matters  of  empathy,  generosity,  and  hospitality.  The  result  is  a  form  of  “white 
innocence”13 through  which  the  white  subject  re-constitutes  itself  as  “ethical”  and 
“good”,  innocent  of  its  imperialist  histories  and present  complicities.  This  not  only 
reproduces colonial and patronising fantasies of the white man's burden, but also helps 
legitimise hegemonic narratives that see Europe as the bastion of democracy, liberty, 
and universal rights. 
What  might  a  different  form of  solidarity  look  like—a  solidarity  that  takes 
seriously  the  materiality  of  the  global  colour  line  and  that  challenges,  rather  than 
confirms,  the  idea  that  Europe constitutes  the  pinnacle  of  freedom, democracy,  and 
humanism? To answer this question, in this chapter I examine the political economy of 
migration, focusing in particular on the links between racial capitalism, imperialism, 
(neo)colonial  dispossession,  and  global  migration.  Building  on  political  economic 
critique of race and racism put forward in the last two chapters, I argue that migration 
constitutes one of the main contemporary routes through which populations racialized as 
non-white  are  rendered  surplus  under  racial  capitalism.  The  creation  of  a  highly 
expendable, super-exploitable, and moveable workforce—be it slaves, sharecroppers, or 
coolies—has  historically  been  central  to  the  world  capitalist  system.  Today,  under 
neoliberalism and corporate globalisation, 
“a  new global  immigrant  labor  supply  system has  come to  replace 
earlier direct colonial and racial caste controls over labor worldwide. 
There is a new global working class that labors in the factories, farms, 
commercial  establishments  and  offices  of  the  global  economy—a 
working class that faces conditions of precariousness, is heavily female, 
and increasingly [is] based on immigrant labor.”14
To recognise these historical and contemporary links between race, capital, and 
migration  is  not  only  to challenge  hegemonic  discourses  that present  Europe as the 
bastion of democracy, liberty, and universal rights. As activist  groups such as  Black 
Lives Matter UK and Parti des Indigènes de la République have shown, it is also to open 
up space for a different kind of internationalism and politics of solidarity—a solidarity 
13 Gloria Wekker, White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race (Duke University Press, 2016).
14 William I. Robinson, “Global Capitalism, Immigrant Labor, and the Struggle for Justice,” Class, Race 
and Corporate Power 2, no. 3 (2014): 3.
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beyond  the  “master's  tools”  and  which  places  the  ongoing  migrant  crisis  within  a 
broader historical  context of anti-racist  and antic-capitalist  struggles both within and 
outside of Europe.
I  develop this  argument  in  four  parts.  In the  first  section I  demonstrate  how 
recent forms of (liberal) pro-refugee activism in Europe have challenged xenophobic 
discourses that cast migrants as ethically non-recognised subjects—what Judith Butler 
describes as “ungrievable life.”  The second section begins to build a critique of these 
discourses through a focus on political economy and the historical connections between 
Europe and the migrants washed up on its shores. Drawing on the concept of the Black 
Mediterranean, I argue that the contemporary migrant crisis must be understood in the 
context  of  Europe's  constitutive  history  of  empire,  racial  capitalism,  and  colonial 
conquest. In the third section I argue that the erasure of these connections has enabled 
recent forms of pro-refugee activism to turn dead migrants into the conduit  through 
which the European Left redeems its  own humanity and ethical salvation—something 
that  ultimately  raises  questions  around  whose  humanity  is  at  stake,  and  for  what 
purposes.  In the final section I focus on the creation of alternative forms of solidarity 
emerging from an analysis  of the materiality of the global colour line. Focusing on 
Black Lives Matter UK and  Parti des Indigènes de la République, I show how some 
activist  groups  connect  the  mass  deaths  of  migrants  during  crossings  of  the 
Mediterranean to anti-racist and anti-capitalist struggles within Europe. By placing the 
ongoing migrant crisis within a broader analysis of empire,  racial  capitalism, labour 
exploitation,  and  (neo)colonialism,  these  groups  open  up  space  for  new  forms  of 
solidarity: for an internationalism and “many-headed hydra” that subverts the national 
“we” and that  brings  together  migrants,  refugees,  workers,  and European minorities 
(Blacks, Muslims, women, Roma, Sami, and so on) in a shared struggle against  the 
violent surplussing of life under racial capitalism.
Borders and the Politics of Solidarity
In June 2015,  the  German activist  collective  the  Center  for  Political  Beauty, 
CPB, staged a mass funeral in Berlin to honour the thousand of migrants that have died 
trying to cross the Mediterranean. With the permission of relatives, bodies of migrants 
buried at the periphery of Europe were exhumed and transported to Berlin, where they 
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were to be given a “dignified burial” before the eyes of their “bureaucratic murderers.”15 
“The  German  government’s  worst  nightmare  is  coming  true”,  explained  the  group: 
“Over the next few days, refugees who drowned or starved to death at Europe’s external 
borders on their way to a new life, will be brought to Berlin. The aim is to tear down the 
walls surrounding Europe’s sense of compassion.”16 Inviting the residents of Berlin to 
join  them  in  commemorating  the  victims  of  “Europe’s  aggressively  sealed-off 
borders”,17 the  group  drew  together  thousands  of  protestors  who  together  marched 
towards the vast grass lawn between the Chancellery and the German Parliament, where 
they dug holes and left behind “a mass graveyard at the heart of a leading bourgeois 
democracy.”18
Like many other activist groups, the CPB contests the hegemonic framing of the 
migrant crisis as a distinctively humanitarian emergency. The European border regime, 
they argue, has converted the Mediterranean into a mass graveyard. As William Walters 
explains,  the  increased  securitization  and militarization  of  the  borders  of  the  global 
North has been negotiated with the emergence of humanitarian aid and services located 
in  border  regions;  “[i]f  certain  border  zones  are  becoming  spaces  of  humanitarian 
engagement, this is only because border crossing has been made, for certain segments of 
the world’s migratory population, into a matter of life and death.”19 Consequently, while 
migrants are typically referred to as “fatalities”20—as victims of bad weather conditions, 
substandard vessels, and inadequate food and water supplies—this obfuscates that the 
Mediterranean need not be the main route of travel for migrants. Rather, and as Polly 
Pallister-Wilkins points out, it becomes the only viable means of transportation through 
a combination of EU border policies that deny people the possibility to fly and that 
closes  off  land  borders,  such  as  restrictive  visa  policies,  advanced  surveillance 
technology,  naval  patrols,  armed  guards  and  guard  dogs,  and  “the  time  honoured 
tradition of  fencing.”21 Before the European Union was formed and Schengen visas 
15 “Art Collective Buries Migrants in Berlin,” artnet News, June 18, 2015, https://news.artnet.com/art-
world/art-collective-bury-dead-migrants-berlin-308975.
16 The statement is available at http://politicalbeauty.com/dead.html 
17 Ibid.
18 Alice von Bieberstein and Erdem Evren, “From Aggressive Humanism to Improper Mourning: 
Burying the Victims of Europe’s Border Regime in Berlin,” Social Research: An International  
Quarterly 83, no. 2 (October 4, 2016): 454.
19 Walters, “‘Foucault and Frontiers: Notes on the Birth of the Humanitarian Border,” 147.
20 Brian and Laczko, “Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration,” 11.
21 Polly Pallister-Wilkins, “There’s A Focus On The Boats Because The Sea Is Sexier Than The Land: A 
Reflection on the Centrality of the Boats in the Recent ‘Migration Crisis,’” The Disorder of Things 




introduced, North Africans could travel freely back and forth to work in Europe or go on 
holiday. The signing of the Schengen accords in 1991 rendered these crossings illegal 
and also more dangerous, leading to the first of many recorded deaths along the Strait of 
Gibraltar.22 When Spain began installing sophisticated border control systems, migrants 
were forced to resort to smuggling and more dangerous sea routes to reach Europe.
While the CPB's burial  of deceased migrants has received mixed responses—
some have called  it  an  act  of  “political  pornography”,23 others  have  hailed it  as  an 
attempt to “transform refugees into people”24—a variety of actors have followed the 
group in framing their calls for empathy, hospitality, and the right to asylum through the 
rhetoric and iconography of loss and mourning. In 2008 Mimmo Paladino's memorial 
sculpture Porta d'Europa/Gateway to Europe was built on Lampedusa to commemorate 
the migrants who have drowned while trying to reach Europe.25 Shaped as an open door 
facing  the  sea,  the  sculpture  seeks  to bring  to  memory  those  who,  in  Butler's 
terminology,  are  ungrievable;  those  who,  “not  conceivable  as  lives  within  certain 
epistemological frames [...] are never lived nor lost in the full sense.”26 In 2013, after a a 
shipwreck off Lampedusa caused the death of 368 migrants,  the European parliament 
observed a minute of silence, President Martin Schultz later explaining that he had spent 
the minute imagining “the screams of children seeing their parents drown, of parents 
unable  to  save  their  children.”27 Pope  Francis  condemned  the  “globalization  of 
indifference” and declared “a day of tears”,  while  the Italian Prime Minister Enrico 
Letta  promised  posthumous  citizenship  and  a  state  funeral  for  the  victims.28 More 
recently,  activist  organisations  such  as  Boats4People,  TracesBack,  and  the  Italian 
feminist collective 2511 have held public commemorations for Europe's migrant dead, 
demanding the right to have the dead identified and properly buried, and for relatives to 
22 Miriam Ticktin, “The Problem with Humanitarian Borders,” Public Seminar (blog), accessed 
September 2, 2016, http://www.publicseminar.org/2015/09/the-problem-with-humanitarian-borders/.
23 “Creative Activism in Berlin on the Refugee Crisis: ‘The Dead Are Coming’ - Qantara.de,” Qantara.de  
- Dialogue with the Islamic World, accessed March 22, 2017, https://en.qantara.de/content/creative-
activism-in-berlin-on-the-refugee-crisis-the-dead-are-coming.
24 Berliner Zeitung, quoted on http://politicalbeauty.com/dead.html 
25 SPIEGEL ONLINE, Hamburg Germany, “Africans Remembered: A Memorial for Europe’s Lost 
Migrants - SPIEGEL ONLINE - International,” SPIEGEL ONLINE, accessed January 9, 2017,  
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/africans-remembered-a-memorial-for-europe-s-lost-
migrants-a-560218.html.
26 Judith Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? (London: Verso, 2010), 1.
27 “Opening: Minute’s Silence for Migrants Drowned off Lampedusa.”
28 Tom Kington, “Lampedusa Shipwreck: Italy to Hold State Funeral for Drowned Migrants,” The 
Guardian, October 9, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/09/lampedusa-shipwreck-
italy-state-funeral-migrants.
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reclaim the bodies and personal belongings of the dead.29 
A recent special  issue on “Borders and the Politics of Mourning” links these 
interventions  to  Judith  Butler's  ethics  of  grieving  ungrievable  life—which  we 
encountered in chapter 1—and  explores the political force of public grief for strangers 
(in this case, migrants).30 Mourning, the contributors argue, enables “new affective and 
political grammars in response to suffering, injustice and death.”31 Pro-refugee groups 
such as the CPB are praised for asserting “a politics of mourning that disrupts the script 
of nationalist kinship”,32 and for scandalizing what makes migrant deaths possible in the 
first place. Grief for unknown others—for strangers—is here understood as offering a 
radical  challenge  to  the  xenophobia  and  white  nationalism  that  underwrite  the 
necropolitical logic of the European border regime. Nonetheless, when viewed closely 
these calls for rescue, welcome, and hospitality turn out to confirm rather than disturb 
colonial-capitalist  relations  of  power.  In  the  next  section  I  show how  a  materialist 
reading of the global colour line disrupts these hegemonic narratives. As we shall see, in 
seeking to extend “grief and care to the dead stranger”33 these left-liberal interventions 
contribute to an ideological formation that disconnects connected histories and divorces 
the contemporary migrant  crisis  from Europe's  long and ongoing history of  empire, 
racial capitalism, and colonial conquest.
The Black Mediterranean: Racial Capitalism and the Political Economy of Migration
The  term the  “Black  Mediterranean” has  recently  started  to  surface  amongst 
academics, artists, and activists to describe the history of racial  subordination in the 
Mediterranean  region.34 Inspired  by  Paul  Gilroy's  Black  Atlantic, the  Black 
29 Kim Rygiel, “In Life Through Death: Transgressive Citizenship at the Border,” in Routledge 
Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies, ed. Engin Isin and Peter Nyers (Routledge, 2014).
30 See in particular Alexandra Délano Alonso and Benjamin Nienass, “Introduction: Borders and the 
Politics of Mourning,” Social Research: An International Quarterly 83, no. 2 (October 4, 2016): xix – 
xxxi and Bieberstein and Evren, “From Aggressive Humanism to Improper Mourning.” See also 
Maurice Stierl, “Contestations in Death – the Role of Grief in Migration Struggles,” Citizenship 
Studies 20, no. 2 (February 17, 2016): 173–91, doi:10.1080/13621025.2015.1132571 and Aleksandra 
Lewicki, “‘The Dead Are Coming’: Acts of Citizenship at Europe’s Borders,” Citizenship Studies 0, 
no. 0 (November 3, 2016): 1–16, https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2016.1252717.
31 Miriam Ticktin, “Thinking Beyond Humanitarian Borders,” Social Research: An International  
Quarterly 83, no. 2 (October 4, 2016): 256.
32 Bieberstein and Evren, “From Aggressive Humanism to Improper Mourning,” 461.
33 Bieberstein and Evren, 461.
34 The term “Black Mediterranean” was first coined by Alessandra di Maio, see Alessandra di Maio, 
“The Mediterranean, or Where Africa Does (Not) Meet Italy: Andrea Segre’s A Sud Di Lampedusa,”  
in The Cinemas of Italian Migration: European and Transatlantic Narratives, ed. Sabine Schrader and 
Daniel Winkler (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014).
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Mediterranean invites  us  to  place  the  contemporary migrant  crisis  in  the  context  of 
Europe's  constitutive  history of  empire,  racial  capitalism,  and colonial  conquest.  As 
Khalil Saucier and Tryon P. Woods explain, the Mediterranean “has been an  ongoing 
crisis for black people for the better part of the past and present millenniums.”35 As we 
saw in chapter 3, there was never such a thing as European modernity without slavery, 
and “the history of Manchester never happened without the history of Mississippi.”36 
While modernity typically is understood as an exclusively European phenomenon—as a 
product of the European Renaissance and Enlightenment—in reality “modernity appears 
when Europe  affirms  itself  as  the  'center'  of  a  World History  that  it  inaugurates.”37 
Colonial  conquest  and  transatlantic  slavery  not  only  contributed  to  the  growth  of 
industrial  capitalism  in  Western  Europe38 but  also,  and  importantly,  provided  the 
condition of possibility for the formation of Enlightenment thought. The very idea of 
Europe  emerged  through  a  process  of  differentiation  from  the  “periphery”  that 
surrounds it; hence, and as Édouard Glissant has argued, Europe is not a  place but a 
project.39 
Viewed through the lens of the Black Mediterranean, the contemporary migrant 
crisis is not a moment of exception or discrete event in time, but a late consequence of 
Europe's ongoing  encounter  with  the  world  that  it  created  through  more  than  five 
hundred years of empire, colonial conquest, and racial capitalism.40 As Saucier makes 
clear, what we are witnessing today is “a new declination of an older repressed issue” 
that  “has  its  roots  in  Mediterranean  racial  slavery,  Enlightenment  thought  (i.e. 
humanism that has relied on the provision of a dehumanized other), the colonial North-
South relationship, its colonial legacy, as well as in its fascist and imperial worldview.” 41 
35 “Slavery’s Afterlife in the Euro-Mediterranean Basin,” openDemocracy, June 18, 2015, 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/beyondslavery/tryon-p-woods-p-khalil-saucier/slavery
%E2%80%99s-afterlife-in-euromediterranean-basin.
36 Walter Johnson, “To Remake the World: Slavery, Racial Capitalism, and Justice,” Text, Boston 
Review, October 19, 2016, https://bostonreview.net/race/walter-johnson-slavery-human-rights-racial-
capitalism.
37 Enrique Dussel, “Eurocentrism and Modernity (Introduction to the Frankfurt Lectures),” Boundary 2 
20, no. 3 (1993): 65, https://doi.org/10.2307/303341.
38 See Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Fahamu/Pambazuka, 2012).
39 Edouard Glissant, Caribbean Discourse: Selected Essays (University Press of Virginia, 1989).
40 P. Khalil Saucier and Tryon P. Woods, “Ex Aqua: The Mediterranean Basin, Africans on the Move, 
and the Politics of Policing,” Theoria 61, no. 141 (December 1, 2014): 55–75, 
https://doi.org/10.3167/th.2014.6114104; Broeck, “Commentary (In Response to Michel Feith).” See 
also Reece Jones, Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move (Verso, 2016); Lucy Mayblin, 
Asylum After Empire: Colonial Legacies in the Politics of Asylum Seeking (Rowman & Littlefield 
International, 2017).
41 Broeck, “Commentary (In Response to Michel Feith),” 33. See also Nicholas De Genova, “The 
‘migrant Crisis’ as Racial Crisis: Do Black Lives Matter in Europe?,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 0, no. 
0 (August 21, 2017): 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1361543.
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The  philosophical  disappearance  of  this  history  has  served  as  a  bedrock  for 
contemporary  discourses  of  migration,  solidifying  the  belief that  the  ongoing  crisis 
originates “elsewhere”, outside of Europe—and that Europe, as a result, is an innocent 
bystander.42 Indeed, in Western media and wider political discourse, the migrant crisis is 
often discussed as the byproduct of the war in Syria and conflicts across North Africa. 
The International Commission for Missing Persons, for example, maintains that “There 
is no mystery as to why more and more people are following what is now the world’s 
most dangerous migration route—and why so many are dying in the attempt. Fighting in  
Syria,  Iraq,  Libya and parts  of  sub-Saharan Africa,  including Congo and Chad,  has 
caused millions to seek asylum, first in neighbouring countries and then in Europe.”43 
The New York Times similarly notes that “The roots of this catastrophe lie in crises the 
European Union cannot solve alone: war in Syria and Iraq, chaos in Libya, destitution 
and brutal regimes in Africa.”44 While it is true that the immediate cause of European 
migration is the breakdown of authority and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and 
North Africa, this framing overlooks how Europe has been implicated—economically, 
militarily, and politically—in creating these violent conditions. A recent work by David 
Miller is notable in this regard, starting, as it does, from the premise that migrants are 
“Strangers in Our Midst”45, as indicated by its title. In his latest book, Zygmunt Bauman 
similarly assumes that migrants are “Strangers at Our Door.” Like Miller, he takes it as a  
given that Europe is external to the origins of the “crisis”; “one cannot help”, he writes, 
“but notice that the massive and sudden appearance of strangers on our streets neither 
has been caused by us nor is under our control. No one consulted us; no one asked our 
agreement.”46 With  such  a  framing,  Miller  and  Bauman  both  occlude the  broader 
question of Europe's responsibility in  creating and upholding a difficult or impossible 
living  situation  in  refugee-producing  countries.  After  all, the  majority  of  migrants 
seeking asylum in Europe are coming from countries that until recently where under 
42 For an example, see Zygmunt Bauman, Strangers at Our Door (John Wiley & Sons, 2016); David 
Miller, Strangers in Our Midst (Harvard University Press, 2016).
43 “Missing Persons and Mediterranean Migration,” International Commission for Missing Persons, 
April 3, 2015, http://www.icmp.int/news/missing-persons-and-mediterranean-migration/.
44 The Editorial Board, “Europe Must Reform Its Deadly Asylum Policies,” The New York Times, August 
31, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/01/opinion/europe-must-reform-its-deadly-asylum-
policies.html.The Washington Post similarly notes that Europe “can’t be expected to solve on its own a 
problem that is originating in Afghanistan, Sudan, Libya and—above all—Syria.” Editorial Board, “A 
Refugee Crisis of Historic Scope,” The Washington Post, August 29, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-refugee-crisis-of-historic-scope/2015/08/29/3cc62592-
4d9d-11e5-902f-39e9219e574b_story.html?utm_term=.afecaa65161f.
45 Miller, Strangers in Our Midst.
46 Bauman, Strangers at Our Door, 15.
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colonial rule. Libya and Eritrea were Italian colonies until 1947; Somalia was ruled by 
Italy and Britain until 1960; Syria was a French protectorate under the Mandate System 
until  1946;  Britain  invaded  and  occupied  Afghanistan  three  times  until  formal 
independence  in  1919.  From  the  days  of  colonial  conquest  and  genocide,  to  the 
economic exploitation under  the Mandate System, and recent  years'  interventions in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, any serious consideration of what lies behind the surge of 
migrants into Europe must account for this colonial history and the way in which it  
continues  to  structure  the  present.  As  Gurminder  Bhambra  makes  clear,  “Europe’s 
relatively high standard of living and social infrastructure have not been established or 
maintained separate  from either  the  labour  and wealth  of  others,  or  the  creation  of 
misery elsewhere.”47 In fact, and as Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson have shown,  the 
origins of the EU are inextricably bound up with imperial politics and “the perceived 
necessity to preserve and prolong the colonial system.”48 From the beginning of the Pan-
European movement in the 1920s to its institutionalisation in the European Economic 
Community (EEC), European integration was inextricably bound up with the question 
of Europe's continued dominance over Africa; indeed, “a unification of Europe and a 
unified European effort  to colonize Africa were two processes that presupposed one 
another.”49 The 2008 agreement  between Italy and Libya, in which Colonel Gaddafi 
agreed to  help curb migration flows in return for colonial reparations, is but a recent 
example of how the historical reality of colonialism continues to pattern the present.
A focus on racial capitalism and the materiality of the global colour line sheds 
new light on these processes. Two aspects in particular are worth highlighting. First, and 
against  those  who  insist  on  a  neat  separation  between  “genuine”  refugees  and 
“economic migrants”, it is worth remembering that the contemporary surge in migration 
is closely linked to the globalisation of neoliberal capital and labour stratifications in the 
world  economy. As  Fran  Cetti  explains,  global  disparities  in  income  levels,  health, 
education, and life expectancy 
47 Gurminder Bhambra, “Europe Won’t Resolve the ‘migrant Crisis’ until It Faces Its Own Past,” The 
Conversation (blog), September 1, 2015, http://theconversation.com/europe-wont-resolve-the-
migrant-crisis-until-it-faces-its-own-past-46555. As Reece Jones explains, what the European Left and 
Right both “miss is that it is not simply a migration crisis in Europe, but also a crisis created by 
Europe.” Reece Jones, “Europe’s Migration Crisis, or Open Borders as Reparations,” 
Versobooks.com, accessed December 10, 2017, https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2900-europe-s-
migration-crisis-or-open-borders-as-reparations.
48 Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, “Bringing Africa as a ‘Dowry to Europe,’” Interventions 13, no. 3 
(September 1, 2011): 461, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2011.597600. See also Peo Hansen and 
Stefan Jonsson, Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism (Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2014).
49 Hansen and Jonsson, “Bringing Africa as a ‘Dowry to Europe.’”
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“have soared over the last thirty years of neoliberal policies, reaching a 
point today when they have never been higher. Poverty, unemployment 
and lack of opportunity have been entrenched in [developing] countries 
by  decades  of  debt  'restructuring'  imposed  by  Western  states  and 
financial  institutions. The collapse of local economies and of formal 
and  informal  systems  of  survival  in  many  countries  in  the  Global 
South,  and  the  unrelenting  rise  in  rural  dispossessions  and  urban 
unemployment,  generate  and  are  compounded  by  conflict  and 
insecurity.”50
Since the 1970s the  forceful  integration of Asia,  Africa,  and Latin America into the 
world  economy has  driven  millions  of  poor  peasants  off  their  land  and  into  urban 
peripheries—with  some  reaching  as  far  as  the  metropoles  of  Europe  and  North 
America.51 Accumulation, dispossession, and migration must ultimately be analysed and 
understood through a unified framework. As Hannah Cross explains, in the neoliberal 
present
“people  are  thrown  out  of  the  global  economy—discarded  and 
sometimes reincorporated. Therefore, there are 'wasted lives' (Bauman 
2004),  people  who  are  left  behind  by  'modernisation'  and  become 
unemployed, unpaid, imprisoned, destitute, lost at sea or perishing in 
the desert.”52
In other words, the violent displacement of millions of people in the global South is not 
random or coincidental but a result of the forceful appropriation of land and resources in 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America; “the dual processes of displacement and migration are 
manufactured through the specific trajectories of colonialism and capitalism.”53 
50 Fran Cetti, “Fortress Europe: The War against Migrants,” International Socialim: A Quarterly Review  
of Socialist Theory 148 (2015).
51 Structural adjustment programmes and public-sector downsizing imposed on the global South have, as 
Mike Davis point out in Planet of Slums, “been an inevitable recipe for the mass production of slums” 
by forcefully incorporating the subsistence peasantries in Asia and Africa into the world market.  
Struggling to compete with large-scale agroindustries, millions of farmers were forced from their land 
and driven into the cities to find work, if at all, in the informal sector. UN-Habitat similarly concludes 
that “the collapse of formal urban employment in the developing world and the rise of the informal 
sector is... a direct function of liberalization... Urban poverty has been increasing in most countries 
subject to structural adjustment programs.” See Mike Davis, Planet of Slums (Verso, 2007); United 
Nations Human Settlements Programme, The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human 
Settlements, 2003 (Earthscan Publications, 2003), 40.
52 Hannah Cross, “Labour and Underdevelopment? Migration, Dispossession and Accumulation in West 
Africa and Europe,” Review of African Political Economy 40, no. 136 (June 1, 2013): 215, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2013.794727.
53 Harsha Walia, Undoing Border Imperialism (AK Press, 2014), 44. As Walia explains, it is imperative 
that we interrogate “the role of Western imperialism in dispossessing communities in order to secure 
land and resources for state and capitalist interests, as well as the deliberately limited inclusion of 
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Second, and as we saw in chapter 3, the rise of global capitalism has historically 
been linked to  the production of unwaged and less-than-free labour,  such as chattel 
slavery, racialized indentured servitude, convict leasing, and debt peonage. As William 
I. Robinson explains, “migration/immigration has thus been central to the creation of the  
world  capitalist  system.”54 In  the  neoliberal  present,  these  forms  of  direct,  colonial 
control over the global labour supply have been replaced, in part, by the creation of 
“immigrant labor.” Indeed, despite widespread anti-immigrant rhetoric throughout the 
global North, neither the state nor capital have an interest in closing down the border to 
all migrants: the goal is not to  prevent migration but to  control and  police it, locking 
migrants into a state of permanent precarity, vulnerability, and super-exploitability. As 
David McNally notes, “it's not that global business does not want immigrant labor to the 
West. It simply wants this labor on its own terms: frightened, oppressed, vulnerable.”55 
Xenophobic  discourses and the  criminalisation of  undocumented  migration enable  a 
division of the global working class into “immigrants” and “citizens.” Migrants are thus 
constituted as a highly precarious, hyper-exploitable, and expendable work force; what 
Peter Nyers refers to as the “deportspora.”56 What is at stake is the production of “a 
subordinate reserve army of deportable 'foreign' labour, always-already within the space 
of the nation-state, readily available for deployment as the inevitably over-employed 
working  poor.”57 The  creation  of  such  a  super-exploited,  hyper-surveilled,  and 
expendable labour pool is central to racial capitalism and the global political economy 
in  so  far  as  it  places  downward  pressure  on  wages  everywhere  and  disciplines  all 
workers—Germany's 1 euro/hr job scheme is a case in point.58 As Robinson elaborates,
migrant bodies into Western states through processes of criminalization and racialization that justify 
the commodification of their labour.” Walia, 39.
54 Robinson, “Global Capitalism, Immigrant Labor, and the Struggle for Justice,” 2.
55 David McNally, quoted in Walia, Undoing Border Imperialism, 70. 
56 Peter Nyers, “Abject Cosmopolitanism: The Politics of Protection in the Anti-Deportation 
Movement,” Third World Quarterly 24, no. 6 (2003): 1070. As William Robinson explains, “The 
transnational circulation of capital and the disruption and deprivation it causes, in turn, generates the 
transnational circulation of labour. In other words, global capitalism creates immigrant workers... In a 
sense, this must be seen as a coerced or forced migration, since global capitalism exerts a structural  
violence over whole populations and makes it impossible for them to survive in their homeland.” 
William Robinson, “Globalization and the Struggle for Immigrant Rights in the United States,” ZNet 
(blog), March 10, 2007, https://zcomm.org/znetarticle/globalization-and-the-struggle-for-immigrant-
rights-in-the-united-states-by-william-robinson/.  See also Hannah Cross, Migrants, Borders and 
Global Capitalism: West African Labour Mobility and EU Borders (Routledge, 2013); Nicholas De 
Genova, “Spectacles of Migrant ‘illegality’: The Scene of Exclusion, the Obscene of Inclusion,” 
Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, no. 7 (July 1, 2013): 1180–98, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2013.783710; Angela Mitropoulos and Matthew Kiem, “Cross-
Border Operations,” The New Inquiry (blog), November 18, 2015, https://thenewinquiry.com/cross-
border-operations/.
57 Genova, “Spectacles of Migrant ‘illegality,’” 1190.
58 “Germany Puts Refugees to Work ... for One Euro,” The Local, May 16, 2016, 
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“Immigrant labor is extremely profitable for the transnational corporate 
economy in a double sense. First, it is labor that is highly vulnerable, 
forced to exist semi underground, and deportable, and therefore super-
exploitable. Second, the criminalization of undocumented migrants and 
the militarization of their control not only reproduce these conditions of 
vulnerability but also in themselves generate vast new opportunities for 
accumulation.  The  private  immigrant  detention  complex  is  a  boom 
industry.”59
In light of this, while activist groups such as the CPB have been effective in 
drawing  attention  to  the  “death  worlds”  that  underlie  and  condition  contemporary 
Europe, their calls for hospitality, empathy, and affective identification with the fate of 
migrants  ultimately  reproduce,  rather  than  challenge,  dominant  interpretations  that 
portray Europe as an innocent bystander. In framing the migrant crisis as a problem of 
inhumane  Frontex  policies  and  a  society  that  turns  a  blind  eye  to  suffering,  these 
interventions  do  little  to  challenge  established  interpretations  that  cast  migrants  as 
“uninvited guests”, “charitable subjects”, and “strangers at our door.”60 This not only 
obscures  Europe's  role  in  having created  the  conditions  which,  in  part,  have  set  in 
motion  the  migration  of  today;  as  Broeck  argues,  it  also  reproduces  dominant 
interpretations that see Europe as the haven of democracy, liberty, and universal rights, 
as opposed to “a colonialist product which guards its comparative wealth and guarantees  
of freedom carefully, sheltered by broad mass approval of its hegemonic white citizenry, 
and by the support of its intellectual elites.”61 Put differently, by divorcing the ongoing 
crisis from Europe's long history of empire and racial capitalism, liberal pro-refugee 
activism  often  end  up  depicting  contemporary  manifestations  of  racism  and  white 
nationalism as exceptions to normality;  as anachronisms, pathologies, and individual 
attitudes—rather than as constitutive elements of European history, culture, identity, and 
macroeconomics.62 As Nicholas De Genova explains, this reduces racism to little more 
than a politics of discriminatory hostility towards difference.  A discussion emptied of 
https://www.thelocal.de/20160516/germany-puts-refugees-to-work-for-one-euro.
59 Robinson, “Global Capitalism, Immigrant Labor, and the Struggle for Justice,” 9.
60 Amongst others, see Bauman, Strangers at Our Door and Miller, Strangers in Our Midst.
61 Broeck, “Commentary (In Response to Michel Feith),” 25.
62 As Alana Lentin makes clear, Europe's contemporary exclusionary practices must be seen as  
consistent and contiguous. Indeed,  “the fact that none of the arguments that are constitutive of the 
case for closing the borders, deporting the undesirables, enforcing integration, or criminalising 
minority cultural practices are set in the politico-historical context out of which they emerge is 
striking.” Alana Lentin, “Postracial Silences: The Othering of Race in Europe,” in Racism and 
Sociology, ed. Wulf D. Hund and Alana Lentin (LIT Verlag Münster, 2014), 74.
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historical  and  materialist  baggage,  this  forsakes  “an  analysis  of  the  distinctively 
European colonial legacies that literally produced race as a socio-political category of 
distinction and discrimination in the first place.”63 In other words, while groups such as 
the CPB do offer critiques of racism and populist nationalisms, they fail to situate these 
critiques within a historical and materialist context that recognises the centrality of race 
to European capitalist modernity.  As De Genova asks:  “If migrant lives do arguably 
matter in Europe, why is it so persistently and perniciously difficult to reognize them as 
Black lives?”64 These discourses  not only  evade the question what Michael Omi and 
Howard Winant call “racial formation”, namely, the historical, political, and economic 
processes through which racial categories are brought into being. As we shall see next, 
they also enable Europe to continue to see itself as the pinnacle of freedom, democracy, 
humanism—and, indeed, anti-racism. 
White Innocence
In the previous section I argued that the majority of left-liberal responses to the 
ongoing crisis in the Mediterranean have contributed to an ideological formation that 
removes  from  view the  interconnected,  material  histories  that  link  Europe  and  the 
migrants washed up on its shores. By foregrounding the spectacle of death and suffering
—emblematised  by the circulation of  the  picture of  3-year  old  Syrian refugee  Alan 
Kurdi, lying dead and alone on a beach in Bodrum, Turkey—these discourses call on 
Europeans to open their hearts, and to feel compassion and empathy with the suffering 
of migrants. As we shall see, this focus on bodies in pain not only decontextualises and 
dehistoricises the ongoing crisis: it also contributes to the construction of a particular 
cultural narrative—of European goodness, humanity, and anti-racism. If  there exists a 
link between mourning and the mattering of human life, as Butler suggests, then this 
raises questions around whose humanity is at stake and, indeed for what purpose.
Sarah  Ahmed's  work  on  stranger  fetishism  offers  a  good  starting  point  for 
thinking about these issues. In Strange Encounters, she explores how colonial amnesia 
and the erasure of connected histories lead to the objectification of the stranger, that is,  
to a “'cutting off' of figures from the social and material relations which overdetermine 
63 Genova, “The ‘migrant Crisis’ as Racial Crisis,” 5. As he notes, it is striking that although the risks 
associated with crossing the Mediterranean are disproportionately inflicted on migrant and refugees 




their existence.”65 This is a move that ontologises the stranger, and that turns him or her 
“into something that simply is.” Ahmed argues that this is a logic that is shared by both 
anti-immigrant and xenophobic policies,  and liberal and multicultural discourses that 
welcome  strangers.  Indeed,  while  liberal  and  multicultural  discourses  challenge 
representations that frame the stranger as a source of danger, they take for granted “the 
stranger's status as a figure that contains or has meaning.”66 The stranger is here turned 
into a reminder of the difference, relationality, and vulnerability that is common to all of 
us—as Bülent Diken argues, “with the stranger, we find ourselves.”67 Uncovering the 
self-serving motives that underpin multicultural calls for welcoming the alien stranger, 
Ahmed notes how
“the alien is a source of fascination and desire: making friends with 
aliens, eating with aliens, or even eating one (up), might enable us to 
transcend the very limits and frailties of an all-too-human form. Or, by 
allowing  some  aliens  to  co-exist  “with  us”,  we  might  expand  our 
community:  we  might  prove  our  advancement  into  or  beyond  the 
human; we might demonstrate our willingness to accept difference and 
to  make it  our  own.  Being hospitable  to  aliens  might,  in  this  way, 
allow us to become human.”68
In her trilogy on national sentimentality, Lauren Berlant raises similar questions 
about  the  limits  of  liberal  and  multicultural  discourses  of  inclusion.  Her  argument 
centres on how the language of emotions and the personal increasingly  has come to 
replace politics and responsibility. She describes this as a form of sentimental politics 
that operates by burning the pain of excluded others “into the conscience of classically 
privileged  [...] subjects”  in  order  to  make them “feel  the pain  […]  as  their  pain.”69 
Berlant argues that this focus on the wounds, pain, and suffering of others works to turn 
political problems into an affective matter to be solved through proper feeling,  equating 
structural  change  with  feeling  good.  Sentimentality,  she  argues,  must  therefore  be 
understood  as  a  political  project  launched  on  behalf  of  the  beneficiaries  of  social 
injustice, as a “defensive response by people who identify with privilege yet fear they 
will be exposed as immoral by their tacit sanction of a particular structural violence that 
65 Sara Ahmed, Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality (Routledge, 2000), 5.
66 Ahmed, 4.
67 Bülent Diken, Strangers, Ambivalence and Social Theory (Ashgate, 1998), 334.
68 Ahmed, Strange Encounters, 2.
69 Lauren Berlant, “The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy, and Politics,” in Cultural Pluralism, 
Identity Politics, and the Law, ed. Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns (University of Michigan Press, 
2001), 53.
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benefits  them.”70 As  Ahmed  reminds  us,  such  “cannibalisation  of  the  other 
masquerading  as  care”71 is  made  possible  by  historical  amnesia  and  the  erasure  of 
history, because only by obscuring the privilege obtained through colonial  conquest, 
genocide, and racial subordination can the white subject present itself as empathetic, 
caring, and good.
Applying Ahmed and Berlant's arguments to the Mediterranean crisis, it becomes 
possible  to  see  how  pro-refugee  appeals  to  affect,  liberal  hospitality,  and 
multiculturalism ultimately function as continuations of, rather than breaks with, the key 
premises  of  the  populist,  far  right,  anti-immigrant,  xenophobic,  and  racist  political 
parties they supposedly seek to challenge. While many of the pro-refugee groups and 
activists discussed above challenge the xenophobic discourses that present migrants as a 
form of danger (to Europe's security, welfare state, women, and so on), they rely on a 
similar fetishising logic. In seeking to  extend “grief and care to the dead stranger”,72 
these interventions not only transform the migrant into a predetermined universalised 
figure  in  need  of  Europe's  help  and  hospitality: they  also  reproduce  a  narrative of 
European goodness and benevolence. As Saucier points out, this kind of activism might 
ultimately not be about migrants at all but, rather, “about constructing a new European 
citizen”  by  highlighting  the  difference  between  “good  whiteness”  (tolerant, 
multicultural, liberal) and “bad whiteness” (fascist, white nationalist). Dead migrants, he 
argues, here function as the conduit through which a more positive, cosmopolitan, and 
empathetic  European  identity  can be  created,  one  that  supposedly  is  attuned  to  the 
suffering of all of humankind, but which in reality is concerned with saving Europe for 
itself.73 
Leftist philosopher and cultural critic Slavoj Žižek's commitment to a culturalist 
Europeanism can be understood in precisely this vein. While Žižek is critical of anti-
immigrant discourses and committed to a policy of open borders, he calls on the Left to 
“embrace its radical Western roots”: 
“Europe needs to be open to refugees, but we have to be clear they are in 
70 Berlant, 83–4.
71 Quoted in Clare Hemmings, “Affective Solidarity: Feminist Reflexivity and Political Transformation,” 
Feminist Theory 13, no. 2 (2012): 152, https://doi.org/10.1177/1464700112442643.
72 Bieberstein and Evren, “From Aggressive Humanism to Improper Mourning,” 461.
73 See Broeck and Saucier, “A Dialogue: On European Borders, Black Movement, and the History of 
Social Death.” and Saucier and Woods, “Ex Aqua.” See also Gada Mahrouse, Conflicted 
Commitments: Race, Privilege, and Power in Solidarity Activism (McGill-Queen’s Press - MQUP, 
2014), which examines solidarity as a colonial encounter that produces First World subjectivities.
-127-
our culture.  Certain  ethical  limits...  are  non-negotiable.  We should be 
more  assertive  toward our  values...  Europe means something noble—
human rights, welfare state, social programs for the poor. All of this is 
embodied in enlightenment of the European legacy.”74
By  erasing  Europe's  colonial  past  and  its  neocolonial  present—and  with  that,  the 
responsibility that Europe bears for the bodies on its shores— Žižek not only reproduces 
hegemonic  discourses  that  see  Europe  as  the  pinnacle  of  democracy,  liberty,  and 
universal  rights.  By  securing  the  migrant's  status  as  a  stranger,  he  also  enables  the 
European  subject  to  re-constitute  itself  as  “ethical”  and  “good”,  innocent  of  its 
imperialist  histories  and present  complicities. Like  activist  groups such as the  CPB, 
Zizek thus sanctions  a  white(washed) sense of self and satisfied way of being in the 
world—what  Gloria  Wekker  describes  as  “white  innocence”—that  sees  little  or  no 
relation between current social advantages and the long history of empire, imperialism, 
and racial capitalism.75  Hence the focus on migrants that are  dead, with sentimental 
stories of innocent children washed up on shores, and with mothers who drown while 
giving birth—that is, with bodies that cannot speak back. As Broeck argues, these are 
the “waves of white empathy” that come “washing up when things get all too obviously 
horrible for black so-called illegal migrants.”76 
Near and Far Peripheries: Connected Geographies of Resistance
So far I argued that dominant forms of pro-refugee activism in Europe elide and 
neglect  the  role  of  race,  colonialism,  and global  capitalism in  creating  the  ongoing 
migrant crisis. The result has been a solidarity which grieves and welcomes migrants as 
universal  humans—and  not  as  victims  of  a  shared,  global  present  built  on  racial 
capitalism, imperialism, and white supremacy. This choice is not innocent because, as 
Bhambra  reminds  us,  “addressing  particular  sets  of  connections  leads  to  particular 
understandings”, and as such it is imperative to consider “why certain connections were 
initially chosen and why choosing others could lead to more adequate explanations.”77 
In chapter 4 I argued that a materialist reading of the global colour line opens up space 
for  a  different  kind  of  solidarity—based  not  on  the  connections  forged  from  the 
74 “‘EU Must Militarize Chaotic Immigration, Identify States behind Middle East Crisis’ – Zizek to RT,” 
RT International, accessed December 10, 2017, https://www.rt.com/news/340562-eu-refugee-policy-
chaos-militarization/.
75 Gloria Wekker, White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race (Duke University Press, 2016).
76 Broeck, “Commentary (In Response to Michel Feith),” 32.
77 Gurminder K. Bhambra, Connected Sociologies (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014), 5.
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ontological  universal experience of  vulnerability and mourning, but  on resistance to 
interlocking oppressions under racial capitalism. In the context of the ongoing European 
migrant or refugee “crisis”, solidarity thus understood requires a shift in focus, away 
from the interconnectedness and oneness of humanity—metaphorised by the umbilical 
cord that connects Yohanna to her lifeless baby—towards the material entanglements 
that link Europe to the diverse regions from which migrants and refugees are coming. In 
the words of Stuart Hall: “They are here because you were there. There is an umbilical 
connection. There is no understanding Englishness without understanding its imperial 
and colonial dimensions.”78
A number  of  activist  groups—including  Black  Lives  Matter  UK,  Parti  des 
Indigènes de la République, New Urban Collective, European Network Against Racism, 
and  Campaign  Against  Police  and  State  Violence—are  practising  precisely  such a 
radicalised and revolutionary form of solidarity. In the same way that Cedric Robinson 
insisted on reading the plantations of Mississippi and the factories of Manchester not as 
separate  systems  but  as  differentiated  and  complementary  parts  of  the  same global 
economy, these activist groups are placing the ongoing migrant crisis within a broader 
historical context of anti-racist struggles within and outside of Europe. These groups are 
doing  the  critical  work  of  contesting  what  Harsha  Walia  describes  as  “border 
imperialism”; that is, the way in which the politics of borders are intimately intwined 
with global systems of power and repression—at once at home and abroad—which find 
their roots in colonisation, slavery, and capital accumulation and exploitation.79 In what 
follows I focus on the work of two of these groups—Black Lives Matter UK and Parti 
des Indigènes de la République—in order to demonstrate how an analysis of the co-
constitution of near and far peripheries under racial  capitalism opens up space for a 
different kind of internationalism and politics of solidarity.
On September 6, 2016, BLM UK shut down London City Airport by blocking a 
runway. In a video posted on Twitter, the group called for cuts in carbon omissions,  
arguing  that  climate  change  is  a  racial  crisis.80 While  the  countries  most  liable 
historically for global warming are located in the global North, many of the countries 
most  significantly  affected  by  global  warming  are  in  sub-Saharan  Africa.  UNHCR 
78 Stuart Hall, Black Chronicles II, ii, accessed January 9, 2017, http://autograph-
abp.co.uk/exhibitions/black-chronicles-ii.
79 Walia, Undoing Border Imperialism.
80 Matthew Weaver and Jamie Grierson, “Black Lives Matter Protest Stops Flights at London City 
Airport,” The Guardian, September 6, 2016, sec. UK news, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2016/sep/06/black-lives-matter-protesters-occupy-london-city-airport-runway.
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estimates that an annual average of 21.5 million people have been forcibly displaced 
since  2008  due  to  climate-induced  hazards,  including  droughts,  mass  flooding,  and 
desertification.81 By linking global warming to migrant fatalities,  and contrasting the 
ease by which “a tiny elite can fly to and from London City airport, sometimes as a 
daily commute”82 with the deadly journeys undertaken by migrants as they try to enter 
Europe,  BLM  UK  thus  connect  their  own  struggle  against  racial  capitalism, 
marginalisation, and state violence in Britain to the global policing of migration flows. 
The group has also organised against  abuse perpetrated during immigrant  detention, 
incarceration, and deportation, as well as against state-sanctioned Islamophobia through 
the Prevent strategy and the escalation of post-Brexit anti-immigrant hate crimes.83
Parti des Indigènes de la République (PIR) has similarly drawn attention to the 
continuity between mass migrant deaths during the crossings of the Mediterranean and 
the everyday violence inflicted on racialized minorities within Europe. PIR was formed 
in  early  2005  with  the  goal  of  contributing  to  “the  emergence  of  a  political  and 
organized  expression  of  the  rage  of  immigrant  populations.”84 PIR  is  primarily 
composed of French youths of African, Arab, Muslim, Maghrebian and Antillean origin, 
born  and  raised  in  France,  who live the  experience  of  racism,  marginalisation,  and 
exploitation.  The  French  term  “indigéne”—loosely  translated  as  indigenous—was 
chosen to invoke the colonial populations who, up until 1946, were governed by the 
Code de l'Indigénat. The notion of “indigéne” ultimately draws attention to the fact that 
the  French  Republic—while  claiming  to  uphold  colour-blind  values  of  equality, 
fraternity, and liberty—in fact continues to treat some of its citizens as  quasi-colonial 
subjects. As Horuia Bouteldja, the spokesperson of PIR, explains:
“When they refuse to accept us as French citizens, they deny us equality. 
We need to name this reality: we cannot be French, so we are native. We 
are second-class citizens; ours is a lumpen-citizenship, just as at the time 
of the colonies. This imaginary linked to colonization and the history of 
81 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Frequently Asked Questions on Climate Change 
and Disaster Displacement,” UNHCR, accessed December 9, 2017, 
http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/11/581f52dc4/frequently-asked-questions-climate-change-
disaster-displacement.html.
82 Alexandra Wanjiku Kelbert, “Climate Change Is a Racist Crisis: That’s Why Black Lives Matter 
Closed an Airport | Alexandra Wanjiku Kelbert,” The Guardian, September 6, 2016, sec. Opinion, 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/06/climate-change-racist-crisis-london-city-
airport-black-lives-matter.
83 See Genova, “The ‘migrant Crisis’ as Racial Crisis,” 4.
84 Sadri Khiari, quoted in Stefan Kipfer, “Decolonization in the Heart of Empire: Some Fanonian Echoes 
in France Today,” Antipode 43, no. 4 (September 1, 2011): 1158, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8330.2011.00851.x.
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slavery continues to determine how they perceive us, for the body of the 
indigenous  was  constructed  during  the  colonial  era.  As  long  as  this 
imaginary is alive, we remain native.”85
For PIR, the legacies of race and colonialism continue to structure present realities in 
Europe: from the dark waters of the Mediterranean, where migrants are left to die, to the 
banlieues of Paris, to be Black in Europe is to be disposable.
In contrast to hegemonic forms of solidarity,  PIR and BLM UK both disrupt 
hegemonic narratives that see Europe as the bastion of democracy, liberty, and universal 
rights. They do this by articulating their critiques of the current migration crisis within a 
wider  analysis  of  European  empire,  racial  capitalism,  labour  exploitation,  and 
(neo)colonialism. As Walia explains with reference to No One Is Illegal, groups such as 
these contest “the capitalist and colonial logics that make immigration an issue in the 
first place.”86 BLM UK and PIR are struggling for more than recognition or inclusion 
within  the  European  polity,  because  the  integrationist  logic  of  immigration  reduces 
racism to an individual mentality or exception from normality. Instead they target three 
specific  problems:  first,  the  problem  of  racism,  stigmatisation,  and  marginalisation 
within Europe; second, the role of racism in creating a super-exploitative work force 
both within and outside of Europe; and three, the necessity of linking anti-racist struggle 
within Europe to internationalist liberation struggles worldwide.87 By connecting near 
and far peripheries these groups are ultimately challenging established geographies of 
power.  Where  IR's  state-centric  imagination  treats  colonial  frontiers  and  Western 
“homelands”  as  fundamentally  separate  domains,  these  groups  insist  on  linking  the 
struggle  against  capitalism and racist  oppression  within Europe to  the  deaths  on its 
borders. As Prem Rajaram explains, this 
“allows for thinking points of articulation between different marginalised 
groups,  refuses  the  state-centric  account  of  migrant  and  refugee 
'governance,' and allows also for the basis of a politics of solidarity. Such 
solidarity is framed around the refusal of a divisive politics of race that 
seeks to establish animosity between classes similarly positioned before 
capitalist systems of production.”88
In linking together metropolitan cores and colonial peripheries, activist groups such as 
85 Quoted in Kipfer, 1158.
86 Walia, Undoing Border Imperialism, ix.
87 Kipfer, “Decolonization in the Heart of Empire,” 1162.
88 Prem Kumar Rajaram, “Refugees as Surplus Population: Race, Migration and Capitalist Value 
Regimes,” New Political Economy 23, no. 5 (September 3, 2018): 11, 
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PIR and BLM UK ultimately open up space for a different forms of solidarity: for an 
internationalism  that  subverts  the  national  “we”  and  that  brings  together  migrants, 
refugees,  workers,  and European minorities (Blacks,  Muslims, women, Roma, Sami, 
and so on) in joint struggle. This is a solidarity which goes beyond liberal notions of 
hospitality, empathy, multiculturalism, and the eventual “creation of a new reserve army 
of precarious labor”;89 a solidarity which instead seeks a revolutionary transformation of 
contemporary Europe through a shared struggle against racism, patriarchy, capitalism, 
oppression,  and  exploitation.  As Turhan  and Armiero  explain,  what  is  at  stake  is  a 
choice between
“a liberal way of dealing with migration as a temporary crisis that can 
be  managed  with  the  likes  of  the  EU–Turkey  migrant  deal  and  a 
revolutionary perspective that embraces migration as an opportunity to 
break away from border-bound definitions of citizenship and create a 
truly cosmopolitan, responsible, and welcoming solidarity.”90
Conclusion
Speaking at a conference in 2016, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon insisted 
that we are “facing the biggest refugee and displacement crisis of our time.” The refugee 
or migrant crisis, he argued, is more than “a crisis in numbers”; in fact, “it is also a crisis 
of solidarity.”91 
What form of solidarity has been at stake in this crisis? In this chapter I have 
argued that the majority of European calls for solidarity with shipwrecked migrants have 
worked to evade the larger historical and material context of the global migration crisis. 
While European  pro-refugee activists, scholars, and policymakers have  harnessed the 
rhetoric of mourning, compassion, and empathy to challenge the xenophobic and white 
nationalist discourses that figure migrants as vermin, pariah, and bogus—that is, as less-
than-human—they have often and inadvertently ended up reproducing the underlying 
assumptions of the far right: namely, that migrants are “strangers”, “charitable subjects”, 
and “uninvited guests.”  By focusing on abstract—as opposed to historical—humanity, 
solidarity practiced this way contributes to an ideological formation that not only fails to 
connect the geo-politics of war and displacement to Europe's own macroeconomic and 
89 Turhan and Armiero, “Cutting the Fence, Sabotaging the Border,” 2.
90 Turhan and Armiero, 7.
91 Ban Ki-Moon, “Refugee Crisis about Solidarity, Not Just Numbers, Secretary-General Says at Event 
on Global Displacement Challenge” (UN Press Release, April 15, 2016), 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sgsm17670.doc.htm.
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foreign policies. It also undoes the “umbilical cord” that links Europe and the migrants 
that are trying to enter the continent. The result has been a shift in focus, from questions 
of European responsibility, guilt, restitution, repentance, and structural reform to matters 
of  empathy,  generosity,  and  hospitality—a  move  that  ultimately  transforms  the 
responsible colonial agent into an innocent bystander, and thus confirms its status as 
“ethical”,  “good”,  and  “humane.” If  the  migrant  crisis,  as  Zygmunt  Bauman  has 
suggested, “is humanity's crisis”92, then this raises questions about whose humanity is at 
stake and, indeed, for what purposes. 
In contrast to these perspectives, groups such as Black Lives Matter UK and 
Parti des Indigènes de la République point towards an alternative, revolutionary politics 
of solidarity that takes seriously the racialized political economy of migration and that is 
painfully  aware of how immigrant workers have “become the archetype of the new 
global  class relations;  the quintessential  workforce of global  capitalism.”93 This is  a 
solidarity  grounded  less  in  the  connections  generated  by  universal  ethics  than  in  a 
recognition  of  the  intertwined  histories  that  arise  out  of  the  colonial  past  and  the 
neocolonial present—summed up by the activist slogan “we didn't cross the border, the 
border  crossed  us.”  These  groups  not  only  challenge hegemonic  narratives  that see 
Europe  as  the  bastion  of  democracy,  liberty,  and  universal  rights: they  also  point 
towards  an alternative  form of  solidarity  and internationalism,  beyond the  “master's 
tools.” In Christina Sharpe's formulation,
“Refuse reconciliation to ongoing brutality. Refuse to feast on the corpse 
of  others.  Rend  the  fabric  of  the  kinship  narrative.  Imagine  otherwise. 
Remake the world. Some of us have never had any other choice.”94
In the next chapter I turn to Black internationalist thought and recent forms of Black-
Palestinian  solidarity  to  deepen  this  analysis  of  how  new  forms  of  solidarity  and 
internationalism are brought into being from below.
92 Brad Evans and Zygmunt Bauman, “The Refugee Crisis Is Humanity’s Crisis,” The New York Times, 
May 2, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/02/opinion/the-refugee-crisis-is-humanitys-
crisis.html.
93 Robinson, “Global Capitalism, Immigrant Labor, and the Struggle for Justice,” 8.
94 Christina Sharpe, “Lose Your Kin,” The New Inquiry, November 16, 2016, 
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C H A P T E R  6
#Palestine2Ferguson: Empire and the Global Security Archipelago
“The young people of Ferguson struggle relentlessly, not just to win justice for Mike 
Brown or to end police misconduct but to dismantle racism once and for all, to bring 
down the Empire, and to ultimately end War. As they reach out to Palestine, and 
Palestine reaches back to Ferguson, the potential for a new basis for solidarity is being 
born—one rooted in revolution.”
—Robin  D.G. Kelley1
“I was born a Black woman 
and now 
I am become a Palestinian 
against the relentless laughter of evil 
there is less and less living room 
and where are my loved ones?
It is time to make our way home.”
—June Jordan2
Introduction
In June 2016, the British-Sri Lankan hip hop artist M.I.A. was dropped as the 
headline  act  for  the London Afropunk festival.  The decision came as  a  response to 
comments  she  had  made two months  earlier  about  Beyoncé's  Black Power-inspired 
Super Bowl performance. “It's interesting”, she said,
“that in America the problem you're allowed to talk about is Black Lives 
Matter. It's not a new thing to me—it's what Lauryn Hill was saying in 
the 1990s, or Public Enemy in the 1980s. Is Beyoncé or Kendrick Lamar 
going to say Muslim Lives Matter? Or Syrian Lives Matter? Or this kid 
in Pakistan matters? That's a more interesting question.”3
As her  comments went  viral,  Tumblr  and Twitter  exploded.  Some criticised  her  for 
trying to devalue the Black Lives Matter movement and minimise the issues faced by 
Black people in the United States.4 Some argued that her comments could be “read 
1 Robin D. G. Kelley, “Yes, I Said ‘National Liberation,’” www.counterpunch.org, February 24, 2016, 
https://www.counterpunch.org/2016/02/24/yes-i-said-national-liberation/.
2 June Jordan, Directed by Desire: The Collected Poems of June Jordan (Copper Canyon Press, 2012), 
400.
3 Guardian music, “Singer MIA Faces Criticism for Comments on Beyoncé and Black Lives Matter,” 
The Guardian, April 21, 2016, sec. Music, https://www.theguardian.com/music/2016/apr/21/mia-
black-lives-matter-comments-beyonce-refugees-criticism.
4 “M.I.A Slams Beyonce & #BlackLivesMatter,” That Grape Juice, accessed May 29, 2017, 
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directly as anti-black racism”,5 while others concluded that “this MIA thing is a good 
reminder that brown people need to work just as hard keeping their cousins in check as 
they do white folks.”6 As pressures for a boycott built up, Afropunk announced that they 
had decided to drop her as the headline act. “I've been told to stay in my lane”,7 M.I.A. 
later explained.
A similar debate erupted in 2015 when three young Muslims were gunned down 
in Chapel Hill  and the Twitter hashtag #MuslimLivesMatter was introduced. Several 
activists responded on social media by urging people not to use the hashtag, which they 
described as an “appropriation” of the ongoing Black movement. As one commentator 
explained: 
“This is not at all to undermine or belittle the injustices that other minority 
groups in this country deal with every day; in fact, it is quite the opposite. 
Every community deserves to be able to think critically about their own 
positions  in  America,  about  their  own  challenges,  about  their  own 
experiences, and in their own terms. Of course Muslim lives are under fire 
in  our  American  systems.  There  is  no  question  about  that.  However, 
building  off  the  #BlackLivesMatter  trend  equates  struggles  that  are, 
though seemingly similar, drastically different.”8
In  this  chapter  I  take  the  controversy  surrounding  M.I.A.  and  the 
#MuslimLivesMatter hashtag as a starting point  for thinking about what it means to 
bring  geographically  dispersed  struggles  into  a  shared  horizon.  Focusing  on  the 
solidarity that in recent years has been uniting Black radicalism with the Palestinian 
liberation struggle, I argue that  the main problem with M.I.A.'s comments is not so 
much that they suggested that a movement for Muslim lives is more urgent than the 
contemporary Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. The problem, rather, it is that her 
comments implied, and were interpreted as suggesting, that the struggles for Black and 
Muslim lives are fundamentally distinct and separate. In what follows I argue that such 
an interpretation is misleading, and that recent protests against police brutality and mass 
http://thatgrapejuice.net/2016/04/mia-slams-beyonce-blacklivesmatter/.
5 “M.I.A. Made a Dumb, Clumsy Statement About Black Lives Matter,” Jezebel, accessed May 29, 
2017, http://jezebel.com/m-i-a-made-a-dumb-clumsy-statement-about-black-lives-1772262968.
6 “M.I.A.’s Critique of Beyoncé and Black Lives Matter Had Black Twitter Upset,” accessed May 29,  
2017, https://mic.com/articles/141472/black-twitter-is-not-here-for-m-i-a-s-criticism-of-beyonc-and-
black-lives-matter.
7 Guardian music, “MIA Says She Won’t Play Afropunk Festival after Black Lives Matter Comments,” 
The Guardian, June 21, 2016, sec. Music, https://www.theguardian.com/music/2016/jun/21/mia-says-
she-wont-play-afropunk-festival-black-lives-matter-comments.
8 Quoted in Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation (Haymarket 
Books, 2016), 187.
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incarceration within the United States are better thought of as a domestic instance of a 
global struggle  against  imperial  violence,  settler  colonialism,  and  racial  capitalism. 
From W.E.B Du Bois to Assata Shakur to Tupac, Black radicals have a long history of 
drawing connections between the racism they face at home and the expansion of empire 
abroad. In Du Bois formulation, the “Black condition in the United States is but a local  
phase of a global problem.”9 To recognise these intersecting logics is to open up space 
for a counter-history of transnational activism and resistance, grounded not in sameness 
and  a  flattening  out  of  differences,  but  on  the  global,  interconnected  character  of 
freedom struggles. 
9 Quoted in Natalie J. Ring, The Problem South: Region, Empire, and the New Liberal State, 1880-1930 
(University of Georgia Press, 2012), 203.
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The chapter develops this argument in four sections. I begin by illustrating how 
(white)  liberal  commentators  predominantly  have  portrayed  BLM  as  a  domestic 
movement struggling for access and reform: that is, for a more inclusive version of the 
American  dream.  Drawing  on abolitionist  scholars  such  as  Angela  Davis  and  Ruth 
Wilson Gilmore, I show that this focus on “recognition politics” elides the distinct class 
character of BLM as well as the ways in which the penal and national security state has 
come to function as a catchall solution to the systemic problems of racial capitalism, 
including mass homelessness,  unemployment,  mental  illness,  and drug addition.  The 
second section places this analysis in a global frame, and argues that  racialized state 
violence against US  domestic minorities is intimately connected to  imperial overseas 
missions in and neocolonial exploitation of the global South. As Black internationalists 
such as Malcolm X, Huey Newton, and Stokeley Carmichael argued, American anti-
Blackness is  not  exceptional  but  part  of  a  global  racial  regime firmly rooted in  the 
history of racial capitalism, imperialism, and settler colonialism. In the third section I 
undertake a more thorough analysis of the intimate linkages between racial violence at 
home and abroad, showing how the contemporary policing of Black and other working 
class  communities  in  the  US  builds  on  explicitly  colonial  models  of  pacification, 
militarisation, and control. The issue here is not that racism elsewhere mimics that in the 
United States—and thus that, say, Brazil, occupied Palestine, and South Africa are like 
America—but,  rather,  that  these  heterogeneous  geographies  are  linked through  the 
overlapping logic of racial capitalism. The final section brings these arguments together 
through  a  discussion  of  the  Black-Palestinian  international  and  the  entangled 
geographies of resistance that bring urban Black America and occupied Palestine into a 
shared horizon.
Citizen? An American Dream
On 9 August 2014, Michael Brown was shot dead by a white police officer in 
Ferguson, Missouri. Unarmed and with his hands raised above his head, Brown was 
pierced by at least six bullets and left lying in public view on the street for four hours, 
visible to anyone passing by.10 The following day a makeshift memorial was created on 
the  bloodstained  spot  where  he  had  died.  As  neighbourhood  residents  and  others 
10 Julie Bosman and Joseph Goldstein, “Timeline for a Body: 4 Hours in the Middle of a Ferguson 
Street,” The New York Times, August 23, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/24/us/michael-
brown-a-bodys-timeline-4-hours-on-a-ferguson-street.html.
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gathered  together,  the  police  soon  appeared,  smashing  the  assembled  candles  and 
flowers with their vehicles.11 The memorial, begun in silence and peace, quickly turned 
into a political protest as locals began to hold a vigil, block off traffic, and march down 
the streets.
In the days, months, and years that have followed that fateful August day, the 
local  outrage  in  Ferguson  has  grown  into  a  nationwide  conversation  about  the 
relationship  between  law  enforcement  and  Black  communities.  Tanisha  Anderson, 
Sandra Bland, Rekia Boyd, Michael Brown, Philando Castile, Eric Garner, Oscar Grant,  
Freddie Gray, Trayvon Martin, Tamir Rice, Walter Scott, Alton Sterling, and countless 
others: in the United States a Black person is killed by a law enforcement officer every 
28 hours.12 Black Lives Matter, which began as a Twitter hashtag, has emerged as a 
nationwide  movement  committed  to  unveiling  and  resisting  police  brutality,  mass 
incarceration, and  the  systematic  criminalisation  of  Black  life—what  Michelle 
Alexander calls the era of the “new Jim Crow.”13 As literary writer Claudia Rankine 
documents,  to  be  identified  as  Black  by  the  US  police  is  to  be  subject  to  hyper-
surveillance and an extensive list of permitted behaviour: “no hands in your pockets, no 
playing music,  no sudden movements,  no driving your car,  no walking at  night,  no 
walking in the day, no turning onto this street, no entering this building, no standing 
your ground, no standing here, no standing there, no talking back, no playing with toy 
guns, no living while black.”14 In challenging Black death at the hands of the police, 
BLM  campaigners  and organisers  are  ultimately  calling into question,  not  just  how 
individuals like Michael Brown or Sandra Bland died, but also and more fundamentally, 
the conditions under which they were forced to live.15 Racialized police brutality is part 
11 Mark Follman, “Michael Brown’s Mom Laid Flowers Where He Was Shot—and Police Crushed 
Them,” Mother Jones, accessed November 24, 2016, 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/08/ferguson-st-louis-police-tactics-dogs-michael-brown.
12 Arlene Eisen, “Operation Ghetto Storm:  2012 Annual Report on the Extrajudicial Killing of 313 
Black People by Police, Security Guards and Vigilantes” (Malcolm X Grassroots Movement, 2012), 
http://www.operationghettostorm.org.According to the Guardian, in 2015 the number of young black 
men killed by the police was five times higher than white men of the same age. See Jon Swaine et al., 
“Young Black Men Killed by US Police at Highest Rate in Year of 1,134 Deaths,” The Guardian, 
December 31, 2015, sec. US news, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/31/the-counted-
police-killings-2015-young-black-men.
13 Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (The New 
Press, 2013). See also Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making  
of Mass Incarceration in America (Harvard University Press, 2016) and Naomi Murakawa, The First  
Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison America (Oxford University Press, 2014).
14 Claudia Rankine, “‘The Condition of Black Life Is One of Mourning,’” The New York Times, June 22, 
2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/magazine/the-condition-of-black-life-is-one-of-
mourning.html.
15 Jordan T. Camp and Christina Heatherton, Policing the Planet: Why the Policing Crisis Led to Black  
Lives Matter (Verso Books, 2016), 1. 
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of a  lager  structure  which systematically  “protects  and benefits  white  people  at  the 
expense of people of color”16, not just in law enforcement and criminal justice, but also 
in healthcare, education, culture, and economic and environmental security. Virtually all 
indicators—including life expectancy, collage graduation rates,  infant mortality rates, 
prison sentences, SAT scores, unemployment rates, and wealth accumulation—tell the 
same story of Black disadvantage: Blacks are 39% of the homeless population, while 
only compromising 12 % of the overall population17; they are more than twice as likely 
to  be unemployed than their  white  counterparts18;  34% of all Black children live in 
poverty, compared to 12% of white children19; the median wealth of a white household 
is 10 times that of Blacks.20 The fact that Eric Garner and Alton Sterling were both 
killed while working on the street to make ends meet—Garner selling loose cigarettes, 
Sterling CDs—highlight the poor living conditions of many Black Americans.
While reactions to BLM have been varied—most notoriously, some have pushed 
back using the slogan All Lives Matter—the majority of (white) liberal commentators 
have interpreted the movement through the lens of “recognition politics”: that is, as a 
struggle to extend basic liberal rights to all members of society and gain recognition for 
an  injured  identity.21 David  McIvor,  for  example,  has  argued  that  BLM  must  be 
understood as a struggle for democratic citizenship.22 Due to its deeply rooted history of 
exclusion, American citizenship is still unevenly experienced. BLM thus functions as a 
form of “democratic pedagogy” that seeks to remake norms of citizenship. A similar 
view is expressed by Ta-Nehisi Coates in his book Between the World and Me. Offering 
a  penetrating  critique  of  the  American  dream,  Coates  argues  that  Black  Americans 
historically have been barred from being citizens: indeed, “[i]n America, it is traditional 
16 Paul Gorski, “Ferguson and the Violence of ‘It’s-All-About-Me’ White Liberalism,” in The Assault on 
Communities of Color: Exploring the Realities of Race-Based Violence, ed. Kenneth J. Fasching-
Varner and Nicholas Daniel Hartlep (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 35.
17 “RACIAL DISPARITIES IN HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES” (National Alliance to 
End Homelessness in the United States, June 6, 2018).
18 Bureau of Labour Statistics, “Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey” (United 
States Department of Labor, July 6, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpsee_e16.htm.
19 “Children in Poverty by Race and Ethnicity” (KIDS COUNT Data Center, 2016), 
https://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/44-children-in-poverty-by-race-and-
ethnicity#detailed/1/any/false/870,573,869,36,868,867,133,38,35,18/10,11,9,12,1,185,13/324,323.
20 “How Wealth Inequality Has Changed in the U.S. since the Great Recession, by Race, Ethnicity and 
Income” (Pew Research Center, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/01/how-wealth-
inequality-has-changed-in-the-u-s-since-the-great-recession-by-race-ethnicity-and-income/.
21 For example, see “#BlackLivesMatter: The Birth of a New Civil Rights Movement,” The Guardian, 
accessed May 29, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/19/blacklivesmatter-birth-civil-
rights-movement.
22 See “Black Lives Matter and the Democratic Work of Mourning” in David W. McIvor, Mourning in 
America: Race and the Politics of Loss (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016).
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to destroy the black body—it is heritage.” As he explains,
“[T]he tradition of attacking the citizenship rights of African-Americans 
extends from slave codes to state-wide bans on black residence to black 
codes to debt peonage to literacy tests, to felon disenfranchisement. You 
literally can trace attacks on black citizenship from the very origins of 
American citizenship itself, up into the present day.”23 
Coates's solution is a more inclusive American dream, and “a healing of the American 
psyche...  what I’m talking about is a national reckoning that would lead to spiritual 
renewal... A revolution of the American consciousness, a reconciling of our self-image 
as the great democratizer with the facts of our history.”24 For Coates, reparations and a 
closing of the wealth gap are crucial to this project of “imagin[ing] a new country.”25
Other  commentators  have  been less  enthusiastic  about  BLM. Mark Lilla,  for 
example, has accused it of using “Mau-Mau tactics to put down dissent” and for being 
“indifferent  to  the  task  of  reaching  out  to  Americans  in  every  walk  of  life.”26 
Constituting  a  prime  example  of  “identity  politics”,  for  Lilla  BLM  is  “a  textbook 
example of how not to build solidarity.”27 Taking a slightly more sympathetic stance, 
David Harvey argues  that the movement for  Black lives  is  rooted in  the search for 
recognition. While the struggle against extrajudicial killings of Black people by police is  
not  without  its  merits,  it  ultimately  falls  short  of  being  the  broad  and  far-reaching 
movement that is needed to challenge and transform capitalist society; “frankly I don’t 
see the current struggles in Ferguson as dealing very much in anti-capitalism.”28 For 
Harvey, BLM is thus qualitatively different from Occupy Wall Street, which for him 
constitutes the “nemesis” of capitalist class power.29 
In spite of their apparent differences, thinkers such as Harvey and Lilla, on the 
one hand, and McIvor and Coates, on the other, actually share an understanding of BLM 
23 Ta-Nehisi Coates, “The Longest War,” The Atlantic, May 4, 2011, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/05/the-longest-war/238334/. See also 
24 Ta-Nehisi Coates, “The Case for Reparations,” The Atlantic, June 2014, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/.
25 Coates.
26 David Remnick, “A Conversation With Mark Lilla on His Critique of Identity Politics,” The New 
Yorker, August 25, 2017, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-conversation-with-mark-
lilla-on-his-critique-of-identity-politics.
27 Remnick.
28 “Symposium: Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism,” Syndicate (blog), accessed March 
20, 2018, https://syndicate.network/symposia/theology/seventeen-contradictions-and-the-end-of-
capitalism/. 




as  a  domestic  integrationist  project:  that  is,  as  a  struggle  for  access,  reform,  and 
inclusion—that is, for recognition. None of these writers make any serious attempt  to 
link the  question of race within the US to broader  global  structures,  such as  world 
poverty, the globalisation of neoliberalism, and the “war on terror.” This is in contrast to 
the actual BLM movement, which has continued to make explicit links between white 
supremacy, imperialism, and global capitalism: indeed, the core message of Black Youth 
Project 100 (BYP100) is that “Racial Justice is Economic Justice”; Umi Selah of Dream 
Defenders has linked racialized domestic inequality to US military operations overseas, 
calling on the US government to “not engage in wars where we perpetuate an economic 
system that ruins democracy around the world”; and Alicia Garza, one of the founders 
of the Black Lives Matter hashtag, has stated that “for the first time in a long time, we 
are talking  about  alternatives  to  capitalism.”30 To depict  BLM as  a  form of identity 
politics—and, thus, as a movement with little or no interest in challenging the logic of 
capital—is  not  only  to  ignore  that  many  of  the  movement's  key  figures  have  a 
background  in  labour  organising  and  other  economic  justice  campaigns.  It  also 
overlooks that race, in Stuart Hall's memorable formulation, “is the modality in which 
class is lived.”31 As Cedric Robinson reminds us, race-making practices are intrinsic to 
capital  accumulation, because  racism  supplies  the  precarious  and  exploitable  lives 
capitalism needs to extract land and labour. Capitalism relies on race to split humanity 
into  those  associated  with  property,  citizenship,  and  wages,  and  those  subjected  to 
super-exploitation  and  dispossession.  Rather  than  an  embarrassment  residue  of  pre-
capitalist social relations, racial differences are constitutive of capital, because processes 
of capital accumulation are themselves predicated on the devaluation of Black and other 
non-white people.
To read  the contemporary criminalisation of Black lives—as well  as  of other 
racialized minorities, including Latinx, Muslims, and First Nations32—through the lens 
30 “BYP100: Our Impact,” n.d., https://byp100.org/our-impact-2/; Lawrence Ross, Blackballed: The 
Black and White Politics of Race on America’s Campuses (St. Martin’s Press, 2016), 226; “A Q&A 
With Alicia Garza, Co-Founder of #BlackLivesMatter,” The Nation, Mach 2015, 
https://www.thenation.com/article/qa-alicia-garza-co-founder-blacklivesmatter/ . 
31 Stuart Hall, “Race, Articulation, and Socities Structured in Dominance,” in Black British Cultural  
Studies: A Reader, ed. Houston A. Baker Jr, Manthia Diawara, and Ruth H. Lindeborg (University of 
Chicago Press, 1996), 55.
32 Native Americans are in fact more likely than other racial groups to be killed by law enforcement.  
While American Indians, Alaska Natives, and Native Hawaiians make up just 0.8% of the American  
population, they are the victims in 1.9% of police killings—a mortality rate that is 12% higher than for 
Blacks, and three times the rate of whites. Native Americans in fact make up three of the top five top 
age-group killed by police. See “The Forgotten Minority in Police Shootings,” CNN, November 13, 
2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/10/us/native-lives-matter/index.html.
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of  racial  capitalism is  ultimately to  pay close  attention  to the neoliberal  context  of 
structural  unemployment,  concentrated  urban  poverty,  and  mass  homelessness.  As 
prison  abolitionists  such  as  Ruth  Wilson  Gilmore  and  Angela  Davis  have  shown, 
racialized state violence (inflicted on Black, Hispanic, Muslim, and Native American 
lives) emerged  as a  solution  to  the  problem  of  how  to  manage  the  devastating 
consequences of the neoliberal economy.33 Over the past 40 years, the US economy has 
undergone  a  fundamental  shift,  from  Fordism—characterised  by  mass  production, 
industrial factories, assembly lines, and bureaucratised unions—to neoliberalism and the 
belief  in  laissez-faire  solutions  to  social  and  economic  problems.  Since  the  1980s, 
millions of industrial working-class jobs have been lost as a result of deindustrialisation, 
globalisation, and capital  flight. As manufacturing's share of US GDP declined  from 
28% in 1950 to 12% in 2012, unemployment rates have sharply increased, particularly 
in industries such as auto, rubber, and steel.34 Black, Hispanic, and Indigenous workers, 
whose vulnerable position in the US economy often make them “last to be hired, first to 
be fired”, were hardest hit by these transformations. The Black unemployment rate is 
currently twice as high as for whites, and more than 20% of young Black workers are 
currently without a job.35 As Jordan Camp summarises “the transition to neoliberalism 
has  led  to  extreme  polarization  of  wealth,  an  expanding  planet  of  slums,  and  the 
formation of the largest carceral state on the planet.”36 
The state's organised political response to this social and economic crisis has, 
above all, been to criminalise poor people and people of colour. Having abandoned the 
liberal welfare state and Keynesian economic policies, the neoliberal state has come to 
rely on the criminal justice system. As Patrisse Cullors, one of the founders of BLM, 
makes clear, “the police have become judge, juror and executioner. They've become the 
social worker. They've become the mental health clinician. They've become anything 
and everything that has to do with the everyday life of mostly black and brown poor 
33 Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing 
California (University of California Press, 2007); Angela Y. Davis, Abolition Democracy : Beyond  
Empire, Prisons, and Torture, 1st ed. (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005). See also Alex Vitale, 
The End of Policing (Verso Books, 2018).
34 See Jordan T. Camp, Incarcerating the Crisis: Freedom Struggles and the Rise of the Neoliberal State 
(Univ of California Press, 2016); Gilmore, Golden Gulag; Jan Rehmann, “Hypercarceration: A 
Neoliberal Response to ‘Surplus Population,’” Rethinking Marxism 27, no. 2 (2015): 303–11, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08935696.2015.1007790.
35 “Black Unemployment Rate Is Consistently Twice that of Whites,” Pew Research Center (blog), 
August 21, 2013, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/08/21/through-good-times-and-bad-
black-unemployment-is-consistently-double-that-of-whites/.
36 Camp, Incarcerating the Crisis, 3.
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people.”37 With cuts to public expenditure on education, transportation, health care, and 
public-sector employment, the police and criminal justice system have ultimately come 
to replace social welfare. Since the early 1980s, state spending on prisons has increased 
three times the rate of spending on schools,38 while spending on police has increased by 
445%. These policies should not be seen as inevitable reactions to criminality or threats 
to public safety; in fact, crime rates have been falling for the past twenty years. Instead, 
and as I argued in chapter 3, mass criminalisation functions to legitimise the neoliberal 
state  by  containing  and pacifying  those  that  have  been rendered  superfluous  by  its 
economic dislocations: predominantly, but not exclusively, poor people of colour.39 As 
Davis makes clear, mass criminalisation has effectively become a catchall solution to 
the  systemic  problem of  racial  capitalism,  including  “homelessness,  unemployment, 
drug addiction, mental illness, and illiteracy”40, as well as the existence of a growing 
“surplus population”—disproportionately non-white—whose labour has been rendered 
redundant  by  the  de-industrialisation  of  the  US  political  economy.41 Blacks  and 
Hispanics currently constitute  58% of the prison population,  despite being only one 
fourth  of  the  general  population.42 Native  Americans,  similarly,  are  incarcerated  at 
nearly twice the rate of whites. Commenting on the link between mass criminalisation 
of non-white life and the neoliberalisation of racial capitalism, Loïc Wacquant observes 
that “fewer than half of the inmates [in U.S. prisons] held a full-time job at the time of 
their  arraignment  and  two-thirds  issue  from  households  with  an  annual  income 
amounting to less than half of the so-called poverty line.”43
In light of this, to suggest that BLM is a struggle for recognition only (as argued 
37 Quoted in Mark Jay, “Policing the Poor in Detroit,” Monthly Review (blog), January 1, 2017, 
https://monthlyreview.org/2017/01/01/policing-the-poor-in-detroit/.
38 “State and Local Expenditures on Corrections and Education” (U.S. Department of Education, July 
2016), https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/other/expenditures-corrections-education/brief.pdf.
39 This analysis was first developed by Stuart Hall and his co-authors in Stuart Hall et al., Policing the 
Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order (Macmillan International Higher Education, 2013). For 
contemporary takes on Hall's thesis, see Gilmore, Golden Gulag; Bernard E. Harcourt, The Illusion of  
Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of Natural Order (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2011); Jonathan. Simon, Governing through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed  
American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear, Studies in Crime and Public Policy (Oxford ; 
New York, New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
https://www.dawsonera.com/guard/protected/dawson.jsp?
name=https://lse.ac.uk/idp&dest=http://www.dawsonera.com/depp/reader/protected/external/Abstract
View/S9780198040026; Loïc Wacquant, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social  
Insecurity (Duke University Press, 2009).
40 Angela Davis, “Masked Racism: Reflections on the Prison Industrial Complex,” n.d., 
http://www.historyisaweapon.com/defcon1/davisprison.html.
41 See Gilmore, Golden Gulag and Rehmann, “Hypercarceration.”
42 “NAACP | Criminal Justice Fact Sheet,” NAACP, accessed June 24, 2017, 
http://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet/.
43 Glenn C. Loury et al., Race, Incarceration, and American Values (MIT Press, 2008), 60.
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by Lilla  and Harvey)  is  to  miss  the  mark.  The contemporary  policing  of  racialized 
minorities is intimately linked to neoliberalism's production of racialized categories of 
surplus people, and as such there can be no real racial justice without economic justice
—and vice versa. In Barbara Fields' insightful formulation,
“There's  no  sense  in  which  the  BLM movement  should  be  seen  as 
identity  politics.  It  is  a  movement  of  a  great  portion  of  the  poorest 
people in the United States resisting the violence of the capitalist state. 
Black  Lives  Matter...  is  as  much  an  example  of  a  U.S.-based  class 
struggle as Occupy Wall Street was. To focus on the black poor is not to 
ignore  others  who  also  endure  economic  inequality.  In  speech  after 
speech, the leading voices of this movement have insisted that if we 
liberate the black poor, or if the black poor liberate themselves, we will 
uplift everybody else who's been kept down. In other words, any serious 
analysis of racial capitalism must recognize that to seek liberation for 
black people is  also to  destabilize  inequality  in  the  United  States  at 
large, and to create new possibilities for all who live here.”44
In what ways is this an international struggle? As Chris Chen perceptibly notes, 
the  same security  state  that  sends 1 in  3 black men to prison in  their  lifetime also 
“deports  nearly  half  a  million undocumented  immigrants  annually,  has  exterminated 
anywhere from 100,000 to over a million civilians in Iraq alone, and is now gearing up 
for a $46 billion dollar 'border surge' which includes drone surveillance and biometric 
exit scanning.”45 In what follows I argue that racialized state violence against minorities 
is intimately connected to imperial overseas missions (particularly in the Muslim world) 
and neocolonial exploitation of the global South: as BLM organisers and activists have 
repeatedly emphasised, police terror  within  the  US is  closely linked to  the violence 
inflicted on Brown and Black people  globally.  To be clear, the issue here is  not  that 
racism elsewhere mimics that in the United States—and thus that, say, Brazil, occupied 
Palestine,  and  South  Africa  are  like America—but,  rather,  that  these  heterogeneous 
geographies are  linked through the overlapping racial  logic of global capitalism.  As 
44 Alicia Garza similarly argues that “#BlackLivesMatter doesn’t mean your life isn’t important–it means 
that Black lives, which are seen as without value within White supremacy, are important to your 
liberation. Given the disproportionate impact state violence has on Black lives, we understand that 
when Black people in this country get free, the benefits will be wide reaching and transformative for 
society as a whole. When we are able to end hyper-criminalization and sexualization of Black people 
and end the poverty, control, and surveillance of Black people, every single person in this world has a 
better shot at getting and staying free. When Black people get free, everybody gets free.” Alicia Garza, 
“A Herstory of the #BlackLivesMatter Movement,” October 7, 2014, 
http://www.thefeministwire.com/2014/10/blacklivesmatter-2/.
45 Chris Chen, “The Limit Point of Capitalist Equality,” Endnotes 3, accessed May 13, 2018, 
https://endnotes.org.uk/issues/3/en/chris-chen-the-limit-point-of-capitalist-equality.
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BLM  co-founder  Alicia  Garza  explains,  “We  remain  in  active  solidarity  with  all 
oppressed people who are fighting for their liberation and we know that our destinies 
are  intertwined.”46 As  we  shall  see,  BLM  organisers  are  enacting a  revolutionary 
solidarity.  In that,  they not only  challenge  the idea that Black freedom is attainable 
within US legal frameworks and political institutions: they also push us to think of the 
protests against police brutality in the US as a domestic instance of a broader and global 
struggle against racial capitalism, imperial violence, and settler colonialism—and, thus, 
as part and parcel of a radical internationalism from below.47 
“No Vietnamese Ever Called Me Nigger”: The Lessons of Black Internationalism
When the streets of Ferguson erupted in protest in 2014, activists in the West 
Bank and Gaza were amongst the first to respond, tweeting messages in support as well 
as concrete advice on how to cope with tear gas inhalation. “Solidarity with #Ferguson. 
Remember to not touch your face when teargassed or put water on it. Instead use milk 
or coke!”,48 read one tweet. A solidarity   statement  signed by a range of Palestinian 
activists and organisations similarly declared: “with a Black Power fist in the air, we 
salute the people of Ferguson and join in your demands for justice.”49 In response, BLM 
protesters  began  waving  Palestinian  flags,  chanting  “from  Ferguson  to  Palestine, 
occupation  is  a  crime.”50 A year  later  over  1,100  Black  activists,  artists,  scholars, 
students, and organizations signed a statement calling for “solidarity with the Palestinian 
46 Alicia Garza, “A Herstory of the #BlackLivesMatter Movement.
47 Such a perspective stands in direct contrast to the increasingly popular body of thought known as 
Afropessimism. Scholars such as Frank Wilderson and Jared Sexton strictly distinguish between 
worker's exploitation and the slave's “social death”, which they argue constitute the very condition of 
possibility for civil society. Yet, and as Barabara Fields and Robin D.G. Kelley make clear, this 
precludes an understanding of slavery as fundamental to capitalism, “as though the chief business of 
slavery were the production of white supremacy rather than the production of cotton, sugar, rice and 
tobacco.” Afropessimism not only frames anti-Blackness as separate from global capitalism, imperial  
violence, and settler colonialism, thus ruling out the possibility of solidarity. In the words of Kelley, it 
also “obscures the dialectic that produced and reproduced the violence of a regime dependent on black 
life for its profitability.” Robin D. G. Kelley, “Black Study, Black Struggle,” Boston Review, n.d., 
http://bostonreview.net/forum/robin-d-g-kelley-black-study-black-struggle.
48 Robert Mackey, “Advice for Ferguson’s Protesters From the Middle East,” The New York Times, 
August 14, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/15/world/middleeast/advice-for-fergusons-
protesters-from-the-middle-east.html.
49 “Palestinians Express ‘solidarity with the People of Ferguson’ in Mike Brown Statement,” Electronic  
Intifada, August 15, 2014, https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/rana-baker/palestinians-express-
solidarity-people-ferguson-mike-brown-statement.
50 Acronym TV, From Ferguson To Palestine Occupation Is a Crime, accessed May 29, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pR6bt9_Yn5o.
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struggle.”51 A short video, entitled “When I See Them I See Us”, was also released. 52 
Featuring activists, artists, and academics such as Cornel West, Angela Davis, Danny 
Glover, Lauryn Hill, Alice Walker, and Palestinian hip-hop ensemble DAM, the video 
highlights the common Black-Palestinian struggle against militarised policing and other 
forms of state-sponsored violence; “Gaza Stands with Baltimore”, “End state racism”, 
and “Your walls  will  never cage our freedom”,  the video declares.  In May 2015, a 
delegation  of  organisers  from  Black  Lives  Matter,  BYP100,  and  Dream  Defenders 
traveled  to  Israel-Palestine  where  they  met  with  artists,  civil  rights  activists,  youth 
organisers, and refugees in Ramallah, Jerusalem, and Haifa. While this pushed Black-
Palestinian  solidarity  into  mainstream  focus,  such  solidarities  are  not  new.  Indeed, 
Palestinians and Black radicals have a long history of drawing connections between 
each others struggles. As Rabab Abdulhadi points out, “[t]hese expressions are not new 
and they're not because of the excitement of the moment. They do have their historical 
precedents in the connections that organically brought together anti-colonial, anti-racist, 
anti-capitalist—very clear revolutionary politics, not reformist politics.”53 Thinkers and 
activists  such  as  W.E.B.  Du  Bois,  Marcus  Garvey,  Claudia  Jones,  Paul  Robeson, 
Malcolm X, and Angela Davis have all waved the banner of internationalism with the 
(Muslim)  Third  World.  Taking  the  intertwined  histories  of  colonialism  and  racial 
capitalism as their starting point, they envisioned a global revolutionary movement and 
thus sought to link their own struggle within the United States to a larger community of 
resistance beyond the nation-state—from Harlem to Cairo, Palestine to Bandung, Cape 
Town to Kingston. As Nikhil Singh has argued,
“perhaps  the  most  consistent  and  enduring  strand  of  modern  black 
activism has been the opposition to imperialism and colonialism. It was 
manifest  across  the  spectrum  of  black  politics,  from  the  secular 
communism of Du Bois and Paul Robeson, to the Christian pacifism of 
King and the  revolutionary,  black  nationalism of  Malcolm X and the 
Black  Panther  Party.  It  led  diverse  groups  of  the  black  activists  and 
intellectuals in the United State to consciously link their own aspirations 
to national liberation struggles across the world, including India, Ghana, 
Cuba, Congo, Vietnam, South Africa, and Palestine.”54
51 “2015 Black Solidarity Statement With Palestine,” Black Solidarity With Palestine, accessed May 29, 
2017, http://www.blackforpalestine.com/.
52 Black-Palestinian Solidarity, WHEN I SEE THEM I SEE US, accessed May 29, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xsdpg-9cmSw.
53 Quoted in Kristian Davis Bailey, “Black–Palestinian Solidarity in the Ferguson–Gaza Era,” American  
Quarterly 67, no. 4 (December 21, 2015): 1017, https://doi.org/10.1353/aq.2015.0060.
54 Nikhil Pal Singh, Black Is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy (Harvard 
University Press, 2005), 53–4. For a good introduction to Black internationalism, see Cheryl 
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Malcolm X's writings and teachings were foundational in shaping this tradition 
of Black internationalism.  Rejecting Martin Luther King's civil rights framework, he 
argued that the struggle against Jim Crow segregation and racial violence was part of a 
global struggle against white supremacy: “The same rebellion, the same impatience, the 
same anger that exists in the hearts of the dark people in Africa and Asia is existing in 
the hearts and minds of 20 million black people in this country who have been just as 
thoroughly colonized as the people in Africa and Asia.”55 For Malcolm, this meant that 
the struggle against racial oppression in the United States had to be internationalised. 
Black freedom would only come about by using what he called “new methods”, which 
required getting out of “the jurisdiction of Uncle Sam” and into the Third World.56 In 
1964, he traveled to the Middle East and Africa, where he visited a string of countries 
and met  with  intellectuals  and political  figures  such as  Gamal  Abdel  Nasser,  Maya 
Angelou, Julius Nyerere, Jomo Kenyatta, and the head of the newly formed Palestine 
Liberation Organization. After returning to the United States, he began to explicitly link 
European colonial rule to institutionalised racism in the US; the police in Harlem, he 
argued, are like the French in Algeria, “like an occupying army.”57 As a former Pullman 
porter and final assembler at the Ford Wayne Assembly Plant, he clearly understood that 
these dynamics were fundamentally intertwined with capitalism: as George Breitman 
documents,  “from  the  thinking  initiated  through  his  discussions  with  African 
revolutionaries... he [Malcolm X] came to the conclusion that capitalism is the cause of 
racism,  that  you  can't  have  capitalism  without  racism.”58 For  Malcolm,  the  Black 
Higashida, Black Internationalist Feminism: Women Writers of the Black Left, 1945-1995 (University 
of Illinois Press, 2011); Robin D. G. Kelley, Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination 
(Beacon Press, 2003); Sean L. Malloy, Out of Oakland: Black Panther Party Internationalism During  
the Cold War (Cornell University Press, 2017); Minkah Makalani, In the Cause of Freedom: Radical  
Black Internationalism from Harlem to London, 1917-1939 (Univ of North Carolina Press, 2011); M. 
Marable and Vanessa Agard-Jones, Transnational Blackness: Navigating the Global Color Line 
(Springer, 2008); Erik S. McDuffie, Sojourning for Freedom: Black Women, American Communism,  
and the Making of Black Left Feminism (Duke University Press, 2011); Vijay Prashad, Everybody Was  
Kung Fu Fighting: Afro-Asian Connections and the Myth of Cultural Purity (Beacon Press, 2002); 
Nico Slate, Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and  
India (Harvard University Press, 2017); Michael O. West, William G. Martin, and Fanon Che Wilkins, 
From Toussaint to Tupac: The Black International since the Age of Revolution (Univ of North 
Carolina Press, 2009).
55 Quoted on the cover of Sohail Daulatzai, Black Star, Crescent Moon: The Muslim International and  
Black Freedom Beyond America (U of Minnesota Press, 2012).
56 Sohail Daulatzai, Black Star, Crescent Moon: The Muslim International and Black Freedom Beyond  
America (U of Minnesota Press, 2012).
57 Quoted in Franziska Meister, Racism and Resistance: How the Black Panthers Challenged White  
Supremacy (transcript Verlag, 2017), 194.
58 Quoted in Malcolm X: From Political Eschatology to Religious Revolutionary (BRILL, 2016), 80.
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struggle  within  the  United  States  thus  had  to  be  understood  in  the  context  of  an 
international struggle against racial capitalism and imperialism: 
“I,  for  one,  would  like  to  impress,  especially  upon those  who call 
themselves leaders, the importance of realizing the direct connection 
between  the  struggle  of  the  Afro-American  in  this  country  and the 
struggle of our people all over the world. As long as we think—as one 
of my good brothers mentioned out of the side of his mouth here a 
couple of Sundays ago—that we should get Mississippi straightened 
out  before we worry about  the Congo,  you’ll  never  get  Mississippi 
straightened out. Not until you start realizing your connection with the 
Congo.”59
The Black internationalist imaginary was perhaps most forcefully articulated by 
the  Black  Panther  Party  (BPP)—whose  multi-racial  Rainbow  Coalition  we  already 
encountered  in  chapter  4—which  sought  to  forge  a  global  revolutionary  struggle 
inspired by the tenets of Marxist Leninism and Maoism. Huey Newton, who co-founded 
the  BPP  together  with  Bobby  Searle  in  1966,  developed  a  theory  of 
“intercommunalism”, a political imaginary rooted in an analysis of racial capitalism and 
imperialism.  As  Alex  Lubin  explains,  the  politics  of  intercommunalism  “directed 
revolutionary  politics  away  from the  nation-bound  horizon  of  the  mainstream civil 
rights  movement  and  toward  the  global  sphere  of  anti-imperialism  and 
decolonization.”60 The Panthers rejected the framework of Black nationalism,  which 
they argued failed  to  identify  the  US as  an  imperial  power.  Black nationalism was 
problematic because, rather than challenging racial capitalism and imperialism, Black 
nationalists sought inclusion within the empire. As Newton maintained, “[w]e cannot be 
nationalists, when our country is not a nation, but an empire.”61 In  Black Power, BPP 
members  Stokely  Carmichael  (Kwame Ture)  and Charles  Hamilton  theorised Black 
urban communities and the ghetto within the United States as “internal colonies.” Black 
subjugation within the US, they argued, effectively mirrored colonial rule: “institutional 
racism has another name: colonialism.”62 Addressing the organization of Latin American 
solidarity  in  1967,  Carmichael  maintained that  “[t]he struggle  we are engaged in is 
59 “When Malcolm X Went to Africa,” Africa Is a Country (blog), June 27, 2011, 
http://africasacountry.com/2011/06/malcolm-x-in-africa1/.
60 Alex Lubin, Geographies of Liberation: The Making of an Afro-Arab Political Imaginary (UNC Press 
Books, 2014), 121.
61 Quoted in Charles Earl Jones, The Black Panther Party (reconsidered) (Black Classic Press, 1998), 
66.
62 Stokely Carmichael, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America (Vintage Books, 1967), 5.
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international...  Our people are a colony within the United States...  It is more than a 
figure of speech to say that the black communities in America are the victims of white 
imperialism and colonial exploitation.”63 
In place of a nation-bound civil rights movement, the Panthers thus sought to 
forge political solidarities beyond the nation-state and in the realm of international and 
intercommunal  politics.  Envisioning  a  global,  revolutionary,  and  anti-imperialist 
movement, they built connections with national liberation movements around the world. 
As Newton explained, 
“We see very little  different  in  what  happens to  a  community here  in 
North America and what happens to a community in Vietnam. We see 
very  little  difference  in  what  happens,  even  culturally  to  a  Chinese 
community in San Francisco and a Chinese community in Hong Kong. 
We see very little difference in what happens to a Black community in 
Harlem and a Black community in South Africa, a Black community in 
Angola and Mozambique.”64
The  BPP's newspaper  captured  this  internationalist  outlook:  it  published  countless 
articles on the struggle for decolonisation in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and 
Asia, including the Congo, Palestine, Bolivia, Cuba, and Vietnam.65 Amongst these, the 
Palestinian national liberation movement was seen as a particularly important question. 
As Lubin has shown, the Panthers approached the question of Palestine, not as a Jewish-
Arab conflict, but “through the optic of anti-imperialism, with a particularly sharp focus 
on the role of the U.S. empire in affecting the plight of Palestinians and the actions of 
Zionists.”66 The Panthers argued that “Zionism was an extension of U.S. imperialism 
and  racial  capitalism”  and,  hence,  “that  the  PLO  was  struggling  against  the  same 
imperial  powers  as  black  radicals  in  the  United  States.”67 Palestinians  and  Black 
communities in the US were thus intimately linked through their struggle for survival 
under the conditions of racial capitalism and imperialism. This meant that the struggle 
for peace in the Middle East by necessity would entail a struggle against Israeli,  US 
imperialism  as well  as racial  capitalism.  More so than other issues,  the question of 
63 Stokely Carmichael and Michael Thelwell, Ready for Revolution: The Life and Struggles of Stokely  
Carmichael (Kwame Ture) (Simon and Schuster, 2003), 590.
64 Huey P. Newton, The Huey P. Newton Reader (Seven Stories Press, 2011), 170.
65 Besenia Rodriguez, “‘Long Live Third World Uniy! Long Live Internationalism’: Huey P. Newton’s 
Revolutionary Intercommunalism,” in Transnational Blackness: Navigating the Global Color Line, 
ed. M. Marable and Vanessa Agard-Jones (Springer, 2008), 161.
66 Lubin, Geographies of Liberation, 123.
67 Lubin, 123.
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Palestine thus exposed the rift between the mainstream civil rights movement and the 
anti-imperialist  intercommunalism of  the  Panthers.  Indeed,  where  Black  nationalists 
sought inclusion within the legal and political boundaries of the American polity, the 
Panthers embraced a “revolutionary nationalism” that disavowed the US empire and lent 
support to Third World national liberation struggles. 
History has not been kind to the internationalist imaginary of the Panthers. Like 
Malcolm  X,  the  Panthers  are  today  typically  remembered  as  violent,  militant,  and 
extremist—a sharp contrast to Martin Luther King Jr., who is celebrated as a saint-like 
figure and national hero, his birthday being a public holiday and his “I Have a Dream” 
speech covering the new five-dollar bill. Here it is worth recalling that King, in his last  
years, adopted a position not radically different from Malcolm X and the Panthers. In 
his “Beyond Vietnam” speech, delivered exactly one year before he was assassinated, 
King linked segregation to imperialism, and described the war in Vietnam through the 
lens of empire. Imperialism, poverty, and racism, he argued, are deeply interrelated and 
must  therefore be confronted together.  The following year he helped orchestrate the 
Poor People's  Campaign,  which addressed questions of poverty,  unemployment,  and 
housing for the poor—regardless of racial background.68 Reflecting on the gulf between 
King and Malcolm X in public  memory, and the empty symbolism of King,  James 
Baldwin would later argue that
“The only reason you talked to Martin is because you were afraid to 
talk to Malcolm. That's the only reason you talked to Martin. And then 
when both men (and this happened before your eyes), when both men 
arrived at the same point—that is to say when they connected—then the 
great black disaster: the global disaster. At the point where Malcolm 
came back from Mecca and said, 'White is a state of mind; white people 
are  not  devils.  You are only  as  white  as  you want  to  be'  and when 
Martin connected the plight of garbage men in Memphis with Korea 
and Vietnam, then both men were killed.”69
In sum, Black radicals have a long history of connecting Third World liberation 
struggles  to  their  own  struggle  for  freedom. In  Lubin's  terminology,  Black 
internationalists  such  as  Malcolm  X  and  Huey  Newton  envisioned  “an  abolitionist 
68 In fact, and as  Nikhil Pal Singh has argued, the scope and aspirations of the civil rights movement 
cannot be captured by recognition politics: the hegemonic narrative of civil rights “fails to recognize 
the historical depth and heterogeneity of black struggles against racism, narrowing the political scope 
of black agency and reinforcing a formal, legalistic view of black equality.” Singh, Black Is a Country, 
31.
69 James Baldwin, Conversations with James Baldwin (Univ. Press of Mississippi, 1989), 218.
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geography”70 based on shared struggles against  state violence,  racial  capitalism,  and 
colonialism.  Connections  of  oppression  produced  connections  of  struggle,  as  “the 
tearful waters of the Mississippi River flow[ed] into the sorrowful waters of the River 
Jordan.”71 In the next section I build on this analysis to show that recent forms of Black-
Palestinian solidarity can and should be understood as a continuation of this tradition of 
Afro-Arab  internationalism.  Focusing  on  how neoliberal  counterinsurgency  methods 
and tactics increasingly have come to flow from Gaza to Ferguson to the battlefields of 
Iraq and Afghanistan—and back again—I demonstrate  that  the  domestic policing of 
Black lives in the United States is intimately linked to the state terror imposed on Brown 
and  Black  people  globally.  The  issue  here  is  not  whether  places  like  urban  Black 
America and occupied Palestine are alike—although they may be, as many have insisted
—but,  rather,  and as  we shall  see,  that  these  heterogeneous  geographies  are  linked 
through the logic of racial  capitalism,  as manifest  in the wars on drugs,  crime,  and 
terror.
The (Post)Colonial Boomerang: Race and the Global Security Archipelago
When protests erupted in Ferguson in 2014 many were shocked by the heavily 
militarised response by the police. The “war has come home”, declared a number of 
leading media outlets.72 As Robin D.G. Kelley explains,  “Ferguson looked like a war 
zone because the police looked like the military.”73 Dressed in riot gear, and armed with 
tear gas, stun grenades, and rubber bullets, the. St Louis law enforcement could have 
been  mistaken  for  soldiers.  Ferguson  is  not  unique  in  this  regard.  In  recent  years 
American  police  departments  have  substantially  increased  their  use  of  war  zone 
equipment and tactics, acquiring everything from body armour, drones, SWAT vehicles, 
70 Lubin, Geographies of Liberation, 24.
71 Vijay Prashad, “Alex Lubin. Geographies of Liberation: The Making of an Afro-Arab Political  
Imaginary.,” The American Historical Review 120, no. 4 (October 1, 2015): 1448, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/120.4.1448.
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Union, 2014); “The US War Culture Has Come Home to Roost,” www.counterpunch.org, August 20, 
2014, http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/08/20/the-us-war-culture-has-come-home-to-roost/; 
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Policing: Postcolonial Perspectives (Routledge, 2016).
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the Policing Crisis Led to Black Lives Matter, ed. Jordan T. Camp and Christina Heatherton (Verso 
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toxic chemicals, military aircrafts, and machine guns.74 Behind this stands a Department 
of Defence programme, which enables the transfer of excess military property to US 
law enforcement agencies. Since the programme was created in 1997, more than $4.3 
billion worth of gear has been imported from the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan to 
the streets of places like Ferguson.75 
Such transfers between military and police are not unique, nor are they novel: 
colonial military tactics have historically helped shape policing methods in the colonial 
metropolis. The contemporary policing of Black and other working class communities 
builds on explicitly colonial models of pacification, militarisation, and control. Colonial 
war-zones  frequently  functioned  as  “social  laboratories”  where  new  techniques  of 
control could be tested before they were shipped back to the metropole:76 the French 
Empire regularly used Algeria as testing ground for forms of population control that 
later  were exported back to  the colonial  metropolis;  the United States relied on the 
Philippines to experiment with new forms of policing tactics; and Britain made use of 
its domestic colony, Ireland, and later Palestine, Malaya, and Kenya.77 Following the 
Second World  War  and the  rising  presence  of  Black and Asian  communities  in  the 
imperial metropoles, alongside the Great Migration of Black Americans into Northern 
cities,  these  imperial  policing  techniques  increasingly  found  their  way  back  to  the 
capitalist heartlands in the North—a “boomerang effect”, in Aimé Césaire's memorable 
formulation. As Foucault later would elaborate:
“while  colonization,  with  its  techniques  and its  political  and juridical 
weapons, obviously transported European models to other continents, it 
also had a considerable boomerang effect on the mechanisms of power in 
the West, and on the apparatuses, institutions, and techniques of power. A 
74 Mark Thompson, “War Comes Home: The Militarization of U.S. Police Forces,” Time, accessed May 
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whole series of colonial models was brought back to the West, and the 
result  was  that  the  West  could  practise  something  resembling 
colonization, or an internal colonialism, on itself.”78
Palestine  has  historically  been  a  node  where  new  methods  of  policing, 
population  pacification,  and  counterinsurgency  have  been  developed.  Laleh  Khalili 
documents how, during the Mandate period, Palestine served as a laboratory in which 
British counterinsurgency practices—including forms of collective punishment, siege of 
cities and villages, the building of walls,  and the usage of civilians as hostages and 
human shields—were perfected and then exported elsewhere to places such as Malaya, 
Cyprus, and Kenya.79 These practices were subsequently absorbed, and innovated upon, 
by the Israeli  security apparatus which has continued to use Palestine as the testing 
ground  for  a  range  of  counterinsurgency  methods  and  tactics.  As  Kahlili  explains, 
“having consolidated its technologies of domination through several decades of military 
occupation,  the  Israeli  military  has  now  become  a  significant  exporter  of  the 
counterinsurgency knowledge it has accumulated in Palestine.”80 Israeli companies have 
emerged at the forefront of a multi-billion-dollar global industry for security technology, 
including unmanned drones, biometric scanners, and surveillance equipment.81 Israeli 
drones designed to target Palestinians are now routinely deployed by police forces in 
North  America,  Europe  and  East  Asia;  similarly,  Israeli  experience  in  closure, 
entrapment,  and  containment—of  locking  down  cities  and  incarcerating  the  entire 
population of Gaza and the West Bank—is increasingly being made use of by those 
planning large-scale security operations in the West.82
One of Israel's largest clients is the United States, which in return offers Israel 
military and political aid. Since 9/11 almost all police department in the United States 
have  sent  high-level  commanders  to  Israel  to  receive  lessons  in  counterterrorism, 
78 Quoted in Joseph Pugliese, Biometrics: Bodies, Technologies, Biopolitics (Routledge, 2012), 52.
79 Laleh Khalili, “THE LOCATION OF PALESTINE IN GLOBAL COUNTERINSURGENCIES,” 
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guerilla warfare, and occupation enforcement.83 These connections are so important that 
the NYPD recently opened a local branch in Israel. In light of this it is not surprising 
that the police violence in Ferguson and the attendant images inspired comparisons with 
Israel’s occupation of Gaza: in fact, out of the four law enforcement agencies that were 
deployed in Ferguson, at least two had received training in Israel.84 When Palestinian 
activists tweeted advice to protesters in Ferguson—including how to cope with tear gas 
inhalation and other riot control methods—they offered solidarity for a struggle which 
not  only is  parallel  to their  own, but  also deeply interconnected.  “Dear  #Ferguson”, 
tweeted one Palestinian activist, “The Tear Gas used against you was probably tested on 
us first by Israel. No worries, Stay Strong. Love, #Palestine.”85
The flow of weapons and tactics between colony and metropole, and military 
and police, has never been a one-way street. From the Philippines to Guatemala to Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the history of policing blurs the edges between the domestic and the 
international.  In  the  same way that  tactics  and technologies  from overseas  imperial 
engagements often have been shipped home and incorporated into domestic American 
policing,  policing  methods  imposed  on  Black  communities  in  the  United  States—
including  surveillance,  racial  profiling,  and  pre-emptive  policing—have  frequently 
served as models for counterterrorism tactics and operations abroad.86 Indeed, just as 
colonial technologies and techniques are “coming home” to organise, police, and pacify 
domestic  racialized  populations,  “so  efforts  to  classify  risky  versus  risk-  free 
populations, activities, and circulations are 'moving out' to colonize the infrastructures, 
systems and circulations which sustain transnational capitalism.”87 Counterinsurgency-
inspired policing emerged in the 1960s as a response to the increasing number of race 
riots in American cities. As William Rosenau explains, “policy elites saw the ghetto and 
its denizens as the cockpit  of nascent  revolution—a fear reinforced by Black Power 
advocates and other radicals who called for insurrection against white oppressors.”88 In 
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an article in  US News & World Report,  Army Colonel  Robert  B. Rigg warned that 
America's urban ghettos could pose a greater danger than enemies abroad: “There is the 
danger and the promise that urban guerrillas of the future can be organized to such a 
degree that their defeat would require the direct application of military power.”89 The 
country, he suggested, was effectively on the verge of a civil war. After the 5-day riot in 
the Watts neighbourhood in Los Angeles in 1965—in which 34 people were killed, 1000 
injured, and 4000 arrested—government officials and police strategists began to study 
counter-guerilla  warfare  and counterinsurgency  techniques  to  quell  ghetto  unrest.90 
Darryl Gates, who was field commander in Watts in 1965 and later would serve as Chief 
of the Los Angeles police during the 1991 riots, explains that
“[We] began reading everything we could get our hands on concerning 
guerilla  warfare.  We  watched  with  interest  what  was  happening  in 
Vietnam. We looked at military training, and in particular we studied 
what group of marines, based at the Naval Armory in Chavez Ravine, 
were doing. They shared with us their knowledge of counter-insurgency 
and guerrilla warfare.”91
In the late 1960s, ideas, equipment, and tactics used in Vietnam increasingly 
made their way back into domestic US police departments.  On 8 December 1960, the 
first  SWAT  squad  made  its  operational  debut  in  an  attack  on  the  Los  Angeles 
headquarters  of  the  Black  Panther  Party.  In  the  decades  that  followed,  the  military 
largely neglected counterinsurgency while the police as, Kristian Williams has shown, 
“kept practicing, and developing, its techniques.”92 The war on drugs, launched in 1971 
by Richard Nixon; the expansion of the prison industrial complex under the Reagan era; 
and the militarisation of the US southern border, all provided new impetus to militarised 
policing.  Black communities such as Skid Row, a high-poverty area of Los Angeles, 
have frequently served as  testing ground for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 
policies that then have been exported around the world. In fact, and as Williams shows, 
many of the contemporary counterinsurgency methods used in Iraq and Afghanistan 
were “developed by police agencies inside the US.”93
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The  broken  window  theory  of  policing  has  been  particularly  influential  in 
shaping new methods of counterinsurgency. Introduced by James Q. Wilson and George 
L. Kelling in an article in  The Atlantic in 1982, it argues that disorder in the form of 
minor  violations  breeds  larger  disorders.  As Christina  Heatherton  and Jordan  Camp 
explain, the idea “is deceptively simple: to stop major crimes from occurring, police 
must  first  prevent  small  signs of 'disorder'  from proliferating,  such as graffiti,  litter, 
panhandling, public urination, the sale of untaxed cigarettes, and so forth.”94 According 
to this logic, if minor crimes are left unchecked this will act as a signal to others in the  
community that more serious crimes can be committed without impunity. Before his 
final and fatal encounter with the police, Philando Castile was stopped 31 times and 
charged with more than 60 minor violations95; Eric Garner was similarly stopped and 
harassed for small-scale infractions for several years before he was slain on a Staten 
Island pavement.  While  it  is  his  last  words—“I can't  breathe”—that  have  become a 
rallying cry for protestors, his preceding words, spoken in an attempt to reason with the 
police officers before they crushed his head to the pavement, are perhaps more telling: 
“Every time you see me, you want to mess with me. I’m tired of it.”96 These examples 
demonstrate  the  ways  in  which broken  windows  policing  has  been  crucial  in 
legitimating pre-emptive measures such as racial profiling and more aggressive policing 
in inner-city communities. As Kelley explains, just like “lethal drone attacks on young 
men who might be terrorists or may one day commit acts of terrorism—the presumption 
of  guilt  based  on  racial  profiling  is  a  essential  component  of  broken  windows 
policing.”97 Broken  windows  techniques  that  have  been  picked  up by  the  military 
includes  the  Neighborhood  Watch,  computerized  intelligence  files,  and  statistical 
analysis.98 “Snake Eater”, a computer networked developed for the Chicago police, is 
currently  being  used  by  the  US  Marines  in  Anbar  province  to  identify  and  track 
insurgents. As Williams notes, “the military has been preparing for this sort of operation 
for  a  long  time:  1999's  'Urban  Warrior'  training  exercises  included  the  biometric 
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scanning of 'resistance fighters'—in Oakland, California.”99 In return, poor urban areas 
within the United States have increasingly come to look like a foreign battleground in 
the war on terror. As Stephen Graham explains,
“The U.S. military’s focus on operations within the domestic urban sphere 
is also  being dramatically strengthened by the so-called War on Terror, 
which  designates  cities—whether  US  or  foreign—and  their  key 
infrastructures  as  'battlespaces.'  Viewed  through  such  a  lens,  the  Los 
Angeles  riots  of  1992;  the  various  attempts  to  securitize  urban  cores 
during major sports events or political summits; the military response to 
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005; the challenges of 'homeland 
security' in US cities—all become 'low intensity' urban military operations 
comparable to conducting counter-insurgency warfare in an Iraqi city.”100
These synergies  cannot be captured by  IR's  standard language of territorial  borders, 
inside/outside, and Westphalian sovereignty. As Black and Palestinian activists remind 
us, “from Ferguson to Palestine, occupation is a crime.” This geography contrasts with 
IR's  hegemonic  language,  which  typically  depicts  colonial  frontiers  and  Western 
“homelands” as fundamentally separate domains.  And yet, from the Black American 
ghetto to the French banlieues to Brazil's favelas, security and military doctrines in the 
cities of the West are melding with those used in colonial borderlands. What Graham 
calls  the  “new  military  urbanism” increasingly  structures  the  global  city  and  the 
neoliberal state worldwide; as seen in the rapid expansion of policing and incarceration, 
border  walls  and  detention  centres,  gated  communities  and  fortress  suburbs;  in  the 
proliferation of militarised borders alongside the world's North-South equator; and in 
the growing “security archipelago”101 designed to protect the wealthy and powerful from 
those rendered surplus by the economic dislocations of racial capitalism.102 As discussed 
in  chapter  5,  the  policing,  entrapment,  and  containment  of  migrants in  the 
Mediterranean and the forceful protection of “fortress Europe” must be considered a 
similar response to the neoliberalisation of racial capitalism and its violent surplussing 
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of racialized populations across the planet. As Ben Hayes and Roche Tasse explain,
“The EU is now 'defended' from those fleeing poverty and destruction 
by  a  formidable  apparatus  that  includes  landmines  placed  along  the 
Greek  Turkish  border,  gun  boats  and  military  aircraft  patrolling  the 
Mediterranean and the coast of West Africa,  and trigger-happy border 
guards and barbed wire fences around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and 
Melilla  in  Morocco.  Added to  this,  unmanned drones  are  now being 
deployed  through  a  consortium  led  by  Dassault  Aviation,  Europe's 
largest manufacturer of combat aircraft, to target the bodies of 'illegal 
immigrants.'”
In the same way that activists  within  Europe (such as PIR and BLM UK) have been 
linking migrant border deaths to their own struggle against racialized state violence, so 
Black and Palestinian activists  have been recognising the intimate linkages between 
Israeli apartheid and American white supremacy. In the next section I build on this to 
consider  how Black-Palestinian  activists  are  enacting  a  revolutionary  solidarity  and 
“many-headed hydra” from below. As we shall see, the issue here is not that Palestine is  
like urban Black America—although this, to varying degrees, might be true—but more 
fundamentally,  that  the  struggle  for  Palestinian  liberation  is  deeply  entwined  and 
interconnected with the fight for Black lives in America.
From Ferguson to Palestine: Entangled Geographies of Resistance
“The coalition emerges out of your recognition that it's fucked up for you, in the 
same way that we've already recognized that it's fucked up for us.”
—Fred Moten103
In December 2017, 16-year-old Palestinian activist Ahed Tamimi was arrested 
for slapping two Israeli soldiers. Earlier that day her 14-year-old cousin had been shot in 
the head by an Israeli solider while protesting against Trump's decision to recognise 
Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. When Israeli soldiers tried to enter the yard of her 
family  home,  Tamimi  asked them to  leave.  The soldiers  refused,  insisting  that  they 
wanted to use her home as a base from which to shoot at protesters. Tamimi stood her 
ground. Video footage, which quickly went viral, shows her slapping and kicking the 
two soldiers. Although she posed no direct threat to any of them—the soldiers wore 
103 Stefano Harney and Fred Moten, The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study (Minor 
Compositions, 2013), 10.
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protective gear and easily fended her off—she was arrested and later sentenced to eight 
months in prison.
Tamimi's  case  is  by  no  means  unique:  since  1967,  Israel  has  imprisoned 
approximately 800,000 Palestinians.104 Palestinians currently face one of the highest per 
capita incarceration rates in the world, with 40% of all Palestinian men having been 
imprisoned  at  one  point  in  their  lives.  Similar  to  Black  lives  in  America,  the 
hyperincarceration of Palestinians must, at least in part, be seen as a consequence of 
neoliberal  restructuring,  and  the  violent  production  of  surplus  populations  that  are 
permanently unemployed and abandoned by the  neoliberal  state.105 As  Lubin makes 
clear,  “[t]hroughout  the  1990s  and  2000s,  Palestinians  and African  Americans  were 
both, in different ways, rendered as surplus populations beyond economic inclusion and 
therefore were viewed as potential threats—insurgencies—that had to be contained via 
counterinsurgency  measures  characterized  by  heightened  security  and  military 
techniques as well as mass incarceration.”106 To recognise these intimate links between 
counterinsurgency efforts in Palestine and urban Black America is ultimately to open up 
space for new forms of solidarity between these geographically dispersed struggles. As 
Dream Defenders, the US civil rights organisation, declared in their solidarity statement 
released in response to Tamimi's arrest: 
“While our struggles may be unique, the parallels cannot be ignored. US 
police, ICE, border patrol and FBI train with Israeli soldiers, police, and 
border agents, utilizing similar repressive profiling tactics to target and 
harass our communities. Too many of our children quickly learn that they 
may be imprisoned or killed simply for who they are.  From Trayvon 
Martin to Mohammed Abu Khdeir and Khalif Browder to Ahed Tamimi
—racism, state violence and mass incarceration have robbed our people 
of their childhoods and their futures.”107
Like  BYP100  and  BLM,  Dream  Defenders  has  continued  to  insist  that  the 
struggle  against  police  brutality  in  the  United  States  is  more  than  a domestic 
integrationist project.  The issue here is not only that policing practices at home mimic 
counterinsurgency abroad but, more fundamentally, that domestic police terror  within 
the US is intimately connected to the state terror imposed on Brown and Black people 
104 IMEU, “Israel’s Mass Incarceration of Palestinians | IMEU,” accessed June 19, 2017, 
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globally. Black and Palestinian struggles are fundamentally connected, not because the 
experience of racial oppression is everywhere the same, but because these systems of 
oppression are intimately entwined. As Angela David notes, private security groups such 
as G4s (the world's largest security provider)
“already recognize what feminists call intersectionality. G4S spans from 
private policing to the transportation of immigrants to private prisons to 
the deportation of people from Mexico in the U.S. to the Mexican border, 
the deportation of Africans from Europe to countries in Africa...  [I]t has 
[also] played a  major  role  in  upholding the  occupation  in  Palestine... 
[T]here’s a lesson to us that the feminist notion of intersectionality is one 
that should be incorporated into our work as well... [I]f one looks at that 
corporation, I think that all of the issues that we are addressing can be 
seen. In a sense, the private corporations recognize the intersectionality 
of issues and struggles, and we have to do that, as well.”108
Black-Palestinian  activists  have  been at  the  forefront  in  recognising  these  linkages. 
Videos such as “When I See Them I See Us” not only point to the similarities between 
police violence in the United States and Palestine, but also reveal the ways in which the 
experience of Black Americans and Palestinians are fundamentally interlinked. The key 
issue here is not that Palestinians and Black Americans have the same relationship to 
state violence but, rather, that their different experiences of oppression must be viewed 
within a shared circuit. As Mychal Denzel Smith notes, “the people of Ferguson aren't 
being treated like a foreign army. They’re being treated like black people in America.”109 
The producers of the “When I See Them I See Us” video were careful to recognise these 
differences, emphasising that anti-Black racism in the United States is not the same as 
military occupation in Palestine: while  Black Americans have some recourse to civil 
society, Palestinians remain stateless. “Our struggles”, the producers explained, “are not 
the same and... solidarity between us is not a given.” Instead, “solidarity is a political 
choice we make.”110 The solidarity envisioned here is not one of sameness or shared 
identity, but a political relation forged through contestation and across boundaries of 
difference: a revolutionary solidarity built on shared struggles against interlocking forms 
of  oppression,  and  brought  into  being  by  transnational  resistance  against  the 
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militarisation  and  neoliberal  governance  of  urban  Black  America  and  Palestinian 
communities. Palestine and Black America are intimately connected, not because these 
locations are the same but because the struggles taking place there reveal “something 
important  and  productive  about  the  colonial  world.”111 Underneath  the  different 
experiences  of  Black  Americans  and  Palestinians  “lies  a  more  profound  layer  of 
similarity that  is  constituted by colonial  modernity and border thinking.”112 As  Ruth 
Wilson Gilmore notes,
“The poorer places, or global South, are also here in the global North, in 
both  urban  and  rural  areas  'unfixed'  by  capital  flight  and  state 
restructuring. The unfixing is not, however, an absolute erasure; what's 
left  behind  is  not  just  industrial  residue—devalued  labour,  land  made 
toxic, shuttered retail businesses, the neighbourhood or small city urban 
farm—but,  by  extension,  entire  ways  of  life  that,  having  been  made 
surplus, unfix people: women, men, 'the kids.'”113
June  Jordan's  poetry  gives  voice  to  this  revolutionary  solidarity  and 
internationalist imaginary. Inspired by the Afro-Arab solidarity movements that emerged 
in the wake of Malcolm X and the Black Panthers, Jordan visited Palestinian refugee 
camps in Lebanon in 1982 and 1996, when she returned to  witness  sixteen days of 
Israeli bombardment in Operation Grapes of Wrath. Through poems such as “To Sing a 
Song of Palestine” and “Apology to the People of Lebanon”, she produced a political 
consciousness that brought urban Black America and occupied Palestine into contact, 
revealing the international dimension of local struggles. After the 1982 Lebanon war she 
wrote “Moving Towards Home”, an elegy to the horrors and “unspeakable events” she 
witnessed  in  the  refugee  camps  of  Sabra  and  Shatilla.  A call  for  an  anti-imperial, 
revolutionary, and internationalist solidarity, the poem ends with the now famous lines:
“I was born a Black woman 
and now 
I am become a Palestinian 
against the relentless laughter of evil 
there is less and less living room 
and where are my loved ones?
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It is time to make our way home.”114
Conclusion
In 2005 Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast and the city of New Orleans. What 
appeared to be a natural catastrophe soon exposed an underlying social crisis, as images 
revealed thousands of poor people—mostly Blacks, but also Latinos, elderly, and a few 
white people—stranded on rooftops without any food and water, or places to wash and 
urinate. As Henry Giroux observes, “[d]ead people, mostly poor African-Americans, left 
uncollected in the streets, on porches, hospitals, nursing homes, in electric wheelchairs, 
and in collapsed houses prompted some people to claim that America had become like a 
'Third World country' while others argued that New Orleans resembled a 'Third World 
Refugee Camp.'”115 New Orleans,  it  turned out,  was devastated not  so much by bad 
weather as by decades of neglect and neoliberal governance that had removed all safety 
nets for the poor, sick, elderly, and homeless. In the days after Katrina, the army fought 
to take back control of New Orleans, which quickly had turned into a no man's land. 
“It's  like Baghdad on a bad day”,116 remarked one of the officers.  In her poem “Of 
Refuge and Language”, Arab American poet Suheir Hammad reflects on the militarised 
response to Katrina, as well as the neoliberal policies that rendered so many poor people 
disposable:




The rest of the world can now see
What I have seen
Do not look away
The rest of the world lives here too
In America”117
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Through  her  poetry,  Hammad  invites  us  to  connect  the  Black  American  poor  and 
Palestinian refugees and, thus, to think of New Orleans as a Third World refugee site. 
Like Hammad's poetry, this chapter has sought to bring the precarity of urban Black 
America and occupied Palestine into a shared horizon. The policing of Black lives and 
other  racialized minorities  within  the  United  States  is  intimately  linked  to  racial 
capitalism and imperialism on a global scale.  The issue here is not only that policing 
practices  at  home  mimic  counterinsurgency  abroad  but,  more  fundamentally,  that 
domestic police terror within the US is intimately connected to state terror imposed on 
Brown and Black people globally—which M.I.A. recognised when she called for a focus 
on the intersectionality of Black and Muslim freedom struggles. Black American and 
Palestinian struggles are fundamentally connected, not because the experience of racial 
oppression is everywhere the same, but because these forms of racialized state violence 
are intertwined responses to  the neoliberalisation of racial  capitalism and its  violent 
surplussing of racialized populations across the planet. Commenting on the backlash 
against the #MuslimLivesMatter hashtag,  Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor thus rightly notes 
that “[i]t is one thing to respect the organizing that has gone into the movement against 
police violence and brutality,  but quite another to conceive of Black oppression and 
anti-Black racism as so wholly unique that they are beyond the realm of understanding 
and,  potentially,  solidarity  from  others  who  are  oppressed.”118 While  the 
intersectionality of Black and Muslim struggles has long been recognised by radicals, it 
is  also  being  brought  to  life  again  by  a  new  generation  of  Black  and  Palestinian 
activists.  By  comparing  their  everyday  realities  of  racialized  state  violence,  these 
activists are enacting a shared political  imaginary that reveals the links between the 
violence  of  neoliberal  globalisation  and the  global  war  on terror.  In  doing  so,  they 
envision a revolutionary solidarity which, as Rabab Abdulhadi has argued, contests the 
“exceptionality  and identity  politics  that  oftentimes suggest  that  racism only  affects 
Blacks who should fight against it; only Palestinians are affected by Zionism and should 
therefore  struggle  against  it  or  only  Indigenous  people  are  impacted  by  US settler 
colonialism  and  must  dismantle  it.”119 Brought  to  life  by  contemporary  Black  and 
Palestinian activists, as well as by June Jordan through her poetry, Malcolm X and the 
Black  Panthers  through  their  politics  of  intercommunalism,  such  a  revolutionary 
118 Taylor, From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation, 187.
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solidarity unravels the intimate connections between domestic anti-racism and global 
anti-imperialist struggles. As Black-Palestinian activists have continued to emphasise, 
such  an  internationalist  view of  liberation  is  urgently  needed—especially  in  an  era 
“when  neoliberal  economic  restructuring  converges  with  global  counterinsurgency 
measures  that  target  Arab  and  Muslim  populations  abroad  and  Black  people  and 
Muslims  at  home.”120 In  the  next  chapter  I  continue  to  analyse  these  entangled 
geographies of resistance by turning to the ongoing struggle for decolonisation in South 
Africa.
120 Chen, “The Limit Point of Capitalist Equality,” 15.
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C H A P T E R  7
Things Fall Apart: Contesting Settler Colonialism, in South Africa and 
Beyond
“To break up the colonial world does not mean that after the frontiers have been 
abolished lines of communication will be set up between the two zones. The destruction 
of the colonial world is no more or less than the abolition of one zone.”
—Frantz Fanon1
“When we say 'Rhodes Must Fall' we mean that patriarchy must fall, that white 
supremacy must fall, that all systematic oppression based on any power relations of 
difference must be destroyed at all costs.”
—Rhodes Must Fall Statement2
Introduction
In March 2007, a UN agency released a special report suggesting that Israel has 
established “an apartheid regime that oppresses and dominates the Palestinian people as 
a whole.”3 Authored by Richard Falk, former UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in 
the Palestinian territories, and Virginia Tilley,  the report established that Israel is “guilty 
of policies and practices that constitute the crime of apartheid.”4 While the description 
of Israel as an apartheid state sparked a heated controversy,5 comparisons between Israel 
and apartheid South Africa are not new. In the last few years a number of activists, 
intellectuals, and policymakers have argued that Israel's policies towards Palestinians 
are  directly  comparable  to  the  South  African  apartheid  regime.6 The  Boycott, 
1 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London: Penguin, 2001), 31.
2 The statement is available at http://jwtc.org.za/resources/docs/salon-volume-9/RMF_Combined.pdf 
3 “Israeli Practices towards the Palestinian People and the Question of …,” archive.is, March 16, 2017, 
http://archive.is/5OWjY.
4 “UN Report: Israel Has Established an ‘Apartheid Regime,’” accessed June 22, 2017, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/03/report-israel-established-apartheid-regime-
170315054053798.html.
5 For example, see “Richard Falk: Anger at My Israel ‘Apartheid’ Report Puts Free Speech at Risk,” 
Middle East Eye, accessed June 25, 2017, http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/academic-freedom-
criticism-israel-united-nations-and-fake-news-748512622; Adam Shaw, “Haley Demands UN 
Withdraw Report Branding Israel ‘apartheid’ State,” Text.Article, Fox News, March 15, 2017, 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/03/15/un-report-co-authored-by-flamethrower-richard-falk-
calls-israel-apartheid-state.html; “Arabs Protest UN’s Withdrawal of Israel ‘Apartheid’ Report,”  
Ynetnews, accessed June 25, 2017, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4939473,00.html.
6 See, indicatively, Jimmy Carter, Palestine Peace Not Apartheid (Simon and Schuster, 2006); Andy 
Clarno, Neoliberal Apartheid: Palestine/Israel and South Africa after 1994 (University of Chicago 
Press, 2017); Sean Jacobs and Jon Soske, eds., Apartheid Israel: The Politics of an Analogy (Chicago, 
Illinois: Haymarket Books, 2015); Ilan Pappé, Israel and South Africa: The Many Faces of Apartheid 
(Zed Books Ltd., 2015); Paul Di Stefano and Mostafa Henaway, “Boycotting Apartheid From South 
Africa to Palestine,” Peace Review 26, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 19–27, 
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Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, which seeks to pressure Israel to adhere to 
international  law  and  respect  basic  human  rights  and  democratic  principles,7 self-
consciously  styles  itself  on  the  South  African  anti-apartheid  movement.  As  Omar 
Barghouti,  a  founding member  of  BDS, explains,  the power  of  comparing  Israel  to 
South Africa is not only that it “invites sanctions—similar in nature and breadth to those 
imposed  on  apartheid  South  Africa.”8 It  also  disrupts  narratives  that  frame  Israel-
Palestine as a Jewish-Arab ethnic conflict rather than a case of settler colonialism and, 
thus, as part of a broader context of anti-colonial and anti-racist struggles.
In this chapter, I seek to push this analysis further: building on the materialist 
reading of the global colour line put forward in previous chapters, I argue that there is 
much to be gained from an analysis of the interconnected logics of racial capitalism in 
Israel-Palestine  and  contemporary South Africa.  Indeed,  while  formal  apartheid  has 
been  dismantled  and  South  Africa  now  is  “free”,  the  struggle  for  decolonisation 
continues.  Twenty  years  after  the  end  of  apartheid,  white  ownership  of  the  South 
African  economy  remains  intact,  and  the  living  conditions  of  the  Black  underclass 
continue  to  resemble  the  historical  disenfranchisements  of  the  apartheid  past.  This 
chapter asks why that is, as well as what (if anything) it might tell us about the struggle 
for Palestinian liberation. Such an analysis is crucial  because if Palestine, as Angela 
Davis has argued, “represents what... South Africa represented in the 1980s and up until 
the end of apartheid”,9 then it is imperative to consider what South Africa represents 
today and what lessons can be learned from that. 
To  develop  these  claims,  the  chapter  puts  settler  colonial  studies  into 
conversation with the literature on racial capitalism. Where settler colonialism often has 
been  understood  as  distinct  from  the  ongoing  process  of  capital  accumulation—in 
essence,  as  the  elimination  rather  than  exploitation  of  the  native—I  argue  that 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2014.876304; Ben White, Israeli Apartheid: A Beginner’s Guide 
(London ; New York : New York: Pluto Press, 2009).
7 More precisely, the BDS movement urges that that sanctions be imposed until Israel 1) ends its illegal 
military occupation of Palestine 2) recognises the equal rights of Arab-Palestinian citizens living in 
Israel, and 3) respects and promotes the right of return for Palestinian refugees. For a more detailed  
description, see “What Is BDS?,” BDS Movement, April 25, 2016, https://bdsmovement.net/what-is-
bds.
8 Omar Barghouti, Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions: The Global Struggle for Palestinian Rights 
(Haymarket Books, 2011), 64.
9 “Angela Davis: ‘This Is the South Africa Moment for the Palestinian People,’” Middle East Eye, 
accessed June 18, 2017, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/activist-angela-davis-compares-bds-anti-
apartheid-south-africa-movement-1086168629. Patrisse Cullors, a co-founder of Black Lives Matter, 
similarly argues that “frankly, we believe that Palestine is the new South Africa.” See “How The Black 
Lives Matter and Palestinian Movements Converged,” Moment Magazine - The Next 5,000 Years of  
Conversation Begin Here (blog), March 14, 2016, http://www.momentmag.com/22800-2/.
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dispossession is a constant and normal strategy of racial capitalism. As Glen Coulthard 
has  recently  argued,  it  is  crucial  that  we  “reestablish...  the  colonial  relation  of 
dispossession  as  a  co-foundational  feature  of  our  understanding  of  and  critical 
engagement  with  capitalism.”10 Applying  these  insights  to  Israel-Palestine  and 
contemporary South Africa, I argue for the importance of a relational analysis that—
rather than merely comparing  different geographies (as if they were isolated localities 
that happen to resemble one another)—reveals the ways in which different  spaces of 
oppression and histories  of  struggle  are  entwined and interconnected.  Consequently, 
while  the apartheid analogy and comparison with South Africa has been helpful  for 
reconnecting some struggles—placing Israel-Palestine in the context of a global struggle 
against settler colonialism and racism—a more thorough understanding of what South 
African apartheid was and continues to be would point to the need to establish a broader 
global movement—a “many-headed hydra”—based on challenging the global logics of 
racial capitalism. As we shall see, this would mean reconnecting the Palestinian struggle 
to the struggles of other disposable communities around the world, from the streets of 
Ferguson to the dark waters of the Mediterranean, from the favelas of Salvador to the 
townships of Cape Town.
I  develop  this  argument  in  three  sections.  I  begin  by  discussing  how  BDS 
supporters increasingly have turned to the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. 
While this analysis has been helpful for reframing Israel-Palestine as a case of settler 
colonialism (rather than ethnic conflict), it  has also overlooked the role of capital in 
producing  and  sustaining  apartheid.  This  is  problematic  because,  as  I  argue  in  the 
second section, decolonisation remains an unfinished project in South Africa. While the 
transition  to  democracy  sought  to  de-racialize  the  state,  it  neglected  underlying 
economic questions of land reform, wealth redistribution, and reparations.11 Since 1994, 
South Africa has undergone an extensive process of neoliberal restructuring which has 
deepened existing  inequalities  and led to  an  increasing  reliance  on  police  violence. 
10 Glen Sean Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 14.
11 At the time of writing, some steps have been taken to initiate a program of land redistribution. After 
gaining power in February 2018, President Cyril Ramaphosa pledged to redistribute land without 
compensation; a parliamentary committee is currently examining whether such redistribution would 
be allowed under current laws. Most critics have written this off as an empty promise, designed to win 
votes in the upcoming elections—not dissimilar from similar promises made in 2014. For example, 
see Marianne Merten, “South Africa Has All Legislative and Policy Tools for Land Redistribution – 





Thus,  rather  than  eliminating  racism,  the  South  African  transition  reconfigured  the 
relationship between race, capital,  and the state.12 In contemporary South Africa, the 
racial, colonial, and gendered logics of dispossession continue to be reproduced—albeit 
in  a reconfigured form.  The third section links this  back to  the BDS movement by 
examining  how  Israel-Palestine  has  undergone  a  similar  process  of  neoliberal 
restructuring  post-1994.  This  has  resulted  in  the  production  of  a  racialized  surplus 
population  for  which  the  Israeli  state  must  deploy  new forms  of  control:  policing, 
incarceration, surveillance, warehousing, border controls, and so on. In the final section 
I turn to the Fallist movements to consider what can be learned from the contemporary 
struggle for decolonisation in South Africa,  and what  possibilities for solidarity and 
internationalism follow from this.
“Our South Africa Moment Has Arrived”:13 Boycotting Israel
In  2005,  a  coalition  of  Palestinian  civil-society  organisations,  academics, 
activists, intellectuals, and trade unions called on the international community “in the 
spirit  of  international  solidarity,  moral  consistency,  and  resistance  to  injustice  and 
oppression...  to  impose  broad boycotts  and implement  divestment  initiatives  against 
Israel  similar  to  those  applied  to  South  Africa  in  the  apartheid  era.”14 The  BDS 
campaign has since then grown into a powerful global solidarity movement. As Gargi 
Bhattacharyya notes, “support for Palestinian human rights has become the emblematic 
solidarity  movement  of  our  time.”15 Boycotts  have  historically  been  a  popular  anti-
colonial and anti-racist tactic; examples include the Indian boycott of British good from 
1919 to the end of the British occupation in 1947, the Montgomery Bus Boycott in the 
United States, and the international boycott of apartheid South Africa. Out of these, the 
South African boycott—which began in the 1950s and lasted through to the early 1990s
—remains  one  of  the  world's  largest  and  most  sustained  international  solidarity 
12 As authors such as Michael Omi and Howard Winant point out, neoliberal projects are ultimately 
racial projects. See Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States 
(Routledge, 2014), 211. See also David J. Roberts and Minelle Mahtani, “Neoliberalizing Race, 
Racing Neoliberalism: Placing ‘Race’ in Neoliberal Discourses,” Antipode 42, no. 2 (March 1, 2010): 
248–57, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2009.00747.x and Jodi Melamed, “The Spirit of 
Neoliberalism: From Racial Liberalism to Neoliberal Multiculturalism,” Social Text 24, no. 4 89 
(December 21, 2006): 1–24, https://doi.org/10.1215/01642472-2006-009.
13 See chapter 14, “Our South Africa Moment Has Arrived”, in Barghouti, Boycott, Divestment,  
Sanctions.
14 “Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS,” BDS Movement, July 9, 2005, https://bdsmovement.net/call.
15 See Gargi Bhattacharyya, “Globalizing Racism and Myths of the Other in the ‘War on Terror,’” in 
Thinking Palestine, ed. Ronit Lentin (Zed Books Ltd., 2013).
-168-
movements.  Anti-apartheid  movements  in  the  UK,  the  Netherlands,  and  the  United 
States  pressured  their  governments  to  stop  trading  with,  and  cut  off  oil  and  arms 
supplies to, the apartheid regime; different Third World governments in the UN worked 
to  institute  the  UN  Special  Committee  Against  Apartheid;  and  campaigns  in  the 
Commonwealth  countries  led  to  the  implementation  of  the  highly  successful  sports 
boycott.16 
Given the success of the anti-apartheid movement, it is not surprising that BDS 
frequently  cites  the  South  African  experience  as  a  major  source  of  inspiration.  As 
Abigail  Bakan  and  Yasmeen  Abu-Laban  explain,  BDS  hopes  to  grow  into  “an 
international  movement  of  economic,  political  and  social  pressure  from below  that 
would isolate Israel as a 'pariah state' comparable to apartheid South Africa.”17 South 
Africa is  seen as a particularly useful  point  of comparison, not only because of the 
success  of  the  anti-apartheid  boycott  campaign,  but  also  because  of  the  similarities 
between  apartheid  South  Africa  and  contemporary  Israel-Palestine.  Many  BDS 
supporters  directly  compare  Israel's  occupation  of  Palestine  with  the  South  African 
system of apartheid. As The Guardian observed in 2006, “comparisons between white 
rule in South Africa and Israel's system of control over the Arab peoples it governs are 
increasingly heard. Opponents of the vast steel and concrete barrier under construction 
through the West Bank and Jerusalem dubbed it the 'apartheid wall' because it forces 
communities apart and grabs land.”18 More recently, leading figures of the anti-apartheid 
struggle such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu have stated that the conditions in Palestine 
are  “worse than apartheid.”19 In an article entitled “Do I Divest?”,  Tutu argues that 
“yesterday's  South  African  township  dwellers  can  tell  you about  today's  life  in  the 
occupied territories... The indignities, dependence and anger are all too familiar... Many 
South Africans are beginning to recognize the parallels to what we went through... If 
apartheid ended, so can the occupation, but the moral force and international pressure 
16 For example, see the special issue on “The Global Anti-Apartheid Movement” in Radical History  
Review.
17 Abigail B. Bakan and Yasmeen Abu-Laban, “Palestinian Resistance and International Solidarity: The 
BDS Campaign,” Race & Class 51, no. 1 (July 1, 2009): 32, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396809106162. See also Salah Hassan, “Historicizing Palestinian Boycott 
Politics,” Social Text Online, n.d., https://socialtextjournal.org/periscope_article/historicizing-
palestinian-boycott-politics/.
18 Chris McGreal, “Worlds Apart,” The Guardian, February 6, 2006, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/06/southafrica.israel.
19 Author Robin Yassin-Kassab, “‘Worse than Apartheid’ – The Movement to Boycott Israel,” P U L S E 
(blog), February 27, 2009, https://pulsemedia.org/2009/02/27/worse-than-apartheid-the-movement-to-
boycott-israel/.
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will  have  to  be  just  as  determined.”20 The  “Not  in  Our  Names  Declaration  of 
Conscience”, signed by hundreds of leading Jewish South Africans, similarly states that 
“it  becomes  difficult,  particularly  from  a  South  African  perspective,  not  to  draw 
parallels with the oppression experienced by Palestinians under the hand of Israel and 
the oppression experienced in South Africa under apartheid rule.”21 By underlining the 
similarities between contemporary Israel and apartheid South Africa, BDS supporters 
are  seeking to  de-exceptionalise  Israel  and disrupt  hegemonic  discourses  that  frame 
Israelis  and Palestinians  through the  language of  moral  equivalency and parity.22 In 
particular,  the comparison with  apartheid South Africa draws attention to the settler 
colonial  character of the Israeli  state.  As Jon Soske and Sean Jacobs explain,  “both 
apartheid South Africa and the Israeli state originated through a process of conquest and 
settlement  largely  justified  on  the  grounds  of  religion  and ethnic  nationalism.  Both 
pursued a legalized, large-scale program of displacing the earlier inhabitants from their 
land.”23
Comparisons between Israel and apartheid South Africa are of course not new.24 
Already in 1961, the apartheid prime minister Hendrik Verwoerd triumphantly declared 
that “Israel like South Africa is an apartheid state.”25 South African activists agreed, but 
unlike Verwoerd did not see this as a reason to praise Israel. Israel, they argued, was not 
only like apartheid South Africa, but also intimately involved in perpetuating their own 
oppression. Throughout the apartheid period, Israel remained an important and loyal 
ally to South Africa. In the 1970s, this cooperation extended into the field of nuclear 
20 “Do I Divest?,” www.counterpunch.org, October 17, 2002, 
https://www.counterpunch.org/2002/10/17/do-i-divest/. In a Guardian article entitled “Apartheid in the 
Holy Land”, Tutu similarly writes: “I've been very deeply distressed in my visit to the Holy Land; it 
reminded me so mich of what happened to us black people in South Africa”. See “Apartheid in the 
Holy Land,” The Guardian, April 29, 2002, sec. World news, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/29/comment.
21 “Declaration of Conscience on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict by South Africans of Jewish Descent,”  
accessed June 18, 2017, http://www.mepc.org/declaration-conscience-israeli-palestinian-conflict-
south-africans-jewish-descent.
22 As Abu-Laban and Bakan explain, the BDS campaign “as a strategy of resistance and cross-border 
solidarity, can be usefully framed as an anti-racist movement that contests a post-second world war 
hegemonic construction of state ideology, in which Zionism plays a central role and serves to enforce 
a racial contract that hides the apartheid-like character of the state of Israel”. See Bakan and Abu-
Laban, “Palestinian Resistance and International Solidarity,” 32.
23 Jacobs and Soske, Apartheid Israel, 1. For a discussion of the failure to use the rhetoric of empire and 
settler colonialism in discussion of Palestine, see chapter 2, “Raw Cuts: Palestine, Israel, and 
(Post)Colonial Studies” in Ann Laura Stoler, Duress: Imperial Durabilities in Our Times (Duke 
University Press, 2016).
24 For an historical overview, see Salim Vally, “Solidarity with Palestine: Confronting the 
‘Whataboutery’ Argument and the Bantusan Denouement,” in Apartheid Israel: The Politics of an 
Analogy, ed. Sean Jacobs and Jon Soske (Haymarket Books, 2015).
25 Quoted in Vally, 43.
-170-
technology,  with  Israel  helping  South  Africa  to  develop  nuclear  warheads.26 This 
friendship continued throughout the 1980s, and enabled the apartheid regime to work 
around international  sanctions. Israel also continued to offer  diplomatic and military 
support, sending 35% of its arms exports to South Africa as late as 1980.27 In 1987, 
when the Israeli cabinet finally denounced South Africa's apartheid policies, a number 
of  critical  Israel  scholars  had  begun  declaring  Israel  an  “apartheid  state”,  some 
suggesting  that  Gaza  was  “the  Soweto  of  the  State  of  Israel.”28 In  the  1990s  these 
comparisons  became  increasingly  common  as  human  rights  organisations  began 
denouncing  the  “Bantustanization”  of  Palestine.  In  2003,  Mahmood  Mamdani  and 
Edward  Said  organised  a  conference  at  Columbia  University  entitled  “An  Anti-
Apartheid Perspective on Israel and Palestine.” As Mamdani explained, “South Africa is 
a way of talking about Palestine. They are different and yet not all that different.”29
In sum, it  is clear that pro-Palestinian activists, artists, and academics have a 
long history of turning to South Africa to underline similarities and to explore strategies 
of  resistance.  By  emphasising  the  settler  colonial  nature  of  the  Israeli  state,  these 
activists and intellectuals not only disrupt hegemonic narratives that continue to frame 
the occupation of Palestine as a Jewish-Arab ethnic conflict. As Salma Musa has argued, 
it  also  opens  up  new  avenues  for  solidarity,  enabling  “alliances  between  peoples 
resisting  oppression,  linking  Palestine  to  struggles  against  militarism,  mass 
incarceration, and policing, as well as indigenous land claims and struggles in North 
America.”30 Nonetheless, the apartheid analogy is not without its limits. Defenders of 
Israel  have  been quick  to  argue  that  the  comparison  is  flawed,  because  Palestinian 
citizens of Israel—unlike Black South Africans during apartheid—enjoy civil rights.31 
26 Sasha Polakow-Suransky, The Unspoken Alliance: Israel’s Secret Relationship with Apartheid South  
Africa (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2010).
27 Polakow-Suransky, “Gold Stones, Glass Houses,” Foreign Policy, May 10, 2010, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/10/gold-stones-glass-houses/. See also the book by the same author: 
Polakow-Suransky, The Unspoken Alliance.
28 Meron Benvenisti, West Bank Data Base Project: A Survey of Israel’s Policies (American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984).
29 Mahmood Mamdani, “Beyond Nuremberg The Historical Significance of the Post-Apartheid 
Transition in South Africa,” in A Journey of Ideas Across: In Dialogue With Edward Said, ed. Adania 
Shibli (Haus der Kulturen der Welt, n.d.), http://journeyofideasacross.hkw.de/resisting-colonialism-
old-and-new/mahmood-mamdani.html.
30 Salma Musa, “BDS and Third World Internationalism,” Social Text Online, 2016, 
https://socialtextjournal.org/periscope_article/bds-and-third-world-internationalism/. See also Keith P. 
Feldman, A Shadow Over Palestine: The Imperial Life of Race in America (University of Minnesota 
Press, 2015); Juliana Hu Pegues, “Empire, Race, and Settler Colonialism: BDS and Contingent 
Solidarities,” Theory & Event 19, no. 4 (October 12, 2016), https://muse.jhu.edu/article/633272; 
Steven Salaita, Inter/Nationalism: Decolonizing Native America and Palestine, 1 edition 
(Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2016).
31 For example, see “Why Israel Is Nothing Like Apartheid South Africa,” New York Times, March 31, 
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While such arguments, at least to some extent, can be written off as ideological attempts 
to  deflect  attention  from  the  illegal  occupation  of  Gaza  and  the  West  Bank,  they 
arguably do highlight the limits of comparative approaches. Indeed, in comparing Israel-
Palestine and South Africa, commentators have primarily focused on similarities in state 
violence, and therefore limited their analyses to the time period before 1994. Because of 
this they have often been prone to overlook that contemporary South Africa—more than 
twenty years after the end of apartheid—remains one most radically unequal places in 
the world.32 As Ashwin Desai and Richard Pithouse point out, “the government's own 
statistics  agency  concludes  that  in  realm  terms:  average  black  'African'  household 
income declined 19% from 1995 to 2000, while white income was up 15 percent.”33 
Despite a growing Black elite, white ownership and domination of the economy remain 
intact; Blacks command only 10% of the economy, and on average earn six times less 
than whites.34 Faced with permanent unemployment, informal housing, and high rates of 
HIV/AIDS  in  the  townships,  the  living  conditions  of  the  majority  of  Black  South 
Africans continue to resemble the historical disenfranchisements of the apartheid past. 
While legalised and formally enshrined apartheid has come to an end, it is undeniable 
that racialized differences continue to manifest themselves in all walks of life: as Heidi 
Grunebaum observes, this is visible “in every sphere of society from who works in 
restaurant kitchens to who owns them: who cleans the roads and sidewalks and who are 
shop owners, whose children are cared for by nannies and whose children have to fend 
for themselves.”35 The large number of strikes, social movements, and popular uprising
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/opinion/why-israel-is-nothing-like-apartheid-south-
africa.html.
32 There exists a large body of literature that have documented how the material conditions of the 
majority black poor have worsened in the “new” South Africa. Amongst others, see Patrick Bond, 
Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa (University of KwaZulu-Natal 
Press, 2005); Ashwin Desai and Richard Pithouse, “‘What Stank in the Past Is the Present’s Perfume’: 
Dispossession, Resistance, and Repression in Mandela Park,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 103, no. 4 
(September 16, 2004): 841–75; Zine Magubane, “The Revolution Betrayed? Globalization, 
Neoliberalism, and the Post-Apartheid State,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 103, no. 4 (September 16, 
2004): 657–71; Thiven Reddy, South Africa: Settler Colonialism and the Failures of Liberal  
Democracy (Uppsala: Zed Books, 2015).
33 Desai and Pithouse, “What Stank in the Past Is the Present’s Perfume,” 843.
34 Achille Mbembe, “Apartheid Futures and the Limits of Racial Reconciliation,” 3, accessed March 3, 
2017, http://wiser.wits.ac.za/system/files/documents/Mbembe%20-%202015%20-%20Public
%20Positions%20-%20Apartheid%20Futures.pdf.
35 Heidi Grunebaum, Memorializing the Past: Everyday Life in South Africa After the Truth and  
Reconciliation Commission (Transaction Publishers, 2011), 124.
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—from miner's strikes36 to service delivery protests37 to university students movements 
such as Rhodes/Fees Must Fall38, which I discuss in further detail below—confirm that 
the struggle for decolonisation and the “long walk to freedom”39 continue, even though 
South Africa now is “free.”
Two conclusions can be drawn from this. First, we might need to rethink the 
nature of settler colonialism, including its relation to capital.  In the literature,  settler 
colonialism  has  predominantly  been  theorised  as  a  process  that  is  distinct  from 
colonialism:  as  the  elimination rather than exploitation of Indigenous populations, in 
Patrick  Wolfe's  famous  formulation.40 Nonetheless,  and  as  the  ongoing  struggle  for 
justice  in  South Africa  reveals,  dispossession  might  be a  constant  feature of  capital 
accumulation, and consequently something that persists—even after the state has been 
de-racialized and formal freedom attained. As we shall see in the next section, in South 
Africa  the  racial,  colonial,  and  gendered  logics  of  dispossession  have  not  so  much 
withered away as transformed themselves into structures more ideally suited for the 
neoliberal present.
Second, the ongoing struggle for decolonisation in South Africa also reveals the 
limits of a comparative approach that merely seeks to add up similarities and differences 
(such as that between Israel-Palestine and South Africa). While comparative approaches 
are not without merit, as David Theo Goldberg reminds us, they often “seem to miss a 
crucial dimension for comprehending racial significance and racist conditioning in all 
their  complexity”:41 namely,  the  global colour  line. In  what  follows  I  argue  that  a 
relational approach—anchored  in  a  global  political  economic  critique  of  race  and 
36 “‘The Marikana Massacre Is a Tale of Utter Shame for South Africa,’” The Guardian, accessed June 
19, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/26/marikana-massacre-ramaphosa-lonmin. 
For a detailed analysis of the Marikana massacre, see Patrick Bond and Shauna Mottiar, “Movements, 
Protests and a Massacre in South Africa,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 31, no. 2 (April 1, 
2013): 283–302, https://doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2013.789727.
37 Peter Alexander, “Rebellion of the Poor: South Africa’s Service Delivery Protests – a Preliminary 
Analysis,” Review of African Political Economy 37, no. 123 (March 1, 2010): 25–40, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03056241003637870.
38 “South Africa’s Student Protests Are Part of a Much Bigger Struggle,” The Washington Post, accessed 
June 19, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/09/23/south-africas-
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racism—demonstrates that there are lessons to be learned from the successes as well as 
the  shortcomings  of  South  Africa's  transition  to  democracy.  Indeed,  studying South 
Africa post-1994 sheds light on the changing character of (settler) colonialism, and the 
ways in which the racial, colonial, and gendered logics of dispossession continue to be 
reproduced—albeit in a reconfigured form—in the neoliberal present. Ultimately,  the 
point  is  not  just  that  Israel-Palestine  is  like (apartheid)  South  Africa  but,  more 
fundamentally,  that  these  spaces  of  oppression  and  histories  of  struggle  are  deeply 
entwined and interconnected under racial capitalism.
The Limits of Rainbowism: From National Liberation to Neoliberalism
Twenty years after the end of apartheid, why has so little changed for the Black 
poor in South Africa? To answer this question it is helpful to consider, once more, the 
materiality of the global colour line. This is important, not least because the concept of 
“racial capitalism”, while popularised by Cedric Robinson, actually derives from South 
Africa; it  was coined in the 1970s when activists and intellectuals debated  the role of 
capitalism in supporting the racial order of the apartheid regime.42 Anglophone liberal 
scholars argued that the “colourblind” logic  of  capitalism,  if  left  to  its  own device,  
would destroy all forms of racial prejudice and discrimination. The free market system, 
it was argued, would eventually replace racism—seen as a “social aberration”—with 
new forms of social interaction, based on rational economic principles and enlightened 
self-interest.  In  contrast,  Marxists  and  radical  intellectuals  form  the  Black 
Consciousness Movement, including Neville Alexander, Steve Biko, Harold Wolple and 
a young Stuart Hall (in conversation with South African exiles living in Muswell Hill 
and other parts of London), argued that racial apartheid was a direct consequence of 
capitalism.43 Anticipating Robinson's Black Marxism, they insisted that racialization and 
capital  accumulation  are  mutually  constitutive  processes,  and  that  race  cannot  be 
understood in isolation from capitalism. For these radicals, this meant that the struggle 
against the racial state could not be de-linked from the struggle against racial capitalism; 
42 Michael Cloete, “Neville Alexander: Towards Overcoming the Legacy of Racial Capitalism in Post-
Apartheid South Africa,” Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 86, no. 1 (March 
10, 2015): 34–6, https://doi.org/10.1353/trn.2014.0032.
43 For example, see Neville Alexander, South Africa: Which Road to Freedom? (Walnut Publishing, 
1994); Cloete, “Neville Alexander”; Derek Hook, “Retrieving Biko: A Black Consciousness Critique 
of Whiteness,” African Identities 9, no. 1 (February 1, 2011): 19–32, 
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indeed, South Africa would remain divided and unequal unless racism and capitalism 
were confronted together.
The years that have followed the end of apartheid lend support to this argument. 
In 1994, democratic elections were held for the first time in South Africa and an interim 
constitution was passed. A year later the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
was set up to help facilitate the political transition. Victims of human rights violations 
were  encouraged  to  come  forward  and  share  their  traumatic  experiences,  as  were 
perpetrators who, in exchange for testimony, could ask for amnesty from prosecution. 
By healing the wounds of  the  past, the  TRC thus sought to  build a “new” and de-
racialized  South  Africa—a  boldly  democratic  and  multicultural  society,  a  “rainbow 
nation”  in  Nelson  Mandela's  evocative  phrase.  Obscured  by  this  polyphonic, 
multicultural, and post-racial vision is the fact that apartheid was a socio-economic—
and  not  just  political—system,  based  on  the  disempowerment,  exploitation,  and 
dispossession  of  Black  South  Africans.  As  Sampie  Terreblanche  has  argued,  “the 
apartheid system (or, more correctly, the system of racial capitalism) was deliberately 
constructed  in  a  very  close  collaboration  between  (white)  business  and  (white) 
politicians  to  create  a  (mainly African)  labour repressive system on behalf  of  white 
business.”44 For centuries South African mines, farms, and factories were dependent on 
the exploitation of cheap Black labour. White South Africans were able to enjoy unfair 
advantages  in  the  labour  market,  accumulating  wealth,  land,  and  power,  while 
impoverishing the Black working class.45 From 1960 to 1983, 3.5 million Black South 
Africans  were  forcefully  removed  from  their  homes  and  resettled  into segregated 
neighbourhoods. While  formal  apartheid  was  abolished  in  1994,  the  spoils  of  this 
system was passed on to younger generations in the form of white privilege. As Achille 
Mbembe  notes,  this  is  visible  in  “monetary  or  property  value,  banking  practices, 
housing and land assets, educational resources, cultural capital, insider networks, good 
jobs, a sense of self-esteem, dignity and superiority.”46
44 Sampie Terreblanche, “Dealing With Systemic Economic Injustice,” in Looking Back, Reaching  
Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, ed. Charles Villa-
Vicencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd (Zed Books, 2000), 267. See also Achille Mbembe, “Whiteness 
without Apartheid: The Limits of Racial Freedom,” openDemocracy, accessed February 28, 2017, 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/whiteness_without_apartheid_the_limits_of_racial_freedom. 
45 For an account of the systematized exploitation of black labourers under apartheid, see Colin Bundy, 
Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry, 2nd edition (Cape Town {u.a.: James Currey, 1988); 
Terreblanche, “Dealing With Systemic Economic Injustice”; Steven Friedman, Race, Class and 
Power: Harold Wolpe and the Radical Critique of Apartheid (Pietermaritzburg: University of 
KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2015).
46 Mbembe, “Apartheid Futures and the Limits of Racial Reconciliation,” 9.  
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The failure to engage with this long history of land dispossession, displacement, 
dispersion of communities, and enforced resettlement has ultimately helped to normalise  
present  inequalities.  As  Michael  Cloete  explains,  “[i]nstead  of  restructuring  the 
apartheid economy to meet  the needs of the black majority,  the leaders of the post-
apartheid state have chosen the option of a formal constitutional democracy, on the one 
hand, and the capitalist system of its former oppressors, on the other, as the foundation 
of the post-apartheid South Africa.”47 Despite a growing Black middle class, the white 
elite retains control over the economy. More so than other issues, the question of land 
highlights the incomplete nature of decolonisation: while the state no longer actively 
colonises the land of Black South Africans, the vast majority of land remains in the 
hands  of  the  old  white  elite. As  Neville  Alexander,  the  Black  intellectual  and 
revolutionary, makes clear:
“Ownership and control  of the commanding heights of the economy... 
have remained substantially in the same hands as during the heyday of 
apartheid. It is perfectly justifiable to say that what we used to call the 
apartheid capitalist system has simply given way to the post-apartheid 
capitalist  system.  The  jargon  of  those  who  make  the  decisions  has 
changed  (everyone  has  become  'non-racial'  and  'anti-racist'),  a  few 
thousand black middle class people have boarded the gravy train and are 
being wooed into the ranks of the established (white) elite, but the nature 
of the state remained fundamentally unchallenged.”48
In  spite  of  this,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  suggest  that  the  nature  of  racial  
oppression in South Africa remains unchanged. The transition to democracy not  only 
left  existing  inequalities  in  place,  but  also  intensified  the  marginalisation  and 
exploitation of the Black poor. To see how and why, it is important to consider how the 
birth  of  the  “rainbow  nation”  coincided  with  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  and  the 
globalisation of neoliberal capitalism. In the years leading up to the fall of apartheid, the 
ANC  leadership  increasingly  turned  to  neoliberal  trickle-down  economics  as  the 
antidote to problems such as poverty, unemployment,  and inequality.  Starting in the 
early 1990s, the World Bank repeatedly sent missions to South Africa to persuade ANC 
researchers  and  policy  advisors  to  subscribe  to  economic  orthodoxy.  Senior  ANC 
officials were also sent to the Washington headquarters to receive training in the tenets 
47 Cloete, “Neville Alexander,” 37.
48 Neville Alexander, An Ordinary Country: Issues in the Transition from Apartheid to Democracy in  
South Africa (University of Natal Press, 2002), 64.
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of neoliberalism and workings of financial markets.49 In 1996—the same year as the 
TRC hearings began in Cape Town—the ANC subsequently became the first African 
government  to  voluntarily  ask  the  World  Bank  for  help  to  implement  a  structural 
adjustment programme.50 Within two years of coming to power, it adopted the neoliberal 
macroeconomic Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) programme,  which 
stressed deficit reduction,  privatization, de-regulation, and trade liberalisation. It also 
accepted responsibility  for the  $25 billion dollar  debt  accumulated  by the  apartheid 
regime,  and  offered  constitutional  protection  for  the  existing  distribution  of  private 
property.
While these neoliberal policies were justified on the basis that they would help 
facilitate the process of democratising the South African state, in reality they have led to 
a reconfiguration of the relationship between race, capital, and the state.51 Rather than 
eliminating racism, the adoption of a neoliberal economic program has transformed the 
apartheid  economy—which  was  characterised  by  state  support  for  industrial  and 
agricultural production, racialized welfare, and a split labour market—into structures 
more  ideally  suited  for  the  demands  of  global  capital.52 Legally  enshrined  racial 
capitalism under  apartheid has  thus  come to be  replaced by racial  neoliberalism, in 
which full citizenship, as David Thero Goldberg explains, is restricted to “the healthy, to 
those  who  can  pay-as-they-go,  and  to  those  who  own  property.”53 In  particular, 
neoliberal restructuring
“has transformed racial apartheid into a more generic and so supposedly 
less pernicious apartheid... Its racial arrangements are thus seen to fall 
within  the  parameters  of  what  has  come to  be  considered  the  global 
normal  and  so  acceptable.  But  acceptable  because  the  terms  of 
recognition now exclude the analytics of racial articulation, because the 
state no longer takes itself so ordered even if the structural informalities 
49 Sagie Narsiah, “Neoliberalism and Privatisation in South Africa,” GeoJournal 57, no. 1/2 (2002): 4.
50 See Bond, Elite Transition.
51 As Michael Omi and Howard Winant point out, neoliberal projects are ultimately racial projects; Omi 
and Winant, Racial Formation in the United States, 211. See also David J. Roberts and Minelle 
Mahtani, “Neoliberalizing Race, Racing Neoliberalism: Placing ‘Race’ in Neoliberal Discourses,” 
Antipode 42, no. 2 (March 1, 2010): 248–57, doi:10.1111/j.1467-8330.2009.00747.x and Melamed, 
“The Spirit of Neoliberalism: From Racial Liberalism to Neoliberal Multiculturalism.”
52 As Terreblanche explains, “the economic system has been changed over the past 30 years from one of 
colonial and racial capitalism to a neo-liberal, first world, capitalist enclave that is disengaging itself 
from a large part of the black labour force. Although the black elite—both the bourgeoisie and petit  
bourgeoisie—has been adopted as a junior partner, the new system has retained a racial character; it is  
still a white-controlled enclave in a sea of black poverty”. Solomon Johannes Terreblanche, A History 
of Inequality in South Africa, 1652-2002 (University of Natal Press, 2002), 422.
53 David Theo Goldberg, The Threat of Race: Reflections on Racial Neoliberalism (John Wiley & Sons, 
2009), 311.
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of the society continue to embed their legacy.”54
The South African white elite and the aspiring Black bourgeoisie have benefitted from 
fiscal austerity, tax concessions, export oriented growth, the lowering of inflation, and 
the liberalisation of steady exchange controls.55 Yet for the majority of South Africans, 
neoliberal  restructuring  has  meant  widespread  unemployment,  deepening  forms  of 
marginalisation, and the privatisation of basic public services such as transport, water, 
electricity, health care, and education.56 20% of urban households now lack access to 
electricity, and a quarter have no running water: 80% of rural households have neither. 
In the  last  decade,  there  has  been  a  rapid  proliferation  of  precarious  forms  of 
employment,  including  temporary,  contract,  casual,  and  part-time  forms.  This 
vulnerable, non-standard workforce has grown so large that at present only 40% of the 
economically active population has full-time employment; for Blacks, this decreases to 
approximately one-third.57 As Desai makes clear, “[p]oor people are not perceived as 
citizens who are entitled to certain basic rights, but as paying customers who forfeit all 
rights  when  they  are  unable  to  pay.”58 Abandoned  by  the  state,  they  have  only 
themselves to rely on for survival. In John Saul's formulation, 
“[a] tragedy is being enacted in South Africa, as much a metaphor for our 
times as Rwanda and Yugoslavia and, even if not so immediately searing 
of the spirit, it is perhaps a more revealing one. For in the teeth of high 
expectations  arising  from  the  successful  struggle  against  a  malignant 
apartheid state, a very large percentage of the population—among them 
many of the most desperately poor in the world—are being sacrificed on 
the altar of the neo-liberal logic of global capitalism.”59
South Africa's  transition  to  democracy thus  demonstrates the limitations of a 
liberation strategy that limits decolonisation to state reformation.60 While the transition 
to  democracy  restructured  the  state  and  rejected  white  supremacy  in  favour  of 
54 Goldberg, The Threat of Race.
55 Ashwin Desai, “Neoliberalism and Resistance in South Africa,” Monthly Review (blog), January 1, 
2003, https://monthlyreview.org/2003/01/01/neoliberalism-and-resistance-in-south-africa/.
56 Amongst other things, corporate taxes have fallen from 48% in 1994 to 30% in 1999; there has also 
been a lifting of capital controls, and lower tariffs on imports. See Patrick Bond, Against Global  
Apartheid: South Africa Meets the World Bank, IMF, and International Finance (University of Cape 
Town Press, 2003), viii.
57 All figures are from Desai, “Neoliberalism and Resistance in South Africa.”
58 Ibid.
59 John S. Saul, “Cry for the Beloved Country: The Post‐apartheid Denouement,” Review of African 
Political Economy 28, no. 89 (September 1, 2001): 429, https://doi.org/10.1080/03056240108704550.
60 Clarno, “Neoliberal Apartheid,” 2015, 70. See also David Theo Goldberg, Are We All Postracial Yet? 
(John Wiley & Sons, 2015).
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reconciliation,  other aspects  of  decolonisation were  sidelined.  The result  has been a 
multicultural and post-racial discourse which puts the category of race under erasure 
and,  as  Myambo  explains, therefore  “enables  'belonging'  but  not  a  material 
redistribution of belongings in the concrete sense of possessions, (private) property, and 
land.”61 The idea of “non-racialism”—a founding value in the constitution and the South 
African term for post-racialism—thus naturalises and de-historicises ongoing forms of 
material  inequality,  socio-economic  marginalisation,  and  structural  poverty. In  this 
context of historical amnesia, to advocate for land reform, redistribution of wealth, and 
the undoing of structures of privilege—in housing, education, employment, and so forth
—is deemed akin to reverse racism. As The Landless People's Movement point out, in 
“South Africa it appears if you challenge for land, you threaten the very foundation of 
the miracle nation.”62 
The Settler Colonial Present
The  incomplete  nature  of  South  Africa's  decolonisation  has  important 
implications for the BDS movement and the wider struggle for Palestinian liberation. 
Indeed, while South Africa now is free in the legal sense of the term—according to 
international law, apartheid ends with the elimination of legalised racial discrimination
—neoliberal restructuring has placed important limits on the meaning of decolonisation. 
As Cloete makes clear, structures of subjugation remain beneath the veneer of rights, 
recognition, and rainbowism; “the ANC willingness to compromise with their former 
oppressors... has ensured that the material systemic conditions underlying the unethical 
practice  of  human  exploitation  in  the  past  have  remained  intact  as  the  enabling 
(structural) conditions for the (im)possibility of the 'new' South Africa.”63 Consequently, 
and in contrast to settler colonial studies—which, as I argued above, often has theorised 
settler  colonialism  as  distinct  from  colonialism;  as  the  elimination  (rather  than 
61 Myambo, “Capitalism Disguised as Democracy,” 65. For similar arguments about how a politics of 
recognition leaves the underlying structural conditions unchallenged, see Glen Sean Coulthard, Red 
Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2014); Elizabeth A. Povinelli, The Cunning of Recognition: Indigenous Alterities 
and the Making of Australian Multiculturalism (Duke University Press, 2002) and Charles R. Hale, 
“Neoliberal Multiculturalism: The Remaking of Cultural Rights and Racial Dominance in Central 
America,” Political and Legal Anthropology Review 28, no. 1 (2005): 10–28.
62 Quoted in Grunebaum, Memorializing the Past, 38. Michael MacDonald, in a similar vein, argues that 
“under apartheid, racial nationalism mobilized opposition; under democracy, racial nationalism 
suffocates it”. See Michael MacDonald, “The Political Economy of Identity Politics,” The South 
Atlantic Quarterly 103, no. 4 (September 16, 2004): 653. 
63 Cloete, “Neville Alexander,” 33.
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exploitation)  of  Indigenous  populations—the  ongoing  struggle  for  justice  in  South 
Africa raises crucial questions about the evolving character of (settler) colonialism, and 
the ways in which the racial, colonial, and gendered logics of dispossession continue to 
be  reproduced in  new ways in  the  present.  As Glen  Coulthard  has  recently argued, 
dispossession and exploitation are not  mutually exclusive but deeply interconnected. 
That  is,  settler  colonial  dispossession  is  not  distinct  from  processes  of  capital 
accumulation, but is rather a strategy which seeks to eliminate unwanted populations 
while  simultaneously  accumulating  land  and  wealth.  In  our  contemporary  era  of 
neoliberalism, these “relations of power are no longer reproduced primarily through 
overtly coercive means”, but through the invisible hand of the market.64 Dispossession 
thus understood survives the formal end of apartheid, but in new and updated forms that 
suit the needs of the post-racial present.
How, at all, does this relate to BDS and the Palestinian struggle? As we saw in  
the first section, a growing body of scholarship now describes Israel as an apartheid 
and/or  settler  colonial  state.  While  this  literature  makes  a  powerful  case  for  de-
exceptionalising  the  Israel-Palestine  conflict  (arguing that  it  needs  to  be  understood 
alongside a host of other cases of settler colonialism), it has paid scant attention to the 
link between race, capital, and land. This is problematic, not least since Israel-Palestine
—like South Africa—has undergone an extensive programme of neoliberal restructuring 
since 1994. The Oslo Peace Process, which took the first steps towards a lasting two 
state  solution,  was from the start  a  deeply neoliberal  process;  as  Clarno points  out, 
“[t]he  Oslo  negotiations  were  promoted  by  Israeli  business  elites  concerned  that 
political  instability would impede their  ability to attract  foreign investors and multi-
national corporations.”65 According to the Palestinian anthropologist Khalil Nakhleh, it 
was in fact the globalisation of the Israeli economy that pushed it towards Oslo.66 By 
removing the existing barriers separating the Palestinian and Israeli economies, Oslo 
was designed to open the markets of the Arab world to US and Israeli capital and, thus, 
to lay the foundations for a process of corporate-led neoliberalisation of the region. As 
Toufic  Haddad  points  out,  this  vision  was  embraced  by  the  international  donor 
64 Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks.
65 Clarno, “Neoliberal Apartheid,” 2015, 69–70.
66 Khalil Nakhleh, “Oslo: Replacing Liberation with Economic Neo-Colonialism,” Al-Shabaka, accessed 
June 23, 2017, https://al-shabaka.org/commentaries/oslo-replacing-liberation-with-economic-neo-
colonialism/. For a discussion of Oslo as neoliberal governance, see chapter 5 in Alex Lubin, 
Geographies of Liberation: The Making of an Afro-Arab Political Imaginary (UNC Press Books, 
2014).
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community.  In  place  of  political  solutions,  Oslo  was  based on “the  notion  that  the 
market's  invisible  hand would guide Israelis  and Palestinians to peace,  provided the 
international  community  financially  and  politically  backed  this  arrangement  and 
facilitated the  creation  of  an  adequate  incentives  arrangement.”67 Oslo thus  saw the 
Palestinian  liberation  movement  being  superseded  by  a  Palestinian  state-building 
programme based on neoliberal institution-building; indeed, “Palestinians were to attain 
national  independence  with  the  IMF,  the  World  Bank,  and  the  Bretton  Woods 
institutions, as well as the United States challenging economic policies and investments, 
and with the occupying power, Israel, on their side.”68 Palestine, argues Haddad, has 
effectively become a business, and it is clearly “a very profitable one, for any number of 
engaged actors from donors to Western states.”69
This vision of a private-sector-led, export-oriented, free-market economy as the 
foundation for an independent Palestinian state was also embraced by the Palestinian 
Authority (PA). The strongest expression of this can be found in the Palestinian Reform 
and Development Plan (PRDP). In 2007, under the leadership of prime minister Salam 
Fayyad—a former  IMF employee—the PA began to  implement  a  neoliberal  reform 
package developed in coordination with the World Bank and the British Department for 
International  Development.  Focusing  on  public  sector  reform  and  private  sector 
investment,  the programme called for a 21% reduction of public-sector  employment 
resulting in the elimination of 40,000 jobs. It also imposed a three year freeze on public 
salaries and ended the supply of subsidised water and electricity to refugee camps. To 
promote  private  sector  investment,  the  PRDP reasserted  the  long-standing  goal  of 
establishing free-trade industrial zones, enabling foreign investors to take advantage of 
low-wage labour in the Occupied Territories.70
It is here that the experience of Israel-Palestine and contemporary South Africa 
begin to converge. In both places, neoliberal restructuring has reconfigured the relation 
between  race,  capital,  and  the  state,  leading  to  the  creation  of  a  racialized  surplus 
population  that  can  be  exploited  and  expropriated  at  will. As  Clarno  makes  clear, 
67 Toufic Haddad, Palestine Ltd.: Neoliberalism and Nationalism in the Occupied Territory (I.B.Tauris, 
2016).
68 Raja J. Khalidi and Sobhi Samour, “Neoliberalism as Liberation: The Statehood Program and the 
Remaking of the Palestinian National Movement,” MPRA Paper, November 30, 2010, 
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29642/; Christine Leuenberger and Ahmad El-Atrash, “Building a 
Neoliberal Palestinian State under Closure: The Economic and Spatial Implications of Walls and 
Barriers,” Economic Sociology European Electronic Newsletter 16, no. 2 (2015): 21.
69 Haddad, Palestine Ltd.
70 See Haddad, Palestine Ltd.
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“neoliberal restructuring has generated surplus populations in both South Africa and 
Palestine/Israel: permanently unemployed, too poor to consume, and abandoned by the 
neoliberal state.”71 This process—which has the effect of pressuring workers to accept 
lower wages, dangerous working conditions, over time, and so forth—is intrinsically 
linked to the neoliberal restructuring of the world economy. As Nerferti Tadar explains, 
“in order for national developing states and economic elites to become viable players in 
the financialized global market, they must have at their disposal a population that can be 
made redundant to any particular lines of industry as dictated by the sudden vicissitudes 
of capital  flows and that will  ultimately shoulder the costs  of fallout of any and all 
speculative manoeuvres.”72 The structural shift  in the global economy—begun in the 
1960s and intensified throughout the 1970s and 80s—have made sectors of the working 
class superfluous to the needs of capital.  Expelled from the labour market and from 
what remains of the welfare state, they have come to resemble what Tadar describes as 
“forms of bare life, at-risk populations, warehoused, disposable people, urban excess 
(planet of the slums).”73 In Gaza and the West Bank, official  unemployment figures 
hover at 27%, but reach up to 45% among university graduates and those younger than 
30. Palestinians have thus come to resemble those who Ashwin Desai, in the context of 
South Africa, calls “the poors”: those who exist at the margins of the capitalist economy 
and “whose plight cannot... be meaningfully addressed or meaningfully improved within 
the neoliberal institutions of global capitalism.”74
In  South  Africa  as  well  as  occupied  Palestine,  the  violent  surplussing  of 
racialized populations has given rise to a growing “security archipelago”,75 designed to 
police the poor and protect the wealthy and the dominant—exemplified by the massive 
expansion  of  policing  and  incarceration,  border  walls  and  detention  centres,  gated 
communities  and fortress  suburbs.  As we saw in chapter  3, neoliberalism has  to  be 
understood as a simultaneous roll-back of the (welfare) state through privatisation  as 
well as a roll-out of new forms of interventionism and social control, meant to contain 
and  pacify  racialized  populations  rendered  superfluous  by  capital.  In  South  Africa, 
71 Clarno, “Neoliberal Apartheid,” 2015, 71–2.
72 Neferti X. M. Tadiar, “Life-Times of Disposability within Global Neoliberalism,” Social Text 31, no. 2 
115 (2013): 26, https://doi.org/10.1215/01642472-2081112.
73 Neferti X. M. Tadiar, 24. For a similar analysis with respect to the water poisoning in Flint, Michigan, 
see Laura Pulido, “Flint, Environmental Racism, and Racial Capitalism,” Capitalism Nature Socialism 
27, no. 3 (July 2, 2016): 1–16, https://doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2016.1213013.
74 Cloete, “Neville Alexander,” 43.
75 Paul Amar, The Security Archipelago: Human-Security States, Sexuality Politics, and the End of  
Neoliberalism (Duke University Press, 2013).
-182-
neoliberal restructuring has been accompanied by a range of “tough-on-crime” criminal 
justice reforms meant to secure urban space and police the poor. Borrowed from the 
carceral technology and “war on crime” rhetoric developed in the United States, harsh 
criminalisation has been framed as crucial  to economic development  in  at  least  two 
ways: first, by signalling to investors that South Africa is safe for foreign investment 
and white commercial farming; and second, by warehousing surplus labour and opening 
up  a  new  market  for  private  interests.76 As  a  consequence,  South  Africa's  prison 
population today ranks amongst one of the highest in the world.77 There has also been a 
rapid increase in gated communities, fortress suburbs, and private security companies. 
The private security industry has been the fastest-growing sector in South Africa since 
the early 1990s, and now employs more than 40,000 people.78 
In Palestine, similar processes of racialized (in)security are at work; since 1967, 
Israel has imprisoned approximately 800,000 Palestinians.79 Palestinians currently face 
one of the highest per capita incarceration rates in the world, with 40% of all Palestinian 
men having been imprisoned at one point in their lives. Since 2007, the international 
security company Group 4 Security (G4S) has been contracted to provide services and 
equipment to Israeli prisons, detention centres, checkpoints, and the police. G4S, which 
is the largest private employer on the African continent, also owns and manages prisons 
in South Africa,  including Mangaung Correctional Centre,  the second largest private 
prison in the world. 
As we saw in the previous two chapters, this link between neoliberal economic 
policies, racialized (in)security, and moral panics is by no means unique to South Africa 
and  Israel-Palestine.80 Indeed,  in  the  United  States  a  Black  person is  killed  by  law 
76 Amanda Alexander, “Democracy Dispossessed: Land, Law & the Politics of Redistribution in South 
Africa” (Columbia University, 2016), 189–191. The link between neoliberal economic policies and 
criminalization has been noted by a number of thinkers. Amongst others, see Jordan T. Camp, 
Incarcerating the Crisis: Freedom Struggles and the Rise of the Neoliberal State (Univ of California 
Press, 2016); Angela Y. Davis, The Meaning of Freedom: And Other Difficult Dialogues (City Lights 
Publishers, 2012); Loïc J. D. Wacquant, Prisons of Poverty (U of Minnesota Press, 2009).
77 “SA Prison Population among World’s Highest | IOL,” accessed March 4, 2017, 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/sa-prison-population-among-worlds-highest-398070.
78 Andy Clarno, “Beyond the State: Policing Precariousness in South Africa and Palestine/Israel,” Ethnic 
and Racial Studies 37, no. 10 (August 24, 2014): 1728, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2014.931984; Tony Roshan Samara, “Order and Security in the 
City: Producing Race and Policing Neoliberal Spaces in South Africa,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 33, 
no. 4 (April 1, 2010): 637–55, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870903337318.
79 IMEU, “Israel’s Mass Incarceration of Palestinians | IMEU,” accessed June 19, 2017,  
https://imeu.org/article/israels-mass-incarceration-of-palestinians.
80 Edna Bonacich, Sabrina Alimahomed, and Jake B. Wilson, “The Racialization of Global Labor,” 
American Behavioral Scientist 52, no. 3 (November 1, 2008): 342–55, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764208323510.
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enforcement every 28 hours; along the borders of the EU, gunboats, military aircrafts, 
landmines, and border guards are similarly used to prevent migrants fleeing poverty and 
violence from entering mainland Europe.  To be clear,  the issue here is  not  that  the 
militarisation and neoliberal governance of South Africa is  like occupied Palestine or 
urban  Black  America—although  that  might  be  the  case—but,  rather  and  more 
significantly, that these different geographies of oppression are linked through uneven 
and combined processes under racial capitalism: and as such they must be analysed and 
resisted within a shared circuit. In the next section I return to South Africa to discuss the 
Fallist movements, the ongoing struggle for decolonisation in present-day South Africa, 
and the bonds of solidarity that are being forged between South African students and the 
BDS.
The Art of Falling: From Recognition to Abolition
“To everyone who has  survived pain,  and trauma at  the  hands of the 
colonial legacy of Rhodes. I am sorry. That those are the places we must 
go to learn, that our black mothers, grandmothers, aunts, and sisters must 
sweat cents from their pores so that we can get better. We were the ones 
with possibility to become 'something better,' the promise of the rainbow 
nation, of women empowerment, of a new South Africa. Is this not why 
our foremothers have suffered? That we get better, safer? Oh, the liberal 
university we could not call home. 
They did not know, that 'better' looked like rape scars and nights sweats 
filled with anxiety. It is not new either; black womxn have long learned 
to  carry rape scars  and night  sweats.  But  it  was  not  meant  to  be us. 
Freedom was not coming tomorrow. Tomorrow was here. Our blackness 
and womxnhood could no longer be used against us as weapons. The 
maggot-filled lies of inclusivity.
Whatever the fuck it was. Seldom better, it was never home.”81
In  2015  students  at  the  University  of  Cape  Town  (UCT)  formed  a  radical 
movement that challenged the exclusionary character of South African universities as 
well as the wider dream sold by the “rainbow nation.” As organisers and activists were 
quick to point out, South African universities have historically played a central role in 
creating and upholding colonialism and apartheid: indeed, under British colonialism, 
81 Redacted, “#RhodesWar: Makunyiwe Macala,” The New Inquiry, February 5, 2018, 
https://thenewinquiry.com/blog/makunyiwe-macala/.
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universities such as UCT received extensive funds to study the “native question”; under 
apartheid,  the  education  system  was  highly  segregated,  with  white  schools  and 
universities  receiving  most  of  the  funding—a  pattern  which  continues  to  structure 
higher eduction in present-day South Africa. Under the hashtag of #RhodesMustFall, the 
students at UCT drew together a variety of individuals and groups marginalised within 
the university community, including cleaners, cafeteria staff, and gardeners. While it is 
the  call  to  remove  the  infamous  statue  of  Cecil  Rhodes  which  has  received  most 
attention by the media, #RMF organised around a much larger set of demands, including  
the  decolonisation  of  the  Eurocentric  university  curricula,  the  transformation  of  a 
predominantly white professoriate, the ending of exploitation of outsourced poor Black 
workers, the expansion of financial aid for low-income students, and higher wages and 
better conditions for campus workers.82 As the #RMF Mission Statement declares, “we 
are an independent collective of students, workers and staff who have come together to 
end institutionalised racism and patriarchy at  UCT.”83 The  call  to  decolonise  higher 
education quickly spread to other campuses, inspiring similar movements such as Open 
Stellenbosch at Stellenbosch University, the Black Student Movement at the University 
Currently Known As Rhodes (UCKAR), Rhodes Must Fall in Oxford, Royall Must Fall 
at Harvard Law School, and the nationwide #FeesMustFall collective. As the movement 
grew from #RhodesMustFall to #FeesMustFall and finally to Fallism, organisers have 
challenged the wider narrative of the transition from apartheid to democracy. Speaking 
to the lived realities of race and class in contemporary South Africa, they remind us that 
the  struggle  to  decolonise  higher  education  is  intimately  linked  to  a  broader  set  of 
struggles:  struggles  against  racial  capitalism—including  its  reliance  on  institutional 
racism, racialized state violence, and the violent production of surplus populations—and 
the way in which it continues to structure everyday life in South Africa in new but old 
ways, twenty years after “freedom” and the end of apartheid.
From its inception,  pro-Black, Black feminist,  and queer activist  organisation 
such as Black Stokvel, Queer Revolution, and South African Young Feminist Activists 
have  been  central  to  the  Fallist  movements.  The  #RMF  Mission  Statement  names 
Radical Black Feminism, alongside Black Consciousness and Pan-Africanism, as one of 
82 For an excellent overview of the role of precarious labour in universities and beyond in South Africa,  
see Andries Bezuidenhout and Khayaat Fakier, “Maria’s Burden: Contract Cleaning and the Crisis of 
Social Reproduction in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” Antipode 38, no. 3 (June 26, 2006): 462–85, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0066-4812.2006.00590.x.
83 The Mission Statement is available at http://jwtc.org.za/resources/docs/salon-volume-
9/RMF_Combined.pdf 
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the founding three pillars of the movement. As the Statement declares, 
“we are not only defined by our blackness, but that some of us are also 
defined  by our  gender,  our  sexuality,  our  able  bodiedness,  our  mental 
health, and our class, among other things. We all have certain oppressions 
and certain privileges and this must inform our organising so that we do 
not silence groups among us, and so that no one should have to choose 
between their struggles.”84
Alongside calls  for free education and an end to the outsourcing of workers, 
Fallists  have  also  been  calling  out  patriarchy,  sexual  violence,  ableism  and  queer-
antagonism. At UCKAR, organisers published the #RUReference List, listing the names 
of 11 men accused of rape on campus, which inaugurated a national debate on rape 
culture  in  higher  education.  Around  the  same  time  Wits  students  initiated  a  naked 
solidarity protest  under the hashtag #IamOneInThree,  to draw awareness to the high 
number of women in South Africa who have—or will  be—sexually assaulted and/or 
raped in their lifetime. As these students make clear, race might be the “modality in 
which class is lived”, as Stuart Hall once put it, but gender is all to often the modality in 
which race is lived. 
84 The Rhodes Must Fall Mission Statement is available at http://jwtc.org.za/resources/docs/salon-
volume-9/RMF_Combined.pdf 
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In  rejecting  the  ideology  of  the  “rainbow  nation”,  Fallists  have  successfully 
exposed  the  limits  of  multiculturalism  and  a  recognition  politics  which  maintains 
structures  of  subjugation  beneath  the  veneer  of  rights,  reconciliation,  and  formal 
equality. These movements are practicing what Du W.E.B. Du Bois called “abolition 
democracy”; namely, a politics which seeks to abolish all institutions complicit in racial 
capitalism and bent on exploiting the “basic majority of workers who are yellow, brown 
and black.”85 Indeed, and as Khadija Khan explains, “RMF/FMF activists have departed 
from  'rainbow  nation'  ideologies  of  transformation  altogether,  and  are  calling  for 
complete reconstruction in the form of decolonisation.”86 Unsurprisingly, Fallists and 
BDS supporters have been quick to make connections between their struggles; as the 
BDS  website  declares,  “Rhodes  Must  Fall  activists  are natural  allies  of  the  BDS 
movement.”87At the UCT, students have repeatedly called on their university to divest 
from Israel and to implement an academic boycott.88 A boycott is seen as essential, not 
only for the purpose of furthering the Palestinian struggle, but also because it is “an 
important step” in the project of decolonising South African universities. As a statement 
from the students makes clear:
“At  a  time  when  there  is  university-wide  consensus  that  UCT must 
commit  to  a  programme  of  decolonisation,  there  is  a  growing 
understanding that  decolonisation cannot  simply be  an  inward-looking 
process, but must include a response to the global context. Any attempt 
by UCT to decolonise will fail at the outset if it disregards the systems of 
oppression in which it is complicit and perpetuates, beyond its campus 
boundaries of Rondebosch and Mowbray. The UCT academic boycott of 
Israel  cannot  be  viewed in  isolation,  but  must  be  seen  as  part  of  the 
broader movement towards decolonising the university.”89
Pointing to the interconnected histories of land dispossession, settler colonialism, and 
apartheid,  as  well  as  of  contemporary  neoliberal  restructuring  and  racialized  state 
violence, UCT students invite us to consider the freedom struggles in Israel-Palestine 
and contemporary South Africa through a shared lens. These struggles are not the same, 
85 W. E. B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America 1860-1880 (Simon and Schuster, 1999), 16. See 
also Angela Y. Davis, Abolition Democracy : Beyond Empire, Prisons, and Torture, 1st ed. (New 
York: Seven Stories Press, 2005).
86 Khan, “Intersectionality in Student Movements,” 113.
87 “For the Record, BDS Is an Anti-Racist Issue,” BDS Movement (blog), May 16, 2016, 
https://bdsmovement.net/news/record-bds-anti-racist-issue.
88 “University of Cape Town Debates Academic and Cultural Boycotts of Israel,” The Jerusalem Post, 
September 29, 2017, https://www.jpost.com/BDS-THREAT/University-of-Cape-Town-debates-
academic-and-cultural-boycotts-of-Israel-506305.
89 UCT Palestine Solidarity Forum, “UCT, Decolonisation And The Academic Boycott Of Israel,” The 
Daily Vox, n.d., https://www.thedailyvox.co.za/uct-decolonisation-academic-boycott-israel/.
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and yet  they are  interconnected—different  fronts  of  the  same war.  In  making these 
connections, students are enacting a revolutionary solidarity through which a “many-
headed  hydra”  is  brought  into  being—an  internationalism  that  stretches  from  the 
townships of Cape Town to the “open-air prison” in Gaza, from the mines in Marikana 
to the free trade zones in the West Bank, and from the punctuated myth of the “rainbow 
nation” to the ruins of the Oslo Accords.
Fig. 2: UCT students protest against the occupation in Palestine
Conclusion
Over the last  few years the Fallist  movements in South Africa have inspired 
groups and activists around the world calling for the decolonisation of higher education 
and  wider  society.  Exposing  the  hollowness  of  rainbow  ideology,  Fallists  have 
challenged the racial, colonial, and gendered logics of dispossession which continue to 
structure everyday life in South Africa. Present-day South Africa is “free” in the legal 
sense  of  the  term but,  as  Fallists  remind  us,  decolonisation  remains  an  unfinished 
project: the transition to democracy not only left existing inequalities in place, but also 
intensified the marginalisation and exploitation of the Black poor.  As South African 
intellectuals such as Neville Alexander and Steve Biko clearly understood, racialized 
dispossession  is  a  constant  feature  of  capital  accumulation.  Perspectives  that  equate 
decolonisation with state reformation ultimately overlook this link: not only are they 
implicated in the reproduction of racialized inequalities, but they also help reproduce a 
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colourblind discourse that places race under official erasure and therefore forecloses the 
very possibility  of addressing racialized inequalities.  As the South African transition 
makes clear, the  racial,  colonial,  and gendered logics  of  dispossession  are  perfectly 
capable of reproducing themselves even after the formal  attainment  of freedom and 
democracy.
This argument has important implications for the BDS movement. While BDS 
campaigners in recent years have turned to the South African anti-apartheid movement 
to  formulate  strategies  of  resistance  and  conceptualise  future  visions,  my  analysis 
reveals  that  there  might  be  just  as  much  to  learn  from  the  incomplete  nature  of 
decolonisation  in  contemporary South  Africa.  Since  1994,  South  Africa  and  Israel-
Palestine  have  both  undergone  processes  of  neoliberal  restructuring,  which  has 
deepened existing inequalities  and led to an increasing  reliance on state violence  in 
order to police the racialized poor and secure the powerful. While the apartheid analogy 
has been helpful for disrupting hegemonic narratives that frame Israel-Palestine as a 
Jewish-Arab ethnic conflict—as opposed to a case of settler colonialism and, thus, as 
part  of a broader context of anti-colonial  and anti-racist  struggles—a more thorough 
understanding of what South African apartheid was and continues to be opens up space 
for a radical internationalism that links together the struggles against racial capitalism, 
(settler) colonialism, patriarchy, ableism, and so on: for an internationalism that makes 
“things fall apart” and that calls for a complete reconstruction of society in the form of 
abolition and decolonisation. In the next chapter I extend this analysis by asking how 
such  ideas  of  universal  history  and total  critique  can be  retrieved without  invoking 
Eurocentric  ideas  of  progress  and  teleology.  As  we  shall  see,  if  the  dream  of 
emancipation is to be retained, not everything can fall: we must also learn to float anew.
-189-
Fig. 3: Scenes from the film Moonlight90
90 Available at https://metro.co.uk/2017/02/27/what-is-moonlight-about-everything-you-need-to-know-
about-the-oscar-best-picture-winner-6475790/ 
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C H A P T E R  8
Universal History Without Guarantees
“Long before Karl Marx wrote 'Workers of the world, Unite!', the revolution was 
international.”
—C.L.R. James1
“The class consciousness of our epoch is not the sole prerogative of male, white, 
productive labourers. It remains to be constructed from the potential complementarity of 
diverse political struggles which constitute the class politically at different levels. It  
provides a promise of unity which may only be apparent in the rarest moments of 
revolutionary rupture, where we may catch a fleeting glimpse of the class for itself.”
—Paul Gilroy2
Introduction
Over the last three decades, post- and decolonial scholars have drawn attention 
to the dangers of universal claims. Thinkers from Edward Said to Gayatri Spivak to 
Walter Mignolo and Sylvia Wynter have shown how moral-political  universalism—a 
form of abstract and eternal knowledge beyond time and space—is intimately bound up 
with European colonialism and domination.3 From the notion of the universal stems a 
teleological,  progressive  reading  of  history,  in  which  European  Enlightenment 
modernity  is  seen  as  “a  developmental  advance  over  premodern,  nonmodern,  or 
traditional forms of life.”4 The universal is, from this perspective, inherently suspect, 
complicit with historical and epistemic forms of imperialism. 
What does this rejection of universalism mean for the internationalism outlined 
in previous chapters? Indeed, if we accept that “[t]he normative perspective that serves 
1 Quoted in Reiland Rabaka, Africana Critical Theory: Reconstructing the Black Radical Tradition,  
from W. E. B. Du Bois and C. L. R. James to Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral (Lexington Books, 
2010), 96.
2 Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: Race and Racism In 70’s  
Britain (Routledge, 2004), 306.
3 For an excellent introduction into questions of time, historicity, and world politics, see Kimberly 
Hutchings, Time and World Politics: Thinking the Present (Oxford University Press, 2015). For a 
critique of universal history, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought  
and Historical Difference (Princeton University Press, 2000); Ranajit Guha, History at the Limit of  
World-History (Columbia University Press, 2012); Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing History  
and the West (Psychology Press, 2004); Sylvia Wynter, “Unsettling the Coloniality of 
Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation--An Argument,”  
CR: The New Centennial Review 3, no. 3 (February 3, 2004): 257–337, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/ncr.2004.0015.
4 Amy Allen, The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory 
(Columbia University Press, 2016), 3.
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to  orient  the  forward-looking  conception  of  progress  is  justified”  by  a  colonial 
“backward-looking  story  about  how  'our'  modern,  European,  Enlightenment  moral 
vocabulary and political  ideals”,  as  Amy Allen has  argued,  then what  is  left  of  the 
emancipatory project of equality and freedom? Put differently, how might we be critical 
of the universal, while simultaneously recognising that to outright reject the possibility 
of universal history is to “read out of existence the whole strand of fighters like CLR 
James,  Claudia  Jones,  and  Dr.  King,  all  of  whom very  much believed  in  universal 
projects  and anti-racist  demands”?5 Responding to  these  questions,  in  this  chapter  I 
examine how, if at all, it might it be possible to disentangle emancipatory politics from 
its  historical  baggage  of  Eurocentrism,  racism,  and  empire.  Connecting  this  to  the 
radical  internationalism outlined  in  previous chapters,  I  interrogate  how it  might  be 
possible to retrieve the notion of universal history and total critique,  without  invoking 
Eurocentric  ideas of progress and teleology. To do so I  put  Susan Buck-Morss's re-
reading of Hegelian dialectics into conversation with Walter Benjamin's philosophy of 
history and Stuart Hall's call for a Marxism “without guarantees.” As we shall see, these 
thinkers not only allow us to centre-stage revolutionary, subaltern groups as the agents 
of  history;  they  also  help  us  re-conceive  revolutionary  transformation  as  the 
interruption of  history,  rather  than  its  culmination.  The  insurgent  universalism that 
emerges out of this is neither abstract (in a Kantian sense) nor free-floating (as it is for 
poststructuralists): instead it arises in opposition to the universalising thrust of racial 
capitalism  and  the  hegemonic  narratives  that  accompany  it.  In  Theodore  Adorno's 
formulation, “progress occurs where it ends.”6
I develop this argument in four sections. In the first section I turn to the groups  
and  movements  discussed  in  the  last  three  chapters,  arguing  that  these  seemingly 
independent  struggles—against  white  nationalism in  Europe,  police  brutality  in  the 
United States, and neoliberal apartheid in South Africa and Palestine—actually must be 
understood as different fronts of the same war and, consequently, as different facets of a 
radical  internationalism from below.  The struggles against  empire,  white  supremacy, 
settler colonialism, gender subordination, and capitalist restructuring are not the same—
but they are interconnected.  Recognising these “discontinuous but  related histories”7 
ultimately points to the necessity of connecting—but not unifying—different struggles 
5 David Roediger, quoted in Satnam Virdee, “Race, Class and Roediger’s Open Marxism,” Salvage 
(blog), n.d., http://salvage.zone/online-exclusive/race-class-and-roedigers-open-marxism/.
6 Theodor W. Adorno, Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords (Columbia University Press, 
2012), 150.
7 Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, EMPIRE STRIKES BACK, 283.
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in a global struggle against racial capitalism. In section two I revisit the post/decolonial 
debate on history and historicism in order to raise questions about the epistemological 
underpinnings of such a project. If this is a universalist project—“the historical antilogic 
to racism, slavery, and capitalism”,8 in Cedric Robinson's formulation—then how can it 
avoid relying on the “master's tools” and repeating the moral-political universalism it 
supposedly  wants  to  challenge?  In essence,  how—if at  all—might  it  be  possible  to 
combine dialectics with dialectics, and universalism with non-Eurocentrism? To answer 
this  question  in  the  last  two  sections  I  read  Susan  Buck-Morss  alongside  Walter 
Benjamin and Stuart Hall, arguing that it in fact is possible to retrieve the emancipatory 
project  of  equality  and  freedom  without  invoking  the  false  universalism  of  the 
Enlightenment. In telling an insurgent counternarrative, movements such as BLM, BDS, 
RMF/FMF, and migrant activists remind us that there could have been, and still can be, 
a  different  world.  In bringing the world to  a  standstill,  they turn the  present  into a 
revolutionary possibility.
Different Fronts of the Same War
In the last three chapters I sketched the contours of a contemporary motley-crew 
of “planetary wanderers” that enact a radical internationalism from below. Focusing on 
migrant struggles in Europe, recent forms of Black-Palestinian solidarity, and the Fallist 
and  BDS  movements,  I  highlighted  that  the  struggle  against  racial  capitalism—
including  the violent surplussing of racialized populations and the consequent growth 
of the penal and national security state—necessitates a national as well as international 
frame. This should not be mistaken for the classical Marxist version of internationalism. 
Indeed,  this  is  not  a  perspective grounded  in  the  notion  of  the  working  class  as  a 
continuous and homogenous historical subject: instead it unfolds from what Paul Gilroy 
describes as “discontinuous but related histories”, capturing the relation between those 
“who, though structurally related,  [are] not always geographically proximate.”9 In the 
same way that Cedric Robinson's Black Marxism insisted on reading the plantations of 
Mississippi and the factories of Manchester not as separate systems but as differentiated 
and complementary parts of the  same global economy, the struggles wages by these 
different groups must be understood as mutually constitutive and dialectically entwined. 
8 Cedric J. Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition, 2 edition (Chapel 
Hill, N.C: University North Carolina Pr, 2000), 240.
9 Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, EMPIRE STRIKES BACK, 283.
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While BLM, migrant activists, Fallists, and BDS supporters recognise the specificity of 
their  struggles,  their  aspirations  also  exceed  territorial  borders. Responding  to  the 
violent  policing,  surveillance,  and  confinement  of  actually  or  potentially  rebellious 
racialized (and gendered) populations rendered surplus by capitalist restructuring, their 
struggles  constitute  different  fronts  of  the  same  war.  Together  they  form part  of  a 
contemporary  “many-headed hydra”  that  stretches  from the  streets  of  Ferguson and 
Baltimore to the dark waters of the Mediterranean, to the refugee camps in Gaza and the 
West Bank to the townships of Cape Town. To be clear, the struggles waged here are not 
the same: indeed, the argument is not that occupied Palestine is like the Mediterranean 
or the townships of South Africa. The point, rather, is that these struggles illuminate 
each  other  in  complex  ways;  that  they  are  part  of  a  larger  network  and  circuit  of 
struggle; and that we are living in related histories. Consequently, while the movements 
for Black lives in the United States, migrant rights in Europe, Palestinian liberation, and 
South African decolonisation are not the same, they  are interrelated and dialectically 
entwined: through  circuits  of  empire,  labor,  migration,  and  cultural  and  political 
imagination. This does not deny the uniqueness and specificity of local struggles—after 
all,  Palestinians,  Blacks,  migrants,  and  Indigenous  peoples  do  not  share  the  same 
experience of oppression—but it does emphasise their transnational character, and thus 
points to the importance of connecting (but  not unifying) different struggles, projects, 
and trajectories under racial capitalism.
Such an internationalism is  of  course not  easy or  automatic:  as  discussed in 
previous chapters, practises of solidarity can easily re-colonise and re-silence those who 
resist  oppression and become yet  another  re-enactment  of  power and privilege.  The 
problem, as Indigenous scholar Andrea Smith has argued, is that racialized peoples can 
be victims of one or more of the logics of white  supremacy, and  simultaneously be 
complicit in oppression through the other logics. The goal of a radical internationalism, 
then,  cannot  be  to  homogenise  oppression,  nor  can  it  be  to  establish  who is  more 
oppressed. Instead, it must seek to understand “how anti-immigrant xenophobia, white 
supremacy,  and  settler  colonialism  are  mutually  reinforcing  in  ways  that  actually 
prevent us from seeing how these logics are fully connected.”10 The struggles against 
empire, white supremacy, settler colonialism, gender subordination, and capitalism are 
not the same—but they are interlocking. As such it is futile to change one system while 
leaving others intact.
10 See Smith's introduction in Harsha Walia, Undoing Border Imperialism (AK Press, 2014), xiii.
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For scholars of a postcolonial and poststructuralist bent, such an emancipatory 
project is likely to look suspicious. How, they might ask, can the idea of total critique 
and transformation  be  retrieved,  without  invoking Eurocentric  ideas  about  universal 
history?  To answer  this  question—and  to  counter  the  idea  that  the  internationalism 
outlined  above  is  yet  another  version  of  Eurocentric  universal  history—in  the  next 
sections  I  revisit  the  post/decolonial  debate  on history  and historicism.  Drawing on 
Susan Buck-Morss, Walter Benjamin, and Stuart Hall, I show that it in fact is possible to 
retrieve the emancipatory project of equality and freedom without  relying on the false 
universalism of the Enlightenment.
Universal History and Its Discontents
The concept of universal history—which sees the history of humanity as a story 
about gradual progress towards greater freedom, equality, prosperity, rationality, and/or 
peace—is  central  to  Enlightenment  philosophy. As  Wendy  Brown  explains,  “[f]or 
Hegel, the world was growing ever more rational; for Kant, more peaceful; for Paine; 
more true to the principles of natural right; for Tocqueville, more egalitarian; for Mill, 
more free and reasonable; and for Marx, perhaps, all of the above.”11 Over the last thirty 
years  such  ideas  have  been  heavily  criticized  by  post-  and  decolonial  scholars.  As 
Dipesh Chakrabarty, Ranajit Guha, Anibal Quijano, Robert White, and numerous others 
have shown, the idea that history progresses from one “stage” to another is intimately 
intwined  with  European  colonialism  and  domination.  In  Chakrabarty's  formulation, 
“[h]istoricism enabled European domination of the world in the nineteenth century.”12 
By privileging and universalising the European path of development,  Enlightenment 
philosophers depicted Europe or “the West” as more developed and advanced than the 
non-European world. As Quijano explains, 
“All  non-Europeans  could  be  considered  as  pre-European  and  at  the 
same time displaced on a certain historical chain from the primitive to 
the civilized, from the rational to the irrational, from the traditional to 
the  modern,  from the  magic-mythic  to  the  scientific.  In  other  words, 
from the non-European/pre-European to something that in time will be 
11 Wendy Brown, Politics Out of History (Princeton University Press, 2001), 6.
12 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference 
(Princeton University Press, 2000), 7. For a discussion of the entanglement of Europe's colonial 
project and the philosophy of history see, amongst others, Allen, The End of Progress; Guha, History 
at the Limit of World-History; Young, White Mythologies.
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Europeanized or modernized.”13
Hegel's  account  of  world  history,  which  is  premised  on  the  development  of  the 
consciousness of freedom, offers a typical example. Africa, Hegel maintained, is outside 
of history, and Africans constitute a “race of children that remain immersed in a state of 
naiveté.”14 For Kant, similarly, non-Europeans—which he classified as black (Africans), 
yellow (Asians), and red (Asians)—were less advanced than white Europeans, and thus 
less capable of self-rule. As Thomas McCarthy has shown, Kant considered “cultivation, 
civilization, and moralization a process of diffusion from the West to the rest of the 
world”,15 through  which  non-European  cultures  gradually  assimilated  to  European 
culture. Marx, meanwhile, described capitalism as an intrinsic stage in history's path, 
leading him to argue that the “country that is more developed industrially only shows, to 
the  less  developed,  the  image of  its  own future.”16 Like Hegel  and Kant,  European 
modernity was for him superior to non-European forms of life. Non-European cultures 
were thus relegated to an “imaginary waiting-room of history.”17
The problem with such narratives of universal history is not only that they give 
legitimacy  to  the  civilising  mission,  serving  as  ideological  rationalisation  and 
justification  for  Europe's  colonial  project.  They also  rely  on  a  skewed  reading  of 
Europe's own history, which elides the ways in which Enlightenment modernity was the 
product, not only of Europe's internal struggle for  liberty, equality, and fraternity, but 
also of the creation of colonial empire abroad. As Fanon reminds us, “Europe is literally 
the creation of the Third World. The riches which are choking it are those plundered 
from the underdeveloped peoples.”18 The rise  of industrial  capitalism in Europe was 
made  possible  by  the  enslavement  of  millions  of  Africans,  the  genocide  of  Native 
Americans, imported Asian indentured servitude, and the extraction of natural resources 
13 Anibal Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Social Classification,” in Coloniality at  
Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate, ed. Mabel Moraña, Enrique D. Dussel, and Carlos 
A. Jáuregui (Duke University Press, 2008), 204.
14 Quoted in Naomi Zack, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race (Oxford University Press, 
2016), 254. For an excellent analysis of the role of race in Hegel’s philosophy of history, see Stuart 
Barnett and Robert Bernasconi, “Hegel at the Court of the Ashanti,” in Hegel After Derrida 
(Routledge, 1998).
15 Thomas McCarthy, Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development (Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 67. For a similar analysis of JS Mill, see Beate Jahn, “Barbarian Thoughts: Imperialism in the 
Philosophy of John Stuart Mill,” Review of International Studies 31, no. 3 (2005): 599–618.
16 Quoted in Kevin B. Anderson, Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western  
Societies (University of Chicago Press, 2016), 177.
17 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, 8. He continues: “the European idea of history... came to non-
European peoples in the 19th century as somebody’s way of saying "not yet” to somebody else.”
18 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London: Penguin, 2001), 58.
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such from the colonies.19 Moreover, and as Edward Said demonstrated in  Orientalism, 
European  Enlightenment  was  also  ideologically  dependent  on  the  colonial  project, 
because  Europe's  own  identity  was  formed  through  encounters  with  those  that  it 
perceived as geographically and culturally other.  
Critiques such as these have led many to conclude that the concept of universal 
history is inherently bankrupt and best left in the dustbin of history.20 Such conclusions 
may nonetheless be too hasty. As Chakrabarty makes clear, “there is no easy way of 
dispensing with these universals in the condition of political modernity.”21 In fact, the 
“very critique of colonialism [is] itself unthinkable except as a legacy, partially, of how 
Enlightenment  Europe  was  appropriated  in  the  subcontinent.”22 The  very  project  of 
provincializing  Europe  presupposes  some  form  of  global  historical  narrative.  For 
Chakrabarty, the challenge is thus how to reimagine history while rejecting teleological 
assumptions  about  historical  progress,  whose  theoretical  subject  is  always  and 
necessarily Europe. His proposed solution draws on Heidegger and suggests that there 
exists a plurality of histories: next to the universal history of capital, which he labels 
History  1,  there  are  multiple,  alternative  histories  that  have  their  own integrity  and 
independence, and that resist easy assimilation into the historicist narrative posited by 
Eurocentrism. According to Chakrabarty, these alternative histories—History 2—consist 
of “antecedents” to capitalism, life-worlds that do not contribute to the self-production 
of capital and that therefore have the power to interrupt it.
A similar idea is developed by Enrique Dussel in his work on analectics. “Ana”, 
meaning beyond, refers to the alterity or otherness that lie beyond totality. For Dussel, 
analectics  thus  designates  a  method  “which  begins  from the  Other  as  free,  as  one 
beyond  the  system  of  totality.”23 He  borrows  this  idea  from  Lévinas,  for  whom 
exteriority names the “otherwise than being, or beyond essence.”24 Nonetheless, where 
Lévinas sees this alterity as belonging to an abstract Other, for Dussel the Other is a 
concrete human subject: the poor, the oppressed, or those that live in the periphery. As 
19 For a classical formulation, see Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa 
(Fahamu/Pambazuka, 2012). See also Lisa Lowe, The Intimacies of Four Continents (Duke University 
Press, 2015).
20 Antonio Y. Vázquez-Arroyo, “Universal History Disavowed: On Critical Theory and 
Postcolonialism,” Postcolonial Studies 11, no. 4 (December 1, 2008): 451, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13688790802468288.
21 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, 5.
22 Chakrabarty, 4.
23 Quoted in Michael D. Barber, Ethical Hermeneutics: Rationality in Enrique Dussel’s Philosophy of  
Liberation (Fordham Univ Press, 1998), 27.
24 E. Levinas, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence (Springer Science & Business Media, 2013).
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he explains, it is by listening to, and learning from, the voices that are located beyond 
the exteriority of domination, that it is possible to formulate both a negative critique (of 
the oppression of the system) as well as a positive critique (which posits an alternative 
utopia, based on Indigenous traditions and world views). 
While these formulations both yield alternative accounts of history, they rely on 
an  ideal  of  authenticity  and unmediated  experience.  In  that  they are  not  unlike  the 
“ethics-first”  approaches  that  we  encountered  in  chapter  1.  Where  the  ethical 
frameworks of Rawls, Habermas, Butler, and others rely on ontological universals that 
separate ethics  and  politics,  Dussel  and  Chakrabarty  instead  seek  to  recuperate  the 
“authentic voices” of the periphery which, they hope, might be able to steer political life 
in  a  more  just  direction.  The  problem,  as  Barbara  Weinstein  explains,  is  that 
Eurocentrism “boasts a long tradition of situating elements of 'oriental' culture outside 
of  its  historicist  narrative.”25 By  grounding  their  projects  in  the  existence  of  a 
supposedly uncontaminated alterity, Chakrabarty and Dussel therefore both “run the risk 
of  replicating  an  'orientalist'  discourse  that  would  certainly  represent  no  challenge 
whatsoever  to  the  eurocentric  vision  of  the  world.”26 In  contrast  to  Dussel  and 
Chakrabarty, who both attempt to reimagine history from the position of exteriority, in 
what follows I argue that it in fact is possible to retrieve the disparaged idea of universal 
history without  invoking the false universalism of the Enlightenment.  To demonstrate 
how and why, I turn to Susan Buck-Morss's provocative work on Hegel and Haiti.
Interrupting History: Unhistorical Histories and Counternarratives
Susan Buck-Morss has in recent years sought to derive a reconstructed notion of 
universal  history.  Her  work  is  directed  against  the  colonial  logic  of  Western 
emancipatory discourses,  as well  as the  relativistic beliefs in plural modernities and 
multiple truths. As she explains,  while  “the postcolonial  attack on Eurocentrism has 
done much to rectify the colonial distortions of global knowledge it has splintered the 
political response at the same time that the celebration of cultural difference has been 
25 Barbara Weinstein, “History Without a Cause? Grand Narratives, World History, and the Postcolonial  
Dilemma,” International Review of Social History 50, no. 1 (April 2005): 87, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859004001865.
26 Weinstein, 87. Ofelia Scutte has similarly argued that Dussel's ethics of pure, uncontaminated 
exterirority presupposes that the oppressed have to stay in the privileged position of exteriority in 
order to be able to to speak to the established system of domination; “One must remain on the 
periphery if one is to receive the moral blessings associated with alterity.” Ofelia Schutte, Cultural 
Identity and Social Liberation in Latin American Thought (SUNY Press, 1993), 201.
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assimilated  into  neoliberal  discourse  and marketing  rhetoric  with  surprising  ease.”27 
While Buck-Morss worries about the disappearance of a future-oriented emancipatory 
politics,  she is  also aware that  a  return  to  a  discussion of universality  “threatens to 
merge.... with the ideological needs of a newly constituted, global, ruling class.”28 The 
problem can  be  summarised  as:  How might  is  be  possible  to  rescue  “the  ideal  of 
universal human history from the uses to which white domination has put it”29 and to 
advocate a “universal history worth the name?”30
Buck-Morss develops an answer to this question by returning to Hegel's dialectic 
of lordship (Herr) and bondage (Knecht). In  Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History she 
argues that Hegel's dialectic of freedom was modelled on the real confrontation taking 
place between the enslaved and slave-owners in the French colony of Saint-Domingue, 
1791-1804. Accounts of the insurrection were widely available in European journals and 
newspapers, including the German cosmopolitan magazine  Minerva which Hegel read 
regularly.  Between 1804 and 1805,  Minerva published “a continuing series, totalling 
more  than a  hundred pages,  including source  documents,  news summaries,  and eye 
witness accounts.”31 As Buck-Morss explains, this leaves us with
“only  two  alternatives.  Either  Hegel  was  the  blindest  of  all  blind 
philosophers of freedom in Enlightenment Europe, surpassing Locke and 
Rousseau by far in his ability to block out reality right in front of his nose 
(the print right in front of his face at the breakfast table); or Hegel knew
—knew about real slaves revolting successfully against real masters, and 
he elaborated his dialectic of lordship and bondage  deliberately within 
this contemporary context.”32
For Buck-Morss, this means that Hegel's master-slave dialectic should not be considered 
a mere philosophical metaphor, inspired by the writings of other European intellectuals. 
Rather it  is a historically grounded metaphor,  based on the self-emancipation of the 
Saint-Domingue slaves. Hegel's  Phenomenology of Spirit cannot  be fully understood 
without accounting for the black bodies that inspired it, or the European empires against 
which they rebelled. By interrupting Hegel's narrative, Buck-Morss thus also intends to 
interrupt the history of European modernity. The uncovered link between Hegel and 
27 Susan Buck-Morss, “The Gift of the Past,” Small Axe 14, no. 3 33 (November 1, 2010): 174, 
https://doi.org/10.1215/07990537-2010-033.
28 Buck-Morss, 174.





Haiti, she argues, subverts the Enlightenment narrative from within, rendering Europe 
strange  and  no  longer  identical  to  itself:  “[w]hat  happens  when,  in  the  spirit  of 
dialectics, we turn the tables and consider Haiti not as a victim of Europe, but as an 
agent in Europe's construction?”33 The answer, she argues, is a decentering of the legacy 
of modernity that allows us to recover and rewrite, rather than reject, its universal intent. 
In other words, by reconnecting the disconnected histories of Hegel and Haiti, Buck-
Morss demonstrates how the universal history theorised by Enlightenment thinkers must 
be understood as a product of the colonial system—and not of Europe's endogenous 
development. As she explains, “[i]f the historical facts about freedom can be ripped out 
of the narratives told by the victors and salvaged for our own time, then the project of 
universal freedom does not need to be discarded, but rather, redeemed and reconstituted 
on a different basis.”34 Ultimately, by interrupting the very idea of universal history so 
central to both Hegel as well as the wider Enlightenment tradition, it becomes possible 
to formulate a counternarrative that holds on to a universal notion of freedom but which 
does so without invoking the false universalism of the Enlightenment.
Buck-Morss's  attempt  to rescue  the  utopian  moment  shares  similarities  with 
Walter Benjamin's philosophy of history. In his  Arcades Project, Benjamin sought to 
formulate  “a  historical  materialism  which  has  annihilated  within  itself  the  idea  of 
progress”, and which takes as its “founding concept... not progress but actualization.”35 
For Benjamin, the past is never fixed nor finalised, but endlessly reconstructed in its 
afterlife; what has been is always open to appropriation and erasure. To articulate the 
past  historically  does  therefore  not  mean  to  recognise  it  the  way  it  really  was  or 
happened. Instead, a truly historical understanding of the past seeks to “blast a specific 
era out of the homogenous course of history” and to recognize “a revolutionary chance 
in  the fight  for the  oppressed past.”36 For Benjamin, revolutionary transformation is 
ultimately an interruption of history, rather than its culmination. Freedom is not internal 
to history—as it is for Hegel, Marx, and Kant—but is instead experienced as a rupture 
that blasts the past and present out of linear sequence. Hannah Arendt, in discussing 
Benjamin's  work,  referred  to  this  as  “pearl  diving”,  in  which  one  “descends to  the 
bottom of the sea, not to excavate the bottom and bring it to light but to pry loose the 
33 Buck-Morss, 80.
34 Buck-Morss, 74–5.
35 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project (Harvard University Press, 1999), 460. For an excellent 
overview of Benjamin's philosophy of history, see Brown, Politics Out of History; Beatrice Hanssen, 
Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project (A&C Black, 2006).
36 Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings: 1938-1940 (Harvard University Press, 1996), 396.
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rich  and the  strange,  the  pearls  and  the  coral  in  the  depths,  and  carry  them to  the 
surface.”37 The sea here functions as a metaphor for the past, with the pearls being the 
forgotten fragments and crystallisations of time that only can be brought to light by 
someone—the pearl diver—who discerns meaning in them. Through its focus on pearl 
divers, Benjamin's philosophy of history not only centre-stages revolutionary, subaltern 
groups  as  the  agents  of  history.  It  also  re-conceives  history  as  a  discontinuity  or 
“arresting  of  happening”  that  transforms rather  than  continues  linear  history.  In  the 
words of Theodore Adorno, “progress occurs where it ends.”38
Like  Benjamin,  Buck-Morss  also  attempts  to  “blast  open  the  continuum  of 
history.” By rescuing the Haitian revolution from the oblivion imposed by the Hegelian 
understanding  of  universal  history,  she  too  seeks  to  grasp  the  universal,  “not  by 
subsuming  facts  within  overarching  systems  or  homogenizing  premises,  but  by 
attending to the edges... the boundaries of our historical imagination in order to trespass, 
trouble, and tear these boundaries down.”39 In other words, by breaking with the silence 
imposed by hegemonic narratives and giving voice to those sacrificed on the altar of 
progress,  Buck-Morss  seeks  to  formulate  a  counternarrative  that  liberates  “our  own 
imagination”  and “inspire[s] action” rather than re-inscribes  power.40 The history  of 
freedom thus conceived is not available to a priori reasoning: rather than a new meta-
narrative of linear progress (be it  the Hegelian march to greater consciousness or the 
Kantian universal peace) freedom is here understood as an insight that appears like a 
flash.
Pearl Divers: To Know the Time On the Clock of the World
We are now in a position to return to the question of how the emancipatory 
claims of the radical internationalism outlined in previous chapters are to be understood. 
Indeed,  how  might  it  be  possible  to  hold  on  to  the  idea  of  total  critique  and 
emancipatory politics while also resisting teleological understandings of history?
37 Quoted in Dana Villa, The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt (Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 278.
38 Adorno, Critical Models, 150.
39 Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History, 79.
40 As Buck-Morss explains in an exchange with David Scott and Sibylle Fischer, “the goal is to disrupt 
the intellectual order by exposing the blind spots that hinder conceptual, hence political, imagination.” 
Susan Buck-Morss, “The Gift of the Past,” Small Axe 14, no. 3 33 (November 1, 2010): 174, 
https://doi.org/10.1215/07990537-2010-033. See also Sibylle Fischer, “History and Catastrophe,” 
Small Axe 14, no. 3 (November 26, 2010): 163–72; David Scott, “Antinomies of Slavery, 
Enlightenment, and Universal History,” Small Axe 14, no. 3 33 (November 1, 2010): 152–62, 
https://doi.org/10.1215/07990537-2010-031.
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Stuart  Hall's  formulation  of  a  Marxism “without  guarantees”  offers  tentative 
answers.  If the  universal arrives as an interruption of History (rather than through its 
linear advancement), then it becomes crucial to know “what time it is on the clock of the  
world”41, as Chinese-American philosopher and political activist Grace Lee Boggs once 
put it. Hall's work revolved around precisely this question. Like Cedric Robinson, Hall 
sought to develop a materialist analysis of ideology, identity, race, and (post)coloniality; 
and like Buck-Morss, he simultaneously tried to retrieve a conception of emancipatory 
politics,  without  invoking  Eurocentric  ideas  of  history-as-teleology.  For  Hall,  this 
necessitated a sensitivity to the contingency of the present: what he called conjunctural 
specificity. As he explained in his famous 1983 “without guarantees” essay on Marx and 
the problem of ideology, the structure of social practices is “neither free-floating nor 
immaterial.  But  neither  is  it  a  transitive  structure,  in  which  its  intelligibility  lies 
exclusively in the one-way transmission of effects from the base upwards.”42 Indeed, the 
“terrain” of the present cannot be defined by “forces we can predict with the certainty of 
natural science” but must rather be assessed with attentiveness to “the existing balance 
of  forces,  the  specific  nature  of  the  concrete  conjuncture.”43 Being  sensitive  to  the 
contingency of the present, Hall argued, thus means abandoning the idea that the present 
rests  on  fixed foundations,  and that  it  is  shaped by a  pre-determined past  and pre-
ordained future: instead, the present has to be analysed in its conjunctural specificity. To 
think conjuncturally—a framework he borrowed from Gramsci—was thus to remain 
attentive  to  the  social  forces,  historical  factors,  and  relations  of  domination  and 
subordination which, at specific points in time, come together and conflict.44 As Hall 
explains,  a  conjuncture  is  a  “period  when  different  social,  political,  economic  and 
ideological contradictions that are at work in society and have given it a specific and 
distinctive  shape  come  together,  producing  a  crisis  of  some  kind.”45 Conjunctural 
41 Grace Lee Boggs and Scott Kurashige, The Next American Revolution: Sustainable Activism for the  
Twenty-First Century (University of California Press, 2012), xiii.
42 Stuart Hall, “The Problem of Ideology: Marxism Without Guarantees,” in Stuart Hall: Critical  
Dialogues in Cultural Studies, ed. Kuan-Hsing Chen, David Morley, and Former Professor of Tropical 
Child Health David Morley (Routledge, 2006), 44.
43 Hall, 44.
44 In Lawrence Grossberg's formulation, “A conjuncture is a description of a social formation as 
fractured and conflictual, along multiple axes, planes and scales, constantly in search of temporary 
balances or structural stabilities through a variety of practices and processes of struggle and 
negotiation... It is not a slice of time or a period but a moment defined by an 
accumulation/condensation of contradictions, a fusion of different currents or circumstances.” James 
Clifford, “Travelling Cultures,” in Cultural Studies, ed. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula 
A. Treichler (Psychology Press, 1992), 4.
45 Stuart Hall and Doreen Massey, “Interpreting the Crisis,” in The Neoliberal Crisis, ed. Katharine 
Harris and Sally Davison (Lawrence and Wishart, 2015), 57. As Hall explains elsewhere:  “Gramsci 
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analysis—the teasing out of the particularities of the present—was for Hall thus always 
a political form of work, designed to reveal the possibilities for action and change in the 
present. In David Scott's observation, the power of thinking conjuncturally is precisely 
that “it  promotes a conception of politics understood as  strategic,  as  always  earned 
rather than derived, as always a matter of ideological  struggle, as an ongoing 'war of 
position.'”46
If there is a universalism to such a politics—and, thinking with Buck-Morss, I 
would like to suggest that there is—then it is neither abstract (in a Kantian sense) nor 
free-floating  (as  it  is  for  poststructuralists).  Instead  it  arises  in  opposition  to  the 
universalising thrust of racial capitalism and the hegemonic narratives that accompany 
it. In Anna Tsing's formulation, “[u]niversal claims allow people to make history, but not 
under  the  conditions  those  claims  might  lead  them to  choose.”47 Understanding the 
universal  thus  requires  analysing how  it  is  given  content  and  force  in  specific 
conjunctures.  The  radical  internationalism  discussed  in  previous  chapters  can  be 
understood  in  precisely  this  way,  because  it  seeks  to  sabotage  and  interrupt  the 
hegemonic  discourses  that  frame  the  present  as  postcolonial  and  postracial,  and 
capitalism as the inevitable endpoint of history. The struggles against police brutality in 
the United States, white nationalism in Europe, and neoliberal apartheid in Palestine and 
South Africa, do not so much change the direction of history as blast it open. Indeed, by 
challenging progressivist narratives that present the contemporary capitalist world as 
inevitable and irreversible, these struggles rupture the continuity of history that sustains 
this order: migrants are interrupting established interpretations that see Europe as the 
haven of democracy, liberty, and universal rights, rather than a physical and cultural 
space  constituted  through  the  entanglements  of  empire  and  racial  violence;  Black 
radicals challenge narratives of American exceptionalism by placing the struggle against 
domestic  police  brutality  within  a  global  struggle  against  the  many  afterlives  of 
argued that, though the economic must never be forgotten, conjunctural crises are never solely 
economic, or economically-determined 'in the last instance'. They arise when a number of 
contradictions at work in different key practices and sites come together - or 'conjoin' - in the same 
moment and political space and, as Althusser said, 'fuse in a ruptural unity'. Analysis here focuses on 
crises and breaks, and the distinctive character of the 'historic settlements' which follow. The 
condensation of forces during a period of crisis, and the new social configurations which result, mark 
a new 'conjuncture.'” Stuart Hall, “The Neoliberal Revolution,” in The Neoliberal Crisis, ed. 
Katharine Harris and Sally Davison (Lawrence and Wishart, 2015), 9.
46 David Scott, “Stuart Hall’s Ethics,” Small Axe 9, no. 1 (2005): 6. See also John Clarke, “Conjunctures, 
Crises, and Cultures: Valuing Stuart Hall,” Focaal: Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology, 
no. 70 (2014).
47 Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection (Princeton University 
Press, 2011), 270.
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historical and ongoing colonialism; and Fallists call into question discourses that equate 
decolonisation  with  state  reformation.  These  “pearl  divers”  invite  the  return  of  the 
oppressed: by seeking to redeem the unknown, the unremembered, and the unmourned 
dead,  they  are  re-conceiving  the  relationship  between  the  past,  present,  and  future, 
without invoking Eurocentric  notions  of  progress  and teleology.  Their  revolutionary 
internationalism  is  thus  at  once  productive  and  destructive.  As  Benjamin  explains, 
“Marx says that revolutions are the locomotive of world history. But perhaps it is quite 
otherwise. Perhaps revolutions are an attempt by the passengers on the train—namely, 
the  human  race—to  activate  the  emergency  brake.”48 Rather  than  the  inevitable 
culmination  of  a  preordained  and progressive  history,  the  internationalism imagined 
here challenges the current direction of history. By bringing the world to a standstill, it 
turns the present into a revolutionary possibility.
Conclusion
In  the  history  of  Western  political  thought,  emancipation  has  often  been 
portrayed  as  a  story  of  gradual  progress  towards  freedom,  equality,  prosperity, 
rationality, and peace. In the words of Raymond Aron, “the dialectic of universality is 
the mainspring of the march of history.”49 After  the post- and decolonial  critique of 
universal history, what remains of this project? In this chapter I have interrogated what 
it means to hold on to the dream of emancipation while recognising that universalism is 
intimately bound up with the history of European colonialism and domination. Drawing 
on  Susan  Buck-Morss,  Walter  Benjamin,  and  Stuart  Hall,  I  have  argued  that  it  is 
possible to retrieve the emancipatory project of equality and freedom without invoking 
teleological,  progressive  readings  of  history.  The  universalism that  underwrites  this 
project  is  neither  abstract  (in  a  Kantian  sense)  nor  free-floating  (as  it  is  for 
poststructuralists),  but  arises  in  opposition  to  the  universalising  thrust  of  racial 
capitalism—including  the way in which it  depends on  gender  subordination, border-
making  practices,  ongoing  primitive  accumulation,  the  production  of  surplus 
populations, and the growth of a global “security archipelago.”50 In enacting a radical 
internationalism, and telling an insurgent counternarrative, movements and groups such 
as Black Lives Matter, BDS, Rhodes/Fees Must Fall, and migrant activists remind us 
that there could have been a different world—and, indeed, that there still can be.
48 Benjamin, Selected Writings, 402.
49 Raymond Aron, Progress and Disillusion: The Dialectics of Modern Society, 1968, 217.
50 Paul Amar, The Security Archipelago: Human-Security States, Sexuality Politics, and the End of  
Neoliberalism (Duke University Press, 2013).
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C O N C L U S I O N
Strikers in Saris: Poetry of the Future
Fig. 4: Jayaben Desai at the picket line at Grunwick
“What you are running here is not a factory, it is a zoo. In a zoo, there 
are  many types  of  animals.  Some are  monkeys  who dance  on  your 
fingertips, others are lions who can bite your head off. We are those 
lions, Mr Manager.”1
With these  words  Jayaben  Desai  and five  other  workers  walked out  of  the 
Grunwick Film Processing Laboratories in North London. It was 1976. The following 
two years  would  see  a  historic  strike  unfold,  led by  East  African  and South  Asian 
women workers, and against poor working conditions, low pay, misogyny, and racism. 
The “strikers in saris”, as they came to be known in the press, not only demanded trade 
union recognition. They also defied the racist patriarchal structures which reproduced 
them as a distinct class category—as “Asian women”, suitable only for the most low 
paid  unskilled  jobs  in  laundries,  the  clothing  and  hosiery  industries,  canteens,  as 
cleaners and homeworkers. In her chapter in the now classic The Empire Strikes Back, 
Pratibha  Parmar  reflects  on  how  Asian  women  at  the  time  were  conceptualised  as 
passive and helpless victims: as subservient non-working wives and mothers, “whose 
1 “Grunwick Dispute: What Did the ‘Strikers in Saris’ Achieve?,” BBC News, September 10, 2016, 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-37244466.
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problems are that they do not speak English, hardly ever leave the house... their lives are 
limited  to  the  kitchen,  the  children  and  the  religious  rituals,  and  they  are  both 
emotionally  and economically  dependent  on  their  husbands.”2 Such stereotypes,  she 
goes  on  to  argue,  were  not  only  without  foundation—indeed,  a  majority  of  the 
Grunwick strikers came from societies where women worked both outside and inside of 
the  home,  and  had  engaged  in  and  supported  anti-colonial  national  liberation 
movements. Moreover, these stereotypes also helped to elide the real institutional power 
structures, which subjected Asian women to virginity testing, placed them in dependent 
positions to their men vis-a-vis the British state, and confined them to the bottom of the 
ladder  in  terms  of  wages,  long  hours,  and  unsafe  working  conditions.3 As  Parmar 
concludes, “The explanation for the ways in which a particular labour force, i.e. Asian 
women, were able to be controlled and consequently exploited in particular ways is not 
to be found in archaic and sexist practices within the Asian cultures, but in the process 
by which these patriarchal features are transformed by a patriarchal ideology invoking 
common-sense racist ideas about Asian women.”4 In claiming the picket line as their 
own,  the  Grunwick  strikers  thus  not  only  confronted  assumptions  of  Asian  female 
domesticity. Indeed, they also transformed the very meaning of class in 1970s Britain. 
Their call for secondary picketing was heeded by miners, dockers, steelworkers, and 
other workers from across the country, who flocked to the small alleys around Dollis 
Hill tube station in North London where they joined the strikers in solidarity. While the 
strike ultimately ended in defeat, the mass support Desai and the other strikers managed 
to draw together demonstrated the power and, indeed, the possibility of building cross-
racial and multi-ethnic coalitions against racial capitalism.5
2 Pratibha Parmar, “Gender, Race and Class: Asian Women in Resistance,” in The Empire Strikes Back, 
by Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (Routledge, 1982), 249.
3 The Home Office regularly carried out vaginal examinations on Asian women to determine whether  
they were married or not and, thus, whether they were fiancées of men already living in Britain. These 
were based on the racist and sexist idea that Asian women were virgins until they married. Once 
settled in Britain, they were made dependent on their husband—the “head of the household”—who 
individually received all vouchers from the state. Consequently, “from the vert beginning Asian 
women have been discriminated against not only because they are black but also as women in terms of 
their legal rights of entry and settlement.” Parmar, 240.
4 Parmar, 260. Indeed, “The image of passive and docile Asian women has been used by employers, 
first to manipulate and control the women in their workplaces, and second to harass and intimidate 
them when they withdraw their labour.” Parmar, 258.
5 For a detailed account of the Grunwick strike, see Amrit Wilson, “Finding a Voice: Asian Women in 
Britain,” in Black British Feminism: A Reader, ed. Heidi Safia Mirza (Psychology Press, 1997); Ruth 
Pearson, Sundari Anitha, and Linda McDowell, “Striking Issues: From Labour Process to Industrial 
Dispute at Grunwick and Gate Gourmet,” Industrial Relations Journal 41, no. 5 (September 1, 2010): 
408–28, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2338.2010.00577.x.
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~In this study I have explored the relationship between solidarity, materiality, and  
the  global  colour  line.  Why  has  the  philosophical  literature  on  global  justice  and 
cosmopolitan ethics had so little to say about the racial structuring of the international? 
What has this silence made possible, and what would it mean for cosmopolitanism to 
take seriously the  problem of  the  global  colour  line? In search  of  answers  to  these 
questions, the thesis has made three distinct contributions—contributions which, as we 
shall see, take us back to Grunwick and the strikers in saris.
First, I have examined how, why, and with what effect cosmopolitan discussions 
of solidarity elide, neglect, and deny the role of race and colonialism in contemporary 
world politics. I have argued that the erasure of race is more than a mere accident or 
matter of oversight: cosmopolitanism is in fact an eminently political project because, in 
disconnecting connected histories and sidelining questions of political economy, it often 
helps to transform the responsible colonial agent into an innocent bystander. With that, 
questions  of  accountability,  guilt,  restitution,  repentance,  and  structural  reform  are 
turned into matters of hospitality, generosity, humanitarianism, and empathy. The rise of 
cosmopolitan thinking in the 1990s must thus be considered less a result of a steady, 
gradual  climb towards  global  justice,  and more a  product  of a  set  of historical  and 
material  conditions  which  in  the  late  20th century  made  it  highly  desirable  for 
policymakers, activists, and intellectuals to think of world politics as an ethical space. 
The end of the Cold War marked not so much the beginning of a new global era as a 
return  to  the  North-dominated  global  order  of  1492-1945.  As  the  global 
counterrevolutions  to  colonialism  and  capitalism  came  to  an  end  and  other 
internationalisms  were  brutally  blocked,  the  ethical  discourses  that  in  the  long  19th 
century had legitimised the colonial enterprise returned but in updated form. The result 
was a  transformation of  the very meaning of  the term solidarity:  as  Kant  displaced 
Marx, and discourses of empathy and suffering superseded the language of struggle and 
liberation, solidarity would increasingly come to be associated with ethics—and not the 
revolution. The cosmopolitan preference for abstraction, ahistoricism, and anti-politics 
should  therefore  not  be  considered  an  innocent,  apolitical  choice;  rather  it  is  an 
eminently political strategy that helps to uphold, legitimise, and entrench the current 
unjust and unequal racialized international order. 
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In  response,  I  have—secondly—examined how  a  materialist  reading  of  the 
global  colour  line  might  help  us  rethink  the  concept  of  solidarity.  The  project  of 
radicalising and decolonising solidarity, I have argued, must begin with rethinking the 
racial structuring of the international through the lens of political economy. While the 
postcolonial focus on questions of cultural difference, Eurocentrism, and representations 
of the imperial Self and the colonial Other has been helpful in bringing certain features 
of  the  global  colour  line  into  view,  it  has  also  left  other  aspects  to  the  side—in 
particular, the material and socioeconomic dimensions of race and racism. Drawing on 
Cedric Robinson and the literature on racial  capitalism, I have instead theorised  the 
global colour line as a racial ontology that enables the hyper-exploitation of non-white 
peoples and lands, while privileging others.  Unwaged and less-than-free labour—such 
as chattel slavery, racialized indentured servitude, convict leasing, debt peonage, and 
gendered  forms  of  caring  work  and  reproductive  labour—are  not  just  incidental  to 
capital  accumulation  (as  orthodox  Marxists  might  argue),  but  fundamental  to  its 
operations. In the neoliberal present these dynamics have been both systematised and 
reconfigured: indeed, while racialized  and gendered forms of domination continue to 
pattern global politics, they have evolved to take on new forms, fit for the postcolonial 
and multicultural present. In this thesis I have focused on two aspects in particular: first, 
the hyperextraction of surplus value from racialized bodies and, second, the racialized 
violence of the penal and national security state. From the ghettos of Los Angeles to the 
slums in Cairo, the favelas of Rio, and the borderlands of Europe, a growing security 
archipelago is quickly taking shape, designed to protect the wealthy and powerful from 
those rendered surplus by the social and economic dislocations of racial capitalism. 
Third and finally,  I have examined what form of  internationalist imaginary is 
enabled by such a materialist reading of the global colour line—in other words, what an 
internationalism that begins, not with universal ethics and moralistic abstractions, but 
from a global political economic critique of race and racism, might look like and mean. 
Undoing easy distinctions between “class struggle” and “identity politics”, a materialist 
reading of the global colour line uncovers new political possibilities. Indeed, the concept 
of  racial  capitalism not  only  compels  us  to  think  of  racism,  capitalism,  and gender 
oppression  as  mutually  constitutive  forces  in  the  world.  It  also  calls  forward  an 
internationalist  perspective,  a  political  imaginary  that  links  together  the  local  and 
international dimensions of white supremacy. W.E.B. Du Bois's Black Reconstruction in  
America, written more than 80 years ago, remains one of the most insightful texts in this 
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regard. Exploring the relation between capitalism, slavery, and emancipation, Du Bois 
argued that  the American Civil  War was a  proletariat  revolution  within a  bourgeois 
republic;  Black  emancipation  was  “one  of  the  most  extraordinary  experiments  of 
Marxism that the world, before the Russian Revolution, had seen.”6 The book finishes 
with  a  call  for  an  internationalist  consciousness  and  revolutionary  movement  that 
reaches beyond national borders and embraces all the oppressed and exploited peoples 
of the globe:
“Immediately in Africa,  a black back runs red with the blood of the 
lash;  in  India,  a  brown girl  is  raped;  in  China,  a  coolie  starves;  in 
Alabama, seven darkies are more than lynched; while in London, the 
white limbs of a prostitute are hung with jewels and silk. Flames of 
jealous murder sweep the earth, while brains of little children smear the 
hills.”7
Du Bois clearly recognised the connections between the struggle for abolition 
democracy at home and the rise of global capitalism and US imperialism. The triumph 
of  white  supremacy  within  the  United  States,  he  argued,  enabled  the  creation  of 
imperialist  projects  abroad.  The  fight  against  white  supremacy  therefore  required  a 
linking together  of  national  and international  struggles—not  because  these  struggles 
were  exactly  and  everywhere  the  same  but,  rather,  because  they  were  linked  and 
interlocking. As George Lipsitz has noted, Du Bois's work thus “compels us to honour 
the particularities of place without becoming subsumed in them to look for unexpected 
alliances and affiliations across and within national boundaries without losing sight of 
the systemic, integrated and fully linked economic, political and ideological practices 
that shape exploitation, hierarchy and oppression everywhere.”8 
Building on these insights, in this thesis I have argued that an internationalism 
that takes seriously the global colour line needs to link together a variety of different 
movements  that often are  considered as  separate  and “only” local.  Through a close 
reading of migrant struggles in Europe, recent forms of Black-Palestinian solidarity, and 
a critical comparison of the anti-apartheid and BDS movements, I have argued that the 
struggle against racial capitalism must be national as well as international, local as well 
as global. My argument stands in direct contrast to dominant discourses that typically 
6 W. E. B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America 1860-1880 (Simon and Schuster, 1999), 358.
7 Du Bois, 650.
8 George Lipsitz, “Abolition Democracy and Global Justice,” Comparative American Studies An  
International Journal 2, no. 3 (August 1, 2004): 279, https://doi.org/10.1177/1477570004047906.
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frame  the  struggles  of  migrants,  Indigenous  peoples,  Blacks,  women,  and  other 
minorities through the lens of recognition and identity politics—and, thus, as devoid of 
economic content.9 As thinkers in the Black Radical Tradition have long argued, it is a 
mistake to write off such struggles as non-class, identity based mobilisations, confined 
to a certain time and place—something that the Patriots and the Panthers recognised in 
1969 when they set up the Rainbow Coalition, and which activists in Ferguson, Cape 
Town, Palestine, and the borderlands of Europe embrace when they make connections 
between their struggles.  The struggles that I have analysed  might appear distinct and 
unrelated but are, in fact, mutually constitutive and interlocking, different fronts of the 
same  war  against  “the  matrix  of  racialised  empire  and  neoliberal  capital.”10 Where 
hegemonic discourses insist on individualising struggles, my analysis thus reveals the 
importance of seeing them as part of a larger global framework. This does not mean that 
all  place-based  struggles  should  be  unified  and  assembled  into  a  coherent  and 
homogeneous whole. Instead it points to the importance of understanding various local 
struggles against  racism, gender subordination,  settler  colonialism, and capitalism as 
part of a global network carrying difference with a common cause; what the Panthers 
and the Patriots imagined as a “rainbow coalition” and Hardt and Negri describe as the 
multitude.  In contrast to cosmopolitan visions—which typically unfold from  abstract 
visions of a universal community of humankind—such an internationalism is inherently 
oppositional and centre-stages the struggle against racial capitalism, including the way 
in  which  it  depends  on  gender  subordination, border-making  practices,  ongoing 
primitive  accumulation,  the  production  of  surplus  populations,  and  the  growth of  a 
global “security archipelago.”11 
That  such  an  internationalist  imaginary  is  both  powerful  and  possible  is 
something that Jayaben Desai and her fellow strikers understood when they assembled 
at the picket line at Grunwick in 1976. In our contemporary era of Trump, Brexit, global 
sweatshops,  mass  migration,  environmental  catastrophes,  #metoo, racialized  police 
violence, and racist populism—where political elites and mainstream media continue to 
separate  the interests of “material” class from “ideational” race, pitting  white workers 
against  racialized  outsiders—such “a  poetry  of  the  future”12 is  not  only  politically 
9 For a classic formulation, see Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism, ed. 
Charles Taylor (Princeton University Press, 1994).
10 Harsha Walia, Undoing Border Imperialism (AK Press, 2014), 75.
11 Paul Amar, The Security Archipelago: Human-Security States, Sexuality Politics, and the End of  
Neoliberalism (Duke University Press, 2013).
12 Karl Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (ReadHowYouWant.com, 2006), 6.
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explosive. It is also urgently needed.
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